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Abstract 
Police corruption networks, hidden within the police organisation, rely on a core set of 
relationships reinforced by an embedded police culture of exclusivity and silence. The opaque 
nature of these networks, coupled with the norms that support the hidden goals and agendas of 
corrupt police officers, provides a firm foundation for corruption to prosper and flourish. 
Previous research has demonstrated that police corruption cannot be explained by a few ‘bad 
apples’, instead prior studies show that corrupt police officers collaborate and collude together 
to operate effectively and remain hidden within the broader police organisation (Fitzgerald, 
1989; Lauchs, Keast, & Chamberlain, 2012; Lauchs, Keast, & Le, 2011; Lauchs, Keast, & 
Yousefpour, 2011; Wood, 1997). Additionally, more recent studies have demonstrated that 
corrupt officers operate within a network structure (i.e., an established pattern of relationships 
and exchanges), which allows officers to gain access to new resources, capabilities, 
opportunities and connections not readily available if these officers engaged in corrupt 
behaviour in isolation (Lauchs et al., 2012; Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011; Lauchs & 
Staines, 2012). As a consequence of this collaboration, secrecy, loyalty, trust and reputation 
are significant elements that bond officers together, allowing them to operate covertly. 
Accordingly, because of this gap in the literature, the current research aimed to investigate why 
police officers engage in corruption, the role of trust in facilitating and bonding officers 
together to allow them to participate in large-scale or serious corruption, and the network 
structures that result from these relationships.  
Given the intent of the study is to investigate the complexities and characteristics of police 
corruption, a single embedded case study design was chosen to present a unique and focused 
investigation around this phenomenon. Documentary and social network analysis were used to 
examine the structures of these networks, as well as to provide an in-depth investigation of the 
factors that aid the operation of these police corruption networks. The overall findings of the 
study reveal that officers collaborated and operated under a network structure reinforced by a 
subculture of unwritten rules, codes and acceptance by senior officers. This network was found 
to be dynamic, shifting in structure, membership and activity, but remained highly clustered 
and cohesive around a few core actors in the network. Additionally, the corruption network 
operated on relationships based on collaborations of trust. Officers used trustworthiness 
attributes, personal experience and third party information to assess whether a fellow officer 
was trustworthy enough to be a member of the corruption network, which resulted in a 
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‘pipeline’ of trust. This pipeline of trust was essential for the development and daily functioning 
of the network, because it allowed members involved to operate with more confidence knowing 
that fellow members could be trusted to keep the corrupt activities hidden. 
As a result of the findings of this thesis, significant contributions are made to the existing 
knowledge of police corruption, the networks these corrupt officers operate in, and the role of 
trust in facilitating and maintaining corrupt exchanges. Furthermore, the findings from this 
thesis provide police administrators with a deeper understanding of the nature of police 
corruption and will help them to make more informed policy decisions, as well as identify 
effective disruptive strategies to combat these dark networks. 
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Chapter One  
Background and Problem Definition 
Introduction 
Corruption. This single word can provoke a wide spectrum of emotions, opinions and proposals 
for action. Corruption, defined as the unlawful or wrongful misuse of influence, power, roles 
or resources to procure personal benefit (Johnston, 2005; Krancher, Riley, & Wells, 2010, p. 
4; Kurer, 2005), is among one of the world’s oldest practices and occurs at all levels of society. 
Corruption can manifest in a number of forms, such as money laundering, extortion, drug 
trafficking, falsifying evidence and bribery. Although corruption is widespread and comes in a 
number of forms it is difficult to provide an exact figure regarding its cost. Some reports and 
studies have attempted to place a dollar amount on the cost of corruption, but these figures are 
likely to be modest because of its covert and secretive nature. One of the most cited and 
influential figures regarding the cost of corruption comes from Daniel Kaufmann’s (2005) 
study that used the World Bank’s enterprise surveys, the World Economic Forum global 
competitiveness surveys, the World Development Indicators and household surveys to estimate 
the cost of corruption. Kaufman (2005, p. 96) suggests that the cost of corruption is between 
US$600 billion and US$1.5 billion. Using bribery as a measure of corruption, similar figures 
presented by the World Bank estimates that the cost of bribery worldwide is about US$1 trillion 
(Holder, 2010; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 2014).  
Corruption has no barriers or boundaries and is therefore not restricted to a particular country 
or region. Corruption scandals have toppled governments in both developed countries and 
developing countries. A widely-used corruption index is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
(2012), produced by Berlin-based Transparency International (TI), which scores countries on 
a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). Using this index, TI reported in 2012 that 
two-thirds of countries scored below 50 on the corruption scale, indicating that there is a serious 
corruption problem worldwide (TI, 2012). As one would expect, the highest scores of 
corruption are in countries plagued by conflict and poverty (such as Sudan, Somalia and North 
Korea) (TI, 2012). The main difference between countries that score high or low on the CPI is 
the acceptability and visibility of corruption within that country. In countries with high CPI 
scores, indicating the magnitude of corruption in that particular country, corruption is more 
prevalent because it is more visible and is an acceptable practice of daily personal and 
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organisational functioning. For example, in these countries, offering and accepting bribes may 
be normal and in some cases a requirement to operate efficiently and be competitive in business 
(such as paying bribes to public officials to win public tenders or paying bribes to speed up 
government processes or influence policy). On the other hand, in countries that score low on 
the CPI, corruption is invisible and the individuals involved place more emphasis on hiding 
these activities. Corruption needs to remain hidden and covert because these societies view this 
type of behaviour as unacceptable and, if caught engaging in a corrupt manner, the individual 
will be heavily sanctioned and in more severe cases prosecuted in court. As a consequence of 
hiding corrupt activities, it is unclear how prevalent corruption is in countries with low CPI 
scores and it is therefore hard to estimate the actual extent of corruption within these countries 
and worldwide. 
Despite the uncertainty around the true cost of corruption, corruption in itself is one of the 
biggest handicaps that societies can face because of its medium- and long-term impacts (Leona, 
Aranaab, & de Leona, 2013, p. 3863). Numerous studies report that corruption is systemic and 
has immense costs for a country’s economic development, individuals, organisations and 
perceptions held by the general public (Independent Broad-Based Anti-Corruption 
Commission [IBAC], 2014; Runde, Hameed, & Magpile, 2014; Schwab, 2013). Corruption 
holds back countries’ economic development (especially for developing countries) and erodes 
the quality of life for citizens. In 2011 the Control Risk Group estimated that developing 
countries were victims to US$1 trillion in “fraud, corruption and shady business transactions” 
(Schwab, 2013, p. 33), which is an increase of 13.7 per cent from 2010 (Runde et al., 2014, p. 
1). Individuals convicted of engaging in corrupt activities face penalties of varying degrees of 
harshness, including repaying finances and serving prison sentences, and can experience a loss 
of reputation that has detrimental effects on relationships and future employment (IBAC, 
2014). Organisations convicted of corruption damage their reputation, which can significantly 
impact their long-term survival. In addition to the huge financial losses these organisations 
face, they also incur human capital costs, such as a loss of morale amongst employees, 
shareholders and stakeholders in the company (Kochan & Goodyear, 2011). As a further 
consequence, society loses trust in institutions, such as the judicial or political system, that can 
contribute to a crisis of confidence in public corporations. This loss of trust is supported in the 
literature by a number of studies that find evidence to support that corruption has a negative 
influence on public trust (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; La Porta, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997; 
Richey, 2010; Rothstein & Eek, 2009). Moreover, the loss of trust in institutions is heightened 
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when the trust violation involves police officers, as it impacts on their legitimacy and 
undermines the rule of law, restricting their ability to serve and protect society in an effective 
and productive manner.  
Impact and Challenges of Police Corruption  
Police corruption is similar to corruption in general, as it also involves the “illegal use of power 
for personal gain” (Gerber & Mendelson, 2008, p. 2). The difference is that ‘police corruption’ 
is used exclusively to refer to the unethical behaviour and activities committed on- and off-
duty by an individual, a group of officers or entire police organisations (Crowder & Turvey, 
2014). Under section 15 of Queensland Crime and Corruption Act (2001), an officer can be 
classified as engaging in corrupt conduct when their conduct: 
(a) adversely affects, or could adversely affect, directly or indirectly, the 
performance of functions or the exercise of powers of – (i) a unit of public 
administration; or (ii) a person holding an appointment; and 
(b) results, or could result, directly or indirectly, in the performance of functions or 
the exercise of powers mentioned in paragraph (a) in a way that – (i) is not honest 
or is not impartial; or (ii) involves a breach of the trust placed in a person holding 
an appointment either knowingly or recklessly; or (iii) involves a misuse of 
information or material acquired in or in connection with the performance of 
functions or the exercise of powers of a person holding an appointment; and 
(c) is engaged in for the purpose of providing a benefit to the person or another 
person or causing a detriment to another person; and 
(d) would, if proved, be – (i) a criminal offence; or (ii) a disciplinary breach 
providing reasonable grounds for terminating the person’s services if the person is 
or were the holder of an appointment. (Crime and Corruption Commission [CCC], 
2015) 
Examples of corrupt conduct activities can range in severity from corruption of authority (e.g. 
accepting a free coffee) to direct criminal activities (e.g. crimes against a person or property for 
personal gain) (Roebuck & Barker, 1974). ‘Police misconduct’ is another term that is often 
interchanged with police corruption; this occurs when an officer’s conduct is “disgraceful, 
improper or unbecoming … or shows unfitness to be or continue as a police officer, or does not 
meet the standard the community reasonably expects of a police officer” (CCC, 2015). 
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Examples of police misconduct may include sleeping on the job, responding slowly to a 
citizen’s call, or presenting expressions of racism. The main difference between these terms 
comes down to the severity and nature of the unethical behaviour that the officer demonstrates. 
In other words, police misconduct is used to describe minor occupational deviance that breaks 
departmental procedures and tends to lead to internal disciplinary actions, while police 
corruption is used to describe serious breaches in authority that can lead to criminal 
prosecutions.  
Parallel to corruption in general, police corruption also incurs enormous costs. In the United 
States (US), police corruption cases cost the taxpayers millions of dollars every year. For 
example, police misconduct complaints accounted for 15 per cent of all cases brought against 
the City of Chicago in 2014 (Schroedter, 2016). As a result, the City of Chicago, between 2003 
and 2012, paid US$63 million in settlements, this is an average of US$7 million per year. Over 
the past two years the city has spent US$106 million on police misconduct and US$642 million 
over the previous 12 years (Schroedter, 2016). Similarly, Philadelphia taxpayers paid US$40 
million to settle 584 of the 1,223 police misconduct lawsuits filed against its department since 
January 2009 (Asa, 2016). In Australia, the costs of inquiries and investigations are not as 
financially high; however, this does not suggest that police corruption in Australia is any less 
important than police corruption in other countries. The roots of the difference may lie in the 
disparate levels of integrity rather than being purely based on contrasting the contexts of 
policing between these two countries.  
In addition to the enormous cost incurred from investigations into police corruption, scandals 
not only impact the perceptions of police but can affect how the public view the entire criminal 
justice system (Barker & Carter, 1991, p. 3). In other words, cases of police corruption can 
decrease the public’s trust in the police, which can cause a deterioration in relations between 
citizens and officers and, as a result, reduce the effectiveness of policing in a community 
(Weitzer & Tuch, 2004; Wortley, Hagan, & Macmillan, 1997). Without the public's 
involvement police efforts in fighting crime are severely hampered. The ability for the police 
to enforce the law is contingent on the public’s “satisfaction with, confidence in, and trust of 
legal authorities” (Tyler, 1984, p. 51). As Porter and Prenzler (2012) note, this is “particularly 
damaging in the present environment of terrorist attacks, with the increased police powers 
under new counterterrorism legislation that engender added risks for suspects who may be held 
without charge and subject to investigative misconduct” (p.8). This unwillingness to report 
possible deviant or criminal acts by members of the public further aid the activities and actions 
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of these criminal groups by allowing them to continue to operate and grow within society 
(Porter & Prenzler, 2012).   
Additionally, findings of police corruption are perceived almost exclusively as detrimental 
signs of a public organisation’s lack of integrity (Ivkovic, 2003, p. 597) and police officers, as 
well as other civil servants, may have a strong reluctance to discuss corruption in their 
organisation. In an effort to keep the scandal out of the media police administrators and other 
stakeholders might use a number of tactics to minimise the effect it can have on the police 
organisation. These techniques can include sweeping the corruption under the rug, denying its 
existence for as long as possible or only accusing particular individuals publicly (Punch, 2009). 
By accusing only a few individuals it signals to the public that there are only a few ‘bad apples’, 
rather than indicating that the problem is more systemic throughout the whole police 
organisation. However, when police corruption is uncovered it does not reveal a few bad 
apples, but instead shows that corrupt officers often work together with other like-minded 
officers (Lauchs et al., 2012; Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011; Wood, 1997).  
Collaborations and Protection among Corrupt Officers 
Findings from previous investigations and Royal Commissions have revealed that corrupt 
officers collaborate to engage in serious corruption (Fitzgerald, 1989; Wood, 1995). It is 
through these collaborations that officers are presented with new resources, capabilities, 
opportunities and connections that would not be available if these officers engaged in corrupt 
behaviour in isolation. Examples of collaboration between corrupt officers are demonstrated 
through the Fitzgerald (1989), Wood (1995) and Kennedy (2004) inquiries.  
The Fitzgerald Inquiry (also known as the ‘Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal 
Activities and Associated Police Misconduct’) (1987–1989) investigated corruption in the 
Queensland Police Force (QPF) and found that corruption spanned across all levels of the 
police organisation (e.g. the Police Commissioner, Terence Lewis, was convicted and jailed 
for corruption). Similarly, Jack Herbert, a Qld detective (also known as ‘the bagman’), was 
found guilty of collecting bribes for the Police Commissioner. The Fitzgerald Inquiry was 
followed by the Wood Inquiry (also known as the ‘Royal Commission into the New South 
Wales Police’) that investigated police corruption in New South Wales (NSW) from 1994 to 
1997. Justice James Wood, the Royal Commissioner, confirmed that there were significant 
levels of corruption among NSW Police which included: high-level organised protection, 
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fabrication of evidence, assaults on suspects, extensive fraud and serious neglect by officers 
(including protecting paedophiles) (Wood, 1997). Most recently, the Kennedy Inquiry (also 
known as the ‘Royal Commission into whether there has been corrupt or criminal conduct by 
any Western Australian Police Officer’) investigated whether police in Western Australia had 
engaged in corrupt or criminal activities and also found similar findings of police corruption 
(Kennedy, 2004). Even though the findings are decades apart, they reveal a continued pattern 
of corrupt behaviour among Australian police officers.  
Although these Royal Commissions and investigations have uncovered a number of key 
individuals and exposed the type and nature of corruption, obtaining information of police 
corruption is a highly challenging task. As the findings of these inquiries revealed, officers are 
bonded together and rely on trust, secrecy and the strength of the ‘Brotherhood’ to keep the 
corrupt activities hidden. The police Brotherhood, demonstrated by strong bonds of loyalty, 
can aid and provide a sound basis for corruption to flourish within the police organisation 
(Punch, 2009; Skolnick, 2002). This Brotherhood is so strong that officers are willing to lie or 
commit perjury to protect the conduct of fellow officers. This type of behaviour is not isolated 
to individuals who are active participants in corrupt activities, but is also displayed by officers 
outside the corruption network who choose to protect these officers by turning a blind eye, not 
reporting this deviant behaviour to police administrators or falsifying evidence to ensure the 
protection of these officers from convictions. This type of secrecy is described in the literature 
as the ‘code of silence’, which is also known as the ‘blue wall of silence’ (Knapp, 1972; Mollen, 
1994; Skolnick, 2002; Wolfe & Piquero, 2011). This code not only protects officers within the 
corruption network but also impacts an officer’s willingness to report misconduct by their 
fellow officers.  
This point is demonstrated in Fabrizio’s (1990) survey of attendees at the FBI National 
Academy, which asked experienced police officers and supervisors from a number of agencies 
across the US to provide “specific examples of graft or corruption in [their] department, without 
revealing names or places, and what [they] think could have been done to prevent it” (p. 39). 
Fabrizio found that, out of the 49 respondents, none of the officers provided an answer to this 
question. The low response rate highlights the strength of the code of silence and officers’ 
unwillingness to disclose personal encounters with police corruption. The reluctance to expose 
a fellow officer’s corruption can be a result of the negative consequences of reporting this type 
of behaviour; as the Wood Inquiry found, officers who go against the code and reveal corrupt 
conduct of fellow officers are ostracised and no longer considered a member of the 
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Brotherhood (Wood, 1995). Whistleblowing often results in the resignation of officers or forces 
officers to change careers because they are no longer a trusted member of the policing 
community (Wood, 1995). Thus, the opaque nature of these networks, coupled with the norms 
that support hidden goals and agendas, and the reluctance to identify corrupt behaviour among 
other officers, not only provide a firm foundation for corruption to flourish (Granovetter, 1973; 
Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011) but also make it extremely hard to uncover this type of 
behaviour. 
Access to Reliable Data 
When considering the detrimental effects and consequences of police corruption the factors 
that influence officers to become involved in corrupt practices and the factors that affect their 
continued participation can provide police administrators with crucial insights to help minimise 
and control this behaviour. However, a review of the literature reveals that much of the extant 
literature on police corruption relies upon concepts and theoretical frameworks rather than 
empirical studies. The possible reasons for this shortage of empirical studies are the nature of 
the topic and the difficulty for researchers to obtain data. As Kane (2007) notes, obtaining 
police data is difficult on two fundamental levels. First, official data on corruption are mostly 
recorded about the anticorruption measures and activities, rather than on the rate or level of 
corruption (Kane, 2007). Second, police departments can be apprehensive regarding the release 
of this information to the public because it can have an adverse impact on the whole policing 
organisation (Kane, 2007).  Researchers are, therefore, restricted by the data available, which 
can impact on research considerations such as the type of research conducted, research 
approach and methodology, and types of data analysis. To further complicate the situation, 
more often than not, the specific details of these cases are protected under privacy and 
protection laws that further hamper a researcher’s ability to access this data. This is why the 
majority of research into police corruption is based on data collected from American cases— 
many of these cases are publicly available, as opposed to in Australia where cases that 
investigate police corruption are not commonly available. 
Within Australia, one vital source of data that previous research has relied on is transcripts 
from major inquiries and Royal Commissions. Royal Commissions are major, ad-hoc public 
inquiries, set up to gather and report findings to the government regarding a defined issue 
(McDonnell, 1999). Royal Commissions result in recommendations and the publication of a 
comprehensive report derived from the court hearings. In Qld and NSW, Royal Commissions 
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have investigated police corruption using the powers of the Royal Commissioner to defeat the 
protective systems (e.g. code of silence, Brotherhood, tainted investigations unit) that corrupt 
police officers might use to shield themselves from conventional investigations.  
To further complicate the situation, the scope and depth of the inquiries can have an impact on 
accessing full and accurate data. For example, although these inquiries have uncovered 
examples of police corruption and have identified a number of key individuals, it is unclear 
whether these inquiries were able to uncover all individuals involved in the corrupt practices. 
Consequently, the data used from these inquiries are imperfect, thus hindering the 
generalisability of findings. It is for these reasons that investigating police corruption is 
extremely challenging for researchers. 
Research Questions and Rationale 
When considering the detrimental effects and consequences of police corruption a 
comprehensive understanding of the nature of the problem is needed and is essential for 
minimising and controlling this type of behaviour. Yet, a review of the literature reveals that 
research into police corruption is limited and under-researched. Moreover, the majority of the 
extant literature on police corruption relies upon concepts and theoretical frameworks rather 
than empirical studies. For these reasons, the aim of this thesis is to add to the literature by 
providing insightful empirical findings to complement and improve the existing theoretical 
frameworks. This thesis also seeks to uncover the patterns of corrupt behaviour among police 
officers to assist police administrators to develop effective screening programs and strategies 
that can be used to disrupt the formation and continued functioning of police corruption 
networks. Accordingly, this section outlines the four key research questions that were derived 
from the gaps identified in the literature.  
Research Question One 
A review of the police corruption and social science literature revealed a number of reasons 
that motivate officers to engage and continue to engage in corrupt behaviour. Previous studies 
suggest that officers participate in these corrupt behaviours because of personal agency (e.g. 
individual characteristics, such as personality or education) and structural (e.g. institutional 
characteristics, such as culture and norms) reasons. Studies that focuses on personal agency 
factors have examined the links between personality (Girodo, 1991; Muir, 1977; Toch, 1996), 
rank (Hickman, Piquero, & Piquero, 2004), career histories (Cohen & Chiaken, 1972, 1973), 
24 
 
education (Kane & White, 2009; Lersch & Kunzman, 2001) and general forms of misconduct 
(Mollen, 1994) to explain why officers participate in corruption. Other researchers have 
focused their investigations around structural/institutional factors such as culture (Palmer, 
2012; Punch, 2009), including the impact of the Brotherhood and code of silence (Kutnjak 
Ivkovic, 2002; Skolnick, 2002), and overall organisational structure of the police force (Wood, 
1997) to explain why officers engage in corrupt behaviour. Although factors of influence, such 
as individual (personal) or institutional (or a combination of both) factors, have been explored 
in criminal networks there are a limited number of studies that have investigated the dialectic 
relationship between institutional and individual characteristics within police corruption 
networks. Furthermore, there are even fewer studies that have empirically investigated the 
interplay of these variables in the context of police corruption networks. This study plans to 
add to the police corruption literature by providing a deeper understanding concerning the 
nature of these factors. This has led to the following research question: 
RQ1: What factors influence police officers to join corruption networks and continue to 
participate in serious corruption? 
Research Question Two 
Within the criminology literature it is well established that the structure of organised crime 
groups plays a huge part in the criminal operations. Previous studies have uncovered that 
particularly organised crime groups operate through different network structures. For example, 
research on the Mafia has found that they are organised around kinship and/or patronage 
relationships (Agreste, Catanese, De Meo, Ferrara, & Fiumara, 2015; Albini, 1971; Ianni, 
1972). Other organised crime networks have been found to be structured around roles and key 
players within the network (Bruinsma & Bernasco, 2004; Kleemans, 2008; Morselli, 2001). 
Studies into police corruption have also found that officers operate in a network structure 
(Lauchs et al., 2012; Lauchs, Keast, & Le, 2011; Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011); 
however, these studies are few and far between. The current study seeks to contribute to the 
knowledge in this field by further providing more empirical evidence regarding the network 
structures police corruption operations exhibit. These insights into the structure of the network 
will help police administrators to understand the resilience of these networks. This research 
gap has led to the following research question: 
RQ2a: How are police corruption networks structured? 
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Building on this research question, this study also aims to investigate the dynamic nature of 
police corruption networks. Like many forms of social relations, networks are cited in the 
literature among many scholars to be flexible, adaptive and to change over time (Bright & 
Delaney, 2013; Morselli, Giguère, & Petit, 2007; Williams, 2001b). The fluid nature of 
criminal networks allows for a host of advantages, including resilience, wide-scale recruitment 
and flexibility to adapt to changes in the environment (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones, 2008, p. 
8). Scholars have noted that membership in criminal networks, such as terrorist or drug 
networks are adaptable, whereby individuals join and leave based on particular needs or 
situations that can arise out of a consequence of opportunities that arise (Williams, 2001a). As 
a consequence, the network may modify their structure and membership to gain necessary 
resources, skills and knowledge so that the network’s operations remain hidden. However, 
longitudinal data is extremely hard to come by, especially regarding criminal networks. As a 
result, few studies have investigated the dynamic nature of criminal networks. In particular, 
previous studies have focused on investigating the dynamic nature of specific criminal 
enterprises, such as the small arms trade (Malm & Bichler, 2011) and terrorist networks 
(Everton & Cunningham, 2013; Xu, Hu, & Chen, 2009). To date, there are no empirical studies 
that investigate the dynamic nature of police corruption networks. Therefore, this current study 
plans to address this gap by being the first study to uncover the dynamic structure of police 
corruption networks. This gap in the literature has led to the following research question: 
RQ2b: Do police corruption networks change over time? 
Research Question Three 
Previous research has explored the operations within a number of different criminal networks, 
for example drug trafficking networks (Morselli, 2001, 2003), terrorist networks (Krebs, 2001), 
transnational illegal networks (Bruinsma & Bernasco, 2004), Mafia networks (Agreste et al., 
2015; Cayli, 2010; Paoli, 2003), organised crime networks (Le & Lauchs, 2013; Levi, 2008) 
and police corruption networks (Lauchs et al., 2012; Lauchs, Keast, & Le, 2011; Lauchs, Keast, 
& Yousefpour, 2011). Research into these networks has found that each of these networks 
displays unique characteristics that enable them to operate covertly. For example, previous 
research on drug syndicates shows that individuals involved in the manufacture and distribution 
have specific roles, such as suppliers, cooks and dealers, and each serves a specific purpose in 
the network’s operations (McKetin, McLaren, & Kelly, 2005; Schloengardt, 2007). Studies on 
terrorist networks have revealed that these networks function in a hybrid space, where activities 
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in geographic and social spaces are necessary for operation and security (Medina & Hepner, 
2011, p. 577). Additionally, research on Mafia-like organisations has shown that these 
networks carry out countless kinds of criminal activities and are characterised by utilising a 
series of resources, such as violence, intimidation, reputation and acquaintance networks 
(Gambetta, 1993). Likewise, studies on police corruption networks also reveal that corrupt 
police engage in a number of different activities, such as greenlighting, extortion, verbals and 
theft, and can operate because of the exclusivity, culture and code of silence (Chan, 1999; 
Porter & Warrender, 2009; Punch, 2009).  
Despite these findings there have been few studies that have investigated the specific tactics 
and techniques used by corrupt police officers. Furthermore, there have been even fewer studies 
that have researched police corruption within an Australian context. Uncovering the unique 
components that allow these networks to operate is important to understand because it will 
assist integrity agencies to detect these networks early in development. This study will, 
therefore, address the third research question: 
RQ3: How do police corruption networks operate? 
Research Question Four 
Trust is a vital component in organised crime networks (Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011; 
Morselli, 2001). Previous studies have highlighted the benefits of trust for a criminal 
organisation and often refer to it as a lubricant or glue that holds criminal networks together 
(Fukuyama, 1995; Gambetta, 1993; Hardin, 2002; von Lampe & Ole Johansen, 2004). Trust 
also fosters and maintains cooperation (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; Tsai & 
Ghoshal, 1998), reduces risk and provides a sense of security (Lane, 1998). For police 
corruption networks to operate successfully within the police force they rely on trust, secrecy 
and well-hidden operations (Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011). The opaque nature of these 
networks, coupled with the norms that support hidden goals and agendas, can provide a firm 
foundation for corruption to flourish (Granovetter, 1973; Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011). 
Although there are previous studies that discuss reputation and trust within a criminal network 
there are limited empirical studies that focus on investigating the role of trust in these covert 
networks. This study seeks to contribute to the knowledge in this field by further providing 
more empirical evidence regarding the role of trust in police corruption networks. Also, this 
study aims to gain a better understanding of how corrupt officers determine an officer’s 
trustworthiness. This gap in the literature has led to the following research question: 
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RQ4: How do members of police corruption networks determine a person’s trustworthiness? 
Research Approach 
Given the above theoretical paradigms, at an epistemological level, the current study is located 
within the constructivist/interpretive paradigm as the overall aim of the research is to 
understand and reconstruct. At an ontological level this research adopts a relativist approach, 
which assumes that reality as we know it is constructed inter-subjectively through the meanings 
and understandings developed socially and experientially (Denzin & Lincoln, 2013). It will 
endeavour to achieve this through reconstructing the realities from the testimonies given 
outlined in the transcripts from Operation Florida. The methodology is hermeneutical in nature 
(Seebohm, 2004), encompassing the interpretation of the text (document analysis) and a social 
network analysis (network mapping). 
In line with the constructivist/interpretive paradigm the current research aims to answer the 
research questions by taking a mixed-methods approach. As Rich and Ginsburg (1999) 
observe, qualitative methods are ideally suited to answering “how” and “why” questions. A 
qualitative approach will allow for the acquiring of rich, insightful knowledge into studying 
human behaviours, specifically assisting in the understanding of a particular phenomenon and 
the interactions between behaviours (Maxwell, 1998). In addition, a quantitative approach was 
also integrated to gain a further understanding in identifying relationship variables.  
Incorporating a quantitative approach not only enhanced the research project’s validity and 
reliability but also assisted in identifying key structural properties of police corruption 
networks. The key relationship variables are used to compare the structural properties of the 
police corruption networks over time. 
Case Study Identification and Justification 
As access to data in Australia is limited, NSW was chosen as the geographical area for 
investigation because it had more publicly available data than any other state.  After a review 
of the available cases, Operation Florida was chosen because, unlike some of the other 
investigations listed above that only involved a few individuals, it involved several police from 
different positions and levels within the police organisation, and operated covertly within a 
network structure. In addition to these unique qualities, Operation Florida is embedded with 
multiple case studies within the major investigation. This single embedded case study provides 
a unique investigation into the complexities and dynamic nature of police corruption. The 
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embedded case study will also provide a base for comparison and will help strengthen the 
contributions of this thesis.  
Operation Florida was a covert investigation into the NSW Police from 1999–2001. In total, 
the investigation identified 418 incidents of police corruption and misconduct from a number 
of different commands within the NSW Police and spanned a period dating from the late 1980s 
to 2001 (Griffin, 2004). Fifty-six of those incidents were the subject of examination in the 
hearings. A public hearing took place over 14 months (or 78 days), where seven separate 
segments (Northern Beaches, Guns, Let’s Dance, Letters of Assistance, Newport, Magnum, 
Kings and O’Toole Segments) of evidence were presented (Griffin, 2004). A total of 99 
witnesses gave evidence in the public proceedings: 32 were serving NSW police officers, 31 
were former officers, and 36 were citizens (Griffin, 2004). Evidence presented at the hearing 
revealed an extensive range of corrupt activities by NSW Police, which included: soliciting 
and receiving bribes from drug dealers, organising or ‘green-lighting’ (e.g. allowing drug 
dealers to continue) drug trafficking, opportunistic theft (e.g. stealing cash and property during 
a search), reducing charges in return for payment, perverting the course of justice, assaulting 
suspects, ‘verballing’ suspects (e.g. creating false statements), ‘loading’ suspects (e.g. planting 
evidence), organising or green-lighting break-and-enter offences (Griffin, 2004, p. i). A total 
of 14 of the 32 serving officers voluntarily left the NSW Police, with 11 of these officers 
leaving the police force as a direct consequence of the inquiry (Griffin, 2004). 
Research Contributions 
Research on criminal networks is well established in the criminology literature but has received 
minimal consideration from a social network theoretical approach, and few studies have done 
so on an empirical basis (Moran, 2005; Morselli & Tremblay, 2004). Accordingly, this thesis 
makes numerous theoretical and practical contributions. 
Firstly, this study draws on actual official enquiries and data on police corruption. Existing 
research tends to rely on secondary sources or make sweeping statements without studying the 
detail of corrupt activity within networks (Caldero & Crank, 2011; Punch, 2009). The use of 
transcripts from Operation Florida allows the study to uncover strong empirical evidence 
regarding an officer’s career path to corruption (Lauchs et al., 2012; Lauchs, Keast, & 
Yousefpour, 2011; Lauchs & Staines, 2012). It also provides a strong foundation for 
understanding the structural properties of police corruption networks, the operational 
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components that allow them to function covertly and reasons why officers engage and continue 
to participate in these corruption networks. Empirical evidence will provide police 
administrators with a deeper understanding of the nature of police corruption, and this 
information will help them make more informed policy decisions. Without strong empirical 
evidence to confirm or reject existing theoretical frameworks “police administrators are left to 
blindly apply policies that target a ‘significant’ correlate of misconduct with no idea why the 
variable has an impact or, perhaps more importantly, whether the variable even has a logical 
causal relationship with misconduct” (Wolfe & Piquero, 2011, p. 334). Thus, this research 
provides key empirical insights to guide police administrators in understanding the nature of 
police corruption and helps inform their decision-making to minimise the occurrence of 
corruption within the police organisation. 
Secondly, this research is a departure from the existing studies investigating corrupt police in 
that it draws on social network analysis (SNA) to uncover the hidden relationships and 
characteristics of police corruption networks. Uncovering the corrupt exchanges between 
individuals in the network will provide a better understanding of the nature and structure of 
these corruption networks. The insights gained from this study will help police administrators 
and intelligence agencies better understand the structures of these corruption networks so that 
they can be more informed in addressing disruption strategies. In particular, this study identifies 
the positions and connections of key players in the network, which will assist these agencies in 
understanding the resilience of these networks. More specifically, it provides key insights into 
whether the removal of key players (e.g. the centrality of corrupt officers in a network) is 
enough to disrupt the future operations of the network. 
Thirdly, few studies provide a comprehensive investigation into the dynamic nature of social 
networks. There are even fewer studies that have empirically studied the dynamic nature of 
criminal networks. Furthermore, there are no studies to date that have investigated the dynamic 
nature of police corruption networks. Therefore, this study addresses this gap by providing the 
first empirical investigation into the dynamic structure of police corruption networks. 
Uncovering the changes in the police corruption network not only identifies and describes the 
evolution of these networks, but also provides an in-depth contextual understanding based on 
empirical findings. In addition to adding key insights to the police corruption literature, the 
findings can also be used as a basis for comparison between other studies investigating the 
dynamic nature of criminal networks. These insights can further the understanding of 
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successful tools and mechanisms that can be adopted to combat these illegal networks from 
operating over time, reducing their resilience. 
Fourth, as previously highlighted, trust is acknowledged as a critical component in the 
functioning and operations of criminal networks. Despite the emphasis placed on trust within 
these criminal networks this gap in the literature has received little attention (Gambetta, 1988; 
von Lampe & Ole Johansen, 2004). There also remains a gap in the police corruption literature 
in relation to studies that theoretically and empirically investigate trust in police corruption 
networks. This current study will therefore help bridge this gap in the literature by providing 
critical insights into the role of trust in police corruption networks. These insights will help 
integrity agencies better understand the connections formed between corrupt officers and 
whether the removal of trust has any bearing on the formation and continued operations of 
these networks.  
Chapter Summary and Overview of Thesis 
This chapter has identified and defined corruption in general and police corruption in particular. 
The current issues and impact of police corruption were described to provide an overview of 
the shortcomings in the understanding of knowledge in this field. This chapter has identified 
that there are numerous gaps in the knowledge of police corruption. Specifically, few studies 
empirically investigate police corruption, particularly the reasons behind an officer’s choice to 
engage and continue to engage in it. There are also unanswered questions regarding how police 
corruption networks are structured and their evolution over time, and the role trust plays in the 
functioning and membership of these networks. As a result of these gaps in the literature the 
chapter has justified and identified the key research questions this study will address. The 
chapter has also provided an overview of the theoretical and practical contributions of the 
current research project. 
The remaining chapters are organised as follows. Chapters Two and Three review the relevant 
literature on police corruption, networks and trust respectively. The review encapsulates a 
discussion on the characteristics of police corruption, SNA and studies that link networks, trust 
and police corruption. Specifically, the review highlights previous studies on police corruption 
and provides an overview of the relevant theoretical frameworks and models. The literature 
review also highlights relevant literature regarding dark networks, drawing upon studies in the 
organised crime literature as there are few studies that empirically investigate police corruption 
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networks. Additionally, it highlights the dimensions of trust, including its antecedents, process 
of trust and how these are associated with police corruption networks. 
Chapter Four contextualises the study by providing an overview of police corruption in 
Australia and provides a detailed description of the chosen case study. The specific details of 
Operation Florida are described, in particular the different segments of the case and key 
individuals involved in the corruption network. A summary of the accusations and outcome of 
the trial, including the charges of all affected actors, is also presented. 
Chapter Five details all aspects related to the research approach and method employed in this 
study. The chapter details the rationale behind the strategy adopted, the related data collection 
and coding, as well as the unique analytical tools used. Specifically, the key components of the 
social network and documentary analysis are discussed. 
The results are outlined and considered in relation to the relevant research question, resulting 
in four chapters. Chapter Six addresses the first research question (RQ1): What factors 
influence corrupt police officers to engage and continue to participate in serious corruption? 
Chapter Seven addresses the second research question (RQ2a and RQ2b): How are police 
corruption network structured? and the subset research question, Do police corruption networks 
change over time? Chapter Eight addresses the third research question (RQ3): How do police 
corruption networks operate? Chapter Nine addresses the final research question (RQ4): How 
do members of police corruption networks determine a person’s trustworthiness? Each of the 
results chapters are structured as follows: each chapter provides a brief overview of the gaps in 
the literature, then a summary of the main findings, followed by exemplars derived from an 
analysis of the data. The results chapters conclude with a discussion linking these findings to 
the relevant literature.  
The final chapter (Chapter Ten) concludes with an overview of the key findings in accordance 
with the relevant literature. It also provides a discussion regarding the study’s theoretical and 
practical implications of the study. The chapter also contains a discussion on limitations and 
application to future research. 
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Chapter Two  
Police Corruption Literature Review 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews research from the social science discipline to address the aim of this thesis, 
which is to provide a comprehensive understanding of the nature and dynamics of police 
corruption networks. Within the social science discipline, this thesis draws upon sociology and 
criminology literature to address five key research questions: (1) What factors influence police 
officers to engage and continue to participate in serious corruption? (2a) How are police 
corruption networks structured? (2b) Do police corruption networks change over time? (3) 
How do police corruption networks operate? and (4) How do members of police corruption 
networks determine a person’s trustworthiness? Specifically, the literature review encompasses 
research in the area of police corruption, social networks and trust. Drawing upon these areas 
of research this chapter provides a comprehensive review of the relevant literature needed to 
address the aim of the study. The literature review draws from three sets of literature: police 
corruption, networks and trust. Figure 2.1 provides a visual representation regarding the 
literature drawn upon to address the study’s research questions.  
Figure 2.1: Research Approach to the Literature Review 
 
As the review draws from three sets of literature it is presented in two chapters. The first chapter 
provides a review of police corruption, with Chapter Three discussing networks and trust. The 
current chapter commences with an overview of the key characteristics of police corruption. 
Police 
Corruption
• RQ1: What factors influence police officers to engage and continue to 
participate in serious corruption?
Networks
• RQ2a: How are police corruption networks structured?
• RQ2b: Do police corruption networks change over time?
• RQ3: How do police corruption networks operate?
Trust
• RQ4: How do members of police corruption networks determine a person's 
trustworthiness?
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This section also provides key definitions and a typology of police corruption. Next, the 
literature review discusses the personal agency factors outlined in the literature that impact an 
officer’s choice to engage in deviant behaviour. Structural factors are then discussed, 
specifically the police culture, socialisation and the Brotherhood are presented to gain a better 
understanding of the critical influences that guide police behaviour. The chapter concludes with 
a summary of the literature review. 
What is Police Corruption? 
Corruption can be defined as the unlawful or wrongful misuse of influence, power, roles or 
resources to procure personal benefit (Johnston, 2005; Krancher et al., 2010, p. 4; Kurer, 2005). 
Police corruption is similar, as it also involves the illegal use of power for personal gain (Gerber 
& Mendelson, 2008, p. 2); however, it is also a broad concept incorporating many activities 
and behaviours that can be committed on- and off-duty by an individual or entire police 
organisation (Crowder & Turvey, 2014). Police corruption has been defined a number of 
different ways over the past few decades. For example, Aultman (1976) defines police 
corruption as “a mode of behaviour that is chosen because it will lead to money or other 
personally desirable rewards, and that involved a misuse of the authority of a police officer’s 
occupational role” (p.324). Roebuck and Barker (1974) outline that police corruption is “any 
type of proscribed behavior engaged in by a law enforcement officer who receives or expects 
to receive, by virtue of his official position, an actual or potential unauthorized material reward 
or gain” (p. 118). Punch (2009) defines police corruption in a narrower sense as “an officer 
knowingly doing or not doing something that is against his or her duty for some form of 
financial or material gain or promise of such gains” (p.18). All of the above definitions outline 
that an officer needs to abuse their position of authority for some type of personal gain. For the 
purpose of this research, Hope’s (2016) definition is used as it provides the most complete 
overview of police corruption by merging a number of previous definitions together (Ivkovic, 
2005; Kleinig, 1996; Newburn, 1999; Punch, 2009). Hope defines police corruption as:                                                                                                             
Police corruption is any action or omission, a promise of any action or omission, or 
any attempt of action or omission committed by a police officer or a group of police 
officers, characterized by the police officer’s misuse of the official position and 
motivated in significant part with the achievement of personal/private or 
organizational gain or advantage. (p. 5)  
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As Hope (2016) highlights, this definition goes beyond the ‘usual quid-pro-quo assumption’ 
and allows behaviours such as robbery, extortion and theft to be included under police 
corruption (Hope, 2016, p. 5). Hope’s definition emphasises three key aspects: (1) police 
corruption must be committed by a police officer, (2) they must abuse their position as an 
officer and (3) be motivated by a personal gain or advantage. In other words, an officer is 
classified as a corrupt officer if they abuse their position of power and are driven by some 
personal or organisational gain.  
Police Corruption Typologies 
Roebuck and Barker’s (1974) paper, ‘A topology of police corruption’, is one of the most 
widely cited typologies of police corruption. Their typology analyses police corruption along 
five dimensions: (1) acts and actors involved, (2) norms violated, (3) support from peer group, 
(4) organisational degree of deviant practices and (5) police department's reaction (Roebuck & 
Barker, 1974, p. 427). Based on these dimensions, Table 2.1 identifies and depicts eight 
categories of police corruption. These categories include: (1) corruption of authority, where 
officers receive some form of material gain (e.g. free drinks); (2) kickbacks, such as receipt of 
goods, services or money; (3) opportunistic theft, including stealing from arrestees (‘rolling’), 
(4) shakedowns, such as accepting a bribe for not following through on a criminal violation; 
(5) protection of illegal activities, involving police protection of those engaged in illegal 
activities; (6) the fix, which involves undermining criminal investigations or proceedings (e.g. 
losing traffic tickets); (7) direct criminal activities, such as a police officer commiting a crime 
against a person or property for personal gain in ‘clear violation’ of the norm or criminal law; 
and (8) internal payoffs, including prerogatives available to police officers (holidays, shift 
allocations, promotion) being bought, bartered and sold. 
Table 2.1: Roebuck and Barker (1974) Police Corruption Typology 
Type Dimension Examples 
Corruption of 
Authority 
When an officer receives some form of material 
gain by virtue of their position as a police officer 
without violating the law per se. These are 
violations of departmental regulations but not 
violations of a criminal statute (Roebuck & 
Barker, 1974, p. 428). 
Free drinks, meals, 
services 
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Kickbacks Receipt of goods, services or money for 
referring business to particular individuals or 
companies. Kickbacks violate formal 
departmental norms but are not generally 
defined or acted upon as criminal violations 
(Roebuck & Barker, 1974, p. 429). 
Referring business to 
towing companies, 
garages, lawyers, 
doctors, undertakers, 
taxi-cab driver. 
Opportunistic 
Theft 
Stealing from arrestees (sometimes referred to as 
‘rolling’). Rolled arrestees are generally 
unaware of the act. Sanctions by police 
departments vary from mild disapproval, 
admonitions and warnings, to suspensions, 
dismissals and criminal proceedings (Roebuck 
& Barker, 1974, p. 430). 
Take merchandise or 
money left behind by 
the original thief from 
unprotected property, 
or sites discovered 
during a routine patrol. 
Shakedowns The officer inadvertently witnesses or gains 
knowledge of a criminal violation and violator 
and subsequently accepts a bribe for not making 
an arrest. Publicly exposed officers are usually 
heavily sanctioned, for example dismissed or 
engaged in criminal proceedings (Roebuck & 
Barker, 1974, p. 430). 
Accepting a bribe in 
exchange for not 
making an arrest, filing 
a complaint or 
impounding property. 
Protection of 
Illegal 
Activities 
Police protection of those engaged in illegal 
activities. Regular operation of all the above 
enterprises indicates police collusion with illegal 
operators, and most of these enterprises function 
within criminal organisations. These police 
collusions and conspiracies break both formal 
departmental and criminal norms (Roebuck & 
Barker, 1974, p. 431). 
Protecting illegal drug 
sales, prostitution, 
liquor violations, 
pornography rings or 
after-hours pubs.  
The Fix Two sub-types constitute the fix: (1) the 
quashing of prosecution proceedings following 
the offender's arrest and (2) taking up of traffic 
tickets. The fix violates departmental and 
criminal norms (Roebuck & Barker, 1974, p. 
432). 
Withdraw prosecution 
in return for some 
material reward or 
agrees to dispose of the 
ticket for a fee. 
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Direct 
criminal 
activities 
A police officer commits a crime against a 
person or property for personal gain ‘in clear 
violation of both departmental and criminal 
norms’ (Roebuck & Barker, 1974, p. 433). 
Burglary and robbery, 
selling or distributing 
drugs. 
Internal 
payoffs 
Prerogatives available to police officers are 
bought, bartered and sold. Internal payoffs are 
often highly organised within departments 
engaged in illegal types of corruption (Roebuck 
& Barker, 1974, p. 434). 
Collect fees for 
assigning officers to 
certain divisions, 
precincts, units, details, 
shifts and beats. 
Source: Created from Roebuck and Barker (1974). 
Punch (1985, 2009) suggests a ninth category of police corruption: flaking or padding. This 
category involves the planting of or adding evidence on a suspect to ensure a conviction. As 
argued by Punch, this is particularly evident in drug cases. Additionally, Roebuck and Barker 
(1974) note that officers can display a number of behaviours which will result in the officer 
falling into numerous categories. 
The types of police corruption depicted in Table 2.1 do provide some classification/ 
categorisation of types of police corruption, but do not come without criticism. Roebuck and 
Barker (1974) present these kinds of corrupt behaviours in a hierarchy from least to most 
serious (from rule breaking to lawless behaviour), suggesting that there is a progression 
towards more-serious corruption. Specifically, Roebuck and Barker outline in the first category 
that ‘corruption of authority’, involving the acceptance of gifts, gratuities and rewards, often 
“marks the first conditioning step into other types of corruption” (Roebuck & Barker, 1974, p. 
429). This statement suggests that an officer engaging in minor corruption will ultimately 
engage in more-serious corruption because of this first step. However, there is no evidence to 
suggest that accepting free drinks or meals will condition an officer to be later involved in 
more-serious corrupt behaviours, such as ‘direct criminal activity’. This problem, also known 
as the ‘slippery slope’ argument (Kleinig, 1996) will be revisited later in the chapter.  
Additionally, the ‘seriousness’ or ‘scale’ of corruption is also questionable as it depends on the 
criteria applied to the typology.  For example, the seriousness can depend on dimensions such 
as the behavioural norms of the police organisation or the consequences of the act to the 
individual police officer and the corrupting party (Aultman, 1976). As a result, corruption 
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categories, such as internal payoffs and flaking or padding, can be viewed by some as being 
less serious than direct criminal activity. Also, the typology does not specify whether there is 
a scale of seriousness within each category. For example, under the ‘shakedown’ category, if 
an officer accepts a cash payment from an average citizen it is unclear if this is more serious 
than accepting a cash payment from an individual with a criminal record.   
There has also been further division of corrupt officers identified by the 1972 Knapp 
Commission in New York, in particular ‘meat-eaters’ and ‘grass-eaters’. Meat-eaters are 
proactive, aggressive and actively misuse their authority for personal gain (Knapp, 1972, p. 4). 
For example, these officers will actively approach drug dealers for bribes in turn for protecting 
their distribution from other officers and investigators. Grass-eaters, on the other hand, are less 
proactive, accepting a bribe or payoff only if it happens to cross their path (Knapp, 1972, p. 4). 
These officers may be offered a bribe or payout to reduce a criminal’s charges. They have not 
proactively searched for this bribe; they were simply offered and accepted the bribe. At an 
initial glance, grass-eaters may be seen as less of a problem; however, as Knapp (1972) notes, 
it is the grass-eater who is the heart of the problem because the vast majority of officers do not 
deal with huge amounts of graft (e.g. unlawful acquisition of money through questionable and 
improper means). Some officers have more exposure and opportunity to engage in illegal and 
deviant behaviour because of the position they hold in the police organisation.  In particular, 
officers who are classified as having ‘wet jobs’ have access and exposure to large amounts of 
drugs and money, such as undercover drug squads. These squads are an ideal breeding ground 
for corruption because they have two key elements: (1) the nature of the job involves a high 
degree of discretion; and (2) these officers are in continuous contact with large amounts of 
money, drugs and members of a drug operation (Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2002). The 
exposure and opportunities presented in wet jobs are far more common than those available to 
the average uniformed officer who engages in routine duties (Barker & Carter, 1991, p. 49). 
The Noble Cause 
In addition to the different levels of involvement of corrupt police officers, another 
classification of police corruption that is cited in the criminology literature is ‘noble cause’ 
corruption. In a broad sense, noble cause corruption can be defined as “a moral commitment to 
make the world a safe place to live. Put simply, it is getting bad guys off the street” (Caldero 
& Crank, 2004, p. 29). Noble cause corruption is distinct from other forms of police corruption 
as it assumes an altruistic motive rather than one that is egocentric (Cooper, 2011; Crank & 
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Caldero, 2000; Crank, Flaherty, & Giacomazzi, 2007; DeLattre, 2006; Kleinig, 2002; Muir, 
1977). Unlike monetary corruption, noble cause corruption is often perceived as a positive act 
by the perpetrators and is seen to benefit society as a whole. Officers who engage in noble 
cause corruption can still be classified into one of Roebuck and Barker’s (1974) typology of 
police corruption, but the main difference is the motivation behind the officers’ actions. 
Officers are not motivated by factors such as money, acceptance and career enhancements, but 
instead these officers are motivated to achieve a positive outcome which is perceived to be in 
the best interest for the general public.  In other words, these behaviours are displayed from the 
officer because their purpose is to obtain what the officers perceive to be morally just and noble 
regardless of the methods employed. In essence, the ends justify the means for officers who 
engage in noble cause corruption.  
Previous research has found that part of the motivation for this form of corruption comes from 
the perceived injustice and incompetence in the judicial system (Skolnick, 1994). In other 
words, noble cause corruption lies within the values of the individual officer (Crank & Caldero, 
2000). However, as its basis exists within an attempt to do good by compensating for the 
apparent flaws in an unjust system, measures used to prevent other types of corruption, such as 
penalties, investigations and procedural change, are unlikely to halt noble cause corruption 
from occurring. Although this theory does have some positive elements (e.g. putting bad guys 
behind bars), much of the literature focuses on the negative aspects (e.g. violation of procedures 
to obtain convictions) (Caldero & Crank, 2004). It can, however, create problems such as 
wrongful convictions and lead to overturned convictions because of the misconduct displayed 
by police to ensure the conviction (Sunahara, 2004) and the fact that there may be no actual 
evidence of guilt. Additionally, the theory is also limited as it only takes into consideration a 
small portion of the policing process and cannot be applied to all situations and circumstances 
(Caless, 2008). The application of this theory is therefore restricted to specific events where 
officers are motivated to engage in corruption because they believe the ends will justify the 
means.  
Despite the number of articles discussing noble cause corruption there are very few empirical 
studies that have investigated this type of behaviour among corrupt police officers. Prior to 
2007 there were no empirical studies that had researched the theory of noble cause corruption 
among police officers. Crank et al.’s (2007) empirical assessment using the Western Sheriff 
Deputy Survey found that noble cause corruption was not a unidimensional construct that could 
be applied to every situation, but instead was very dependent on the context. Porter and 
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Warrender’s (2009) study using British officers found similar findings that noble cause 
corruption was not a static occurrence but was situational, demonstrating that officers engaged 
in noble cause corruption when they believed it was necessary for certain situations.  They also 
found in their study that noble cause corruption did not occur as much as other forms of 
corruption, further suggesting that it may only be used by officers when they believe there is 
not enough evidence to ensure a conviction or that they are restricted by regulations (or ‘red 
tape’) to do their job effectively. Supporting this finding, Merrington, Lauchs, Bell and Keast’s 
(2015) recent article, investigating noble cause corruption among officers involved in the Wood 
Royal Commission, found that officers were motivated to engage in noble cause corruption 
because they believed that the system unfairly worked against their ability to do their job 
correctly (Wood, 1997). These few empirical studies contribute to the current research by 
extending the knowledge regarding noble cause corruption through their empirical 
investigations. However, all three studies fail to provide a theoretical foundation for noble 
cause corruption.  
Building on the typologies presented, the next section provides a review of the literature that 
has focused on the factors that influence officers to engage in corrupt practices. The discussion 
commences with an overview of the previous research on personal agency (individual) 
characteristics of deviant behaviour. This is followed by a summary of the relevant literature 
surrounding the institutional/structural features that influence an officer’s choice to participate 
in corrupt behaviour.  
Factors of Influence: Personal Agency versus Structural 
The majority of the literature on corruption focuses on the origin of corruption or, in other 
words, the starting point of corrupt practices among individuals (Baucus, 1994; Geis & 
Salinger, 1998). A review of the existing literature establishes that personal agency factors 
(such as individual characteristics) and structural factors (such as organisational 
characteristics) both influence an individual to engage in corruption (Haarr, 1997; Kane & 
White, 2009; Lersch & Kunzman, 2001; Reiss, 1971; Sherman, 1974; Wolfe & Piquero, 2011). 
A review of the relevant literature is presented in the next sections.  
Personal Agency (Individual) Factors 
In the past research has focused and placed the majority of the emphasis on individual 
characteristics to explain why officers participate in corruption. The first dominant theory to 
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explain police corruption on an individual level was the ‘rotten apple’ theory (Sherman, 1974). 
This theory draws on an individualistic model of human failure (e.g. people with a faulty moral 
character) to explain the causes of corruption (Morris, 1955; Nettler, 1974; Punch, 2003). The 
rotten apple theory can be viewed as a popular way to explain police corruption because it 
places the emphasis on the individual, rather than claiming that the whole police organisation 
or department is corrupt. It attempts to ‘normalise’ or invent plausible explanations for 
individual officers’ conduct (Lemert, 1967). By doing so, it minimised the consequences and 
negative impact resulting from the unethical behaviours demonstrated by a few officers.  
As previously outlined in the introduction, police corruption undermines the rule of law and 
can have grave consequences regarding the public’s attitude towards policing (Porter & 
Prenzler, 2012). Prior studies have revealed that when a member of the public has a negative 
encounter with the police it tends to decrease confidence in the police (Weitzer & Tuch, 2004; 
Wortley et al., 1997) and, as a result, the public’s perception of police can become negative, 
which in turn negatively affects the cooperation between police and society. As a result of 
highlighting a few ‘rotten apples,’ the exposure of incidents of corruption through media outlets 
allows police administrators to rectify the situation by removing the deviant individuals, rather 
than implicating the whole police organisation. 
Previous research investigating individual factors has examined the links between personality 
(Girodo, 1991; Muir, 1977; Toch, 1996), position or rank (Hickman et al., 2004), career 
histories (Cohen & Chiaken, 1972, 1973), education (Kane & White, 2009; Lersch & 
Kunzman, 2001) and general forms of misconduct (Mollen, 1994).  For example, Lersch and 
Kunzman’s (2001) study of a southern US sheriff’s department found that police deputies who 
hold only a high school diploma accumulated significantly more complaints (specifically 
policy compliance complaints and administrative referrals)than police deputies with two-year 
college degrees. They suggest that deputies with only a high school education appear to have 
more difficulties performing their duties in comparison to their more-educated peers and thus 
may receive more formal complaints. Although this study only encompasses compliance and 
administrative complaints, it does provide some evidence to suggest a link between education 
and an officers prospect of demonstrating misconduct behaviour likely to receive a formal 
complaint. 
In one of a few large-scale studies, Cohen and Chaiken (1972, 1973) examined associations 
between life and career histories and found that officers who had records of dismissal in 
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previous jobs were found to also have a history of internal police rule violations. Cohen and 
Chaiken further explain that this deviant behaviour can be explained by understanding the 
connection individuals have to society. In other words, they stress that individuals with weak 
bonds free people to deviate from the norms to gain something in their own self-interest. In a 
more recent study by Kane and White (2009) into career-ending police officer misconduct in 
the New York City Police Department (NYPD), they also investigated the life and career 
histories of all officers who involuntary separated from the NYPD for reasons of misconduct 
from 1975 to 1996. This study found evidence that individual officers displayed particular 
attributes that were evident before their employment as police officers, thus suggesting that 
these attributes could be used to predict future deviant behaviour. Although these studies have 
insightful findings they are extremely narrow and focus only on the personal agency 
(individual) characteristics, excluding the institutional/structural factors that may also play a 
role in influencing an officer to engage in corruption.  
These individualistic theories of corruption (which focus on individual traits that explain 
corrupt behaviour) are consistent with rational choice theory. According to the rational choice 
perspective, individuals participate in corrupt practices because they make a rational choice to 
do so (Cornish & Clarke, 1986). Thus, the individual is portrayed as a person who rationally 
calculates decisions and engages in corrupt acts when the advantages outweigh the expected 
disadvantages (de Graaf, 2007). Using this theory corrupt police officers make rational and 
calculated decisions to engage in corrupt behaviour. Additionally, in more recent years, rational 
choice theory has been applied to gain a more comprehensive perspective that incorporates the 
complexity of criminal conduct (Pratt, 2008). Researchers who utilise the rational choice theory 
as a theoretical foundation acknowledge that individual factors, such as experience with crime 
and punishment (Piquero & Tibbetts, 1996), levels of self-control and impulsivity (Paternoster 
& Piquero, 1995; Stafford & Warr, 1993) and environmental restraints for certain corrupt 
opportunities (Pratt, Cullen, Blevins, Daiglr, & Madensen, 2006), are the main factors that 
impact an individual's choice to participate in corrupt behaviour. Additionally, situational 
factors are also acknowledged to play a role in the decisions individuals make. In particular, 
trust can play a major role when it comes to making rational decisions whether to engage in 
corrupt behaviours or not (Gambetta, 1993).   
In the context of police corruption, trust can play a major role in an officer’s decision to take 
part in corrupt activities during specific events. If an officer is present during a search that has 
been deemed untrustworthy (i.e., no previous history working with another officer), then 
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corrupt officers will make a rational decision not to engage in corrupt behaviour in front of 
untrustworthy officers. This type of decision-making can be used to minimise or reduce the 
risk of exposing corrupt officers to potential outsiders. In this sense, the individual is making 
a rational decision not to trust the individual and therefore decides not to engage in corrupt 
practices because of the uncertainty regarding the trustworthiness of the other officer. Unlike 
other theories that explain behaviours based on causes beyond the individual's control, this 
theory suggests that decisions made by individuals are made because they are in control of 
these decisions. An advantage of this theory is that it looks at the specific situation of an 
individual, such as a corrupt officer, who calculates the advantages and disadvantages of a 
particular action. This narrow focus, however, is one of the main downfalls of the theory, as it 
does not take into consideration the wider context or account for triggers caused in the situation 
(de Graaf, 2007). 
Limitations to Individualistic Factors 
Although the rotten apple theory appears sound, recent research has discredited this approach, 
in part because corruption, when uncovered, is usually widespread across various departments 
of an organisation (Lauchs et al., 2012; Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011; Perry, 2001; 
Porter & Warrender, 2009; Punch, 2003; Tiffen, 2004). The shortcomings of the rotten apple 
theory are best illustrated by numerous scandals across a number of police departments (e.g. 
Los Angeles Police Department in the early 1990s, the QPF in the 1980s, the NSW Police in 
the 1990s and the Chicago Police Department in late 2000). For example, testimony from 
officers from the Fitzgerald (1989) and Wood (1995) inquiries disclosed a range of extrinsic 
influences behind engaging in corrupt behaviour. Examples of these extrinsic influences 
included the police culture, doing it for the greater good of society, excitement or a cure for 
frustration, and the desire to belong (Fitzgerald, 1989; Lauchs & Staines, 2012; Wood, 1995). 
Claims that officers choose to participate in corruption purely for material gain is too simplistic. 
Police scholars now point to alternative explanations for police deviance, such as the 
organisational culture or structure and opportunity to engage in corrupt practices (Knapp, 1972; 
Lauchs et al., 2012; Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011; Sherman, 1974). Patrick Murphy, a 
top law enforcement executive in New York City until 2011, also supports the notion that the 
‘rotten apple theory’ will not work any longer. As Murphy explains, “corrupt police officers 
are not natural-born criminals, nor morally wicked men, constitutionally different from their 
honest colleagues. The task of corruption control is to examine the barrel, not just the apples—
the organisation, not just the individuals in it—because corrupt police are made, not born” 
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(cited in Barker & Carter, 1986, p. 10). Punch (2003) also rejects the metaphor of the corrupt 
officer as a rotten apple. Punch believes that it is rarely the case that serious corruption can be 
pinned exclusively upon one of a few individuals. Punch argues that it is not the apple that is 
rotten but rather the barrel, the orchard or the whole fruit industry. Furthermore, the reliance 
on the rotten apple theory does not capture the real state of police corruption (White & Terry, 
2008).  
Despite the contributions of these theories within the police corruption literature they focus on 
the individual and individual characteristics to help explain why certain individuals engage in 
corrupt activities. For these reasons, researchers have also investigated the 
structural/institutional factors that provide a different approach regarding the reasons why 
officers participate in corrupt behaviour. 
Structural (Institutional) Factors 
Unlike the previous literature discussed above regarding the individual characteristics that 
influence officers to conduct deviant behaviour, this body of literature focuses on the structural 
properties. In other words, this set of literature and the theories within are concerned with the 
institutional factors that influence an individual to engage in corruption. 
As noted earlier, the rotten apple theory is no longer viable and, as a consequence, Punch (2003) 
extended the rotten apple theory to the collective called the ‘rotten barrel’ theory. This theory 
is an occupational socialisation model of group-level failure. The rotten barrel theory suggests 
that the fundamental nature (morals and ethics) corrode away, resulting in a group of officers 
engaging in deviant behaviour (Griffin & Ruiz, 1999). This theory suggests that corruption 
involves actions that are “embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations” 
(Granovetter, 1985, p. 487), and it is these social relations that drive an individual to participate 
in corrupt practices. Research has shown that the bad apple theory might be useful for 
explaining small-scale corruption (e.g. grass eating, where individuals simply accept the 
payoffs) but is not suitable for explaining large-scale corruption as it requires the cooperation 
of many individuals (Lauchs et al., 2012; Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011). These findings 
are demonstrated by Lauchs et al.’s (2012) research investigating the Fitzgerald Inquiry (the 
largest inquiry into QLD police) to understand the nature of police corruption networks. Using 
trancripts from the trial, they found that corruption occurred at the network level (e.g. the 
corruption network called ‘The Joke’ which was a fruitful and ongoing network which 
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protected illegal gambling in return for monthly payments), rather than at the individual level 
(Lauchs et al., 2012, p. 198).  
In addition, Punch (2003) further extended the rotten barrel theory by introducing the notion 
of ‘rotten orchards’ to highlight police deviance at the systemic level; that is, “deviance that 
has become systemic is: in some way encouraged, and perhaps even protected, by certain 
elements in the system” (Punch, 2003, p. 172). The word ‘system’ refers to both the formal 
system, such as the police organisation, and the informal system, such as the organisation and 
collaboration between officers.  As Punch (2003, p. 172) notes, to understand corruption it is 
important to comprehend how deviant officers are organised, how they conduct their deviant 
practices and how they rationalise their actions.  
To help answer some of these questions, previous research has focused on investigating how 
police officers become embedded into the police culture, which has been found to influence 
officers’ participation in corruption. Stojkovic, Kalinich and Klofas (2003) outline that an 
officer can become embedded in the police culture through a number of steps. They state that 
this process begins when future police recruits are influenced by individuals around them (e.g. 
friends, family and the media) and take on aspects of the police subculture before being fully 
embedded in it. In other words, an individual may already have some idea or understanding of 
the police culture before any formal training occurs. These values or perceptions are either 
reinforced or supplemented through formal and informal social mechanisms that occur during 
their initial training at the police academy (Stojkovic et al., 2003). As the individual officer 
becomes more involved and experienced, particular norms and attributes displayed by fellow 
officers will further establish and embed the officer into the police culture to the point that their 
actions and beliefs are consistent with those of fellow officers. Therefore, it is the individual 
values and the subculture within the organisation that can impact and determine patterns of 
deviant behaviour (Cooper, 2011).   
The next sections outline some of the key structural factors that have been cited in the literature 
as reasons behind an individual’s choice to engage in police corruption. Specifically, the 
discussion begins with an overview of the police culture and subculture. It then outlines the 
socialisation process into police corruption. It also includes a discussion regarding the impact 
of the Brotherhood and codes of conduct among corrupt police officers.  
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Culture 
Using culture as a measure to determine whether an individual will participate in corrupt 
activities is one of the more dominant explanations for organisational misconduct. Numerous 
studies have investigated the correlations between police and their occupational culture (Farkas 
& Manning, 1997; Manning, 1989; Muir, 1977). Some of these studies present the police 
culture as largely homogeneous (Crank, 1998; Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1998), while others 
have highlighted the cultural diversity between police organisations (Chan, 1997; Paoline, 
2001; Waddington, 2008). According to Schein (2004), culture can be broadly understood in 
terms of the following categories: shared meanings, formal rituals and celebrations, rules of 
the game, habits of thinking, group norms and observed behavioural regularities when people 
interact. The cultural explanation is rooted in the theoretical perspective “that views 
organizations as communities, and organizational participants as normative appropriateness 
assessors” (Palmer, 2012, p. 67).  Stinchcomb and Ordaz (2007) further explain that “culture 
is to organizations as personality is to people—a unique identity that sets one apart from all 
others ... Like oxygen or carbon monoxide, culture is an invisible environmental force— 
odorless, colorless, and tasteless—that blends unnoticeably with its surroundings, yet 
influences everything within it” (p. 145–146).  For the purpose of this study, police culture is 
defined by Manning (1989) as:  
An occupational culture is a reduced, selective, and task-based culture that is shaped 
by and shapes the socially relevant worlds of the occupation. Embedded in 
traditions and history, occupational cultures contain accepted practices, rules, and 
principles of conduct that are situationally applied, and generalized rationales and 
beliefs. (p. 360) 
Police culture has been widely cited across the literature and is a multifaceted concept with 
many layers and complexities. For example, social scientists who have studied police culture 
describe it as an ‘exotic tribe’, which has established and developed specific rules, perceptions 
and “interpretations of what they see, along with consequent moral judgements” (Skolnick & 
Fyfe, 1993, p. 90). Wolfe and Piquero (2011) describe that police operate in a close-knit culture 
because the unique demands, such as the threat of danger and scrutiny by the public, can 
“generate a tightly woven environment conducive to the development of feelings of loyalty” 
(p.334). Sherman (1985) further notes that the demands of the job and culture of policing 
fosters solidarity, secrecy and cynicism and emphasises ‘real police work’ related to crime 
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control. In addition, Crank (1998) outlines that police culture can be described through the 
interaction of cultural themes, where these themes can be both activities and shared sentiments 
about activities. Punch (2000) also provides a detailed overview of the main cultural themes. 
These include: a sense of mission, danger and sacrifice; rule of silence; cynicism; hedonism; 
machoism; female exclusion; pragmatism; taking it easy/work avoidance; social isolation; 
suspicion; dichotomous thinking; excitement/action; real police work; rough justice; 
moral/political conservativism; ducking and diving; and routinisation and commodification. 
Although Punch (2009) provides a detailed overview of a variety of themes apparent in the 
police culture these findings are based on theory rather than strong empirical findings. In turn, 
it is unclear how many of the themes and what combinations of themes need to be present for 
a culture to be classified as a police culture. Furthermore, if researchers use Punch’s cultural 
themes as a basis for understanding deviant behaviour within the police force there is no 
evidence to suggest that these themes correlate with officers engaging in corrupt practices.  
Although there are limitations to Punch’s (2009) overview of police culture there are certain 
ones that may be more closely related to factors that influence officers to bend or break the 
rules, such as socialisation into the Brotherhood and rule of silence. Each of these factors is 
discussed in the following sections. 
Socialisation into the Brotherhood 
Socialisation is commonly cited in the literature as a critical factor that affects officers’ 
willingness and acceptance to participate in corrupt activities. Socialisation in an organisation 
is the process by which an individual learns the attitudes, behaviours and norms required as an 
organisational member (Beck & Wilson, 1998). This socialisation results in “an ideology and 
shared culture that breeds unprecedented conformity to the traditional police norms and values” 
(Kappeler et al., 1998, p. 84). The socialisation of individual police can be formal (e.g. official 
training) and informal (e.g. learning norms and acceptable behaviour by other officers). Both 
forms of socialisation are important and are influential factors that shape and guide an officer’s 
behaviour. This understanding of socialisation is supported by a number of empirical studies 
(Kappeler et al., 1998; Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011; Stojkovic, Kalinich, & Klofas, 
2003). For example, Hollinger and Clark (1983) concluded from their study of employee theft 
that “employee deviance is more constrained by informal social controls present in primary 
workgroup relationships than by the more-formal reactions to deviance by those in positions 
of authority within the formal organization”(p.126). Stoddard (1968) found that rookie officers 
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were socialised into the police subculture by learning from more experienced officers regarding 
how to behave in a deviant manner. Stoddard further states that the police subculture is self-
perpetuating and that all police officers are subject to a culture's values to a lesser or greater 
degree.  
As Palmer (2012) also points out: 
Culture can also be classified as a ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ culture depending on the extent 
to which their forms convey content in a consistent and redundant way, and the 
degree to which that content holds sway with employee[s] … A strong culture has 
many forms that convey the same message or multiple interrelated messages to 
which employees adhere religiously. A weak culture has few forms that convey 
different and contradictory messages that employees freely ignore. (p. 67)  
Additionally, Trice and Beyer (1993) outline that strong subcultures are more likely to emerge 
when there is higher within-group task interdependence. An organisation that demonstrates 
high within-group task interdependence works in an environment focused on cohesion, group-
based rewards, physical proximity and peer-based socialisation (Trice & Beyer, 1993). With 
this reasoning, the subculture explanation assumes that individuals will participate in deviant 
behaviour when they believe this behaviour is consistent with the organisation’s norms, values, 
assumptions and overall culture. Using the above examples, deviant subcultures in the police 
organisation can be argued to demonstrate a strong willingness of members to follow the 
deviant norms and rules outlined by other officers. For example, police officers work in close 
proximity with one another to work as a cohesive unit to combat crime. Due to the repeated 
interaction and closeness to other officers, peer-based socialisation is a huge factor in 
understanding why officers participate in deviant behaviour. An officer’s deviant behaviour 
can, therefore, be a direct consequence of wanting to conform to the group’s norms and become 
a trusted and accepted member within the group. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, these forms of socialisation begin when an individual 
becomes a police recruit. In particular, the socialisation process can be broken down into three 
phases (Stojkovic et al., 2003). Socialisation begins before the formal academy training, called 
‘anticipatory socialisation’. This type of socialisation occurs when future police recruits are 
already aware of the police subculture as a result of influences around them (e.g. including 
friends who are officers or media reports). Then, as these recruits enter the police academy, 
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these values and understanding of the subculture are reinforced through formal and informal 
training (e.g. field training, working closely with experienced officers). Essentially, recruits 
need to play the part of a police officer, where recruits anticipate what “others will expect of 
them and what they should expect of others” (Hopper, 1977, p. 149). Finally, as the officer 
experiences more of the police culture their value will then work in tandem to determine future 
behaviours. In the final stage, officers are entrenched in the police culture, whereby decisions 
to participate in corrupt activities are consistent with the rules and norms of the group. These 
shared experiences assist officers in the socialisation process, where officers learn the rules and 
standards of the organisation or unit within the police organisation. Through this socialisation 
lifelong friendships are developed and Brotherhoods are formed (Punch, 2009).  
The Brotherhood and the Code of Silence 
The police Brotherhood demonstrate strong protective behaviours and measures to safeguard 
other officers from any external threats. Working in a profession that can involve dangerous 
encounters, with occasionally hostile and aggressive members of the public, can drive police 
towards a unique need for loyalty, solidarity and protection (Chin & Zhang, 2008; Crank, 1998; 
Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). Solidarity is a central theme that many scholars outline when 
discussing police corruption (Punch, 2009; Trostle, 2005). Police officers are often cited to be 
isolated from society because of the nature of police work, their authoritative role in society 
and interaction with the lowest ‘scum’ of society on a regular basis.  In this sense, an officer 
may operate under the mentality of ‘us versus them’ and see no reason to be loyal to the rules 
of society, and may deem individuals outside the police force to be untrustworthy (Sunahara, 
2004). Under these conditions officers may be able to justify participating in misconduct or 
corruption involving members of the community. Therefore, the nature of policing “together 
with hostility from the community and patterns of shift work can lead to social isolation with 
officers preferring to socialise together outside of work, becoming negative about outsiders, 
feeling that only a fellow officer can truly understand ‘what it is really like’ (Punch, 2009, p. 
38). 
Police also exhibit behaviours such as secrecy and silence to protect themselves and other 
officers from possible external threats. This type of secrecy is described in the literature as the 
‘code of silence’, also known as the ‘blue wall of silence’ (Knapp, 1972; Mollen, 1994; 
Skolnick, 2002; Wolfe & Piquero, 2011). In other words, the code of silence is an “an unwritten 
code in many departments which prohibits disclosing perjury or other misconduct by fellow 
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officers, or even testifying truthfully if the facts would implicate the conduct of a fellow 
officer” (Chin & Zhang, 2008, p. 238). Examples of such unwritten rules can be described as 
‘don’t give up another cop’; ‘if you get caught, don’t implicate anyone else’ and ‘don’t trust 
new cops until they have been checked out (Kappeler et al., 1998; Reuss-Ianni, 1984, p.14). 
This code is also viewed as one of the strongest forms of peer pressure, where officers who do 
not adhere to the code can be ostracised or excluded from the main group. As Turvey (2013) 
outlines: 
It pressures new officers into conformity by exploiting their commitment to group 
loyalty and the threat of peer retaliation; it protects longstanding group members 
from exposure by ensuring that nobody talks to outsiders, and that “cops protect 
cops”; and it allows for the shuffling, or continued employment, of “gypsy cops” 
that would otherwise have been terminated or in extreme cases indicted on criminal 
charges. In essence, it makes those law enforcement officers who abide into liars, 
by what they either report or fail to report with respect to corrupt activity. (p. 53) 
Gottschalk (2011) further describes the use of the code of silence as systemic, whereby officers 
are involved in corruption at some level, by either engaging in it or concealing the practices. 
The code of silence is not only a cultural norm but can also be seen as a protective layer, which 
reduces the likelihood of being reported by fellow officers. As Wolfe and Piquero (2011) note, 
“officers who adhere to the code of silence are less likely to report a fellow officer [sic] 
excessive use of force or corruption … and more likely to commit perjury during a trial” (p. 
334).  This unwritten rule was demonstrated in the Mollen Commission (1994), where NYPD 
officers were found to sometimes lie under oath because many departments had an unwritten 
rule that prohibited disclosing misconduct by fellow officers (Baer & Armao, 1995). Recent 
studies on the Wood and Fitzgerald inquiries have also found similar findings, providing 
further support for the notion that the Brotherhood and code of silence are widespread and 
continue to operate in modern policing (Fitzgerald, 1989; Wood, 1995). 
The literature also suggests that the strength of the code of silence is also impacted by the 
organisation’s size. Lim and Sloan’s (2016) study examined the impact of police supervisors’ 
perceptions of the presence of a deviant climate in their agencies on whistleblowing. 
Specifically, they found that the smaller the police agency the stronger the culture is and, 
therefore, the less likelihood there is of officers reporting deviant behaviour. Lim and Sloan 
further note that “small agencies may well possess an organizational climate where, because 
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few sworn personnel work there, stronger ties exist among sworn officers. This intimacy 
creates a thicker ‘blue wall of silence’ reducing supervisory constables’ willingness to whistle 
blow” (p. 298). This statement makes sense, because although police are part of a large 
organisation they often work in smaller units within the police organisation. These smaller 
units can, therefore, resemble more of a close-knit family, where officers form strong bonds 
with other officers in their unit. This observation is also consistent with a recent study by 
Makono (2016). Makono surveyed 100 officers from the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) 
Traffic Branch, specifically from the Harare Province and found that the majority of the 
operational officers said they would warn a colleague they observe engaging in corruption, 
rather than reporting them. Baker (1994) also found that officers were more inclined to report 
less-serious cases of corruption (e.g., corruption of authority, kickbacks, internal payoffs) than 
more-serious corruption. These findings suggest that officers are more likely to report small-
scale corruption rather than large-scale corruption. It also implies that officers are more likely 
to approach a fellow officer to discuss their deviant behaviour before exposing this behaviour 
to senior officers. This demonstrates that officers are more inclined to consider and try to rectify 
the situation, reducing the likelihood of heavy sanctions, before reporting a fellow officer’s 
deviant conduct to police administrations. However, what is unclear regarding these findings 
is whether other elements, such as context, timing or occurrence (or reoccurrence) of 
behaviour, impacts an officer's willingness to report this type of deviant behaviour, or whether 
the nature of the relationship impact an officer's choice to report deviant conduct by fellow 
officers.  
There is support in the literature that suggests officers are more inclined to speak to a member 
of the group or be a ‘snitch’ as a result of personal reasons. Punch (1985) outlines “that police 
can blow the whistle as a personal vendetta for being lied to, betrayed, hung out to dry, or 
‘carrying the can’ for another group. Whistle-blowing may also be part of a deal to avoid being 
fired or to receive immunity from prosecution” (p. 156). Similarly, Heck (1992) points out that 
“police are more inclined to ‘snitch’ for less noble motives including retaliation for 
mistreatment by colleagues, the desire for administrative recognition, to prove one’s loyalty to 
the department, compensation for feelings of inadequacy, concerns about civil liabilities”(p. 
256). This statement suggests that officers will be more likely to complain or reveal the actions 
of other officers when there is a personal reason to do so. It highlights that reasons for 
whistleblowing are usually not about the corrupt behaviours of individuals or groups of 
individuals but because of mundane activities that violate an individual’s image; thus, 
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suggesting that officers decide to speak out when there is a breakdown in the relationship with 
the Brotherhood, rather than as a result of altruism. 
Why do officers cooperate and conform to group norms and deviant behaviour? 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, due to the nature of police work, whether an individual 
officer conforms to the behaviours and norms of the group will depend on their need to develop 
their self-concept (Aultman, 1976). In particular, police work can result in experiences of 
solidarity and isolation from society and, therefore, police officers tend to spend more time 
with other officers (Skolnick, 1966, 1994). With this reasoning, police officers will become 
more dependent on their reference group’s acceptance and can hence become extremely 
vulnerable to group demands. As Aultman (1976) outlines: 
When a powerful reference group such as the police subculture is involved in the 
learning process, the behaviour that is being reinforced will have special meaning 
or importance to the individual police officer. For this reason, it is suggested that a 
consideration of the functions of reference groups may be especially valuable to an 
understanding of the motivating forces behind police corruption. (p. 329) 
For this reason, reference group theory is utilised in the criminology and broader social science 
literature to help explain how individuals learn certain behaviours and norms of the groups they 
identify with and wish to be a member of. This identity is based on an individual's belief that 
they are similar or dissimilar to a particular group. Group identification can, therefore, 
influence group members’ perceptions, as well as the conformity to group norms. Research 
suggests that individuals who do not identify with group norms are less likely to conform to 
the behaviour and norms of the group, while individuals that identify strongly with a particular 
group are more likely to be consistent with the norms—even when these norms are at odds 
with their personal interests (Rimal & Real, 2005; Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001). This explanation 
is supported by De Cremer and Van Vugt’s (1999) study into conformity in groups. The study 
involved a scenario where participants were provided with a monetary reward that they could 
either keep for themselves or invest in a common interest for the group. They found that 
“increasing the group salience encourages people who are normally only focused upon the 
personal outcomes to make efforts in obtaining good outcomes for the group even when it runs 
against their direct self-interest” (De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999, p. 887). However, these results 
were based on a low motivation to put their self-interests ahead of the group’s. Specifically, 
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they used a public good (such as a pool of money) as a stimulus, but the amount was not very 
high (just over $4), and this amount may not be enough to encourage individuals to go against 
the group’s goals. If the reward was greater the results of this study might display different 
findings. A further consideration could be whether the strength of the reference group impacted 
their choice to keep or invest the money. With this line of reasoning, an officer's identification 
with a certain unit or squad can impact on their willingness to put the group’s interests ahead 
of their own. This argument can also help explain why individual police officers are more 
inclined to participate in corrupt activities, as these officers identify more strongly with the 
group of corrupt officers than their self-interests. These officers may view the acceptance and 
membership in groups of corrupt officers as being more important than the acceptance in 
groups of honest officers.  
Another theory acknowledged in criminology literature to explain why officers conform to 
corrupt behaviour is social identity theory. Social identity theory suggests that when an 
individual is a member of a particular group they are more likely to take on the values, norms 
and beliefs of the group (Abrams & Hogg, 1990). In other words, people can conform to the 
values of a particular ‘in-group’, while at the same time devaluing the values of ‘out-groups’ 
they do not belong to (Tajifel & Turner, 1986). When a person becomes part of a group they 
will usually take on the values, norms and beliefs of the group. Individuals take on these 
behavioural norms because they want to be accepted and liked among their peers (Brown & 
Abrams, 2003). Consequently, as a result of this need to fit in, a person may engage in unethical 
behaviour in order to satisfy the group’s needs, rather than displaying conduct that would go 
against the group (Beck, 1999, p. 145; Grossman, 1995, p. 153; Weber, Kurke, & Pentico, 
2003). This drive to put the in-group’s values and ideologies above all others clearly paves the 
way for collective corruption (Ashforth & Anand, 2003, p. 10).  
As previously mentioned, much of the police corruption literature supports the argument that 
corruption occurs in a collective sense rather than on an individual basis. This is underpinned 
by several inquiries into police corruption. For example, the Mollen Commission found small 
groups of NYPD police officers engaged in aggressive and serious corrupt activities (Mollen, 
1994). Similarly, the Fitzgerald Inquiry into police corruption revealed corruption from the 
Police Commissioner, Terence Lewis, down to front-line police officers. This was supported 
by the findings of Lauchs et al.’s (2011, 2012) studies into police corruption networks in the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry. These studies used the Fitzgerald transcripts to map out the connections and 
operations of the corruption network among Qld police officers. The Wood Inquiry into police 
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corruption into NSW Police also found similar findings, where officers engaged in corrupt 
activities alongside a number of other officers, rather than participating in these activities alone 
(Wood, 1997). Findings of collective corruption were also confirmed by Merrington et al.’s 
(2015) study using the Wood Inquiry transcripts to uncover the nature of police corruption 
among NSW police officers. In addition, these findings have also been supported by Makono’s 
(2016) study of Zimbabwe traffic officers, which found that most of the corruption was taking 
place during enforcement patrol and at roadblocks in which duties were performed by more 
than a single officer at a time. The nature of police work was such that members often got 
common vilification from the public, and this tended to bind them together against outsiders.  
Corruption in this sense can be seen as ‘contagious,’ whereby an individual becomes corrupt 
because other individuals around them are corrupt (Klitgaard, 1988; Hulten, 2002). For 
example, if an officer is working with officers who demonstrate the utmost integrity the 
likelihood of that officer engaging in corruption is unlikely. On the other hand, if an officer is 
surrounded by a reference group in which corrupt behaviour is an accepted norm the likelihood 
of that officer engaging in corruption increases significantly. It is, therefore, important to 
understand the police subculture as it can be a significant force in determining an officer’s role 
and behaviour. Depending on the type of police subculture, the norms and values displayed can 
be very different across departments and units. For example, the corrupt behaviour of an 
officer, such as planting evidence, can be seen as an acceptable practice if the subculture and 
reference group believe in these actions.  
Therefore, considering the interaction of role theory and theories of social learning, such as 
social identity theory, provides a theoretical foundation regarding the influential factors that 
affect an officer’s behaviour to engage in corrupt activities. It is also important to acknowledge 
that despite the empirical evidence that supports these theories, it still remains unclear why 
some officers engage in corrupt activities while others do not. As Punch (2000) concludes, “the 
implication is that in tackling corruption and other forms of police deviance, it is vital to focus 
on group dynamics, the escalation from minor to serious deviance, and on the negative 
elements in the police culture” (p. 317). Using Punch’s statement, in addition to understanding 
the group dynamics and the effect they have on group conformity among corrupt police 
officers, it is also important to understand an officer’s escalation from minor offences to more-
serious offences. The dominant theory to explain this escalation is the slippery slope theory, 
which is discussed in the following section. 
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Slippery Slope to Corrupt Behaviour 
In line with the above argument, individuals who operate within a group supported by a culture 
of corruption are provided with a sound basis for corruption to flourish and escalate to more-
serious corruption. The police corruption literature suggests that an officer’s path to corruption 
can occur through a number of gradual stages (Dean, Bell, & Lauchs, 2010). In other words, 
the literature suggests that the first step towards a police officer becoming corrupt is the 
acceptance of gratuities (e.g. such as a free cup of coffee or meal), which sends individuals 
down a ‘slippery slope’ to larger-scale corruption (e.g. illicit drug deals with criminals) 
(Kleinig, 1996; Punch, 2009). This progression to more-serious corrupt activities is known as 
the slippery slope theory. Unlike the bad apple theory that suggests the individual is inherently 
evil, the slippery slope theory suggests that anyone can be corruptible (Caless, 2008). 
According to Sherman (1985), police corruption occurs on a continuum of graft stages. These 
stages start from the acceptance of gratuities to the acceptance of bribes, to involvement in 
direct criminal activity (Sherman, 1985). Regardless of the behaviour, accepting free gratuities 
or dealing drugs are both instances that demonstrate an individual is corrupt. The only 
difference is the seriousness of the corrupt act. Sherman further proposes that once an officer 
takes the first step, such as accepting free coffee, then this action will lead them down a slippery 
slope where the officer will engage in more-serious corruption which will be difficult to stop.  
However, the slippery slope argument does not come without criticism. The main flaw in this 
theory is that it suggests that the first step will lead to the second, which will soon lead an 
officer down a slippery slope to more-serious corruption. However, there is no evidence to 
suggest that officers who engage in minor corruption will end up participating in more-serious 
corruption in the future. As Feldberg (1985) suggests, this argument is the same as the argument 
that marijuana use leads to more-serious drug addictions (such as heroin or cocaine addictions); 
there is no proof or causal evidence that marijuana leads to addiction of hard-core drugs. 
Therefore, by using this argument, there is no empirical evidence that acceptance of a cup of 
coffee always leads to more-serious corruption. Coleman (2004, p. 35–36) further outlines that 
there are three problems with this argument: (1) there is no proof that acceptance of gratuities 
leads to more-serious corruption; (2) even if there is a link between accepting gratuities and 
more-serious corruption, removing the latter does not necessarily mean that the officer will not 
engage in serious corruption; and (3) banning the acceptance of gratuities will not bring an end 
to corruption. In addition, the overemphasis on the slippery slope can lead to a further 
separation between the police and society. If an officer accepts a form of gratuity, they might 
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feel as if they are already corrupted, and this could lead to a psychological justification that 
might make it easier to engage in large-scale corruption later (Coleman, 2004).  Even if there 
was a link between accepting gratuities and later corruption it cannot be assumed that if we 
take away the gratuities that the individual will not then engage in corruption. In other words, 
banning acceptance of gratuities will not end all police corruption.  
In addition to the slippery slope theory there are a number of researchers who have developed 
seriousness scales of corruption. Caless (2008) offers a scale of corruption from less serious to 
more serious, where this scale starts with ‘corruption of authority’ and ends with ‘direct 
criminal activity’. The scale commences with corruption of authority, where actions can range 
from “not being assertive enough to take charge of the situation or allowing undue familiarity, 
through to turning a blind eye to misdemeanour of friends” (Caless, 2008, p. 11). Favours are 
the next level, where officers can “embrace letting someone know that a lucrative maintenance 
contract is in the offing, through to using a particular crash recovery service for motorway 
accidents” (Caless, 2008, p. 11).  This stage is followed by bribery, which includes accepting 
money to assist in benefiting a third party (e.g. accepting cash not to give someone a speeding 
ticket) (Caless, 2008, p. 11). Protecting a criminal is the next stage, which overlaps with 
bribery, where an officer provides some level of protection to criminals (e.g. warnings about 
raids) (Caless, 2008, p. 11). Finally, direct criminal activities are the final stage and include 
activities such as “pimping for prostitutes to theft, from embezzlement to violence and from 
resale of stolen goods to the intimidation of witnesses” (Caless, 2008, p. 11). Caless also 
acknowledges that officers who start their corruption career by engaging in small-scale 
corruption can go down a slippery slope, where it then becomes difficult to stop or go back 
down the scale to smaller-scale corruption. Although this scale informs the current research on 
the levels of corruption it does not provide a clear end between each level. As mentioned earlier 
in this chapter, bribery and protecting criminals overlap but it is unclear whether other 
categories overlap as well.  
Similarly, Dean et al. (2010) offer a conceptual framework that shows that police deviance can 
increase in seriousness as it progresses along a continuum from misconduct to corruption to 
predatory policing (i.e., where police approach criminals to extort money by providing 
protection; Gerber & Mendelson, 2008). In their framework they offer three levels, the 
individual, the group and the organisation against three categories: police misconduct, police 
corruption and predatory policing. They present this information on a slippery scale, where an 
individual moves from police misconduct down the slope to more-serious corruption such as 
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predatory policing. Dean and Gottschalk (2011) explore this conceptual framework by 
applying it to a sample of Norwegian police officers charged with various types of police crime. 
The application of the framework in their study and findings were consistent with how courts 
in Norway apply “an implicit ‘seriousness’ scale regarding the severity of the sentence given 
to deviant police officers” (Dean & Gottschalk, 2011, p. 27). The model provides a scale of 
seriousness of police corruption and provides a good overview of the breadth and depth, but 
there are a few weaknesses in this model. First, the framework does not take into account the 
influences of the broader society. Second, it does not consider the influence opportunities have 
on individual officers. Third, by presenting the framework in a slope it suggests that officers 
will end up engaging in serious corruption. 
Both the slippery slope and scale of seriousness of police corruption provide some theoretical 
foundation for addressing the factors that lead officers to more-serious corruption. However, it 
remains unclear as to whether the slippery slope or serious scale can be applied to groups or 
networks of officers. It is also unclear whether personal agency factors or structural factors or 
a combination of both influence an officer to engage in corrupt practices. It therefore remains 
unclear in the literature as to why some officers participate and continue to participate in 
corrupt activities while other officers do not. The gap presented in this literature review has led 
to the following research question: 
RQ1: What factors influence police officers to join corruption networks and continue to 
participate in serious corruption? 
Chapter Summary 
Theoretical and empirical studies into police corruption conducted during the last several 
decades have revealed that it is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. This review of the 
individual factors and theories of police corruption aimed to demonstrate that these factors 
alone cannot explain why individual police officers engage in corruption. Building on 
individual factors, structural/institutional influences were also presented to show that 
corruption can be significantly impacted by the police culture and socialisation process into the 
Brotherhood, rather than simply by individual characteristics of the police officers. From this 
literature review, previous studies suggest that individual characteristics are viewed as less 
important, in part because corruption, when uncovered, is usually widespread across various 
departments and includes a number of individuals in the police organisation (Lauchs et al., 
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2012; Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011; Perry, 2001; Porter & Warrender, 2009; Punch, 
2003; Tiffen, 2004). 
While some empirical studies have revealed valuable insights into the factors that influence a 
police officer’s decision to engage in corrupt behaviour relatively less is known regarding the 
‘how’ and ‘why’ officers engage, and continue to engage, in these corrupt ways. Even more 
so, although previous studies have outlined that police operate in a network form there are very 
few empirical studies to support this claim. Specifically, little is known about the structural and 
operational properties of police corruption networks and the role of trust in the functioning of 
these networks. For these reasons, a review of the network and trust literature is presented in 
the following chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
Network and Trust Literature Review 
Introduction 
The previous chapter presented a comprehensive literature review on police corruption. 
Specifically, the chapter outlined what police corruption is and provided an overview of the 
current typologies of police corruption. The preceding chapter also presented the literature 
around the factors that play a role in influencing officers to engage in corrupt activities and 
found more support for institutional (structural) explanations than individual (personal agency) 
ones. This chapter continues the literature review on police corruption, but does so from a 
network and trust perspective. As outlined in the previous chapter, studies suggest that 
individual characteristics are seen as less important, in part because corruption, when 
uncovered, is usually widespread across various departments and includes a number of 
individuals in the police organisation. Recent research has started to investigate police 
corruption networks and has found evidence that corrupt police work together in network 
structures (Lauchs et al., 2012; Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011). For this reason, the 
current study investigates police corruption through a network lens to provide further insights 
into why police engage, and continue to participate, in corrupt activities. This chapter also 
provides an overview of the key structural properties of corruption networks which allow these 
networks to function. In addition, trust within these networks is explored to uncover its role 
and to gain a better understanding of how members determine an individual’s trustworthiness. 
As such, this chapter provides a thorough literature review on trust in corruption networks. As 
few studies investigate trust networks in the context of police corruption this literature review 
draws upon the wider network and trust literature.  
The literature review commences with a review of social networks, including an overview of 
classifications of networks. It then reviews the dominant analytical tool used to uncover the 
structural properties of networks, namely Social Network Analysis (SNA). In particular, the 
main concepts of SNA and theoretical frameworks are presented. The chapter then provides a 
review of the dimensions of social capital, with a particular focus on the concept of trust. The 
remainder of the chapter provides a detailed review of the components of trust and the process 
of trust-building through network embeddedness. The chapter concludes with a summary of 
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the key points presented as well as outlines how the remaining research questions were derived 
from the gaps within the literature. 
Social Networks 
The study of social networks focuses on the way individuals are connected to one another, the 
nature of the network they are operating in and how human capital, such as trust, is built and 
communicated between members of the network (Burt, 2000; Monge & Contractor, 2003). 
Social networks consist of actors (also referred to as nodes or vertices), such as people or 
organisations, that are formally linked by a specific set of ties or relations (Gilmore, O'Donnell, 
Carson, & Cummins, 2003; Keast, Mandell, Brown, & Woolcock, 2004; Mitchell, 1969). Ties 
between individuals can be direct links such as friendships and work relationships, or they can 
be indirect links, such as affiliations to clubs or specific events both parties have attended. As 
a result of these connections, networks are highly fluid and therefore depend on “the ongoing 
social relations established between members to create the shared values, trust and mutuality 
necessary for collective action” (Keast & Brown, 2002, p. 9).  
Networks acknowledge that leadership does not come from an individual but instead comes 
from several sources in the network (Chisholm, 1996). Unlike formal organisations, built 
around power based on an individual’s position in an organisation’s hierarchy (horizontally, 
e.g. function) and vertically (e.g. differential distribution of rights and duties), networks by 
contract do not display a hierarchy and power is not represented by holding a leadership or 
supervisory role (Mayntz, 2004, p. 8). Networks, therefore, have no formal lines of command 
and can be thought of as being essentially leaderless (Mayntz, 2004).   
It is therefore the unique interaction of people and their respective locations within the network 
that can give the network an advantage over other forms of organisation (Weiss and Miller, 
2001). For example, within a network, individuals may be unware of others in the network and 
are connected through a third party or broker (an individual who connects people together who 
would otherwise be unconnected). These brokers occupy valuable positions in the network 
because they not only connect actors together but can also control the flow of information and 
resources to and from the network (Burt, 2005). 
While traditional organisational arrangements can display several forms, such as partnerships 
and hierarchies, the relationships formed can be referred to as “as ‘networked organizations’ 
(Miles and Snow, 1986), and ‘interfirm’ or ‘organizational networks’ (Uzzi, 1996)” (Keast & 
60 
 
Brown (2002, p.8-9). However, as Carrington (2011) points out, the social network technique 
does not necessarily lead to the formation of a network model. Even within a traditional 
hierarchical organisation, network methods can transcend modes of organisation. For example, 
previous research into criminal networks “has confirmed the presence of loosely structured 
action groups, this does not exclude the possibility that some demonstrations based on network 
analytical techniques may confirm that form, hierarchical criminal groups are indeed in place” 
(Bouchard & Morselli, 2014, p. 295-296). In other words, a researcher studying hierarchies as 
networks may be surprised at how horizontal the organisation is (or not). The same can be said 
for partnerships, they might turn out to be more hierarchical than first thought. These 
observations can be found in previous studies investigating outlaw motorcycle gangs (Morselli, 
2005) and mafia groups (Morselli, 2009) and demonstrate that the interaction of ongoing social 
relationships can go beyond traditional organisational structures. 
Classifications of Networks 
Within the social network literature, social networks have been classified into two main types: 
bright and dark networks. A bright network is a visible and legal network, while a dark network 
is covert and operates outside the boundaries of the law (Milward & Raab, 2006; Raab & 
Milward, 2003). As Milward and Raab (2006) further outline, the two dimensions that 
distinguish dark networks from bright networks are the visibility and legality of activities. 
Legality refers to the laws of the state, while visibility refers to how easily the network can 
function without being identified and investigated (Bakker, Raab, & Milward, 2012, p. 34; 
Milward & Raab, 2006). Since the focus of this study is to investigate police corruption 
networks the review has focused on outlining the relevant literature pertaining to dark 
networks. 
A closer investigation of dark networks reveals that not all dark networks have the same degree 
of visibility or level of darkness. For example, at one end of the spectrum, terrorist networks 
plan its operation and recruitment in secrecy, yet are very public in their demonstrations (e.g. 
Bin Laden was known around the world as the leader of the terrorist group al-Qaeda from his 
publicity through the media). The operations of drug trafficking networks are hidden 
underground, yet cannot be so hidden that customers cannot find key players. Therefore, these 
networks need to have some visibility to potential drug users. At the other end of the spectrum, 
police corruption networks are completely dark and hidden. As the corruption takes place 
within a bright network (the police organisation) the corrupt behaviour needs to remain hidden 
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because the visibility of these behaviours would mean that the network could no longer operate. 
Subsequently, these networks feed on the bright network’s resources to achieve success in their 
network operations. As Lauchs, Keast and Yousefpour (2011) note, there is a growing 
understanding that embedded corruption, rather than an individual practice, is undertaken 
within highly resilient ‘dark’ networks hidden within the host organisation. Similarly, the 
Australian Crime Commission (ACC) (2011) outlines that “internationally, powerful organised 
crime groups have strategically purchased businesses” (p.7) which can be used to hide the 
illegitimate business taking place; thus suggesting that dark networks conceal their operations 
within bright networks and consequently make it extremely difficult to identify and uncover 
the hidden nuances of the network. 
Typology of Dark Networks 
The literature has also classified networks based on the type of structure these networks 
resemble. Williams (2010) developed a network typology that comprises four main types of 
networks: directed networks, mesh networks, transactional networks and flux networks. A 
directed network is formed and structured around a set of individuals that make up the core of 
the network. The core of the network is the hub and essentially acts as a “steering mechanism” 
to coordinate the network as a whole (Williams, 2001a, p. 72). A mesh network is classified 
by its decentralised structure, where actors perform tasks with other members but do not need 
the core actors to be involved in the activity. This type of network structure is characterised by 
horizontal relationships across the network, rather than vertical ones. Next, a transactional 
network relies heavily on middlemen or brokers to bridge the communication channels in the 
network. These networks are generally seen in drug syndicates, where brokers play a significant 
role in connecting the source of the drugs to individuals in the supply and distribution side of 
the network. Finally, flux networks have little structure and are highly unstable. As a result of 
the instability, trust among members is limited and actors in these networks work together for 
a specific criminal activity (Williams, 2010). As Williams outlines, these network types  
fluctuate and change through the growth and evolution of the network’s operations. Williams 
further notes that, within the overall network, there can exist a number of these types of 
networks because of the kinds of activities and processes carried out by specific actors in the 
network.  
Previous research that has applied this typology to police networks has found that the structure 
of the police organisation is loosely-coupled and decentralised which allows officers 
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(especially street-level officers) the autonomy to make decisions on a daily basis (Kraska & 
Kappeler, 1997; Mastrofski, 2004). Applying Williams’ (2010) typology, this type of network 
would be classified as a mesh network because of the decentralisation of activities between 
officers in the network. Lauchs et al.’s (2012) study into the police corruption group (aka ‘The 
Joke’) found that the network began as a transactional network because it emerged 
spontaneously. The study also found that the network was also directed by individuals in the 
core of the network. The findings from this study and supporting theoretical frameworks 
suggest that corrupt police operate in a network structure.  
Social Network Analysis Terms, Concepts and Theory 
SNA has proven to be a successful analytical tool in the criminology literature when 
investigating connections, relations and collaboration in criminal enterprises. SNA is the 
“study of relations, ties, patterns of communication, and behavioural performance within social 
groups” (Ortiz-Arroyo, 2010, p. 27). SNA is a unique analytical tool because rather than 
focusing on individual attributes it focuses on connections and relationships. This emphasis on 
relational ties allows researchers to take into account the constraints and opportunities that are 
inherent in the way social relations are organised (Poucke, 1980; Raab & Milward, 2003). 
Fredericks and Durland (2005) further highlight that SNA is more about “telling the story of a 
network with quantitative tools than it is about summarizing, organizing, and determining 
inferences…[it] is more about understanding the nuances of complexity than about testing a fit 
or finding a difference or determining common occurrences” (p. 33). It can therefore be used 
to explain varieties of behaviours by investigating the relationships and ties that are formed 
from social relations (Raab & Milward, 2003).  
The networks that emerge from SNA can also be used to label specific social structures or can 
be used as a concept to describe forms of coordinating social activity (Powell, 1990; Raab & 
Milward, 2003, p. 417). The actors and network ties can, therefore, be used to form a sociogram 
or graph to display and conceptualise the social structure. Rooted in graph theory (Biggs, 
Lloyd, & Wilson, 1986; Harary, 1969), these networks are represented through ‘network maps’ 
to depict a larger network of connections embedded with relationships that exist between 
groups of actors. These network maps allow researchers to visualise the links between 
individuals and help researchers uncover some of the complexities and dynamics of these 
networks. An example of one of these networks maps is depicted in Figure 3.1. This map was 
created using some of the facts from Operation Florida, and was formed to demonstrate the 
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visual effect of these network maps. The network map represented in Figure 3.1 visually shows 
that there were clusters or groups of corrupt police officers, whereby these groups were 
connected by certain individuals.  Thus, these networks maps allow researchers to not only see 
the connections between actors but also the clustering of actors. It also visually emphasises the 
actors who provide a bridge between other actors and groups of actors which can help police 
administrators establish effective strategies to disrupt these networks. 
Figure 3.1: Sample Network Map 
 
Source: This map was created by the researcher using information derived from the transcripts in 
Operation Florida. 
However, despite the numerous benefits that these network maps evoke, it has been criticised 
as being highly descriptive and abstract (Keast, Mandell, & Agranoff, 2014). Accordingly, the 
network concept has been described as a technique without imagery (Shrum & Mullins, 1988). 
The current research plans to minimise these limitations by complementing these network maps 
with qualitative findings to provide a more comprehensive analysis of police corruption 
networks. In other words, the network maps will be used to enrich the qualitative findings by 
conceptualising the social structures that form from police corruption. 
Constructs of Social Network Theory 
In SNA an actor can refer to classifications such as individuals, subgroups, organisations, 
communities and nation-states that are involved in social relations (Everton, 2012, p. 8). Since 
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an actor can be classified as a discrete individual or collection of individuals SNA does not 
always analyse networks solely on an individual basis, but can analyse individuals within 
particular groups or subgroups to gain a better understanding of the dynamic relations of 
particular individuals.  
Actors within a network are linked together by what SNA refers to as a tie. The types of ties 
can vary regarding the type, direction and strength of the tie. Borgatti and Halgin (2011) 
classify ties into two categories: states and events. States are continuous relationships, such as 
kinship or role-based ties (e.g. a supervisor or a friend) (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). An event, 
on the other hand, refers to a discrete interaction between actors in the network. Examples of 
event-type ties include phone conversations, email exchanges or meeting for a coffee. These 
event-type ties can also be captured over time, such as the frequency or regularity of the 
occurrence. Event-type ties can, therefore, be utilised to investigate the patterns of ties between 
actors (Ebers, 1997). Patterns of behaviour can be especially useful for uncovering criminal 
networks as these patterns can reveal significant connections to a specific event, aiding law 
enforcement agencies to arrest and convict suspects. 
To gain a further understanding of the types of ties, Table 3.1 below summarises Wasserman 
and Faust’s (1994) overview of ties. 
Table 3.1: Types of Ties 
Types of Ties Examples 
Association or Affiliation Ties Members of the same club 
Biological Ties Kinship 
Behavioural Ties Communication ties 
Geographic Ties Migration, physical mobility 
Formal Ties Organisational hierarchy 
Physical Connection Bridge connecting two points, road, river 
Resource Ties Business transactions, financial flows 
Sentimental Ties Friendship, liking, respect 
Status Movement Ties Social mobility 
A tie can also be understood in terms of the tie’s directionality. The direction of the tie refers 
to the way communication flows between actors. For example, a tie could be directional in the 
sense that the flow of resources is passed from one individual to another in the network. The 
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movement of resources could be the result of certain positions in the network, where members 
have access to particular resources that are not available to other actors. There are also cases 
where ties do not have any directionality. These ties (also referred to as an edge), are the result 
of strong ties where actors repeatedly interact, resulting in meaningful and intense relations, 
such as ties between family or close friends. 
In addition to the directionality, the path or path distance is also an important concept to define. 
A path (also known as a walk) is the path between two actors (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Path 
distance, on the other hand, refers to the number of steps between two actors (e.g. the number 
of paths to each particular actor in the network). For example, the path distance can vary 
depending on the number of actors within the network, resulting in actors of the network having 
longer or shorter paths than others. The shortest path between two actors is known as the 
geodesic path distance (Everton, 2012). Having a short path generally mean that an actor is the 
most central and most connected in the network. Centrality measures have been used in several 
previous studies and are therefore explored in the next section.  
Centrality 
The majority of previous studies into criminal networks have focused their analyses on 
identifying central or key players in a network (Krebs, 2001; Morselli, 2009b; Xu et al., 2009). 
The centrality of key players can be identified based on a number of SNA measures. Although 
there are numerous ways to measure centrality of actors, this review outlines the four most 
commonly used centrality measures within the criminology literature. These measures include: 
(1) degree centrality, which is the number of ties an individual actor has; (2) closeness 
centrality, which measures how close on average a particular actor is to all other actors in a 
given network; (3) betweenness centrality, which measures which actors lie on the shortest 
path in comparison to all other actors in the network; and (4) eigenvector centrality, where ties 
with highly central actors are considered to be more significant than ties to actors on the 
periphery (Borgatti, 2005; Faust, 1997; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The central positions in a 
network benefit these individuals as they are highly connected and have access to valuable 
resources. In the context of criminal networks, these central actors can play a large role in the 
operations and efficiency of the network.  For example, Malm and Bichler’s (2011) recent 
study of the roles (or niches) in drug trafficking, in particular in production and transport, found 
centrality was highest among actors in the complex transport and supply niches. They further 
suggest that actors in the complex transport and supply niche are the most central actors of the 
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network and, as a consequence of their centrality, they both play a critical role in the overall 
operations of the network. 
Additionally, previous studies have also found that certain criminal groups are more 
decentralised in their operations in order to minimise risk. In Baker and Faulkner’s (1993) 
study of risk and security in the context of price-fixing network structures, they found that 
players positioned on the periphery of the network were less targeted than central players. 
Baker and Faulker outline that this was the case because being positioned on the periphery was 
a way of protecting themselves from detection. Tenti and Morselli’s (2014) study into a group 
of drug smugglers labelled the ‘Ndrangheta group also revealed that the criminal network was 
more decentralised than centralised. Specifically, they found:  
… smaller criminal groups involved in import and wholesale as well as supply 
activity (Italian and Brazilian criminal groups) tended to be more closely 
interconnected with specific action segments of the network, while larger criminal 
groups of importers and suppliers (the ‘Ndrangheta and the Albanian and 
Colombian criminal groups) showed a tendency to more widely co-offend and reach 
out to the most participants across the network. (p. 33)  
Another study into the ‘Ndrangheta group by Calderoni (2014) found that the ‘Ndrangheta 
bosses had higher betweenness centrality scores than other members in the network. Calderoni 
also found that actors in more central positions in the network were not necessarily associated 
with high-status members. These findings were supported by Agreste, Catanese, De Meo, 
Ferrara and Fiumara’s (2016) study into the Sicilian Mafia in Italy. They found that “criminals 
high up in the organization hierarchy do not occupy the most central positions in the criminal 
network, and oftentimes do not appear in the reconstructed criminal network at all” (Agreste  
et al., 2016, p. 30), thus suggesting that centrality in a network does not mean that you need to 
hold a powerful position. Bright, Greenhill, Reynolds, Ritter and Morselli (2014) further 
support this idea by suggesting that the centrality of the key players in a network is not 
restricted to their structural position in the network, but can also refer to the actor’s attributes 
(e.g. key skills and resources valuable to the network). 
As highlighted earlier in this chapter, the findings through the use of SNA give law 
enforcement agencies insight into the structure of criminal networks, in particular, the location 
and centrality of key players, which is necessary for developing effective disruptive strategies. 
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The identification of central actors and their associated ties allows law enforcement agencies 
to remove these central actors with the view that it will cause a ripple effect and disrupt the 
network’s operations. As Burcher and Whelan (2015) point out, recent research has taken a 
“more balanced position, such as with regards to how SNA can potentially support other 
strategies for disrupting dark networks rather than just ‘removing’ actors from the network” 
(p.108), thus suggesting that in order to disrupt organised crime networks it is important to not 
only look at central players in the network, but it is important to look at other positions within 
the network. For example, a path may go through what is referred to as a ‘broker’ who connects 
actors together who may otherwise have been disconnected. This broker can also assist in 
creating shorter or longer path distances between actors in the network and can, therefore, be 
more important than the most central actors within the network. This concept of brokerage lies 
in Ronald Burt’s structural hole theory. 
Structural Hole Theory 
Burt’s (1992) structural hole theory of social capital aims to explain the relationship between 
non-redundant and redundant contacts. Contacts are considered redundant when there is a 
direct connection to one another, or when they are indirectly connected to the same actors. 
Non-redundant contacts are connected through what Burt (1992) calls a ‘structural hole’. A 
structural hole is “a relationship of non-redundancy between two contacts. The hole is a buffer, 
like an insulator in an electrical circuit. As a result of the hole between them, the two contacts 
provide network benefits that are in some degree addictive rather than overlapping” (Burt, 
1992, p. 18). Actors who are able to bridge structural holes are known as brokers. 
Burt (1992) explains that actors with strong networks or who are optimally structured will 
generally know more about others in their network and will also be able to gain access to the 
information quickly. Furthermore, brokers in strong networks will have more bargaining power 
than other individuals and will have more control of the flow of information in the network. 
Burt’s theory aims to enhance these benefits to their full potential by optimising these structural 
holes in the network. In his view, non-redundant actors provide more valuable information than 
redundant actors (Burt, 2002). 
Additionally, according to Burt (1992), there are a number of ways to optimise structural holes 
in a network.  First, the size of the network determines the amount of information that is shared 
in the network; therefore, the more non-redundant actors in the network the better because it 
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creates more avenues to access information (Burt, 1992). Second, to maximise the number of 
non-redundant contacts by building effective relationships in a network it is important to ensure 
that the network is efficient. This theory is valuable because it provides a theoretical foundation 
to understand how networks can be connected through brokerage and that it can be generalised 
across multiple contexts. However, its weakness lies in the fact that Burt’s theory does not 
acknowledge the environmental factors that influence the dynamic nature of the network’s 
structural properties (Beugelsdijk, 2009). Since this current research will complement SNA 
with qualitative findings it aims to investigate the environmental factors that impact on the 
overall structure of police corruption networks. 
The wider literature has shown enormous support for the structural hole theory. The literature 
on brokerage in relation to criminal networks supports the idea that criminal networks that have 
brokers operate at a higher degree of sophistication than networks without brokers (Coles, 2001; 
Klerks, 2001). The value of brokers has been a consistent finding in the criminology literature, 
such as drug trafficking (Morselli, 2001; Natarajan, 2006; Pearson, Hobbs, & Great Britain. 
Home Office. Research, Development Statistics Directorate, 2001), police corruption (Lauchs, 
Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011) and other criminal enterprises (Morselli, 2005). Findings suggest 
that brokers can be very beneficial to criminal networks as they provide an avenue for resources 
to pass through the network (Burt, 1992, 2005).  Della Porta and Vannucci (2011) outline that 
brokers essentially manage four kinds of interrelated resources, specifically, social capital, trust, 
reputation and information. Brokers can help manage the network of personal contacts and 
relations that control their sphere of operations. They can also contribute to generating and 
cultivating trust between members, where contacts can be introduced to members of the 
network for exchange opportunities. Trust becomes more important when relationships involve 
actors who have never met and do not have any reciprocal information on previous conduct. 
Actors in these positions can, therefore, supply assistance and provide guarantees that a third 
party can be trusted. Additionally, brokers can assist in creating and maintaining valuable 
exchange relationships with members over time. Finally, brokers can influence the flow of 
information which can be used to strength their network of trust relationships. Individuals on 
either side of the broker rely on these individuals to receive and deliver information to other 
members in the network. As a result, these brokers occupy powerful positions because they 
control the flow of knowledge by restricting or releasing information as they see fit. These 
positions can, therefore, create a competitive advantage for these brokers over the whole 
network.  
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Strength of Weak Ties Theory 
As highlighted in an earlier section of this chapter, the strength of the tie can also vary between 
strong and weak. Strong ties exist when actors have repeated interactions and where the 
behaviour of another person can almost become predictable. Weak ties, on the other hand, 
involve actors who only have one interaction or only see each other occasionally. This is based 
on the strength of weak ties theory by Mark Granovetter (1973). The strength of weak ties 
theory was discovered during Granovetter’s dissertation investigating the network structure of 
job seekers. Granovetter found that his participants found jobs through distant contacts (which 
they met at a recent social event or by accident) rather than through close contacts.  
The strength of weak ties theory is based on two main assumptions. The first premise is the g-
Transitivity, which states that if A and B have a strong tie they are likely to have many 
acquaintances or weak ties in common, and that it is these weak ties that bring valuable 
resources to the network (Granovetter, 1973). The second premise is bridging, which connects 
individuals together to provide sources of novel, non-redundant information (Granovetter, 
1973). The overall argument suggests that our acquaintances (weak ties) are less likely to be 
socially involved with one another than are our close friends (strong ties), and therefore our 
weak ties are valuable because they are more likely to be the source of novel information 
(Granovetter, 1983). For example, if two individuals only meet once, for a short time, and there 
is a high probability that they may never meet again then this connection would be considered 
a weak tie (Brass, Butterfield, & Skaggs, 1998). This is why there is little incentive for deviant 
or unethical behaviour to occur among these individuals because their connection is weak 
(Uribe, 2014). However, when a large network has a number of weak ties and relies on the 
cooperation of these individuals, detecting them can be difficult for law enforcement because 
of the absence of links between some of the individuals in the network (Brass et al., 1998). 
Levin and Cross (2004) further maintain that useful knowledge emerges from trusted weak ties, 
whereby individuals trust others to be competent or benevolent in particular tasks despite not 
knowing them well. 
On the other hand, strong ties (also referred to as network closure) also play a role in the 
network, such as being a dependable source of social or emotional support (Granovetter, 1982). 
Provan and Lemaire (2012) explain that it is beneficial for individuals to maintain strong ties 
because it is these ties that are needed to build and maintain a trusting relationship where 
valuable information is still shared among individuals with strong ties.  In other words, 
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individuals are more likely to show support (material and emotional) to individuals who are in 
need of this type of assistance. Abrams, Cross, Lesser and Levin (2003) further emphasise that 
there is value in the face-to-face contact as it helps develop meaningful insights which aid the 
development of close relationships. Hansen (1999) also notes that strong ties can also be 
powerful platforms for knowledge sharing in networks. 
In the criminology literature, previous studies have also supported the notion that strong ties 
play a large role in criminal networks.  For example, Rodriguez’s (2005) study into the terrorist 
network involved in the 2004 Madrid bombing discovered that weak ties were a key feature of 
the terrorist network. These weak ties played a role in the operations because they could draw 
resources and ideological support. He outlines that these weak ties played a critical role in the 
terrorist network because they provided the network with the flexibility that allowed for rapid 
adaption to changes in the environment. Rodriguez further notes that they also provided 
stability (being able to continue the mission when other members were arrested) and security 
(given weak ties are harder to detect than stronger ties).  
Additionally, previous studies have also demonstrated that strong ties have assisted in 
facilitating corrupt deals because these corrupt deals were based on trust. For example, 
Lambsdorff’s (2002) study into illegal transactions and confidence for investors found that 
strong ties created environments based on trust that assisted in facilitating corrupt deals 
between officers. Similarly, Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2002) conducted a bribery game 
where individuals either accepted or rejected a bribe based on a long-term relationship with the 
briber (e.g. the briber meets the same public official over and over). They found that reciprocity 
and trust between the briber and public official could establish a stable exchange of benefits. 
They also found that at the beginning of the relationship reciprocal cooperation increased and 
then reached a high stability level after the coordination of the bribe (Abbink et al., 2002). As 
the current research plans to investigate trust in police corruption networks these studies 
provide key insights because they not only show support for strong ties, but they also 
demonstrate that these strong ties play a critical role because they can connect and facilitate 
corrupt deals based on an environment of trust.  
Although the strength of weak ties has advantages it does not come without criticism. As 
Tindall (2011) highlights, the definition of tie strength can be a challenging task due to the 
operationalisation of the term. For example, various indicators of tie strength between 
individuals that have been developed are not consistent across different bodies of research 
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(Tindall, 2011). Some examples include: frequency of contact (how frequently an ego 
communicates), social homogeneity (social similarity), network overlap (ego and alter share 
members of their personal networks), felt closeness (emotional closeness) or multiplexity 
(being related through multiple ties of different content) (Borgatti, 2011; Tindall, 2011). When 
the tie strength indicators are altered, this can result in different values, and some indicators 
can be misleading (e.g. the frequency of contact will overvalue neighbours and undervalue 
close family members who live far away). Similarly, the duration of the relationship can 
overvalue extended family members and can, therefore, affect how tie strength is conducted 
(Rosen, 2011, p. 869). In other words, just because a particular tie has the capability to 
communicate or transfer resources it does not guarantee that the tie is willing to transmit this 
information to other members in the network (Marsden & Campbell, 2012). For example, 
research by Marin (2012) recounts reasons why actors will decide whether or not to convey job 
information to contacts in their network (examples of such reasons are: maintaining one’s 
reputation or reluctance to appear intrusive by offering information that was not sought). 
Examples such as the ones highlighted by Marin (2012) add to the complexities of this concept.  
Dynamic Networks 
Like many forms of social relations, networks are flexible, adaptive and change over time. 
These characteristics of networks have been cited by scholars in the criminology literature over 
the past decade (Bright & Delaney, 2013; Morselli et al., 2007; Williams, 2001b). A network 
structure is fluid and dynamic and can “provide networks with a host of advantages including 
adaptability, resilience, a capacity for rapid innovation and learning and wide-scale 
recruitment” (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones, 2008, p. 8). Williams (2001b) highlights that 
membership among networks can be adaptable, whereby individuals join and leave based on 
specific needs or due to particular opportunities. In this sense, individuals can be recruited into 
certain criminal networks based on the resources of knowledge that they hold. Williams further 
highlights that some members may join or leave the network and play a specific role based on 
the needs of the network, while other members stay constant. Consequently, the network may 
modify their structure and membership to gain the necessary resources, skills and knowledge 
so that the operations of the network remain hidden. However, longitudinal data on criminal 
operations is extremely hard to obtain and, as a result, few studies have investigated the 
dynamic nature of criminal networks. The majority of the articles on longitudinal data have 
mainly focused on model development (de Nooy, 2011) and existing studies using longitudinal 
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data tend to concentrate on bright networks. As a consequence, there are only a few studies that 
have used longitudinal data to explore dark networks.  
In recent years, however, there have been more studies that have investigated criminal groups 
using longitudinal data.  For example,  Bright and Delaney (2013) investigated 
methamphetamine drug networks and found that the individuals involved changed their roles 
based on the network’s needs. They noted that this was done instead of bringing in less-trusted 
recruits. They also found that changes to the network structure also changed the centrality of 
individuals in the network. Malm and Bichler’s (2011) study used the Small Arms Survey to 
map out the small arms trade networks between 120 countries over a six-year period. The study 
found that external forces, such as weapon availability and market infrastructure, were the 
driving force behind the changes to the network over the six-year period.  
Another study by Xu et al. (2009) investigated the dynamic nature of the Salafi Jihad terrorist 
network over a 14-year period. They found that the structure of the network changed and passed 
through three phases over time (i.e. emerging, maturing and disintegrating). In a more recent 
study, Everton and Cunningham (2013) investigated the Noordin Top terrorist network from 
2001 to 2010 and also found that significant changes occurred to the network. The study found 
that between December 2002 and February 2003 the network’s degree of centrality increased 
(which occurred shortly after the first Bali bombing when Noordin acquired a cache of weapons 
left over from the 2000 Christmas Day bombings). They also found that between September 
2003 and December 2003 there was an increase in network cohesion (the Al-Ghuraba group, 
which was the student cell, was in the process of being trained). They also found a decrease in 
betweenness centrality (when Noordin and other key leaders were killed by Indonesian 
authorities) (Everton & Cunningham, 2013, p. 107). 
Despite the increasing number of studies investigating the dynamic nature of networks using 
longitudinal data they are limited in the sense that the existing studies revolve around criminal 
or terrorist networks. To date, there are no empirical studies that investigate the dynamic nature 
of police corruption networks. Therefore, this current study plans to address this gap by 
providing the first study to uncover the dynamic structure of police corruption networks. This 
gap in the literature has led to the following research questions: 
RQ2a: How are police corruption networks structured? 
RQ2b: Do police corruption networks change over time? 
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RQ3: How do police corruption networks operate? 
The first half of this chapter has outlined the definition of a social network and provided an 
overview of the key elements of these networks. Gaps in the network literature were also 
outlined, establishing that previous research using SNA has focused on uncovering criminal 
networks, in particular the majority of previous studies have focused on terrorist networks. In 
addition, the chapter highlighted the fact that only recently have studies into criminal networks 
investigated the dynamic nature of the network. As was established earlier, the main reason for 
the lack of research in this area is because of the difficulty in obtaining longitudinal data. The 
second half of the literature review provides a comprehensive overview of social capital and 
networks of trust. This will lay the foundation for the last research question regarding the role 
of trust in police corruption networks. 
Social Capital and Networks of Trust 
One of the most fundamental concepts in social network theory is social capital. Social capital 
emerges from accumulated and ongoing social relationships (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1990) 
and represents features of social life, such as norms, networks and trust which enable 
individuals to work together to pursue shared objectives (Putnam, 1995). This concept is widely 
cited among a number of different scholars (Bourdieu, 1986; Burt, 1992; Lin, 2001). Bourdieu 
(1983) defined social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are 
linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships in a 
group” (p. 248).  Coleman (1990) adds to Bourdieu’s definition by providing more of a 
comprehensive overview of the function of social capital. Coleman (1990) states: 
Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of 
different entities having two characteristics in common: They all consist of some 
aspect of a social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are 
within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making 
possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence. 
Like physical capital and human capital, social capital is not completely fungible 
but is fungible with respect to certain activities. A given form of social capital that 
is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or even harmful for others. 
(p. 302) 
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Coleman’s (1990) definition of social capital focuses on the idea that social capital can facilitate 
productivity at a group or personal level between individuals within an organisation. 
Furthermore, Putnam (1995) builds on Coleman's work of social capital, defining social capital 
as “the features of social organizations, such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate 
coordination and cooperation for mutual benefits” (p. 65–78). In Putman’s definition, the focus 
of social capital is on the network, where trust can aid in facilitating cooperation within the 
network. In other words, social capital, emphasises specific benefits that flow from reciprocity, 
cooperation, and trust between individuals within certain social networks. 
Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005) note that despite the different definitions of social capital there 
are three main underlying ideas. First, social capital generates positive externalities for 
members of a group. Externalities occur in a social structure “when a contact’s network (i.e., 
its members) influence not only their own work (first-order effects occur) but spill over and 
impact the focal actor to whom they were connected (second-order effects occur)” (Galunic, 
Ertug, & Gargiulo, 2012, p. 3). In other words, positive externalities occur when members of 
a network improve the outcomes and create broader benefits for the network as a whole. 
Second, these externalities are achieved through shared values and norms that are based on 
relationships of trust (Durlauf & Fafchamps, 2005). Trust in this sense is developed through 
repeated interactions, where an individual develops certain expectations regarding the 
individual’s future behaviour. Additionally, they add that trust and shared norms can also arise 
from informal relationships based on social networks and associations (Durlauf & Fafchamps, 
2005, p. 1644). In their view, the underlying assumption of social capital is that networks are 
based on processes that generate beneficial outcomes through norms of trust (Durlauf & 
Fafchamps, 2005). 
Dimensions of Social Capital 
Burt (2000) provides an overview of social capital in relation to social networks, as well as 
provides a figure that can be used as a roadmap to understand the components of social capital. 
Figure 3.2 presents a modified version of Burt’s roadmap of social capital. Burt’s figure 
outlines three network models of social capital: contagion, prominence and range. According 
to Burt, the model of contagion occurs when there is limited information, or the information 
available does not provide a clear guide to behaviour. Individuals, therefore, rely on observing 
their peer’s behaviour as a signal of what is considered acceptable behaviour. Likewise, the 
model of prominence occurs when, again, there is not a clear guide to behaviour, an individual’s 
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prominence (i.e. reputation, status, standing) is taken as a signal regarding the quality of 
resources. The third model range refers to the closure and brokerage of the network. As Burt 
describes, closure or closed networks enhance communication, while brokerage provides 
members with access to resources and can control information between individuals. Both 
closure and brokerage are important because individuals can affect “the flow of information 
and what people can do with it” (p. 350).  
Figure 3.2: Social Capital Presented in Burt (2000) 
 
Source: Information derived from Burt (2000) was used to create this figure 
What is prominent in Burt’s (2000) model of social capital is that there are both structural and 
relational components. The structural component refers to the position actors hold in a network, 
the cognitive component refers to the network’s shared understanding of the collective 
vision/goals of the network, and the relational component refers to trustworthiness and trusting 
relationships among actors. 
Structural Component of Social Capital: Brokerage 
As the above paragraph alluded to, the structural dimensions focus on the patterns formed and 
positions held in network relationships. In this sense, social capital is concerned with the 
structural properties of the network or, in other words, the types of ties within the network. It is 
the quality of the ties between individuals that creates a structure where new opportunities can 
occur through social capital transactions and resources (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1990; 
Granovetter, 1982). These ties can play a significant role in a network (e.g. accessing 
information and providing strong links between members of the network).  
Closure: closed networks enhance 
communication and facilitate enforcement of 
sanctions
Brokerage: structual holes provide broad and 
early access to control over information
Contagion: Information is not a clear guide to 
behaviour so observable peer behaviour is taken 
as a signal of proper behaviour 
Prominence: Information is not a clear guide to 
behaviour so the prominence of an individual or 
group is taken as a signal of quality or resources
Social Capital Metaphor 
(Advantages that individuals or groups 
have because of their location in social 
structure)
Social 
Capital
Contagion Prominence Range
Closure Brokerage
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This structural dimension overlaps with Burt’s (1992) notion that the location of the main 
players in a network can create a competitive advantage for that individual. This is especially 
the case when the actor is positioned in a structural hole where the actor’s position creates a 
valuable link to other members of the network—members who in other situations would be 
disconnected. As previously outlined, these positions in the network are classified as ‘brokers’. 
Brokers provide bridging capital which extends beyond the immediate social circle to 
individuals they may have no direct ties to or involve few personal connections (Putnam, 2000).  
Relational Component of Social Capital – Closure 
The relational dimension of social capital also overlaps with Coleman’s (1988) idea of closed 
networks. Closed networks are made up of people who have strong relationships and who share 
the same interests (Burt, 2005). These closed networks allow members to exchange information 
and resources in an environment where members’ reputations can be evaluated and determined. 
A member’s reputation is based on his/her past performance whereby “repeated good 
performance builds an expectation of future good performance” (Lauchs et al., 2012, p. 111). 
Coleman’s overarching idea is, therefore, that an individual’s reputation and trustworthiness 
can only be developed in a closed structure, rather than in an open structure.  
In a criminal context, individuals in closed networks can be persuaded and influenced by other 
members in the network (e.g. Brass, Butterfield and Skaggs, 1998; Brunetti and Weder, 2003). 
For example, Anderson (1999) notes that close groups of friends in disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods are more likely to become involved in the drug trade. Anderson outlines that 
this happens when the drug organiser approaches the group of friends’ leader. Once the leader 
becomes involved it is not long before other friends are also participating. Burt (1992) calls this 
phenomenon ‘redundancy by cohesion’. Burt outlines that everyone in the network is highly 
connected, where everyone has access to everyone else, which ensures the greatest level of trust 
in the network. This capital (also referred to as bonding capital) holds people together in groups 
and, as such, will have a significant influence on the levels of trust between individuals 
(Hawdon, 2008). Hawdon (2008) further notes that individuals with high levels of bonding 
capital are more likely to trust individuals within their immediate circle and are, therefore, more 
likely to view individuals outside this circle as untrustworthy. As such, the combination of 
bonding and bridging capital will strengthen or reduce the level of trust between members of 
the network.  
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Furthermore, Coleman (1988) outlines that closure is argued in the literature to impact access 
to information and to facilitate sanctions that reduce the risk for people in the network to trust 
one another. For example, a closed network allows actors in the network to reliably access valid 
and reliable information. The speed of obtaining information is slower as the network structure 
becomes less dense. When there are also specific sanctions understood and displayed by 
members of a network this reduces the level of risk associated with instilling trust in other 
members. These members know that if their behaviour is not classified as acceptable they will 
be punished for their behaviour. This creates a strong deterrent for exhibiting untrustworthy 
behaviour in the network. This argument is also supported by Granovetter (1985), who further 
highlights that the threat of sanctions among individuals who have mutual friends are more 
likely to create trust between these individuals.  Displaying untrustworthy behaviour will not 
only impact on the immediate relationship but can have consequences for relationships with 
mutual friends. These mutual friends may now have reservations and uncertainty regarding the 
trustworthiness of the actor in question. In police corruption networks this information relating 
to an actor displaying untrustworthy behaviour can create a ripple effect, where this information 
is passed to other members in the network resulting in a level of distrust with the member who 
violated the norms or codes of the network.  
Dark Side of Social Capital 
The previous sections have highlighted the positive attributes and effects of social capital. 
Equally as important is the dark side of social capital. Although social capital can be extremely 
beneficial to the parties involved, it is important to acknowledge that the outcomes may not 
always be pro-social. As Portes (1998) states “bad things are more commonly associated with 
the behaviour of homo economicius” and highlights, there are a number of negative 
consequences of social capital, such as “exclusion of outsiders, excess claims on group 
members, restrictions on individual freedoms and downward levelling norms” (p. 15). In the 
context of this thesis, exclusion on outsiders provide a protective barrier around criminal 
networks but at the same time it excludes them from the resources and opportunities presented 
to criminals within the network. This negative effect of social capital has been found in a 
number of previous studies involving criminal networks (see Bouchard and Nguyen, 2010; 
Uribe, 2014). Additionally, social capital can restrict freedom and further development of 
members within the criminal network. For example, the position of actors within a network can 
impact on the number of opportunities and freedom to pursue these prospects because they may 
not be in the best interest of the network as a whole. Networks based on kinship, such as Mafia 
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networks demonstrate this point whereby members are restricted to their roles and restrictions 
in the network. Similarly, highly connected corrupt police officers that have high corruption-
based social capital can be guided and influenced by strong norms of conformity. These 
uncontested norms by outside groups and traditional accountability measures can create an 
environment where individuals within the corruption network become a ‘law unto themselves’ 
(Keast & Brown, 2002, p. 11). This can be part of the reason why officers that engage in corrupt 
practices find it hard to remove themselves from the corruption network and as a result continue 
to follow the rules and norms of the network despite their lack of willingness and negative 
impact on society as a whole.  
Defining and Conceptualising Trust and Trustworthiness 
Although there are a number of definitions of trust, the two most cited definitions are by 
Rousseau et al. (1998) and  Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995).  Rousseau et al. define trust 
as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive 
expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (p.395). Mayer et al.’s definition 
similarly emphasises that trust is the “willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of another 
party” and that “these actions are based on the expectations that the other party will perform a 
particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that 
other party” (p.712). The common theme across both these definitions is the willingness to 
accept vulnerability and positive expectations (Lewicki, Tomlinson, & Gillespie, 2006). In 
interpersonal relationships, for trust to be built and established, a level of uncertainty exists 
regarding whether the other party is an individual who can be trusted. This uncertainty in 
another individual can be minimised depending on the particular antecedent presented. 
Although there are numerous articles that have been written about the benefits of trust, such as 
it being a lubricant for social relations (Fukuyama, 1995; Hardin, 2002; von Lampe & Ole 
Johansen, 2004), that it fosters and maintains cooperation (Rousseau et al., 1998; Tsai & 
Ghoshal, 1998), reduces risk and provides a sense of security (Lane, 1998), the concept is 
multifaceted and complex. Six (2005, p. 4–6) outlines many reasons why trust is a difficult 
concept not only to understand as researchers but also to build and maintain in everyday life. 
First, there are misunderstandings regarding what trust is and how it develops between 
individuals, organisations and societies. Second, interpersonal trust-building is an interactive 
process between at least two people, where learning occurs to develop an understanding of the 
other person’s trustworthiness. This process requires both parties to be willing to build trust 
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with one another. They also must demonstrate and maintain trusting behaviour through 
consistent encounters. Third, trust is not instant—as Six (2005) notes: “you cannot just ‘install’ 
trust” (p.4)—it is a learning process where trust is built over time. Trust over time is reinforced 
by previous experiences that have led to positive outcomes. Fourth, despite the effort 
individuals may make to build trust with someone else, once it is established there is no 
guarantees that trust with be honoured. Betrayals of trust can occur between individuals at any 
stage of the trust-building process, which can have severe consequences for the relationship 
continuing. Six outlines that the final complication is that trust is based on an individual’s 
predictability based on consistent behaviour. However, an individual’s behaviour is not always 
consistent with previously demonstrated behaviour. These actions may cause uncertainty, but 
it is unclear whether trust is lost and if so whether trust can be rebuilt. Six provides a good 
overview of the complexities surrounding trust; however, these points are further complicated 
by a host of factors such as an individual’s own predisposition to trust (previous events in one’s 
life can impact whether they are willing to trust or not trust another person) and the impact of 
our social network (e.g. opinions of friends and family including rumours and gossip in 
someone’s social circle). For these reasons, trust is a highly complex concept with multiple 
layers and no clear roadmap on how to develop and maintain it.  
Antecedents and Model of Trust 
Models of trust in the trust literature have taken several trajectories over the past few decades.  
A review of theoretical trust models reveals that trust can be understood using two approaches: 
behavioural and psychological. The behavioural approach views trust as a rational choice, 
whereas the psychological approach takes a more complex understanding of the interpersonal 
conditions associated with trust (such as expectations, dispositions and intentions) (Hardin, 
2002; Mayer et al., 1995). Researchers who study trust in a behavioural sense have typically 
observed this behaviour through laboratory games. In these game simulations trust is indicated 
by a party’s willingness to cooperate with another individual/group, while distrust is signalled 
through their unwillingness to cooperate and behave in a way that signals they are a competitor 
(Deutsh, 1958; Arrow, 1974). Research that takes a psychological approach focuses on 
observable behaviour and understands that trust may result from factors other than just 
demonstrating a rational choice to do so (Lewicki et al., 2006). Within the psychological 
approach, trust can also be distinguished as being unidimensional (confident expectations and 
willingness to be vulnerable), two-dimensional (confident positive and negative expectations) 
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and transformational (the basis of trust such as expected costs and benefits) (Lewicki et al., 
2006).  
Mayor, Davis and Schoorman’s (1995) multidimensional model of trust consolidates these 
dimensions of interpersonal trust. This model of trust, presented in Figure 3.3, suggests that for 
trust to be established a specific course of events will impact on the final outcome of trust. The 
model outlines that there are three antecedents to trust (ability, benevolence and integrity) 
which are used to identify the trustee’s trustworthiness.1   
Figure 3.3: Mayer, Davis and Schoorman's (1995) Model of Interpersonal Trust 
 
Ability, or competence as other scholars have referred to it (Butler, 1991), is defined as “a group 
of competencies or skills that enable a person or group to carry out a task within a specific 
domain” (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 717).  An individual needs to demonstrate that they have the 
ability and competencies to be able to complete the task at hand. Abrams et al. (2003) argue 
that competence can increase through frequent close encounters, leading individuals to better 
understand each other’s expertise (p. 68). In addition, this assessment is largely based on a 
specific context where a person may demonstrate high competence in one area but can also 
demonstrate low competence in another (Baron, 1988). For example, in drug syndicates some 
members may be knowledgeable and have the ability to only carry out certain tasks. For 
instance, a member may be seen as knowledgeable and trustworthy when it comes to 
distributing drugs; however, is seen as less competent and trustworthy in cooking the drugs. 
Mollering (2006) further notes that in order to build trust, clearly defined roles and tasks are 
                                                 
1 This is a simplified version of the model produced by Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) for the purpose of 
highlighting the key components. 
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required. It is in these roles that members can demonstrate their ability to perform certain tasks 
and it is through these demonstrations of ability that trust can be formed. 
Benevolence is defined as “the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to the 
trustor” (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 719).  Benevolence is represented by good intentions and a 
positive orientation on the part of the trustee, whereby the trustor creates an emotional 
attachment to the trustee in a caring and supportive manner (Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007). 
For the act of benevolence to have a significant impact on the trustor the good intentions 
displayed by the trustee need to be relevant and desired by the trustor (Tan & Lim, 2009). In 
the context of corrupt police, officers may already have a strong emotional attachment to other 
officers as a result of the strong culture, Brotherhood and nature of the job. As previously 
mentioned in Chapter Two, officers form strong bonds with other officers through shared 
experiences and common goals. Benevolence, therefore, can play a strong part in police 
corruption networks as officers behave in a manner that is consistent with the norms and 
expectations of the network, whereby corrupt officers support other corrupt officers. This is 
demonstrated by the code of silence, where officers protect fellow officers by staying silent on 
corrupt or deviant behaviour displayed by fellow officers. 
Integrity involves the “trustor’s perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the 
trustee finds acceptable” (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 719). Adherence and acceptability are both 
important principles, because if the principles are not accepted by the trustor then the trustee 
would not be considered as trustworthy (McFall, 1987). Examples of factors that might affect 
integrity are: “the consistency of the party’s past actions, credible communications about the 
trustee from other parties, belief that the trustee has a strong sense of justice, and the extent to 
which the party’s actions are congruent with his or her words, all affect the degree to which the 
party is judged to have integrity” (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 719). Integrity can be demonstrated 
among police corruption networks, where officers fulfil promises, behave in a manner that is 
acceptable or provide resources that add value to the network.  
Risk-taking is also required in the relationship (trust behaviour). According to Mayer et al. 
(1995), an individual must take a risk in order to engage in the trust action. This risk, however, 
is unknown until the trustor approaches the trustee to develop a trusting relationship. Until this 
takes place, no risk occurs because the individuals have not established that they are both 
willing to participate in a mutual relationship built on trust.  Finally, to complete the process, 
the trustor must demonstrate trusting behaviour with the trustee. An additional component of 
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this model is that it includes a feedback loop from the outcome of risk-taking back to the 
trustworthiness factors. Mayer et al. further propose that after taking a risk with the trustee the 
trustor will observe the outcome, and if the outcome is positive prior beliefs about 
trustworthiness will be reinforced (Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). However, if the outcomes are 
negative it will lead to a lower level of trust (Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). Trust is therefore 
reinforced over time by this feedback loop. 
The strength of this model is that it provides a clear distinction between trustworthiness, 
trusting behaviour and trust. In particular, trustworthiness is conceptualised as a characteristic 
of a potential trustee demonstrated by displaying trustworthy attributes (Kharouf, Lund, & 
Sekhon, 2014, p. 362), while trust “is an attitude reflecting a willingness to assume a risk and 
relinquish control in the hope of receiving a desired benefit” (Caldwell & Clapham, 2003, p. 
351). In other words “trust refers to the act of trusting or not trusting, trustworthiness entails 
an evaluation of those criteria that constitute trust and, consequently, influences both the 
direction and intensity of any decision to act in a trusting manner” (Bews & Rossouw, 2002, 
p. 378). Although this model has many benefits it does not come without criticism. Although 
ability, benevolence and integrity are seen as key components of trustworthiness it remains 
unclear whether each has a unique impact on trust levels (Colquitt et al., 2007). It may be the 
case that either ability or character is sufficient enough for trust to foster and that both may not 
be required (Colquitt et al., 2007). Furthermore, this model is useful for understanding 
perceived trustworthiness in bright networks; however, some of the factors may not be useful 
for police corruption networks. For example, perceived benevolence and integrity are not 
common factors or criteria in these networks.  
Trust Building and Dynamics 
Just like the dynamic nature of networks, trust is also considered a dynamic phenomenon. Trust 
has been cited numerous times as a construct that builds incrementally over time (Deutsch & 
Krauss, 1965; Gambetta, 1988; Gausdal, 2012; Hardin, 2002; Kramer, Brewer, & Hanna, 
1996). A review of the trust literature has revealed that there are three main levels of trust: 
deterrence-based (also referred to as calculus-based), knowledge-based (also referred to as 
cognitive-based) and identification-based (also referred to as affective-based). These levels of 
trust are visually depicted in Figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.4: Levels of Trust 
 
Shapiro, Sheppard and Cheraskin (1992) outline that the most basic level of trust is referred to 
as deterrence-based trust. This level of trust is driven by avoiding punishment for unacceptable 
behaviour. In other words, individuals will behave in a particular way in order to avoid being 
sanctioned. Trust at this level surrounds the idea that, at the very least, an individual will follow 
through with their promise and continue to act in a consistent manner. Lewicki and Bunker 
(1996) refer to this level of trust as calculus-based trust because the authors believe that 
“deterrence-based trust is grounded not only in the fear of punishment for violating the trust 
but also in rewards to be derived from preserving it” (p.119). They explain that trust at its most 
basic sense is a calculated decision to either demonstrate trustworthy behaviour (e.g. meeting 
expectations, maintaining a high credibility rating) and be rewarded or demonstrate 
untrustworthy behaviour (e.g. breaking promises and compromising credible reputations) and 
be punished for it (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). Shapiro et al. further note that trust will be 
maintained if the trustee believes that they will have future encounters (with multiple 
transactions) with the trustor and if the trustor has some level of control over the reputation of 
the trustee. In the context of police, because of the nature of their profession, they need to have 
this basic level of trust in order to fulfil the duties of their job. They rely on fellow officers to 
do their job effectively and consistently throughout their careers. This is also the case for 
corrupt officers working together with other corrupt officers to achieve a certain corrupt 
outcome; these officers again rely on other officers to maintain a consistent behaviour where 
activities are kept hidden. 
Building on deterrence (calculus-based) trust, the next level of trust is referred to as knowledge-
based trust. Other researchers, such as Lewis and Weigert (1985) and McAllister (1995), call 
this cognitive-based trust.  This level of trust is grounded in the other person’s predictability. 
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It occurs when an individual acquires enough information to assess and accurately be able to 
predict someone else’s behaviour (Shapiro et al., 1992). From this information, an individual 
will make a decision about whom to trust and under what circumstances, based on ‘good 
reasons’ that are compiled from evidence of demonstrations of trustworthiness (Lewis & 
Weigert, 1985, p. 970). This type of trust develops through interactions over time that allow 
individuals to develop an expectancy that the other party will behave in a certain manner 
because of consistent past encounters (Rotter, 1971).  
Shapiro et al. (1992) further outline that knowledge-based trust is based on several dimensions. 
First, the better an individual knows another individual (based on information obtained over 
time) the better and more accurate they can predict the behaviour of the other party (Shapiro et 
al., 1992). Second, the more consistent an individual’s behaviour is (whether trustworthy or 
untrustworthy) the more predictable their behaviour will be. Third, regular communication and 
interaction (e.g. exchanging information about personal attributes and preferences) is required 
to enhance the predictability of trust in another individual (Shapiro et al., 1992). Applying this 
to the context of police, this level of trust is developed over time. It starts when they enter the 
police academy and continues to grow the longer and more frequently officers work together. 
Officers who have repeated interactions with other officers can better understand their nature 
and can more accurately predict their behaviour. This is especially important in corrupt police 
networks. Officers need to be able to rely on other officers to behave in a consistent manner, 
not only for consistently but also to ensure that their corrupt behaviour is not visible to officers 
outside the network. 
The third and final level of trust is referred to as identification-based trust, also referred to as 
affective-based trust by Lewis and Weigert (1985) and McAllister (1995). This level of trust 
exists when the connection formed between two individuals is an emotional connection which 
can result in one member acting for the other (Shapiro et al., 1992). At this level “trust exists 
because the parties effectively understand and appreciate the other's wants; this mutual 
understanding is developed to the point that each can effectively act for the other” (Lewicki & 
Bunker, 1996, p. 122). This is considered the stronger level of trust, where individuals have 
full confidence and trust in another person, therefore reducing the need to control or to use 
surveillance tactics to check that their behaviour is consistent with expectations (Lewicki & 
Bunker, 1995). Trust that reduces monitoring devices is highly supported among scholars in 
the trust literature (Lane, 1998; Rousseau et al., 1998; Shaw, 1997). Some police officers are 
likely to form an emotional bond with other police officers because of the nature of the job. As 
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previously discussed in Chapter Two, officers are often faced with dangerous and sometimes 
life-threatening situations with hostile members of the public. In these cases officers can be 
pushed to desire needs of loyalty, solidarity and protection as well as develop strong emotional 
bonds with other officers (Chin & Zhang, 2008; Crank, 1998). 
However, when a trust violation occurs at this level of trust it can have a catastrophic impact 
on the relationship, where strong feeling of betrayal or hatred can surface in the trustor 
(Bachmann, Zaheer, & Edward Elgar, 2013). In the context of police corruption, an officer who 
goes against the code of silence and reveals the corrupt nature of his workmates can result in 
the whistleblower being be treated as an outsider and being ostracised. Whistleblowers of 
police corruption usually have to change professions and sometimes relocate to restart their life 
somewhere else. Now that they have been classified as untrustworthy and essentially a ‘rat’ or 
‘nark’ they will never be accepted back into the police Brotherhood as a trusted member. This 
is why there are very few police officers willing to come forward and disclose misconduct or 
corrupt practices by other officers; they would be giving up their career and reputation, which 
is not something most officers are willing to do.  
Building Trust through Network Embeddedness and Reputation 
A reputation for being trustworthy is an essential component for cooperation in any social 
exchange. When an individual is believed to be trustworthy others around them are more likely 
to cooperate with them because they are seen to have integrity and are considered to be a 
dependable individual (Dyer & Chu, 2003; Kollock, 1994). As Granovetter (1985) notes, the 
source of trust is likely to be the result of an ongoing network of exchange relationships. These 
relational exchanges can, therefore, develop into a network with high embeddedness that can 
provide a strong foundation for trusting relationships to grow and prosper. Pyrooz, Sweeten 
and Piquero (2013) outline that criminal embeddedness is a: 
… multidimensional, emergent property encompassing not only conventional 
network characteristics such as density of network ties or centrality within a deviant 
network but also the level of involvement in crime, isolation from prosocial 
networks, positions of leadership within a deviant network, and adoption of deviant 
values and identities. (p. 242)  
As Granovetter (1985) outlines, this type of relational structuring is, therefore, crucial to 
building trust and discouraging members from acting in a way that is against the norms of the 
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network. These networks are often made up of small homogenous groups (referred to as closed 
networks), which allow for the development of strong relationships where information 
regarding an individual’s trustworthiness can flow rapidly through the network (Coleman, 
1988). This is particularly the case in dense networks, where actors are able to obtain consistent 
information regarding other network actors (Burt & Knez, 1995). The interaction of members 
of a closed network provides a solid platform where members can share information about the 
reputation of other network members.  
In these networks trustors can also obtain information about a trustee’s previous behaviour 
through other trustors or third parties (Buskens, 2002). The information gathered can be used 
to update their own views and beliefs regarding a trustee, in a positive or negative manner. 
When information regarding an actor’s trustworthiness is verified by multiple sources it 
reduces the risk and uncertainty in forming a trusting relationship (Colquitt, Lepine, Piccolo, 
Zapata, & Rich, 2012). Therefore, the sources of information can provide credibility and 
verification for actors in the network. This information can, therefore, have an enormous 
impact that will either establish and enhance or discredit an actor’s reputation in the network.  
Reputation 
Trust can also be based on reputation, where the trustor relies on publicly-formed information 
held regarding the trustee. A reputation is, therefore, a characteristics or attribute ascribed to 
one person based on their previous behaviour (Wilson, 1985). Within a network, a member’s 
reputation is “determined by group members’ expectations of the person’s future performance 
based on his/her past performance within the group; repeated good performance builds an 
expectation of future good performance” (Lauchs & Staines, 2012, p. 111). Previous research 
has demonstrated that individuals form beliefs and understandings regarding another individual 
through information acquired from personal experience and observation (Anderson & Shirako, 
2008; Ferris, Blass, Douglas, Kolodinsky, & Treadway, 2003). In addition to personal 
experience and observation, there is a growing body of research regarding explicit information 
communicated by third parties (Buskens, 2002; Kurland & Pelled, 2000). In particular, research 
on triads and trust have demonstrated that third parties that are strongly connected to a focal 
individual influence others’ evaluations of an individual by providing explicit information 
regarding an individual’s reputation (Ferrin, Dirks, & Shah, 2006). More broadly, Gausdal’s 
(2012) study investigating the trust-building process in networks within a regional university 
college and a network of Norwegian electronics firms found that the trust-building process and 
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resource sharing have the capacity to build cognitive and word-of-mouth trust. Gausdal further 
notes that “these types of trust may also develop further to committed relationships and an 
enduring interpersonal trust in networks” (p. 27). Similar findings are cited in Uzzi’s (1996) 
study of apparel firms establishing new relationships based on a referral from a third party. 
They note that partners who are viewed as trustworthy by other network members are likely to 
be perceived in a similar manner by others as well. These findings suggest that an individual’s 
reputation can spread through a network, resulting in other members of the network also 
perceiving these individuals as trustworthy. Therefore, for an individual to demonstrate their 
trustworthiness they must have a good reputation.  
Being trustworthy, or at least having the appearance of being trustworthy, is also important for 
any criminal network. A lack of trust can be a huge barrier for individuals to collaborate in a 
dark network. This is supported in the literature in several studies across various criminal 
networks. For example, Morselli’s (2001) case study of the career of international cannabis 
trade smuggler, Howard Marks (a.k.a. Donald Nice), found that Marks’ reputation of being 
trustworthy came from his position in the network. Specifically, Morselli (2001) concluded 
that because Marks was a peripheral player, rather than a central player, he was able to maintain 
a low profile resulting in him maintaining a trustworthy reputation among members of the 
cannabis network. Morselli’s (2003) research into the Gambino Mafia family based in New 
York also found similar findings. Morselli (2003) notes that Saul Granovo’s success climbing 
the ranks among the Gambino family organisation was due to his ability to build and extend 
his personal network over time. Thus, demonstrating that Granovo could create strong 
relationships and trust between members in his family organisation. While Morselli’s (2001, 
2003) studies address how the position of particular actors in the network can impact their 
reputation of being trustworthy it is unclear if these finding can be generalised to other contexts. 
In the context of police corruption, a recent study by Lauchs and Staines (2012), investigating 
the Fitzgerald Inquiry, found that trust was obtained via references from trusted sources. They 
note that bookmakers were only included in the corruption network if they had a reference from 
an existing Joke member. In addition, they found that Jack Herbert obtained his position as a 
broker in the network through his reputation. Herbert’s reputation was so established that he 
was able to attract more bookmakers to the Joke, thus increasing the number of members.  
Although there have been a few studies that discuss reputation and trust within a criminal 
network, Lauchs and Staines’ (2012) study is the only study to empirically investigate trust 
within police corruption networks. The current study seeks to contribute to the knowledge in 
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this field by further providing more empirical evidence regarding the role of trust in police 
corruption networks. This gap in the literature has led to the following research question: 
RQ4: How do members of police corruption networks determine a person’s trustworthiness? 
Chapter Summary 
In summary, theoretical and empirical studies reveal that the structure of organised crime 
operations plays a huge part in criminal operations. Previous studies have uncovered that 
network structures provide several benefits to criminal operations, such as facilitating 
cooperation, access to resources and transferring valuable information among members of the 
network. SNA was outlined as a valuable analytical tool that has been used by a number of 
criminology researchers to uncover these network structures. Studies using SNA found that 
these criminal networks are structured around roles and key players within the network 
(Bruinsma & Bernasco, 2004; Kleemans, 2008; Morselli, 2001). Roles such as brokers play a 
large part in facilitating, connecting and controlling information in the network. Although there 
are many advantages of using SNA to identify central players few studies have investigated the 
structural elements within criminal networks and even fewer have investigated the structural 
properties of police corruption networks.  
Additionally, trust in networks is also a key area that assists in the operation of criminal 
networks. Trust is not instantaneous, but rather is built through incremental steps over time. 
Trust is built upon having a good reputation with members in the network (Gausdal, 2012; 
Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). A good reputation is built upon past behaviour and group members 
use this information to create beliefs regarding expectations of the person’s future behaviour 
(Lauchs & Staines, 2012). The level of trust between members can impact their reputation 
regarding their ability, benevolence and integrity within the network. Criminal networks 
operate on the basis that members are trustworthy enough to do the job that they say they are 
going to do, or trustworthy enough that other members know that they will not disclose their 
criminal operations to authorities. Despite the number of studies that cite trust as a lubricant 
for criminal operations there is only one empirical study that has investigated trust in police 
corruption networks. For the reasons mentioned above, the current study will contribute to the 
knowledge on network and trust by providing further empirical evidence to uncover the 
network structures and the role of trust in police corruption networks. In particular, the current 
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study investigates an Australian police corruption network. The context of the case study and 
previous police corruption networks are discussed in the following chapter.  
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Chapter Four  
Australian Policing Context and Case Study 
Introduction 
The implication of the previous chapters is that police corruption is a multifaceted problem that 
involves a number of officers from all levels within the police organisation. As a result, corrupt 
police officers tend to collaborate together to achieve successful outcomes, rather than work in 
isolation. Officers who operate in a network structure have access to resources and 
opportunities that may not be available if they conducted corrupt practices alone. As the 
introduction and literature review highlighted, previous studies on police corruption have found 
support for this assumption through empirical investigations of major inquiries and Royal 
Commissions. This thesis adds to the knowledge and literature on police corruption networks 
by also providing an empirical investigation into a major inquiry into police corruption in 
Australia. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the major inquiries and Royal 
Commissions into police corruption in Australia. The chapter commences with a brief overview 
of policing in Australia to provide a foundation for understanding how policing operates in the 
Australian context. Next, a review of the major inquiries and Royal Commissions are presented 
to highlight the magnitude of the problem in Australia. The remainder of the chapter provides 
a detailed description of the chosen inquiry, Operation Florida.  
Modern Policing 
Modern policing operates under a federated system, whereby six state police services—NSW, 
Qld, South Australia (SA), Tasmania, Victoria (Vic.), Western Australia (WA)—and two 
territory jurisdictions—the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and Northern Territory (NT)—
function within one federal policing organisation (Dean et al., 2010). The principal duties of 
the police are to serve the state in the “prevention and detection of crime, the protection of life 
and property, and the enforcement of law to maintain peace and good order” (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics [ABS], 2012). According to the most recent survey by the ABS (2012), the number 
of sworn officers in relation to the relative states are: ACT (n=798), NT (n=1528), NSW 
(n=16802), Qld (n=13087), SA (n= 5105), Tasmania (n =1372), Vic. (n=12 945) and WA 
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(n=6382). From the statistics provided NSW contains the most police officers, which is a 
reflection of having to police the largest population among the Australian states.  
Although Australia adopted a new professional structure of policing, incidents of corruption 
and misconduct were still revealed across a number of Australian states. These events of 
deviant behaviour by police officers were brought to light as a result of major investigations 
and the introduction of Royal Commissions. As was highlighted in the introduction chapter of 
this thesis, Royal Commissions are major public inquiries into defined issues and produce a 
comprehensive report outlining the results and recommendations from the court hearings. 
Within Australia there have been a number of inquiries and Royal Commissions that have 
directly investigated police corruption, while in other commissions police corruption was 
uncovered as a result of the evidence presented during court proceedings. These major 
investigations have exposed that corrupt practices have been found in four of the biggest states: 
NSW, Vic., Qld and WA. 
This thesis draws on a report by Police Integrity Victoria (PIV) (2007), as it provides a good 
overview of the major inquiries into police corruption between the 1970s and 2000. The report 
identifies several major inquiries within Australia involving some level of police misconduct 
or corruption. In particular, the PIV (2007, p. 116) report outlines the following inquiries and 
Royal Commissions that all revealed several levels of corruption that affected police and other 
public officials: Moffitt, NSW (1973–1974); Woodward, NSW (1977–1979); Williams, ACT 
(1977–1979); Lusher, NSW (1979–1981); Costigan, ACT (1980–1984); Stewart, Vic. (1981–
1983); Inquiry into Casinos, Vic. (1982–1983); Fitzgerald, Qld (1989); Wood, NSW (1994); 
and Kennedy, WA (2004). These inquiries are further highlighted in Table 4.1 to demonstrate 
the extent and magnitude of corrupt practices among police officers over the past few decades. 
Collectively this list of major inquiries shows how widespread and versatile police corruption 
is in practice. It is also apparent from Table 4.1, that many the inquiries involve officers within 
the State of NSW, signalling that there is a serious corruption problem within this state. This 
is the main reason why NSW was chosen as the region to further investigate police corruption. 
However, before this chapter proceeds with a discussion specifically around the inquiries in 
NSW, the next section provides an overview of the Fitzgerald Inquiry into the QPF, as it is one 
of the most pivotal and influential inquiries that drastically impacted and changed the policing 
landscape.   
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Table 4.1: Summary of Major Inquiries and Royal Commissions into Police Corruption 
Inquiries Date State Summary 
Moffitt 
Royal 
Commission  
1973–
1974 
NSW Examined organised crime in nightclubs in NSW and found evidence that police helped cover up the investigation into 
this behaviour. The inquiry outlined that “one of the weapons of organised crime is corruption of officials, particularly 
those, such as police, charged with investigating organised crime” (PIV, 2007, p. 117). 
Woodward 
Royal 
Commission  
1977–
1979 
NSW Examined illicit drugs in NSW and found that certain members of the NSW Police and the Honoured Society (involved in 
extortion, drug trafficking and murders) were involved in covering up the activities of local criminals for dishonest motives 
(PIV, 2007, p. 117). 
Williams 
Royal 
Commission  
1977–
1979 
All 
States 
Examined the illicit drug trade in Australia and found widespread police corruption was linked to the illicit drug trade. The 
inquiry outlined that “this behaviour was not confined to any one state but extended across the nation. Moreover, corruption 
did not dwell solely around the drug trade, but was also found more generally throughout various facets of criminal law 
enforcement” (PIV, 2007, p. 118). 
Lusher 
Inquiry  
1979–
1981 
NSW During an ongoing investigation into NSW Police, evidence emerged that police at almost every level of the Service had 
been involved in organised crime and its protection. The inquiry found “that the extent of corruption pointed to serious 
management deficiencies, the absence of proper procedures to deal with corruption, and responses that concentrated on 
individual offenders rather than confronting wider institutionalised corruption” (PIV, 2007, p. 119). 
Stewart 
Royal 
Commission  
1981–
1983 
Vic. Established following the findings on the murder of Douglas and Isabel Wilson (whose bodies were found in shallow graves 
in Vic. in 1979), the inquiry found “cogent evidence that Commonwealth and State officers had engaged in corrupt practices 
in relation to the deaths of the Wilsons” (PIV, 2007, p. 120). 
Board of 
Inquiry into 
Casinos  
1982–
1983 
Vic. This report was established to make recommendations upon whether a casino or casinos should be established in Vic.; 
however, it was also noted by Deputy Commissioner J. R. Hall of the Victoria Police that “We cannot escape the fact that 
much organised crime could not exist unless there was involvement by some members of police forces and other law 
enforcement agencies” (PIV, 2007, pp. 123–124). 
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Fitzgerald 
Inquiry  
1989 Qld In 1987, following a series of articles in the Courier-Mail about the police in Qld, and the ABC Four Corners program ‘The 
Moonlight State’, an inquiry was launched into police corruption in Qld. The inquiry successfully unmasked widespread 
corruption in the QPF, particularly embracing gaming and vice. It was revealed that “corruption extended to the very leaders 
of the police force, and tainted some politicians revealing a large network of corruption” (PIV, 2007, p. 125). 
Wood Royal 
Commission 
1994 NSW Established in 1994 to inquire into the workings of the NSW Police Service and the nature and extent of corruption in that 
Service. Significant systemic and entrenched corruption involving a wide range of criminal behaviours by police was 
revealed. This conduct was supported “by a negative police culture described as the ‘enemy within’ – it thrived on greed 
and valued allegiance to colleagues, even those who were corrupt, above loyalty to the police service. Dependent on group 
loyalty and a tradition of mateship and peer pressure, it gave its adherents little reason to fear exposure” (PIV, 2007, p. 127). 
Kennedy 
Royal 
Commission  
2002 WA In December 2001 public concern over several controversial investigations by the WA Police Service and doubt over the 
integrity of that organisation led the WA Government to establish a Royal Commission. Kennedy’s report disclosed “the 
existence of corruption ranging from stealing to assaults, perjury, drug dealing and the improper disclosure of confidential 
information” (PIV, 2007, p. 130). 
Source: This table was created from detail presented in a report by PIV (2007).  
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The Fitzgerald Inquiry 
The Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police Misconduct 
(hereafter referred to as the Fitzgerald Inquiry), arose from publications from the Courier-Mail 
and the broadcasting of the Australian Broadcasting Commission’s (ABC) national television 
program, Four Corner’s  ‘The Moonlight State’, (Lewis, Ransley, & Homel, 2010, p. 2). The 
Fitzgerald Inquiry was established in 1987 to inquire into possible activities of Qld officers 
involving: (1) prostitution, (2) unlawful gambling, (3) the sale of illegal drugs, (4) associated 
misconduct by members of the QPF, and (5) payment by named persons to one or more political 
parties in Qld and the purpose of such payments (Fitzgerald, 1989, Appendix 6, A37). The 
inquiry revealed that corruption within the QPF was widespread and particularly focused on 
gaming and vice (PIV, 2007). More specifically, the inquiry revealed that the Queensland 
Licencing Branch (QLB) within the QPF had successfully established a protection network of 
illegal gambling, prostitution and illegal alcohol sales in return for monthly payments (Lauchs 
et al., 2012; Lauchs, Keast, & Le, 2011; Manning, 2014). The inquiry uncovered that corruption 
was “embedded in the heart of the police. Generations of men had been moulded into accepting 
corrupt systems and responded either by joining in or by learning to work around it” (PIV, 
2007, p. 125).  
Significant prosecutions followed the inquiry, leading to convictions and jail sentences for four 
ministers and various police. Most notably, the Queensland Police Commissioner, (Sir) 
Terence Lewis, was convicted of receiving and accepting bribes and was sentenced to 14 years 
in prison. The former Premier, Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen, was also charged with perjury for 
evidence presented during the trial but was never convicted due to a hung jury (CCC, 2014). 
As a result of the inquiry a 630-page report was written which presented over 100 
recommendations.  
The Fitzgerald Inquiry is a pivotal case because the findings of the investigation dramatically 
transformed Qld’s policing landscape (Manning, 2014, p. 135). As a result, not only the 
policing structure in Qld changed, but the criminal and political environments also changed 
(Ivkovic, 2003). The impact of the inquiry also extended beyond Qld: “unlike other 
investigative inquiries, [it] has had a lasting effect both from its policy recommendations … 
and in the model it has provided for subsequent investigative inquiries” (Ransley, 2010, p. 22). 
These lasting effects have rippled through the subsequent inquiries into police corruption.  
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The first part of this chapter has presented a brief overview of the history of policing in 
Australia. It has also outlined the key inquiries and Royal Commissions that have investigated 
and revealed that police corruption does exist in Australian police organisations. Further detail 
regarding the Fitzgerald Inquiry was presented to establish a foundation for subsequent 
inquiries. As the chosen case study for this research is situated within NSW, the next section 
provides an overview of police corruption within that state. The following sections will address 
and outline the chosen case study, Operation Florida.  
Police Corruption in New South Wales 
As noted earlier in this chapter, although most states in Australia have had scandals regarding 
police corruption the clear majority have been in NSW. Police corruption dates back to 
European settlement; however, the 1960s and 1970s are continuously cited as a time when the 
NSW police organisation was entrenched in corrupt practices (Committee on the Office of the 
Ombudsman and the Police Integrity Commission [COOPIC], 2002; Wood, 1997). For this 
reason, this chapter starts with an overview of police corruption cases in NSW from the 1960s 
onwards. 
1960s 
During the 1960s there was an increase in illegal gambling involving starting price betting, and 
increases in the drug trade provided a fertile field for corruption (Wood, 1997). Corruption 
among police operated more on the basis as an ‘open secret’, rather than putting the time and 
effort into keeping the corruption practices completely secret from other officers. In other 
words, the corruption was an official secret but, in reality, it was widely known among many 
officers (COOPIC, 2002). This open secret and understanding between officers allowed 
officers to engage in corrupt practices more freely and with the understanding that if other 
officers observed their corrupt behaviour it would remain hidden without punishment from 
senior officers.  
During the 1960s there were a number of scandals that made headlines in the media, suggesting 
that police abused their power, specifically around detentions, interrogations and investigations. 
Some examples of scandals include serious injuries to a detainee, William Stanevics, which he 
alleged were sustained during his detention in at Sydney Police Station in 1965 and the physical 
assault of Geoffrey Rixon in 1968 by Sydney police (Wood, 1997). Both of these cases resulted 
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in successful civil actions against the NSW Police (Wood, 1997). At this time, there were also 
serious allegations that the Police Commissioner, Norman Allen, (as well as his successor 
Frederick Hanson) were paid $100 000 each a year in bribes to allow illegal casinos to operate 
in Sydney without police interference (Hickie, 1985, p. 59).  
1970–1980s 
During the 1970s there were specific concerns regarding the policing and management of 
organised crime within NSW clubs. There were a number of allegations that arose during this 
time relating to the handling by police of illegal gambling and bookies. One of the major 
investigations during this period was the Moffitt Royal Commission (1973–1974), also 
highlighted in Table 4.1, which focused its investigation on organised crime activities in the 
State of NSW. Specifically, the commission focused on allegations that Bally Technologies 
(formally known as Bally) was linked to the Mafia in the US and that they were planning to 
expand their interests in Australia. Through its inquiry it found that the NSW Police and NSW 
Government were involved in official corruption, where officers under-reported crime statistics 
(Arantz, 1993). Philip Arantz, a NSW police officer and computer expert, discovered that the 
NSW Police had been systematically under-reporting crime statistics for a number of years 
(Arantz, 1993). The reason behind the recording of lower statistics was an effort by police to 
cover up the corruption that took place. This disclosure of information regarding NSW officers 
was not received positively by the police organisation, and efforts were made to silence Arantz 
by discrediting his claims. The final Commissioner’s report outlined that he found insufficient 
evidence to suggest that police covered up this corruption but also criticised the Special Branch 
for failing to provide a proper and thorough investigation of these activities (COOPIC, 2002). 
Arantz’s claims were denied by the NSW Police and campaigns to discredit his claims were 
launched. Arantz was suspended and forced to undergo a psychiatric assessment. It was not 
until 1989 that Arantz’s claims were vindicated and he was awarded $250,000 in compensation.  
The Moffitt Royal Commission demonstrates two key points. First, that police were 
participating is misconduct in order to hide and make it appear that organised crime was lower 
than it actually was. Second, it demonstrates that there was a strong culture at the time to silence 
any ‘whistleblowers’ to ensure the reputation of the police organisation remained positive in 
the public’s view.  
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In addition to the Moffitt Royal Commission, internal covert investigations were being 
conducted to uncover the true nature and extent of police corruption within NSW. COOPIC’s 
2002 report on trends in police corruption outlined that in 1977 there was an internal covert 
operation to investigate allegations that numerous police at all levels were involved in a 
protection racket, where protection was given to particular organised crime groups (COOPIC, 
2002). The report outlined that allegations included: 
$14 million a year had been paid to police and politicians to protect illegal gambling 
and other criminal activities; organised crime was extensively conducted with the 
co-operation, protection and direct assistance of certain NSW police; and certain 
CIB officers were heavily involved in organising a variety of crimes including drug 
trafficking, prostitution and armed hold ups. (COOPIC, 2002, p. 26) 
These corrupt officers had a strong influence on the Police Association and the media, and 
utilised these connections to cover up their corrupt activities (Wood, 1997). Police during this 
time were under the impression that aggressive forms of complaints or investigations were not 
expected (Wood, 1997). This example further supports the notion that efforts were made to 
keep misconduct and corruption incidents out of the media’s attention. It further demonstrates 
that corrupt officers had a huge influence on the flow of information between police personnel 
and members of the public, thus suggesting that internal reviews would be ineffective in 
reporting deviant behaviour. Efforts to expose this type of conduct failed partly because of 
inadequate investigative powers and officers’ unwillingness to come forward and essentially 
‘rat’ on their fellow officers. It was not until the establishment of the Royal Commission in 
Australia that exposure of corrupt practices by police was revealed. 
As the Wood Inquiry’s Final Report (1997, p. 52) outlined, the 1970s were categorised by the 
following behaviour by NSW officers:  
(1) a ‘barbecue set’, comprised mainly of senior officers considered to have close 
links to illegal gaming, became powerful in the organisation;  
(2) corrupt police wined and dined members of the Police Association;  
(3) who had strong influences with the media and were skilled at using those 
connections;  
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(4) strong ties were established that enabled corrupt police to maintain a degree of 
influence within the Service after leaving it, which was used to foster corrupt 
relationships with criminals and gain access to confidential information; and  
(5) police did not expect any form of aggressive investigation of internal 
complaints. 
 
The summary of behaviours and actions by NSW officers identified in the Wood (1997) report 
demonstrates that officers collaborated and worked together to foster corruption. It also shows 
that officers not only had a strong influence on each other but also had a strong influence on 
external organisations, such as the media. Having power and influence further demonstrates 
that corrupt officers during this time could create a ‘protective shield’ that aided in keeping the 
corrupt practices hidden from police administrators. 
1980s–1990s 
The revelations and inquiries into police corruption during this period also revealed similar 
characteristics to previous periods. The Fitzgerald and Moffitt inquiries were followed by the 
Royal Commission into the NSW Police (commonly known as the Wood Royal Commission), 
held in 1994, to investigate corruption within the NSW Police (Wood, 1997). Sydney at this 
time was seen as one of the most corrupt cities in Australia, where police participated in 
protection rings, in particular ongoing organised crime protection and graft (Porter & Prenzler, 
2012). The final report of the Wood Royal Commission discovered a broad range of corruption, 
such as:  
… process corruption; gratuities and improper associations; substance abuse; 
fraudulent practices; assaults and abuse of police powers; prosecution — 
compromise or favourable treatment; theft and extortion; protection of the drug 
trade; protection of club and vice operators; protection of gaming and betting 
interests; drug trafficking; interference with internal investigations, and the code of 
silence; and other circumstances suggestive of corruption. (Wood, 1997, p. 83–84)  
The Royal Commission also exposed that corruption was apparent across numerous levels 
within the Police Service (e.g. senior officers, whole squads, detective groups and inter-
jurisdictional task forces) (Chan & Dixon, 2007) and reported that it found a “state of systemic 
and entrenched corruption” (Wood, 1997, p. 84), meaning that the Commission did not find a 
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few ‘bad apples’, but that the whole police system was affected. The Commission 
recommended that to fix this problem the focus of reform should not be on the actions of 
individuals but on cultural (and broader institutional) contexts which appear to be the factors 
that created, supported and allowed these practices to flourish. Furthermore, it recommended 
that the reform “lies in addressing the structure, attitudes and professionalism of the Service, 
with a view to preventing the occurrence of such conduct” (Wood, 1996, p. 2). 
The Wood Inquiry’s Final Report (1997, p. 53) also outlined that corruption was able to prosper 
during this period because of three main factors: (1) corrupt police were able to hand-pick and 
nurture junior officers who demonstrated their willingness to participate in corrupt activities, 
(2) a corrupt unit or management made sure that it was difficult for officers to report unethical 
or corrupt behaviour demonstrated by officers, and (3) as a result there was a great reluctance 
to target corrupt officers who had close links to senior officers. The reluctance and willingness 
of management and senior officers to combat these corrupt behaviours allowed corruption to 
flourish. The report further highlighted that senior officers were, in particular, supportive of 
noble cause corruption, whereby officers would green-light small-time criminals to eliminate 
or reduce large-scale organised crime activities (Wood, 1997). 
Case Study Identification 
The most recent major inquiry into police corruption in NSW is called Operation Florida and 
has been chosen as the case study to be applied in this thesis. Operation Florida was chosen as 
it is the most recent inquiry and initial reports revealed that a significant number of police, from 
different positions and levels within the police organisation, operated covertly together with 
other police officers. In addition to these unique qualities, Operation Florida also contains 
multiple case studies. These case studies will provide a base for comparison and will help 
strengthen the contributions of this thesis. 
Operation Florida was a covert investigation into NSW Police that took place between 1999 
and 2001. In total, the investigation identified 418 incidents of police corruption and 
misconduct from a number of different commands within the NSW Police and spanned a period 
dating from the late 1980s to 2001 (Griffin, 2004). Fifty-six of those incidents were the subject 
of examination in the hearings. A public hearing took place over 14 months (or 78 days), where 
seven separate segments (labelled Northern Beaches, Guns, Let’s Dance, Letters of Assistance, 
Newport, Magnum, Kings and O’Toole) of evidence were presented (Griffin, 2004). Table 4.2 
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outlines the segments, the total number of actors involved in each segment and how many 
individuals were charged.2 
Table 4.2: Operation Florida Demographics 
Segments Total Actors Affected Actors Charged Actors 
Northern Beaches 61 12 8 
Guns 19 10 9 
Let’s Dance 28 17 8 
Newport 17 12 3 
Magnum 24 11 10 
King 29 9 6 
Letters 32 7 2 
O’Toole 7 2 1 
A total of 99 witness gave evidence in the public proceedings: 32 were serving NSW police 
officers, 31 were former officers and 36 were citizens (Griffin, 2004). Evidence presented at 
the hearing revealed a large range of corrupt activities by NSW police, which included: 
soliciting and receiving bribes from drug dealers, organising or ‘green-lighting’ drug 
trafficking, stealing cash and property, reducing charges in return for payment, perverting the 
course of justice, assaulting suspects, ‘verballing’ suspects, ‘loading’ suspects, and organising 
or green-lighting break-and-enter offences (Griffin, 2004, p. i). The investigation resulted in 
14 of the 32 serving officers leaving the NSW Police, with 11 of them leaving as a direct 
consequence of the investigation (Griffin, 2004). Each segment is explored in the following 
sections. 
Northern Beaches Segment 
The Northern Beaches segment examined the conduct of detectives from the Manly/Davidson 
Local Area Command in the Northern Beaches of Sydney that occurred during 2000–2001. 
The segment featured primarily electronic evidence (such as telephone intercept recordings and 
listening devices) and utilised the assistance of two covert operatives (a serving NSW police 
officer and a civilian within the police corruption network) (Griffin, 2004). Testimony from 
                                                 
2 The numbers presented in the table are not mutually exclusive. Some actors were involved across several 
segments. 
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civilians, drug dealers and police revealed that corrupt conduct arose primarily from dealings 
between police and drug offenders, where it was disclosed that officers routinely stole money 
and drugs while executing search warrants and/or made monetary deals with suspects for a 
reduction in charges (Griffin, 2004). For example, some drug dealers were required to make 
regular payments to the police in order to continue dealing drugs in the area without any police 
interference. In addition to exposing the corrupt conduct, this segment also examined 
management and supervision issues at the Manly Local Area Command Level in an attempt to 
understand how this behaviour and activity could have taken place undetected. Consequently, 
the investigation found that six NSW officers were involved in police misconduct and were all 
criminally prosecuted. For a summary of the individuals involved, the allegations against them 
and the outcome of the proceedings please refer to Appendix A. 
Guns Segment 
The Guns segment investigated the conduct of officers in the Armed Hold-Up Unit or Squad 
(AHU) attached to the Major Crime Squad North (MCSN). The segment was primarily 
concerned about the collection or ‘stash’ of weapons by members of the AHU for the alleged 
purpose of ‘loading’ suspects to strengthen or secure a conviction (Griffin, 2004). Over 11 
days, testimony from 16 witnesses (including covert operatives: two former police officers and 
one civilian) and a considerable amount of electronic evidence was presented (Griffin, 2004).  
The initial focus of this segment was on the dumping of a stash of weapons by members of the 
MCSN during the Royal Commission during 1995 and 1996. It was disclosed that two officers 
borrowed a boat belonging to their Inspector and disposed of the weapons in the Hawkesbury 
River. In 2001–2002 some of the weapons were recovered from the Hawkesbury River which 
sparked important conversations between the officers involved. Many of these conversations 
were captured by a covert operative using a listening device. In addition, the segment examined 
two specific operations involving officers from the AHU. The first operation involved a 
number of civilians who were arrested in 1990 and charged by MCSN officers. In regards to 
the first operation, evidence from these civilians suggested that they were loaded with firearms 
and verballed into admitting guilt (Griffin, 2004). The second operation occurred in 1994 and 
involved the arrest and charging of a person (codenamed in the transcript) where it was alleged 
that this individual was also a victim of loading and verballing from the officers under 
investigation (Griffin, 2004). The evidence and testimonies portrayed serious police 
misconduct and, as a result, nine former police officers were found to have engaged in police 
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misconduct. For a summary of the individuals involved, the allegations against them and the 
outcome of the proceedings please refer to Appendix B. 
Let’s Dance Segment 
The Let’s Dance segment was an investigation conducted by Manly Detectives and the MCSN 
over a period of two days in February 1992. Over 16 days, 21 witnesses gave evidence 
regarding the arrest of two offenders (A1 and P1). It was alleged that police involved in the 
arrests had corruptly taken around $85 000 from the Manly Pacific Hotel and $25 000 from 
A1’s premises (Griffin, 2004). This money was then divided among the officers at the time of 
the arrest as well as among other officers who were not physically involved in the operation. 
In addition, there were allegations against officers who prepared the documentation for the 
prosecution of A1 and P1, deliberately misrepresenting how much money was found by police 
on the premise. The segment featured listening device recordings of conversations between a 
police informant and officers involved in the corrupt activities. The segment uncovered that 
officers participated in stealing money during Operation Let’s Dance and implicated others in 
the corrupt taking and receiving of money seized during the course of the Operation (Griffin, 
2004). Because of this investigation one serving and seven former police officers were found 
to have engaged in police misconduct. For a summary of the individuals involved, the 
allegations against them and the outcome of the proceedings please refer to Appendix C. 
Newport Segment 
The Newport segment focused on the activities of members of the NSW Police attached to the 
MCSN Drug Unit, who were based at the Gosford Drug Unit (GDU) and North Sydney Drug 
Unit (NSDU). The primary focus of the segment was in relation to the execution of search 
warrants at West Ryde and Newport on 21 February 1992 (Griffin, 2004). The reason for this 
inquiry came from information provided by a police informant who participated in the 
execution of the search warrant. The search resulted in the arrest of an offender who was 
charged with possession and supply of a prohibited drug (Griffin, 2004). The offender was 
committed for trial but it resulted in a not guilty verdict on both counts. The police involved 
were alleged to have engaged in misconduct. Specifically: 
• police stole a small gold ingot from the Newport premises; 
• police stole $10,000 in cash from the Newport premises; 
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• $10,000 stolen from the Newport premises was shared among the members of the GDU 
and NSDU; 
• police officers involved in the prosecution of L17 corruptly assisted L17 in relation to 
the charges brought against her; 
• members of GDU and NSDU shared $50,000 corruptly received following the arrest 
and charging of L17 (Griffin, 2004). 
 
The result of this segment was that two former officers were found to have engaged in police 
misconduct. For a summary of the individuals involved, the allegations against them and the 
outcome of the proceedings please refer to Appendix D. 
Magnum Segment 
The Magnum segment investigated the conduct of NSW police officers within Task Force 
Magnum. The Task Force was established in 1991 to conduct an inquiry into a growing number 
of armed robberies. The focus of the hearing was to investigate two specific cases: C11 and 
William Stanley Stuart, who were involved in the robbery of Danny’s Seafood restaurant in 
1991 (Griffin, 2004). C11 claimed that he was not involved in the arrest and made an official 
complaint to the NSW Police regarding the operation of the investigation. The investigation 
revealed that police had fabricated evidence to prosecute the alleged offenders which led to 
these police officers being charged with conspiracy to pervert the course of justice (Griffin, 
2004). As a result, one serving and nine former police officers were found to have been 
involved in police misconduct. For a summary of the individuals involved, the allegations 
against them and the outcome of the proceedings please refer to Appendix E. 
Kings Segment 
The Kings segment investigated four incidents that involved officers from the MCSN at 
Chatswood and Mona Vale Police Station. Over 12 days, 13 witnesses gave evidence. The 
evidence presented was primarily from recording devices and covert police informants (Griffin, 
2004). The first incident arose out of a proceeding in 1994 against King for driving under the 
influence (DUI) at Mona Vale. The police informant provided information to the court that 
King conspired with other officers to pervert the course of justice (Griffin, 2004). The second 
incident was another proceeding against King for driving with the prescribed concentration of 
alcohol in his blood in 2000 at Mona Vale. Three civilian witnesses gave evidence that 
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disclosed that King conspired with another officer to pervert the course of justice. The third 
incident related to the payment of a police informant. It was discovered that King had a corrupt 
arrangement with the ‘false’ police informant, where King and another officer, O’Toole, would 
keep most of the money they were to using to pay the police informant (Griffin, 2004). The 
fourth incident related to the laundering of money obtained by another corrupt police officer. 
As a result of this segment six officers were found to have engaged in police misconduct. For 
a summary of the individuals involved, the allegations against them and the outcome of the 
proceedings please refer to Appendix F. 
O’Toole Segment 
Dennis Peter O’Toole was named as a key player in three of the four matters about which 
evidence was given in the King segment. O’Toole’s involvement in these issues was as follows: 
• O’Toole, together with King and other members of the NSW Police, conspired to 
pervert the course of justice in proceedings arising out of King’s arrest for DUI in 
1993 at Mona Vale; 
• O’Toole was with King on the night he had the accident that resulted in King’s arrest 
and charging for prescribed concentration of alcohol in 2000 at Mona Vale; 
• King and O’Toole entered into a corrupt arrangement with M13, in M13’s capacity as 
a registered informant, to falsely claim a reward payment (Griffin, 2004). 
Letters of Assistance Segment 
The Letters of Assistance segment examined documentation by members of the former Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) of NSW Police. The primary aim of this segment was to 
investigate the agreement between police and two offenders on tendering documents that 
detailed assistance given by the offenders with a view of having a sentence reduced. Over seven 
days, 14 witnesses gave evidence (which also included evidence delivered in the Let’s Dance 
segment) (Griffin, 2004). The testimonies and evidence exposed that the letters of assistance 
were false. In addition, this segment found that other forms of misconduct took place by 
members of the DEA, in particular stealing money from offenders and being involved in drug 
dealing (Griffin, 2004). As a result of this investigation two police officers were found to have 
engaged in police misconduct. For a summary of the individuals involved, the allegations 
against them and the outcome of the proceedings please refer to Appendix G.  
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Chapter Summary 
The aim of this chapter was to provide an overview of the major inquiries and Royal 
Commissions into police corruption in Australia. The chapter commenced with a brief history 
of policing in Australia to provide a foundation for understanding how policing operates in the 
Australian context. An overview of the major inquiries and Royal Commissions followed. 
These were presented to give an indication of the severity and number of incidents of police 
corruption in Australia. The remainder of the chapter provided a detailed description of the 
chosen inquiry, Operation Florida. The details of Operation Florida were outlined in 
accordance to the seven segments investigated. This chapter demonstrated that: (1) police 
corruption is a problem in Australia, (2) that these inquiries revealed that a number of police 
collaborated to commit criminal offences, and (3) that the majority of cases of police corruption 
are found in NSW. As a result of these key findings from the review of previous cases of police 
corruption in Australia the research approach was shaped and is discussed in the following 
chapter.  
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Chapter Five 
Research Approach 
Introduction 
The preceding chapters highlighted that police officers can be influenced by a variety of 
personal agency (individual) and institutional (structural) factors. The literature review 
emphasised that personal agency factors, such as individual characteristics, are viewed as less 
important, in part because corruption, when uncovered, is usually widespread and includes a 
number of individuals in the police organisation (Lauchs et al., 2012; Lauchs, Keast, & 
Yousefpour, 2011; Perry, 2001; Porter & Warrender, 2009; Punch, 2003; Tiffen, 2004). 
Previous studies confirm that corrupt officers work together and operate within a network 
structure because of the benefits these networks provide, such as facilitating cooperation, 
access to resources and transferring valuable information among members of the network 
(Lauchs, Keast, & Le, 2011; Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011). It was also noted that these 
police corruption networks are hidden within the police organisation and rely on relationships 
based on trust imposed by an entrenched police culture of exclusivity, loyalty and silence. The 
opaque nature of these networks, coupled with the norms that support hidden goals and agendas 
can, therefore, provide a firm foundation for corruption to thrive. As noted in Chapter Three, 
previous research (see Agreste et al., 2016; Morselli, 2009) has distilled particular operating 
characteristics of other dark networks, such as terrorist and organised crime networks; 
however, the structure of police corruption networks remains under-explored. Furthermore, 
trust is referred to as the glue that holds criminal networks together and is a fundamental 
element within dark networks that aids in the facilitation and operation of these networks. Yet 
there is a lack of empirical research which specifically explores the presence or absence of trust 
in criminal relations and even fewer studies that investigate trust in police corruption networks. 
Having identified the major gaps in the literature, the following research questions were 
identified: 
 RQ1: What factors influence police officers to join corruption networks and continue 
to participate in serious corruption? 
 RQ2a: How are police corruption networks structured? 
 RQ2b: Do police corruption networks change over time? 
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 RQ3: How do police corruption networks change over time? 
 RQ4: How do members of police corruption networks determine a person’s 
trustworthiness? 
These research questions provide the basis for the chosen research approach considered most 
appropriate for this study. Given the intent of the study is to investigate the complexities and 
characteristics of police corruption, a case study is the most suitable approach as it enables the 
researcher to capture and analyse the complexities, practices, roles and changes in the network 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2011). More specifically, a single embedded case study design was 
chosen to present a unique and focused investigation around this complex phenomenon. 
Documentary and social network analysis were used to examine the structures of these 
networks as well as provide an in-depth investigation of the factors that aid the operation of 
these police corruption networks. 
Having identified the broad research design, the remainder of the chapter describes the 
methodology employed in this study as well as the types of data collected for analysis. The 
chapter commences with a discussion around the research paradigm and philosophical 
assumptions. The next section discusses why a case study approach was taken and outlines the 
details of each case. Next, the coding and coding software are discussed, followed by a review 
of the data analysis, both qualitative and quantitative. Finally, the limitations of the 
methodology are outlined. 
Research Paradigm 
At an epistemological level, this research is located within the constructivist/interpretive 
paradigm as the overall aim of the research is understanding and reconstruction. This paradigm 
is most appropriate for this research as its focuses are on studying human behaviours through 
meaning related to events, things and social processes (Creswell, 2014; Denzin & Lincoln, 
2013). At an ontological level, this research adopts a relativist approach, which assumes that 
reality as we know it is constructed inter-subjectively through the meanings and understandings 
developed socially and experientially (Denzin & Lincoln, 2013). This thesis will endeavour to 
achieve this through reconstructing the realities from the testimonies given in Operation 
Florida. The methodology will be hermeneutical in nature (Seebohm, 2004); it will encompass 
the interpretation of the text (document analysis) and SNA (network mapping) to reconstruct 
the corruption network that operated from the 1980s to 2000. 
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Mixed Qualitative and Quantitative Approach 
The overarching research question provides direction for the research approach. The research 
question here is to explore, understand and describe the phenomenon of police corruption 
through an embedded case study. To explain and understand such a social phenomenon a mixed 
qualitative and quantitative approach was adopted to be able to gain a comprehensive 
understand of the meaning of police corruption. Taking a qualitative approach assisted in 
acquiring rich, insightful knowledge into studying human behaviours, specifically assisting in 
the understanding of the interactions between behaviours of corruption police and the 
formation of corruption networks. In addition, a quantitative approach was also integrated to 
gain further understanding in identifying relationship variables. Incorporating a quantitative 
approach not only enhanced the research project’s validity and reliability but also assisted in 
identifying key structural properties of police corruption networks. The key relationship 
variables are used to compare the structural properties of the police corruption networks over 
time. 
Single Embedded Case Study Research Approach 
The research approach selected for the study is derived from previous work by Eisenhardt 
(1989) and Yin (2014). A qualitative, single embedded case study design is used in this research 
to address the how and why questions. The soundness of the single embedded case study 
research approach is grounded in its value, its constant application across different disciplines 
of research and its impartiality (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2014). 
A case study is defined as a study that “investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the ‘case’) 
in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context may not be evident” (Yin, 2014, p. 16). Case studies allow 
researchers to gain a deeper understanding of the research problem and help to explain a 
research problem or situation (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Tellis, 1997; Yin, 2014). The choice of a 
case study as the research methodology is ideal when conducting an inductive, in-depth 
investigation into a particular phenomenon (Stake, 2013; Yin, 2014) and this is one of the 
primary virtues of the case study method (Gerring, 2004). Specifically, a case study approach 
is suitable for exploring research questions that aim to answer how and why things are 
happening, as well as how events and people involved are observed over time (Yin, 2014).  
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A case study approach was chosen because there is a lack of comprehensive, empirical research 
on police corruption networks. Also, given the intent of the research is to investigate the 
complexities and dynamic characteristics of police corruption, a case study is the most suitable 
approach as it enables the researcher to capture and analyse the complexities, practices, roles 
and changes in the network (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). Similarly, Yin (2009) outlines that 
these types of research questions “deal with operational links needing to be traced over time, 
rather than mere frequencies or incidence” (p. 9). This reasoning also supports the current 
research as the focus of the study is not to record the number of corruption incidences but, 
rather, to understand the network’s structure and operational components. In addition, this 
research approach will also be useful in uncovering the factors that influence police to engage 
and continue to participate in corruption networks.  
Additionally, an embedded case study approach will serve as a foundation to understand the 
factors (or interactions) between corrupt police officers and the context (or networks they 
operate in). It will allow for findings across the embedded cases to be compared for differences 
and similarities, which increases the validity of the analyses and conclusions of the study 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Also, an embedded single case study approach will also assist in 
understanding what the right mix of corruption control is under specific circumstances. As 
Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996) state: “The right mix of corruption controls will undoubtedly 
differ from governmental unit and from agency to agency within the same governmental unit. 
Moreover, the optimal mix changes over time” (p. 198). Hence, this study will provide valuable 
insights for the NSW Police which can be used to establish critical corruption controls. 
Research Process 
The study’s research process followed a strict and deliberate step-by-step approach. The 
research approach was conducted in five phases: (1) literature review and identification of 
research questions, (2) preliminary research to establish an appropriate case study, (3) 
identification of data treatment and analysis, (4) developing a detailed coding protocol and 
actual coding of data and (5) data analysis and interpretation. Each of these phases is discussed 
in the following sections.  
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Phase One: Establishing the Research Design and Research Questions Derived from the 
Literature Review 
In phase one the literature review was derived from reviewing three key sets of literature: police 
corruption, network and trust. A systematic search of the literature was conducted using online 
databases and hard copy sources to find all relevant publications on police corruption. Each 
relevant publication was recorded in a master excel file to organise the literature into a table 
that could be easily searched and analysed. This excel file recorded information such as the 
title of the publication, author, key research findings and limitations. From the excel file, gaps 
in the literature were identified which resulted in the development of the research aim, 
subsequent research questions and theoretical frameworks for this study.  
Phase Two: Case Study Identification 
After establishing the research questions, phase two involved preliminary research to identify 
Royal Commissions and inquiries in Australia which had investigated police corruption.  A list 
of possible inquiries was compiled which revealed that most publicly available data derived 
from inquiries in NSW.  In turn, NSW was chosen as the geographical area for investigation. 
Once the geographic scope was narrowed down, a more detailed investigation of each case was 
examined to determine the suitability of the case. More detail regarding the short-list of cases 
was obtained from the publicly accessible summary reports on the inquiries’ findings, available 
on the Police Integrity Commission (PIC) website:    
https://www.pic.nsw.gov.au/Publications.aspx.  
Since the main focus of the research was to uncover the hidden patterns and structure of police 
corruption networks the chosen inquiry needed to meet the following criteria: (1) involve a 
number of actors, (2) be longitudinal data that covered at least a 10-year period, (3) the size of 
the case needed to be manageable within the time frame and (4) permission to review 
transcripts and publish information regarding findings was necessary. After considering the 
shortlist of possible case studies that addressed this set of criteria Operation Florida was 
deemed the best choice because it matched the above criteria more so than any other case. To 
obtain the official transcripts a formal request (a written letter with the research proposal) was 
sent directly to the PIC. 
To reiterate, Operation Florida was a covert investigation into the NSW Police that investigated 
corrupt activities by police officers between the 1980s and 2001. The trial led to over 6,000 
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pages of transcripts being produced, uncovering deep corruption practices. The testimonies 
themselves are what make this dataset unique and suited for investigating police corruption 
networks. Specifically, the richness of the data comes from the testimony made by serving and 
former police officers. Many of the officers involved provided a comprehensive description of 
the corruption networks. Specifically, the testimony revealed who participated in the network, 
how the network operated, types of corruption and factors that influenced individuals to engage 
in corrupt activities. The testimony from these officers also identified techniques they used to 
cover their tracks and identified the roles and positions various actors held in the network. 
Phase Three: Identification of Data Treatment and Analysis 
This project utilises a mix of documentary and social network analysis to guide the research 
approach. These types of data treatment and analysis were chosen because they are in line with 
the research questions and can provide insights into the dynamics and structure of police 
corruption networks by investigating the hidden patterns and connections formed. These types 
of analyses were also used to investigate the factors that impact an officer’s decision to engage 
and continue to engage in police corruption networks and to uncover the role of trust in these 
networks. Both analyses are discussed in the subsequent sections. 
Documentary Analysis 
A major source used in social science research is the utilisation and analysis of documents. 
Documentary analysis refers to the analysis of documents that contain information regarding a 
particular phenomenon a researcher wishes to study (Bailey, 1994). Payne and Payne (2004) 
further highlight that documentary analysis is used to categorise, investigate, interpret and 
identify the strengths and limitations of the documents used.  
As highlighted in the introduction of this thesis, obtaining documents to examine any criminal 
phenomenon is difficult for criminology researchers since much of the content within these 
documents includes sensitive information about specific details regarding criminals. As Punch 
(1985) further notes, studying a sensitive issue such as police corruption is difficult because 
access is vigorously denied by those who have an interest in doing so. For this reason, previous 
studies often rely on secondary documents, such as officer inquires or reports, government data 
sets and other forms of secondary data.  
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In this research, documents (in particular transcripts) from Operation Florida were used to gain 
further information regarding police corruption in Australia. Documentary analysis was chosen 
as a first step to identify the key characteristics of police corruption. It was specifically used in 
this study to highlight the key demographic information regarding the individuals involved in 
the corruption network. It also helped highlight the factors that influence officers to engage and 
to continue to participate in these networks. For example, admissions of guilt and 
acknowledgement of the motivation (e.g. influence of other officers, opportunity, increase 
statistics…etc.) behind an officer’s corrupt behaviour were analysed. Likewise, the role trust, 
trustworthiness attributes (e.g. previous behaviour, ability…etc.) and its impact on the 
operations of these networks were also analysed through the officer’s testimonies. Overall, the 
information obtained through the documentary analysis complemented and provided further 
support to the findings gained from using SNA. 
Social Network Analysis 
SNA is an empirical tool used to identify, describe, measure and analyse the structural forms 
and fundamental contents of relations among actors (Knoke & Yang, 2008). SNA is a 
quantitative methodology used to model actors’ relationships (both individual and collective 
behaviour resulting from the structure of the network and patterns in the relationships) (Morris 
& Deckro, 2012, p. 71). The main objective of SNA is to focus on the relationships between 
individuals and it seeks to identify the network’s organisational structure (Borgatti, 2012; 
McCulloh, Armstrong, & Johnson, 2013; Milward & Raab, 2006). Therefore, the social ties 
and patterns formed in which actors are embedded will have significant consequences for the 
actors involved (Freeman, 2004). The network structure can, therefore, influence, endorse and 
constrict individual actor behaviour (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Linkages between the actors 
(or nodes) in the “network are facilitated by trust between the actors based on reciprocity and 
the ability to reward cooperation by transferring resources to the complying party or in a dark 
network by fear of the consequences of non-compliance” (Milward & Raab, 2006, p. 349). The 
network structure created by SNA depicts the relationship patterns among the actors and 
describes them visually (e.g. using a network map) and statistically (e.g. using measures such 
as density, strength, centrality and structural equivalence of ties) (Morris & Deckro, 2012, p. 
71). As the focus of the research is to uncover the structure of police corruption networks, SNA 
is the most viable option for outputting key insights into the structural properties of these 
networks. The combination of documentary and SNA provided an in-depth investigation into 
the complexities of police corruption networks. 
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Software Packages Used to Code, Store and Analyse Document and Network Data  
UCINET Software Package. The police corruption networks were mapped and analysed using 
the software program UCINET. UCINET is an SNA tool that researchers can use to analyse 
the connections and relationships between actors as well as to construct network 
diagrams/maps. The network maps provided an effective way to visualise the social structure 
because they immediately demonstrate key features of the network, such as the overall structure 
of the network, the ties between actors, centralisation of actors and the density of the network 
(Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). Once the initial appraisal of the network was achieved, 
the network map was reshaped to “channel the principal analytical questions and facilitate its 
visualization for others” (Morselli, 2008, p. 38). In other words, it was manipulated to uncover 
key structural properties such as the centrality of key officers and overall network cohesion. 
NVivo Software Package. The qualitative data analysis package NVivo (version 10) was used 
to store, analyse and report on secondary data source documents. NVivo is a software package 
that allows large amounts of information to be consolidated, organised and coded in a flexible 
manner. It provided the researcher with full control over organising and coding the data on a 
case-by-case basis and enabled coding of discrete phrases of text. Additionally, the researcher 
had complete control regarding how information was organised using some of the unique 
features in the program. For example, in NVivo the researcher can create free or hierarchical 
nodes (e.g. parent and child nodes) to organise the information coded into a clear and orderly 
fashion. For this research project nodes were created regarding the segments under 
investigation as well as nodes to represent specific individuals. This feature allowed the 
researcher to cross reference demographic information across the cases embedded in Operation 
Florida.  
Phase Four: Development of Coding Protocol and Application to Coding Transcripts 
The development of the coding protocol and coding of over 6,000 pages of transcripts was a 
lengthy and complex phase of the research. The coding protocol changed and advanced into a 
highly-structured protocol through the coding process. The coding process and complexities 
with the coding are outlined in the following sections. 
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Coding Protocol 
A deductive approach was taken with the first stage of coding. A provisional ‘start list’ of codes 
was created using the existing themes and categorisation in the literature. The coding protocol 
provided the code, definitions, guidelines for when to use or not use the code, and examples 
derived from the literature and transcripts (MacQueen, McLellan, Lernal, Bartholow, & 
Milstein, 2008, p. 121) (see Appendix I for full coding protocol). This start list derived from 
the literature was used to help categorise the coding into existing classifications; however, if a 
section of text could not fit into any of the existing categories a new code/category was created. 
The main strength of this approach is that existing theory can be supported and extended by 
the study’s findings.  Overall, using an open approach to code the transcripts allowed for new 
insights and key findings to emerge. This method has also been employed in previous studies 
that investigate police corruption networks (Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011; Merrington 
et al., 2015). 
In addition to the development of the coding protocol a coding reliability test was conducted 
to ensure the coding and interpretation of text matched the coding protocol. Inter-rater 
reliability was conducted on the first three days of the trial, which consisted of 129 pages of 
transcripts, whereby any inconsistencies in the coding protocol were modified to reflect the 
agreeance of both coders. The coding protocol and samples of text coded were also verified by 
the primary supervisor of this thesis. 
Cycles of Coding 
Following Saldaña’s (2013) categorisation, coding was conducted in two major stages: first 
and second cycle coding. The purpose of first cycle coding is to initially assign codes to 
sections of data, while the second cycle coding is a more refined coding method as a result of 
the first cycle coding (Saldaña, 2013, p. 73).  The cycles of coding are visually presented in 
Figure 5.1 and will be explained in more detail in the following sections. 
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Figure 5.1: Coding Process 
 
First Cycle of Coding 
During the first cycle of coding, three types of coding were utilised—attribute, initial and 
simultaneous coding—to gain an in-depth investigation into police corruption networks. The 
purpose of the first cycle of coding was to capture the basic descriptive information that would 
allow for a clear understanding of actor demographics and corruption events that would assist 
in reconstructing the police corruption network. This type of coding is referred to as attribute 
coding, which entails “basic descriptive information such as the fieldwork setting, participant 
characteristics or demographics, data format, and other variables of interest for qualitative and 
some application of quantitative analysis” (Saldaña, 2013, p. 79).  Initial coding was also 
utilised during the first cycle of coding. Initial coding was applied to gain a deeper reflection 
regarding the contents and nuances of the codes produced (Saldaña, 2009, p. 81). Specifically, 
this initial coding phase was conducted to identify the strengths and weaknesses in the coding 
protocol.  Complementary to this, simultaneous coding was also used during this coding phase. 
Simultaneous coding can be defined as “the application of two or more different codes to a 
single qualitative datum, or the overlapped occurrence of two or more codes applied to 
sequential units of qualitative data” (Saldaña, 2013, p. 81). The application of simultaneous 
coding was necessary because it allowed a number of codes to be applied to a single piece of 
text. This type of coding was very relevant when capturing descriptives (e.g. corrupt actors, 
locations and dates of corruption incidents) as well as codes outlined in the coding protocol. 
Specifically, individuals associated with each segment were identified and captured in a table 
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to provide an overview of the actors involved in this investigation (see appendix H for full 
table). This resulted in the following demographics per segment: Norther Beaches (N=62), 
Guns (N=20), Let’s Dance (N=29), Newport (N=17), Magnum (N=24), King (N=29), Letters 
(M=32) and O’Toole (N=7), demonstrating the Northern Beaches segment involved the most 
number of individuals, while the O’Toole segment involved the least3.  
In addition to the broad overview of the individuals involved within each segment, 27 
individuals were identified and used in the analysis because they were criminally charged or 
labelled as having engaged in misconduct. Further demographics were captured for each of 
these individuals, such as the year they joined the police force, their rank at the time of the trial 
and associated segment. This is captured in Table 5.2. This identification highlighted the range 
in experience and rank from officers involved in the corruption network. 
Table 5.1: Demographics of Charged Actors 
Name Year 
Joined 
Force 
Rank Time of Trial Segment 
Bernasconi 1967 Detective Sergeant Magnum 
Blake 1982 Detective Constable Magnum 
DavidsonS 1995 Senior Constable NBeaches 
DavidsonJ 1971 Commander Task Force Magnum Magnum 
Dowding 1978 Detective Senior Constable Guns, Magnum 
Ehsman 1973 Detective Senior Constable Guns 
F7 1980 Detective Senior Constable Guns, LetsDance, 
Magnum 
Hill 1977 Sergeant NBeaches, Newport 
Hulmes 1968 Inspector of Police LetsDance 
Irwin 1972 Detective Senior Constable Magnum 
Jasper 1989 Senior Constable NBeaches 
Kempnich 1979 Detective Senior Constable Letters 
Kendall 1974 Detective Inspector Guns, LetsDance 
King 1978 Detective Senior Constable Guns, LetsDance, 
Magnum, King 
M5 1980 Detective Senior Constable Guns, Newport, 
Magnum, King 
McDougall 1992 Senior Constable King 
Messenger 1976 Detective Sergeant NBeaches 
Monk 1980 Assistant Commissioner LetsDance 
Moore 1984 Senior Constable King 
                                                 
3 Note that these numbers are not mutually exclusive as some individuals were involved in numerous segments. 
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N1 1969 Detective Senior Constable Guns, LetsDance, 
Magnum 
O'Toole 1967 Inspector Guns, LetsDance, King 
Patison 1978 Detective Senior Constable NBeaches 
Peattie 1976 Detective Sergeant NBeaches 
S8 1965 Sergeant King 
Smith 1973 Inspector Guns, LetsDance 
Wilding 1977 Detective Sergeant Letters 
Wrice 1975 Detective Senior Constable Magnum 
The complexity of coding certain actors within the transcripts occurred because some of the 
identities of particular individuals involved in the case were either ‘blacked out’ or 
interchanged with a codename. Individuals who were fully blacked out were not included in 
this research because it was impossible to identify these individuals as actors in the corruption 
network or not. Therefore, only charged actors (either charged with misconduct or criminally) 
were coded in the transcripts.  
In addition to specific actors, events (defined as specific corruption events) were also coded 
for the purpose of understanding the dynamic changes of the network over time. This 
information assisted in visually reconstructing the police corruption networks and analytically 
measuring the changes in structure. The complexity of coding these events occurred when 
specific dates were not disclosed in the transcripts. Although there were only a few events 
without dates it added to the complexity of the coding. These events were still coded to 
understand the number of corruption events particular officers were involved in but they were 
not included in analysing the structure of the networks. 
Second Cycle of Coding 
Following the first cycle of coding a second cycle of coding was undertaken to group together 
specific themes that emerged from the first cycle of coding. Themes were created for the 
purpose of defining patterns across the embedded case studies and were used as a base to 
compare similarities and differences between corruption networks. Saldaña (2013) provides a 
useful explanation of this step: “They pull together a lot of material from first cycle coding into 
more meaningful and parsimonious units of analysis” (Saldaña, 2013, p. 86). To elaborate 
further Saldaña (2013, p. 86) highlights that pattern coding helps researchers create and develop 
a cognitive map which helps provide the groundwork for cross-case analysis by surfacing 
common themes. For example, some of the initial codes were collapsed into broader categories 
to allow for key themes to emerge. This was an important step in the current research because 
118 
 
it provided a more contained and manageable set of themes. These themes were then used to 
organise and interpret the key findings of this study. 
Network Coding: Connections, Relationships, and Corruption Events 
Any SNA begins with a matrix (see Table 5.2 for example). The connections between actors 
in the network were first coded in a binary format (e.g. 0 meaning that there is no presence or 
1 that there is a presence of a relationship). This type of network is considered to be 1-mode 
network data. For two individuals to be coded as having the presence of a relationship it needed 
to be clearly stated in the transcripts (e.g. ‘officer X and officer Y buried stolen cash together’). 
All forms of relationships were coded (e.g. working relations, social relations and corruption 
relations) to fully understand the dynamics of the police officers involved and a selection of 
these relationship ties were used in the analysis. The direction of the relationship/ties was not 
coded due to missing information in the data. The purpose was to capture the ties between 
actors in order to help understand the structure of the whole network as well as the ego networks 
of key players and was uploaded to UCINET. 
Table 5.2: Binary Tie Data – 1-mode Network Data 
 Actor A Actor B Actor C Actor D 
Actor A - 0 1 0 
Actor B 0 - 1 1 
Actor C 0 0 - 1 
Actor D 1 1 1 - 
 
Second, the relationships were coded for ordinal values (such as the type of interaction) as well 
as the continuous variability within the relationship (e.g. coding the events each actor was tied 
too) (see Table 5.3 for example). This type of network is considered a 2-mode network data. 
The purpose was to capture the ties between specific corruption events and actors involved. 
Each of these events were used in the analysis to determine the links between officers in the 
network (therefore helping to understand the structure of the corruption network). Utilising the 
measure in UCINET, this data helped identify which actors were more frequently involved and 
helped in understanding the centrality of these players in the network. 
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Table 5.3: Binary Tie Data – 2-mode Network Data 
 Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 
Actor A - 0 1 1 
Actor B 0 - 1 1 
Actor C 0 0 - 1 
Actor D 1 1 1 - 
 
 
Coding of Trust and Trustworthiness 
In seeking to investigate and analyse trustworthiness within police corruption networks it is 
useful to outline the distinction between the terms ‘trustworthiness’ and ‘trust’ within this 
study. Trustworthiness is conceptualised as a characteristic of a “potential trustee (an entity 
who may or may not be trusted)” (Kharouf et al., 2014, p. 362). Whereas the term trust is 
conceptualised as “an attitude reflecting a willingness to assume a risk and relinquish control 
in the hope of receiving a desired benefit” (Caldwell & Clapham, 2003, p. 351). In other words, 
“trust refers to the act of trusting or not trusting, trustworthiness entails an evaluation of those 
criteria that constitute trust and consequently, influences both the direction and intensity of any 
decision to act in a trusting manner” (Bews & Rossouw, 2002, p. 378). Therefore, one can only 
trust actors who are trustworthy or have the appearance of being trustworthy. Trust is a 
multifaceted concept that is very difficult to measure and identify. For this reason, the study 
focused on coding instances where officers demonstrated their trustworthiness in the corruption 
network (e.g. loyalty, reputation or following orders). The coding of demonstrations of 
trustworthiness helped to provide key insights into the overall role of trust in police corruption 
networks. 
Phase Five: Data Analysis and Interpretation 
 
Levels Used to Analyse the Structure in Data 
As Knoke and Yang (2008) outline, there are a number of levels to analyse the structures in the 
data: egocentric network, dyadic network, triadic relations and the complete network. The first 
and simplest level is the egocentric network, which focuses on relationships and connections a 
specific individual (also known as an ego) have, which collectively make up an individual’s 
personal network (Knoke & Yang, 2008, p. 13). This level of analysis is highly relevant to the 
current research because actors in the network are unlikely to know and have contact with 
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everyone in the network and therefore allows the researcher to build the network based on 
individuals within the network. The second level is the dyadic network which consists of pairs 
of actors. This type of analyses investigates and analyses the ties that exist between two actors 
(e.g. brokers or intermediaries). More specifically, dyadic relations can be analysed regarding 
the strength, duration or intensity of the relationship (Knoke & Yang, 2008, p. 13). The third 
level is to explore triadic relations, which means: “A set of N actors has N/3 triples, the number 
of ways to take N actors, three at a time. All possible combinations of present and absent choice 
relations among the actors in a triple generates a set of 16 distinct triad types” (Knoke & Yang, 
2008, p. 13). The fourth level investigates the complete network as a whole. This level is vital 
for the current research as it provides a macro level of analysis, and information about every 
relation can be used to understand the entire network’s relations.  
As this project’s overarching aim is to understand the structural properties and to investigate 
whether these properties change over time the whole network was first analysed using 
UCINET. In other words, the data derived for each segment were assessed as a whole to analyse 
the overall network properties. The whole network was then analysed during four phases of 
operation to gain a deeper understanding of the dynamic nature of the network. As the first 
corruption incident was identified in the transcripts to have taken place in 1987 and the last one 
in 2001 the 14-year span was divided into four time frames: 
 1987–1990 
 1991–1994 
 1995–1998 
 1999–2001 
Breaking the corruption network into four distinct phases allowed for a more in-depth analysis 
to be conducted to examine the changes in the network over time. Initially, three periods were 
identified and analysed to show the network changes, but upon closer investigation, the time 
periods were further divided into four phases because it allowed for more network changes to 
be observed and analysed. The identification of these changes was established by using several 
fundamental network measures, which are discussed in the following sections. 
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Fundamental Network Measures to Uncover Network Structure 
 
Centrality 
Any study involving the use of SNA involves particular structural metrics in order to 
understand the structural properties of the network. This study employs a number of different 
metrics to explore the characteristics and connections within police corruption networks. 
Centrality is one of the key measures used in this thesis. Centrality is “the relative importance 
of a node and gives an indication about how influential a node is within the network” (Ilhan, 
Gündüz-Ögüdücü, & Etaner-Uyar, 2014, p. 4). The different types of centrality, in particular 
betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, degree centrality and eigenvector centrality, are 
all used in this study. Each of these metrics is explained below. 
Betweenness centrality is the point in a “communication network [that] is central to the extent 
that it falls on the shortest path between pairs of other points” (Freeman, 1977, p. 35). It 
“focuses on the number of contacts within a network that pass through a certain individual” 
(Bright, Hughes & Chalmers, 2012, p. 163) which can be used to identify individuals who are 
in key channels for the flow of information. Closeness centrality measures the distance between 
a particular node and all other nodes in the network (Freeman, 1979) and “is a proxy for how 
easy a particular individual can connect with other members” (Bright, Hughes & Chalmers, 
2012, p. 163). Degree centrality measures the total graph-theoretic distance (e.g. the number 
of nodes to which a particular node connects) from an ego to all others in network (Freeman, 
1979).  The assumption is that the more central an actor is within the network, the more that 
actor has access to resources (including other actors) and can influence the network as a whole. 
Capturing the positions of the actors in the current study helped reveal whether centrality 
played a role in the operations of the network. These measures also assisted in revealing 
whether the network contains structural holes and whether there was a need and reliance on 
brokers to link an otherwise disconnected network together. Brokers or central players in strong 
networks will have more bargaining power than other individuals and therefore will have more 
control of the flow of information in the network. Individuals on either side of the broker rely 
on these individuals to receive and deliver information to other members in the network. 
Therefore, brokers hold the key to the criminal network; they are in control of the flow of 
knowledge and can restrict or release information as they see fit in order to create a competitive 
advantage over the whole network. As the value of brokers has been a consistent finding in the 
criminology literature, such as in drug trafficking (Morselli, 2001; Natarajan, 2006; Pearson et 
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al., 2001), police corruption (Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011) and other criminal 
enterprises (Morselli, 2005), the findings in this study provided further empirical evidence  
In addition to the centrality measures mentioned above, other network measures were used 
reveal overall network characteristics. For example, cohesion measures, such as density, size 
and core-periphery provided valuable information regarding the overall network components. 
The measures were crucial in mapping out the changes in the corruption network overtime. 2-
mode measures were also utilised to understand an officer’s involved (or lack of involvement) 
with certain corruption events. This information allowed for a comparison between 1-mode 
and 2-mode data. 
To summarise the remaining centrality and cohesion measures used in this thesis, Table 5.4  
provides an adapted version from Borgatti, Jones, and Everett’s (1998) research.  
Table 5.4: Other Network Measures 
Measures Definition Relation to Social Capital 
Cohesion Measures 
Density (Harary, 1969) The proportion of group 
members who are tied (with a 
‘positive’ relation, such as 
friendship, respect, 
acquaintance, past 
collaboration, etc.). 
Positive. Curvilinear for 
intellectual conflict 
relations; Negative for 
personal conflict relations. 
Degree/Size (Burt, 
1983) 
The number of alters that an 
ego is directly connected to, 
possibly weighted by strength 
of tie. 
Positive. The more people 
you have relationships with, 
the greater the chance that 
one of them has the resource 
you need. 
Average or Maximum 
Distance (Harary, 1969) 
The average (or maximum) 
graph-theoretic distance 
between all pairs of members. 
Negative. Smaller distances 
mean faster communication 
among members, which is 
an asset. 
Centralisation/Core 
Periphery Structure 
The extent to which the 
network is NOT divided into 
Positive. Controlling for 
density, core–periphery 
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(Borgatti & Everett, 
1996; Freeman, 1979) 
cliques that have few 
connections between groups. 
structures are easier to 
coordinate than fractioned 
networks. 
Centrality Measures 
Closeness (Freeman, 
1979) 
The total graph-theoretic 
distance from an ego to all 
others in network. An inverse 
measure of centrality: large 
values indicate less centrality. 
Negative. The greater the 
distance to other nodes, the 
less the chance of receiving 
information in a timely way. 
Betweenness (Freeman, 
1979) 
The number of times that an 
ego falls along the shortest 
path between two other actors. 
Positive. Actors with high 
betweenness link together 
actors who are otherwise 
unconnected, creating 
opportunities for 
exploitation of information 
and control benefits. 
Eigenvector (Bonacich, 
1972) 
The extent to which an ego is 
connected to nodes who are 
themselves high in eigenvector 
centrality. 
Positive. An actor has high 
eigenvector scores when 
they are connected to well-
connected others. 
Group Centrality Measures 
Group Degree (Everett 
& Borgatti, 1999) 
Number of outsiders tied to at 
least one group member. 
Positive. As noted by 
Ancona (1990), a member’s 
positive relationships with 
the rest of the network are 
an asset to the team. 
Group Closeness 
(Everett & Borgatti, 
1999)  
Total distance of the group to 
all non-members. Distance 
from group to outsider usually 
defined as minimum distance 
from outsider to any insider. 
Negative. The greater the 
distance to outsiders, the 
less timely information 
available to the team. 
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Group Betweenness 
(Everett & Borgatti, 
1999) 
The number of ties that the 
shortest path between any two 
outsiders passes through a 
group member. 
Positive. Teams scoring 
high on group betweenness 
have few redundant ties 
with outsiders, generating 
exploitable structural holes. 
2-Mode Centrality Measures 
2-mode Closeness 
(Borgatti & Everett, 
1997; Faust, 1997)  
Total distance of the group to 
all other groups and non-
member individuals. 
Negative. The greater the 
distance to outside entities, 
the less timely information 
available to the team. 
2-mode Betweenness 
(Borgatti & Everett, 
1997; Faust, 1997)  
The number of times that the 
shortest path between any two 
entities (groups or individuals) 
passes through the group. 
Positive. Teams scoring 
high on 2-mode 
betweenness have members 
who belong to groups that 
share few members. This 
lack of redundancy 
generates exploitable 
structural holes. 
2-mode Eigenvector 
(Bonacich, 1991; 
Borgatti & Everett, 
1997; Faust, 1997) 
A group is central to the extent 
that it has many members who 
belong to groups who have 
many members. 
Positive. Groups high on 
this measure are well-
connected in terms of 
working together in multiple 
settings. 
Source: This table is a is derived from a combination of tables presented in Borgatti et al. 
(1998). 
Interpreting the Network Maps 
The father of sociometry, Moreno (1953), noted that drawing graphs of networks is a ‘method 
of exploration’ (Moreno, 1953). In the same way, Prell (2012) outlines this approach as a 
technique for exploration and outlines that it should be an initial step to get a ‘feel’ for the 
network. In line with Moreno and Prell’s (2012) advice, the network maps used in this thesis 
were produced in the early, middle and final stages of analysis to gain a better understanding 
regarding the network’s overall structure. They provided a visual representation that 
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highlighted key players and positions within the network. Utilising the key features of the 
software program UCINET allowed for the network maps to be configured based on the type 
of analysis. For example, the network maps were reconfigured to display actors based on the 
key network measures used in this thesis, such as centrality or betweenness scores. This visual 
and analytical component was extremely valuable to this thesis, helping to visually understand 
how police corruption networks are structured. These maps and associated network measures 
were used to compare similarities and differences between the networks over time. These maps 
will also be useful for providing a basis for comparison with previous studies that also visually 
present police corruption network maps.  
Approach to Answering Research Questions 
After all the analyses were conducted the results were organised according to the relevant 
research questions. To address RQ1, the qualitative analyses derived from coding the 
transcripts were organised into key themes. These themes were then re-examined using NVivo 
and the resulting key themes are presented in Chapter Six. This method was replicated to 
answer RQ3 and RQ4 as they both involve addressing qualitative aspects of this research 
project. To address RQ2a and RQ2b, qualitative and quantitative analyses were conducted to 
investigate the structural characteristics of police corruption networks. A variety of different 
analyses were carried out using UCINET; the main findings are presented in Chapter Seven.  
Ensuring Research Integrity and Quality 
Trustworthiness is one of the criteria that secures rigor and quality of the research, and one way 
of demonstrating trustworthiness is by being thorough in the research and to conduct it in a 
comprehensive manner (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009).  This thesis has been thorough in the 
research approach and process. Specifically, this chapter has highlighted the research process 
as follows: 
 All the steps conducted from the start to the finish have been described and visually 
represented in detail throughout this chapter. 
 The step-by-step approach was presented in detail across four different phases of the 
research process: (1) establishment of research design and research questions derived 
from the literature review, (2) case study identification of Operation Florida, (3) 
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identification of data treatment and analysis, (4) development of coding protocol and 
application to coding the transcripts and (5) data analysis and interpretation. 
 The strict, deliberate and comprehensive nature of the coding and coding protocol 
ensured rigour and quality in identifying key themes. A coding reliability test was 
conducted to ensure a high score of inter-rater reliability. 
However, despite the thoroughness and attention to research integrity and data quality it is 
acknowledged that all research methods have limitations. This study acknowledges several 
limitations of the methodology that may have an impact on the interpretation of data and, 
ultimately, on the final results presented in this thesis. 
Limitations to Methodology 
The first limitation is the nature of the police investigation and boundaries of the trial. The 
transcripts obtained from Operation Florida are bound by the legal process and therefore some 
details of the case have been omitted from the transcripts due to privacy laws. However, the 
sections that have been omitted are only personal attributes of the witnesses, such as their home 
address, and therefore had no effect on the study’s results. Also, the investigation focused on 
specific corruption events identified by investigative officers and therefore the study is 
constrained by the boundaries of the trial. In other words, there was no control group and the 
analysis could only be conducted on charged actors resulting in the study having selection bias. 
This means that there may have been non-corrupt officers who were exposed to the same 
circumstances but this study only focuses on the charged officers found guilty of misconduct 
or criminal prosecution. Additionally, the analysis was based on the testimony of former and 
serving officers. Although the testimony was based on their recollection of events these officers 
were also cross-examined to ensure their stories were consistent. Testimony from fellow 
officers and civilians were also used to cross-reference testimony to unpack not only the core 
officers of the network but also to reveal the connections these core officers have with less-
active officers (or officers on the periphery) in the network. As a result, the data sources are 
imperfect and rely on evidence produced at police inquiries and reminiscences of participants, 
thus neither source of data is complete.  
Second, since this study uses document analysis the content coded can have a strong subjective 
component (this is especially true when exploring the role trust plays in these networks). 
Testimony from individuals involved in the inquiries is unlikely to clearly express whom they 
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trusted in the corruption network, and therefore proxies of trust (such as reputation or loyalty) 
were used to capture trust and trustworthiness in this study. This subjective component can 
make replicating this type of research difficult. In addition, this study has developed its own 
coding protocol for classifying the content and can be interpreted in a different manner by other 
researchers. To overcome this obstacle a highly-detailed coding protocol was applied, 
outlining: the codes, definitions, ways to interpret the content and examples of how it has been 
coded. Nonetheless, because of the careful consideration of the existing and comprehensive 
research approach, the data are valuable and useable for theory development as well as being 
useful as a base for comparison with other police corruption studies. 
Third, mapping the connections and relationships among actors within the corruption network 
can be based on the testimony of a third party without the benefit of confirmation from other 
parties identified. Hence, the individuals plotted on the network map may imply a relationship 
that never existed. To determine if actual relationships existed between actors in the network 
would require primary data, which unfortunately was not feasible for this study as the available 
data were restricted to secondary sources. To overcome this obstacle both 1-mode (e.g. actor-
to-actor) and 2-mode (e.g. actor-to-event) data were used to cross-reference relationships and 
connections to the corruption network. 
Fourth, this research investigates Australian data, and while Australia is culturally similar to 
other English-speaking nations there is no guarantee that the findings in this study can be 
applied to other nations. Furthermore, as the data used in this study is historical and focused 
on corruption incidents between 1980 and 2000, specifically investigating transcripts involving 
NSW officers, the findings may not be generalised to all Australian police. Additionally, as 
there have been numerous changes to the structure of the NSW police and Australian police 
force in general, caution should be taken when comparing these findings to other studying 
utilising Australian data. Although there are limits in the generalisability of this study, the 
findings still provide key insights into police corruption in Australia which provides further 
empirical evidence that can be used to compare similarities and differences from previous 
studies (using data from a similar period) into Australian police corruption. 
Summary and Towards Key Findings 
This chapter has explained and justified the research design and methodology adopted for this 
thesis. At an epistemological level, it outlined that this research is located within the 
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constructivist/interpretive paradigm, as the overall aim of the research is to understand and 
reconstruct police corruption networks. The chapter also outlined that to answer the established 
research questions a qualitative approach using documentary and SNA was undertaken to 
uncover the complexities and nuances of police corruption networks. More importantly, this 
chapter provided a detailed discussion of the research process by identifying and describing 
five stages. The thoroughness and detail in each of these stages were highlighted to add to the 
data integrity and overall quality of the research.  
The next four chapters report the findings in relation to each of the research questions identified 
in this thesis. Each chapter commences with a brief overview of the gap in the literature the 
research question addresses and then follows with a broad overview of the main findings. This 
is followed by key examples derived from the transcripts. Next, each chapter provides a 
detailed discussion of the key findings and links them back to the literature.  
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Chapter Six  
What Factors Influence Police Officers to Join 
Corruption Networks and Continue to 
Participate in Serious Corruption? 
Introduction 
The preceding chapters highlighted that personal agency (individual), structural (institutional) 
or a combination of both factors influence officers to engage in corrupt behaviour. Early 
research has stressed the primacy of individual decision-making, where individuals can plan, 
organise and execute their actions autonomously and are not driven by structural properties 
(Weber, 1968). Under this assumption, the ‘rotten apple’ theory was the dominant 
individualistic model of human failure (e.g. people with a flawed moral character) used to 
explain the causes of police corruption (Punch, 2003). However, recent research has discredited 
this assumption because the admission of guilt from corrupt officers has outlined a range of 
factors to explain what influenced them to participate in corruption. Examples, of these factors 
include: the police culture, greed, doing it for the greater good of society (noble cause) seeking 
a higher rank, excitement or a cure for frustration, and the desire to belong to a group 
(Fitzgerald, 1989; Lauchs & Staines, 2012; Wood, 1995). 
Although factors of influence have been explored in criminal networks there are a limited 
number of studies that empirically investigate the interplay of these variables in the context of 
police corruption networks. Understanding the structural and personal agency factors that 
influence officers to engage in corrupt activities is, therefore, important, as it will provide a 
deeper understanding concerning the nature of these factors. The focus of this chapter is to 
provide a critical analysis and discussion of the interactions that a police officer engages in, 
both structurally and individually, and to provide a more in-depth understanding of the process 
involved in becoming corrupt. This chapter therefore addresses the first research question: 
RQ 1. What factors influence police officers to join corruption networks and continue to 
participate in serious corruption? 
This chapter begins by providing exemplars from the transcripts to highlight the key themes 
that emerged. The source of each exemplar is provided at the end of the quote, citing the name 
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of the witness testifying and the page number where the exact testimony can be found in the 
court transcript. First, the chapter presents the structural factors cited by officers that influenced 
their decision to engage in corruption. In particular, the subculture at Manly, the influence of 
other officers and opportunity are discussed. This is followed by exerts of testimony relating 
to personal agency that were disclosed by officers. Finally, a discussion of the key themes are 
explored in relation to the police corruption literature. Linking the findings to the literature will 
help establish the main contributions of this thesis. The chapter ends with concluding 
observations regarding the finding of this research question. 
Structural Factors Influencing Police Corruption 
Testimony from officers disclosed that there were a number of structural factors that assisted 
in the operations of the corrupt network. These factors were also influential in officers joining 
and continuing to engage in corrupt activities. The common themes found in the transcripts 
are: 
 Culture in the Manly Division: There was a very distinctive culture of unwritten rules 
and norms that governed the corruption network in the Manly division (43 references, 
40% of officer responses). 
 Influence of Senior Officers: Senior officers accepted and encouraged these corrupt 
actions by their officers (13 references, 30% of officer responses). 
 Influence of Fellow Officers: Officers were influenced by fellow officers to engage in 
corrupt activities (23 references, 34% of officer responses). 
 Opportunity: Officers involved in the AHU or drug unit had more opportunities to 
participate in corrupt activities (17 references, 11% of officer responses).  
 Pressure to Reduce Crime Statistics: There was pressure to reduce crime statistics 
and therefore officers resorted to untraditional and unethical methods to obtain a 
conviction (7 references, 9% of officer responses).  
Each of these themes is discussed in more detail in the following sections. Specifically, key 
examples of each of these factors are analysed using relevant theories and studies of similar 
and different findings. The discussion follows the order outlined above, starting with the 
culture, followed by the influence of senior and fellow officers, followed by the opportunities 
that were presented and, finally, the chapter finishes with a discussion around the pressure to 
reduce crime statistics. 
131 
 
Manly Subculture 
There are two distinct culture characteristics: protecting the Brotherhood and code of silence. 
Each of these is discussed below. 
Codes and Unwritten Rules: Brotherhood and Code of Silence 
There was a distinct subculture among police in Manly that was enriched with distinct rules, 
perceptions and interpretations of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. This subculture 
accepted and endorsed corrupt practices among its officers and was a common theme found in 
many of the officers’ testimony. For example, in Davidson’s testimony, he outlined that there 
was a specific culture and rules that were to be followed and if you did not follow them your 
career would cease:  
Q. And, without going to particular passages, the general thrust of what you were 
saying was that there were certain rules which were imposed on you and if you 
didn’t play by the rules you wouldn’t get anywhere in the Police Service?  
A. That’s correct.  
Q. And they were not formal rules; they were informal rules imposed by senior 
officers who had been in the Service for a long time? 
 A. Yes.  
Q. And part of the rules were that if you didn’t play the game in which they were 
engaged of acting improperly and corruptly, then you weren’t part of the club 
that was going to get on in the Service?  
A. That’s right. (Davidson, p. 538) [emphasis added] 
 
The club that Davidson is referring to is the ‘Brotherhood’ or ‘blue fraternity’, consisting of 
officers who followed informal rules and regulations. This Brotherhood was characterised by 
strong bonds between officers that were reinforced through unwritten rules. As Davidson 
agreed to the questions being posed to him, to be considered part of the Brotherhood officers 
needed to follow and abide by these rules. One of the main rules that surfaced from the 
transcripts was loyalty to other officers. This loyalty meant that officers were to protect one 
another but keep the corrupt practices hidden from anyone outside the corruption network. This 
loyalty is referred to in the literature as ‘the code of silence’, whereby officers are willing to 
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break the law to protect fellow officers from prosecution. Officers who broke the code of silence 
would be sanctioned by other officers in the form of threats, ostracism or violence.  
Testimony by officers outlined that they did not report any misconduct by other officers because 
they did not want to be ostracised from the Brotherhood. Being excluded from the Brotherhood 
meant that these officers would be labelled untrustworthy and thus would be negatively targeted 
by other officers in the corruption network. The negative outcomes that would arise from 
disclosing corrupt behaviour by fellow officers were enough of a deterrent that many officers 
did not report any deviant behaviours to senior officers. This was apparent in Davidson’s 
testimony, where he outlined that he did not report any of the misconduct that he had observed 
because he considered the police officers to be his friends and peers and he was not sure what 
the repercussions would be for him if he reported the conduct (Davidson, PIC Exhibit 431B, p. 
17).  
Similarly, Smith outlines that when M5 told him about the dumping of weapons into the river 
he made a conscious decision not to do anything about it:  
Q. Mmm-hmm. What did you do about it?  
A. I did nothing.  
Q. You made a conscious decision to do nothing about that?  
A. What had happened had happened.  
Q. Can I trouble you to answer the question? You made a conscious decision to do 
nothing about it?  
A. Yes. (Smith, p. 3485)  
Smith also acknowledged that he did not report the misconduct because it would discredit the 
Police Service's reputation: “Q. What other reasons can you suggest why you didn’t reveal this 
misconduct to senior officers, other than protection of your own position and M5 and Dowding? 
A. Well, discredit it’s going to bring on the Police Service as well” (Smith, p. 3501). Smith’s 
testimony shows that officers were also reluctant to disclose unethical behaviour because it 
would not only negatively impact on the officer engaging in deviant behaviour but would have 
repercussions for the whole police organisation. In other words, all officers would be tarnished 
with the same brush, which could have had an adverse impact on the daily tasks and on their 
overall effectiveness as police officers in reducing crime. 
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The above examples and testimony from other officers demonstrates that the unwritten rules 
(such as the code of silence) and the desire to be an accepted member of the Brotherhood 
influenced officers to not only engage in corruption but also played a role in supporting and 
protecting other corrupt officers. It is these unwritten rules that provided a protective barrier 
around these corrupt officers, whereby corruption could grow and prosper in the Manly 
division. This suggests that the code of silence played an integral part in allowing these corrupt 
practices to take place, because corrupt officers were not only protected by other members of 
the corruption network but they were also protected by the wider community of officers. 
Although this is not a new finding it provides further evidence that corrupt police officers do, 
in fact, operate within a Brotherhood and are protected by unwritten rules and guidelines. 
Drinking Culture 
In addition to the unwritten rules, the subculture in the Manly division was also characterised 
by excessive drinking. Testimony from officers outlined that drinking on and off the job was a 
common practice among officers in the Manly division. At once stage, Minehan pointed out 
that they even had a beer fridge in their office so they would not have to leave the office to have 
a drink: “Q. Were you aware at any time of, for example, police officers having alcohol in their 
lockers? A. We had actually a beer fridge at one stage” (Minehan, p. 3286). Similarly, King 
said drinking while on duty with other officers from the Major Crime Squad was a common 
occurrence: 
Q. Would it be correct to say that you generally drank on duty with police – other 
police?  
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you got a memory of who you regularly drank with?  
A. Oh, basically whoever I worked with. (King, pp. 1012–1013) 
Monk, another officer in the Major Crime Squad, also acknowledged in his testimony that he 
would get so drunk sometimes that he would need to leave the station and go home: “Q. Do 
you ever recall in your career any officer being so drunk that he had to be taken out of the 
station? A. Oh, a number of times” (Monk, p. 1513). Thus, suggesting that drinking was a large 
part of the subculture in Manly and that it was an acceptable practice among officers stationed 
there. 
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Since drinking was a large part of the subculture officers would often be caught drinking and 
driving on- and off-duty. In line with the code of silence discussed earlier, there was also an 
unwritten rule that if you were pulled over by another cop while DUI there was an 
understanding that you would not be breathalysed or charged. Instead, the arresting officer 
would instead escort the intoxicated officer home. Drink driving was so common that one 
segment of Operation Florida was allocated to investigating officers intoxicated while operating 
a vehicle. Specifically, an officer named King was the focus of this segment because of a 
specific incident where he was found to be DUI and other officers helped him cover up this 
incident. In King’s testimony, he explains this unwritten rule among officers: 
Q. Was there a bit of an unwritten rule, if you like, that amongst police - or certain 
police, I should say, that if you happen to pick up a police officer who is apparently 
driving while drunk, that that person shouldn’t be charged?  
A. I think that was the culture, yes.  
Q. And that that person in some cases might be assisted to get home?  
A. Yes.  
Q. And, indeed, that that person might sometimes be allowed to continue driving 
in the apparently drunken state?  
A. It may well have been part of the police culture, I do agree with you. (King, p. 
4578) [emphasis added] 
The above testimony provides a good basis for understanding the drinking culture among Manly 
officers. It demonstrates that drinking was a huge part of the operations of policing during the 
1990s and that there were unwritten codes regarding officers drinking on the job or outside of 
work. This finding that there was a strong drinking culture is consistent with other inquiries that 
took place during the 1990s in Australia. In particular, the Wood Inquiry (1995) also noted that 
drinking was common among NSW police officers and was embedded in the subculture, thus 
suggesting that drinking was not only common practice among officers positioned in Manly, 
but was also common practice among police in the State of NSW. Additionally, as a strong 
drinking culture was also noted in the Fitzgerald Inquiry (1989), it further suggests that drinking 
was a common and accepted practice among both Qld and NSW officers during the 1980s and 
1990s. As the testimony from officers involved in Operation Florida has disclosed, drinking 
continued to be a common characteristic of policing into the 2000s. 
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Influence of Senior Officers and Acceptance of Corruption 
Another common theme that emerged from the transcripts was that senior officers had a huge 
influence on whether individual officers or units of officers under their supervision engaged in 
corrupt activities. Testimony by officers in the corruption network outlined that it was the 
influence of senior officers that impacted their decision to engage in corrupt activities. 
Throughout the transcripts, two themes emerged under this category: senior officers’ 
acceptance of corrupt behaviour and following orders from senior officers.  
Senior Officers’ Acceptance 
The corruption network would not be able to operate without the acceptance and involvement 
of senior officers. Senior officers were in a position of authority and therefore allowed officers 
underneath their control the freedom and autonomy to engage in corrupt practices, without the 
hassle of hiding these activities from senior officers. At the commencement of his evidence, 
Peattie conceded that he had engaged in corrupt conduct. Peattie, being a senior officer, 
admitted knowing that Patison, Jasper and Davidson had acted corruptly while under his 
command at Manly. This makes sense, because Peattie was part of the corruption network and 
was one of the original members who introduced other officers, such as Patison, to a corrupt 
lifestyle. Peattie outlined that his own introduction to corrupt conduct was during an incident 
in 1980 when he was attached to 21 Division as a Trainee Detective. He said that he, in 
company with other officers, attended a “card school” to execute a search warrant. The senior 
officer took the “boss of the card school” out the back, and a short time later they returned and 
a number of people were arrested for playing cards: “He came back. After a short time, we 
arrested X number of people for playing cards, one of which wasn’t that apparent boss. We 
took them away and charged them. Later in that shift that permanent fellow handed me $100 
and I took it” (Peattie, p. 262).  
Peattie’s introduction early in his profession made a significant impact on his acceptance of 
corrupt practices later in his career. Specifically, this experience and others to follow 
conditioned Peattie to believe that these types of corrupt practices were the norm among NSW 
police and provided him with a foundation for future corrupt practices. It demonstrates that 
fellow officers were conditioned and learned to behave in a corrupt manner by observing and 
engaging in corruption with senior officers. Peattie, being in a senior position, demonstrated 
that his involvement in corrupt practices had an enormous impact on influencing other officers 
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to do the same thing. It also shows that Peattie’s involvement also shaped the subculture among 
officers in his unit. The subculture in Peattie’s division was therefore characterised by 
acceptance and active participation among members of the corruption network. 
The acceptance of corrupt behaviour by senior officers, such as Peattie, O’Toole and Patison, 
also assisted in the operations of the corruption network. First, it allowed officers to engage in 
misconduct during searches. For example, Jasper outlined that at Manly they often asked 
Peattie to be the Independent Officer for the execution of search warrants because of his 
tolerant attitude towards their misconduct (Jasper, p. 347). Without him being appointed in that 
role it would have been harder to engage in such corrupt activity than if there had been an 
honest supervisor. Second, it provided a level of protection for the corruption network. For 
example, Peattie’s behaviour as a supervisor sent clear signals to the rest of the police force. In 
Hill’s testimony, he outlined that if you were not with Peattie and accepted his practices then 
you were considered an outsider and any outsiders that tried to make a complaint would be 
targeted and ostracised:  
A. Well, it became an “us and them” mentality in that no-one was allowed to make 
a complaint against the detectives because Peattie wouldn’t accept it and the boss 
would listen to Peattie.  
Q. When you say “us and them”, you are talking of the division between the 
detectives and general duties officers, are you?  
A. Between the detectives, the crime management unit and the rest of the staff, 
basically, yes. (Hill, p. 567) [emphasis added] 
This testimony is consistent with other testimony by officers who outlined reasons why they 
did not report misconduct to higher-ranked officers at Manly. Hill outlined that he would not 
report misconduct because he would have been victimised (Hill, pp. 572–573). Similarly, 
Monk outlined that he witnessed Nimmo drunk a number of times but did not report it because 
he would become a 'mark':  
Q. So would it be correct to say that you considered it to be futile to report it to any 
of the senior officers because, as far as you were concerned, they were well aware 
of what was happening?  
A. I think that I made myself a mark by commenting on it at all and I did that and I 
paid the penalty for it. (Monk, pp. 1560–1561)  
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These examples further provide evidence that officers followed the code of silence out of fear 
that they would be sanctioned for revealing unethical behaviours by fellow officers.  
Following Orders from Senior Officers 
Another common theme that emerged from the transcripts was that officers followed orders 
from senior officers, even if they were not willing participants in the corrupt activity. 
Testimony from individual officers outlined that they did what they were told because there 
was no other choice other than to obey the orders of senior officers. As McDougall outlined: 
“We were given a direction to do something and we did it. It wasn’t a matter of, ‘Yes, we'll go 
along with you, yes, we’ll do this.’ That didn't happen at all. We followed a direction and - or 
I followed a direction and that’s what we did” (McDougall, p. 4964).  
In one incident, M5, who was a junior officer at the time, was involved in a search of a known 
drug dealer. During the search M5 was ordered by a senior officer to plant a loaded gun on the 
suspect to ensure that his conviction would stick: 
A. But I think the - probably the overriding thing is that the extras in relation to the 
gun, loading him with the gun, was probably something I was unhappy with on this 
occasion.  
Q. Why didn’t you take issue with that and not proceed with it?  
A. Well, that wasn’t really an option.  
Q. Why?  
A. Well, it - I didn’t think it was an option at that time. I’d been requested to do 
something and I did it. (M5, p. 3359) [emphasis added] 
 
In another incident, after the briefing, N1 and Davidson had a conversation about the arrest of 
C11. N1 said he had doubts as to C11’s involvement in the robbery but that Davidson told him: 
“It’s got to be done. If you don’t do it, I’ll do it” (N1, p. 5290). N1 said that Davidson was 
referring to the loading and verballing of C11. His explanation for his subsequent actions was 
that in this conversation, Davidson “… pressed a few buttons on my ego and I then agreed to 
do it” (N1, p. 5290). N1 then went on to outline that “you’re a weak bastard if you don’t” (N1, 
5290). N1 explained that the issue for him was not the verballing and loading of C11 but rather 
that he did not think that C11 was involved in the robbery. In this instance, Davidson was his 
senior officer and he therefore felt that he had no other option but to obey his orders. 
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The above examples demonstrate the important role of senior officers in the corruption 
network. Being in a position of power not only provided a protective layer against outsiders 
but they also used their position to ensure fellow officers followed their orders. Their position 
of authority in the police organisation, and their corrupt behaviours being reinforced by fellow 
officers, suggests that senior officers assisted in moulding and shaping a fellow officer’s 
willingness to engage in corruption (such as loading and verballing suspects to ensure a 
conviction). This type of behaviour provides support for the noble cause theory, which is 
viewed as a positive act by the officer because their actions are perceived to benefit society as 
a whole. By enforcing and accepting these noble cause actions officers were, therefore, able to 
learn from senior officers which impacted future decisions. As many officers outlined, they did 
not just participate in one corrupt practice but, instead, they continuously participated in corrupt 
behaviour for a number of years. This further suggests that because these officers had the 
support of senior officers, and because they justified their actions, it made it easier to continue 
to participate in corrupt activities with other officers. 
Influence of Peers 
The influence of fellow officers was another theme that emerged from the transcripts. 
Testimony from officers disclosed that their peers were just as influential, if not more, in their 
decision to engage in corrupt activities. When asked for the primary reason as to why officers 
involved themselves in such corrupt activity many of the officers responded by saying one of 
the main reasons was because their friends in the force introduced them to it.  In one example, 
Davidson outlined in his testimony that M5 was a big influence on his decision to engage in 
corrupt activities. In Davidson’s testimony he stated: 
Q. But you went down that path without any real persuasion from anyone?  
A. No, I made that decision - well, not entirely without persuasion. M5 played a 
large role in persuading me to go down that particular path, but I did go down 
that path. (Davidson, p. 3126) [emphasis added] 
 
In similar testimony by Patison, he outlined that he was also influenced by his fellow officers 
to falsify evidence:  
Q. What was it about that activity which involved impropriety?  
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A. Basically, the arrest and everything was done properly. It was when we did the 
interview it was suggested that the gun that we found be said that it was loaded. I 
don’t believe that - I think the magazine was in the gun, the magazine was loaded, 
but I don’t think there was one actually in the chamber. But it was suggested by 
one of the other detectives that we say that it was, that there was one in the 
chamber.  
Q. Who suggested that? A. D5, sir. (Patison, pp. 1688–1689) [emphasis added] 
 
Testimony by Davidson and Patison shows that they were influenced by fellow officers to 
participate in corruption. As Patison outlined in his testimony, he was motivated to falsify 
evidence based on the suggestion made by one of his fellow officers. This example shows that 
Patison accepted the proposal that D5 loaded the gun, even when he believed this statement to 
be untrue. It also displays the relationship between and compliance of some officers, 
demonstrating that peer pressure is a stronger indicator of misconduct than the ethical standards 
honest officers have. Thus, this suggests that, collectively, officers played a significant role in 
influencing fellow officer to engage and continue to participate in corruption. 
Additionally, officers outlined in their testimony that the peer pressure was so great that they 
were coerced into engaging in corrupt activities. Peattie was one officer who admitted to 
coercing officers into engaging in corrupt activities, even if they were reluctant:  
Q. How was it that he became involved? Did you discuss the matter with him?  
A. I coerced him. I coerced him into doing it…I discussed what I wanted to do and 
asked him whether he's [sic] assist me to do it. 
 Q. And he said yes?  
A. Reluctantly, yes. (Peattie, pp. 338–339) [emphasis added] 
 
Patison outlines that M5 used coercion to get him to get back into corrupt activities. This took 
place after Patison went on stress leave and requested to move units to get away from the 
corruption; he was not interested in working with M5: 
It was hard to work out how he felt about that, sir. He was quite a - he made it clear 
to me he wanted nothing to do with M10 and he hadn’t heard from him, but the 
following day M10 contacted me. M5 was trying to - he was trying to coerce me 
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into becoming involved in that similar arrangement if M10 was still dealing drugs. 
(Patison, p. 1777) 
The above testimony from Patison provides some insight into why they decided to engage in 
corrupt practices in the first place. It demonstrates that sometimes coercion was used to get 
officers to practice corrupt activities, regardless of their level of reluctance. The use of coercion 
suggests that not all members of the corruption network were willing participants, and some 
had to be pressured in a way that would create a positive outcome for the rest of the corruption 
network. 
Opportunity, Resources, and Access 
Jasper, in his testimony, said that he did not participate in or observe any corrupt conduct during 
his career in the NSW Police prior to his posting in Manly in 1999: “All I can say is that before 
I got to Manly I didn’t leave work five minutes early, and for some reason it just seemed to be 
- and I was there for a while before the first - I ever took money” (Jasper, pp. 445–446). In his 
previous position with the Warringah Anti-Theft Squad a high level of supervision meant there 
was no scope for improper conduct (Jasper, p. 343). In his testimony Jasper stated: 
A. I think you’ll find that the anti-theft squad - that we were a great deal tightly 
more supervised, but I think it may just be the people that we were working with. 
None of them were designated detectives. Basically, we were tasked every day for 
specific operations and surveillance, whether - the whole office, including the 
sergeant who was the commander, would be with you. ...  
Q. In what way was the supervision different in the anti-theft squad compared with 
the way things happened at Manly?  
A. Well, as I just mentioned, basically the commander of the section would be with 
you while you were working the operation there. That is, effecting arrests, executing 
search warrants, conducting surveillance, the charging processes and the like. 
He’d be there 90 per cent of the time. (Jasper, p. 347) 
 
Jasper’s testimony provides a good example of the differences of working in the anti-theft 
squad versus the drug squad at Manly. It shows that Jasper had more autonomy and freedom 
to act in a corrupt manner while in the drug squad compared to the anti-theft squad. This lack 
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of supervision of police work can, therefore, create opportunities for irregular practice and 
corruption.  
Likewise, working in the drug squad brought more opportunities to engage in corrupt 
behaviour because of the nature of the work. In the drug squad officers are exposed to drugs, 
money and drug dealers, while in other departments such as the anti-theft unit there would be 
less exposure to these activities.  Jasper outlined that there were more opportunities to engage 
in corruption working for the drug squad than when he was working for the anti-theft squad:  
Q. Did that seem to open up more opportunities, from what you could observe, for 
corruption than had been the case in relation to the anti-theft investigations?  
A. Yes, I could - suppose you could say that. I mean, where there is drugs there 
seems to be vast amounts of money. (Jasper, p. 348) 
 
Similarly, Patison also acknowledges that there are more opportunities to partake in unethical 
behaviours working in the drug unit than in any other unit in the police force: 
Q. I mean, without being frivolous, for example, domestic violence work is not such 
an area where the avenues for potential corruption would arise?  
A. No, certainly not, sir.  
Q. It is drug work in particular, then, isn’t it?  
A. Where there’s the likelihood of that money being around, sir. (Patison, p. 1881) 
[emphasis added] 
 
The above examples demonstrate that the combination of a lack of supervision and working in 
the drug unit created opportunities to participate in corrupt activities. These conditions would 
have increased the likelihood of officers engaging and continue to participate in the corruption 
network. As Patison outlined, where there was money there was an opportunity to engage in 
corrupt behaviour, thus suggesting that particular divisions in the police organisation create 
more opportunities for officers to participate in corruption. 
Establishing Units, Allocating Corrupt Officers and Accessing Exhibits 
In addition to the lack of supervision, officers were also presented with specific opportunities 
to engage in corruption because of the establishment of particular units. One unit in particular, 
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the Task Force Magnum Unit, was established to minimise armed robberies in the Manly 
region. The officers assigned to this unit were, however, given the green light to do anything 
necessary to ensure a conviction. Officers F7, N1 and M5 all gave evidence suggesting that 
they were selected by Peattie for this unit because they were willing and prepared to load and 
verbal individuals who they suspected had committed crimes.  As F7 stated: 
Q. On any occasion were you told by any senior officer within Task Force Magnum 
that you were expected to load and verbal suspects?  
A. I don’t think we were told that it was expected. It was just that you knew that 
you were expected. You wouldn't have been sent on to - put on to Magnum if you 
weren’t prepared to do that.  
Q. Is loading and verballing something that you had done in the past?  
A. Yes.  
Q. And it was something you say you were prepared to do whilst being deployed 
at Task Force Magnum?  
A. Yes. (F7, p. 5240) [emphasis added] 
 
M5 also gave similar evidence, testifying that Task Force Magnum was formed to ensure 
suspected offenders were locked up. He went on to state “… and it didn’t matter how we did 
it as long as they went in”. He indicated that verballing, at that time, was accepted practice 
and that it was “common practice”. He said the methodology used by Task Force Magnum 
was the same as had been used by previous task forces that he was previously attached to (M5, 
p. 5245).  
The creation of this unit is an important insight as it demonstrates that officers were given a 
specific platform to participate actively in corrupt activities. As F7, N1 and M5 testified, they 
were specifically allocated to this division because of their reputation and willingness to ‘get 
the job done’. This platform not only provided the freedom to officers to do what was necessary 
to ensure a conviction but they were also able to use this platform to build their reputation 
within their corruption network.  
In a similar instance, Peattie also allocated Patison and Jasper to lead the drug unit, despite 
Patison’s previous police misconduct. Peattie also admitted in his testimony that he knew 
Patison was acting corruptly: “… you were aware of him engaging in corrupt conduct while 
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working under your command at Manly? A. Yes, sir” (Peattie, p. 218). Patison further outlined 
in his testimony: 
Q. But, worse than that, I suggest, from the beginning of the year 2000 he and 
Detective Jasper were specifically given the job of cleaning up a backlog of drug 
investigations, weren't they?  
A. Yeah. We had a meeting with the management committee at Manly and Ray 
Peattie suggested - I had already identified we had quite a build-up of drug 
information through various sources, mainly through community sources and other 
- and public campaigns which we hadn’t had a look at. And I put it to the committee 
that we should look at this because our actual control charts were showing not a 
great deal of drug detection performance in the command, and, given that I would 
have to account to the regional office for that, I tactically asked the committee that 
we needed to have a look at them. They then sought the advice of Ray Peattie and 
Ray suggested that because of their experience that Patison and Jasper would be, 
you know, good at doing drug law enforcement and so we agreed with – that they 
would lead, if you like, the investigations. (Raymond, p. 2006) 
 
Raymond’s testimony provides a good example of how power and rank impacted the 
operations of the corrupt police. As Raymond outlined, Peattie was able to convince the rest 
of the committee to allocate Patison and Jasper as lead investigators within the drug squad. 
By assigning these officers to the drug squad it allowed them to engage and gain better access 
to drug dealers and essentially their money. This arrangement was made possible because 
Peattie was their senior officer and was a respected member of the police force. This example 
further demonstrates the ease of placing specific officers within specific units to benefit the 
corruption network as a whole. It not only provided these officers with access and resources, 
but it also provided key connections to the underworld. 
In addition to providing platforms for corruption, officers were also provided with exhibits 
(e.g. weapons, drugs and other items that can be used as evidence) to load suspects. Officers 
outlined that, in the Manly division, these exhibits were stored in a locked cabinet in their 
office where other corrupt officers could access and use these exhibits to load suspects. F7 
outlined in his testimony: 
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Q. They were future exhibits - they weren’t actual exhibits obtained from legitimate 
operations seized from offenders?  
A. No. No, they were items which were kept there for the sole purpose of loading 
people, offenders.  
Q. You mentioned there was a master key that most in the squad had. When you say 
“squad”, do you mean the major crime squad north, or do you mean more 
specifically any particular unit?  
A. I think - I - I would have said around that time probably about half of the police 
force would have had a master key to the - to lockers and filing cabinets, whatever. 
(F7, pp. 3215–3216) [emphasis added] 
 
This testimony provides a good example of how officers were able to load suspects. As F7 
outlined, old exhibits were kept in a locked cabinet and used for the sole purpose of loading 
potential suspects. Essentially there was a local deposit of weapons that could be used to load 
suspects. This admission suggests that members of the squad knew about these exhibits and 
were willing to incorporate them into searches to ensure a conviction.  
Bringing all the findings together, it shows that officers were highly influenced by the officers 
around them and the subculture in which they operated. Collectively, these officers were so 
influential that they were able to shape the subculture at Manly in a way that corrupt practices 
became a regular occurrence. This subculture was characterised by unwritten rules and codes 
that protected corrupt officers and assisted in covering up these deviant behaviours. 
Additionally, the establishment of specific units and access to exhibits further provided these 
officers with a strong platform to not only engage in corruption but also allowed corrupt 
behaviour to grow and prosper among officers working in the Manly division. 
Personal Agency Factors Influencing Police Corruption 
In addition to the structural factors mentioned above, officers also used individual factors to 
explain why they participated in and accepted corrupt actions. Three main reasons emerged 
from the transcripts: 1) officers outlined that they would take part in corrupt behaviour 
regardless of their surroundings, 2) that they were not in the right state of mind (e.g. suffered 
from depression) or 3) that they were unable to explain why they engaged in corrupt practices. 
Examples of each of these themes are outlined below. 
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Patison acknowledged that he would have engaged in these types of activities regardless of his 
surroundings. In his testimony he stated: 
A…I was probably in that frame of mind that I would have done it even - as I say, 
like, there was good, honest supervisors there during the search warrants and I still 
took money and did the wrong thing, sir. Their presence there - it didn’t sort of - it 
didn’t influence me, sir, put it that way. (Patison, pp. 1830–1831) 
Patison’s testimony provides a good example pointing to the fact that he had a faulty character 
that led him down a corruption path. He acknowledged that he would have still engaged in 
corrupt practices regardless of whether there were honest officers around or not. A possible 
reason for this belief could be the fact that Patison had a long history of participating in the 
corruption network and that he therefore believed that he would not get caught. In his 
testimony, Patison also confirmed this belief by stating that he got away with it for so many 
years that he felt he would never get caught and, if he did, he would be able to talk his way out 
of it:  
A. I think there must have been something inside me that just - I don’t know. I’d got 
away with it for so long in the past and the mentality that you have is that you - if 
you get away with it, it doesn’t really matter if you get caught. All you do is you lie 
about it and then you’ll probably beat it at court. That’s the sort of thinking of the 
whole - the mentality of the whole thinking, sir. (Patison, p. 1733) 
Another common theme throughout the transcripts was that officers stated that they were not 
in the right state of mind and, as a result, made poor decisions. These poor decisions led to 
these individual officers partaking in corrupt behaviours. In one example, Messenger outlined 
that he accepted the money because he was depressed at the time and not in the right state of 
mind: 
Q. In relation to receiving money which you believed to be stolen in relation to the 
execution of the search warrants, you knew that that was wrong, did you? 
A. Yes, I did, sir. 
 Q. Why did you do that?  
A. I was depressed.  
Q. Depressed?  
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A. [Witness nods].  
Q. And why did your depression cause you to take money?  
A. For some reason it made me feel a bit better. I don't know. It’s something now I 
just can’t understand why I did it. (Messenger, p. 2076)  
 
Other officers testified that they were unable to identify the main reason or factors that 
contributed to their undertaking of corrupt activities. For example, Jasper outlined that before 
he was transferred to Manly he would not have even considered becoming corrupt and was 
unsure why he changed from being an honest officer to a corrupt one. In his testimony he stated: 
Q. Had something happened which caused you to transform yourself from someone 
who had otherwise been an honest policeman to one who was then corrupt?  
A. I've been asking myself the same question for the last 10 days, but I don’t know. 
It's just something I can’t explain. I've never - before I went to Manly I’d never 
even considered taking money. I’d seen it - admittedly I’d never done any drug 
work. (Jasper, p. 352) [emphasis added] 
 
Although personal agency factors were not strongly cited in the testimony, these examples offer 
some insights into why officers engaged in corrupt practices. Examples outlined by Patison, 
Jasper and Messenger show that they were not only influenced by structural factors, but that 
personal agency factors also played a role in their decision-making process. A possible reason 
for so few justifications involving personal agency factors could be because these officers 
wanted to protect their reputation. By placing the blame on the structural factors these officers 
were, therefore, able to place the blame on someone else, which may have lessened the impact 
of the accusations of being a corrupt officer.  
Discussion of Key Findings 
The findings from this study reveal that both structural (institutional; i.e., there are specific 
conditions which produce human actions or behaviour) and personal agency (individual; i.e., 
human action is autonomous) factors influenced an officer’s decision to engage and continue 
to engage in corrupt behaviour, although structural factors far outweighed personal agency 
factors according to the admissions from corrupt officers. This interplay of variables is 
represented in Figure 6.1. The variables are displayed in a funnel because each of the key 
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factors can be channelled down in different orders (e.g. an opportunity could present itself 
before structural factors are considered). The size of the circles represents the amount of 
influence these factors have on influencing officers, which was determined by the number of 
responses made by officers in their testimony. As highlighted above, structural factors were 
the largest influences and therefore are represented by a larger circle in the funnel. Although 
personal agency was not a common theme it is still acknowledged to play some role in guiding 
an officer’s behaviour and is represented in a smaller circle. In addition, even though 
opportunity is a structural factor it is classified as a separate variable because it is the one factor 
that needs to be continuously present for officers to be able to behave in a corrupt manner. 
Without an opportunity, corrupt officers are unlikely to engage in deviant practices. Figure 6.1 
also displays a feedback loop, which represents the positive reinforcement officers received 
when they were willing participants in the corruption network. Positive reinforcement was 
displayed among the officers through monetary rewards and the general acceptance of other 
members of the corruption network. This positive feedback loop helps explain why some 
officers engage and continue to participate in more-serious corrupt practices. This feedback 
loop can, therefore, become a continuous cycle where officers become so embedded in the 
corruption that it makes it hard for them to stop.  
Figure 6.1: Behavioural Reinforcement Loop 
 
The remainder of the chapter will provide a more detailed discussion of the most common 
structural and personal agency factors that influenced officers. The findings are discussed in 
relation to the relevant literature, whereby key insights are presented. The chapter finishes with 
concluding comments regarding the overall findings for this research question. 
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Manly Subculture 
As the findings highlight, admissions from corrupt officers outlined that the subculture at 
Manly played a role in influencing officers to engage and continue to participate in corruption. 
Officers stated that it was only when they started working in the Manly division that they 
became entrenched in the corrupt culture. In addition, the influence of senior and fellow 
officers impacted officers’ decisions to partake and continue to be an active member in the 
corruption network. Many officers outlined that the main reason why they initially got involved 
was that they were introduced to corrupt behaviours by a fellow officer. Also, officers outlined 
that they engaged in these unethical acts because they were presented with the opportunity to 
do so.  
The Brotherhood 
There was a distinct subculture among police in Manly that was enriched with distinct rules, 
perceptions and interpretations of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. The subculture in 
Manly was dominated by strong codes, norms and unwritten rules that allowed corrupt 
practices to grow and flourish without the resistance of outside influences. These strong codes 
and unwritten rules were enforced by the strength of the Manly Brotherhood. This finding 
suggests that there were two layers to the Manly Brotherhood. The first and outer layer stems 
from the nature of dangerous police work, whereby all officers bond together to establish a 
loyal, dependable and trustworthy unit where officers work together as a collective unit to 
minimise crime, providing a support net or, in terms of bright networks, a safety net. The 
second or inner layer of this Brotherhood stems from stronger bonds between officers who 
engage in corruption. The inner layer has the same characteristics as the outer layer. However, 
these characteristics are extremely heightened because officers have now engaged in 
behaviours unacceptable to society and will be severely sanctioned if caught. The collection of 
corrupt officers placed more emphasis on loyalty and trustworthy officers to ensure that the 
corrupt operations were not discovered.  
For this reason, a strong emphasis is placed on the code of silence, whereby officers are strongly 
encouraged to protect other officers from prosecution even if it means lying or covering up 
evidence. Officers in these networks are not only protected by the Brotherhood within the 
corruption network but they are also protected by the wider Brotherhood of the police 
organisation. This provides a double protection layer, where corrupt officers are insulated by 
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essentially two layers of protection. Breaking any of these codes or rules would result in 
sanctions, such as threats, ostracism or violence, and these officers would be classified as 
untrustworthy. Whistleblowing or reporting any crimes by fellow officers was highly 
discouraged and even dismissed by senior officers. As the finding reveals, some of the Manly 
senior officers were themselves part of the corruption network. Although it was not explicitly 
addressed in the transcripts, one can assume that fellow officers within the unit would have 
some inkling regarding the senior officer’s acceptability or tolerance for corrupt behaviour. For 
this reason, it would be extremely hard for officers to report this type of deviant behaviour, 
therefore probably causing them to turn a blind eye to the corruption. This supports previous 
findings of cases of whistleblowing of police corruption, where officers who did come forward 
explained how their lives were completely ruined. Trevor Haken, for example, the 
whistleblower in the Wood Inquiry, has written a book explaining the negative consequences 
coming forward has had on his career and personal life (e.g. he was forced to give up policing, 
ostracised and put into witness protection) (Padraic, 2011).  
This type of mentality is widely cited and supported in the police corruption literature (Baer & 
Armao, 1995; Punch, 2009; Rabe-Hemp, 2011; Skolnick, 2002). For example, during the 
Mollen Commission, officers admitted that they would lie under oath because of an unwritten 
rule in many departments that prohibits disclosing misconduct by other officers (Baer & 
Armao, 1995). Recent studies on the Wood and Fitzgerald inquiries have also found similar 
findings, providing further support for the notion that the Brotherhood and code of silence are 
widespread and they continue to operate in modern policing (Fitzgerald, 1989; Wood, 1995). 
The findings in this study regarding the strength of the Brotherhood provide further support for 
this assumption. In addition, these findings also extend previous findings by establishing the 
subsequent layers of the Brotherhood within corrupt police networks.  
Influence of Officers 
Culture is also learned through a complex process of behaviours from fellow officers (Aultman, 
1976; Schein, 2004). In addition to the wider context of the Brotherhood, the most common 
theme that emerged from the transcripts revealed that senior and fellow officers impacted 
officers’ decisions to become a corrupt officer. The findings reveal that fellow officers were 
the driving force behind an officer’s career path to corruption. As many officers outlined in 
their testimony, they became corrupt because they were introduced to corruption early in their 
careers by fellow officers. The finding that corruption was a common and acceptable practice 
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allowed it to flourish among officers in Manly, thus supporting the notion that corruption 
breeds corruption (McLagen, 2003).  
This finding is also supported by previous studies that have found evidence that a corrupt career 
path is the result of the socialisation process. Through this socialisation process officers learn 
“what is customary and desirable in the work setting” (Manning & Van Maanen, 1978, p. 268). 
For officers in this study, the socialisation process is where they learned how to be corrupt from 
other officers. Officers outlined that they learnt the norms and acceptable behaviours by 
working, observing and listening to stories of other officers. The understanding and willingness 
to conform to the group’s norms were two key ingredients that motivated officers to change 
from honest to corrupt officers. As Turvey (2013) notes:  
… it pressures new officers into conformity by exploiting their commitment to group 
loyalty and the threat of peer retaliation; it protects longstanding group members from 
exposure by ensuring that nobody talks to outsiders, and that ‘cops protect cops’; and it 
allows for the shuffling, or continued employment, of ‘gypsy cops’ that would otherwise 
have been terminated or in extreme cases indicted on criminal charges. (p. 53) 
The learning process is also transmitted through positive reinforcements, which play a strong 
role in constructing and reinforcing the police subculture (Schein, 2004). The findings of this 
study also reveal that acceptable behaviour and practices were strengthened by positive 
reinforcements from other officers. Reinforcements came in two main forms: monetary 
rewards and acceptance by other officers. When an officer participated in a corrupt act they 
were positively rewarded by receiving a financial reward for a job well done. These officers 
were also indirectly positively reinforced through social acceptance and belonging among other 
officers in the corruption network. Previous support for this assumption is found in the 
literature, whereby police officers learn corrupt behaviour through reinforcements obtained 
from the police subculture, and that these reinforcements play a huge role in shaping an 
officer’s behaviour (Aultman, 1976). The subculture is, therefore, a powerful reference group 
in determining whether an individual officer will engage in corrupt behaviour and, with the 
processes of social learning, the network has great potential for reinforcing an individual 
officer’s corrupt conduct.  
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Opportunity 
In addition to the culture at Manly, another key theme was that opportunity played a significant 
role in corrupt officers’ career paths. In particular, officers who worked in the drug unit were 
faced with more opportunities to engage in deviant behaviour. In some of the officers’ 
testimonies, they outlined that they only became corrupt when they started working in the drug 
unit at Manly. This finding emulates what Punch (2009) refers to as a ‘wet job’, especially 
units such as the drug squad because they have more consistent contact with the underworld. 
These officers are therefore confronted with more opportunities to engage in corrupt activities. 
It shows that operating in an environment with continuous engagement with criminals presents 
a multitude of opportunities for highly-driven officers to participate in corrupt activities (Miller 
1998; Langer 1986; Punch 2000). Similar findings were found by Makono (2016), 
where “excessive exposure to temptation was a cause of corruption within the traffic 
department of the ZRP traffic officers in Harare. Police officers interacted [with] daily 
commuter omnibus drivers who dangled rewards in front of them to avoid arrests for the 
various traffic offences”. Thus, this finding demonstrates that opportunity and corruption can 
have a high probability of co-occurring together. 
Officers were also presented with more opportunities to participate in corrupt acts through the 
establishment of the Magnum unit, as it provided these officers with a platform for corrupt 
activities to take place. The Magnum unit was established to minimise armed robberies in the 
Manly region. However, officers were granted the freedom ‘to do what was necessary’ to 
ensure armed robberies decreased. Officers F7, N1 and M5 all gave evidence suggesting that 
they were selected for this special unit because they were willing and prepared to load and 
verbal individuals. The establishment of this unit reflected the corrupt subculture among these 
officers. It also demonstrates that senior officers supported this corrupt behaviour (as they were 
the ones who set up and allocated officers in the first place). It thus provided a platform for 
corrupt officers to engage freely in deviant behaviours knowing that they were supported by 
senior officers.  
Many officers testified that verballing and loading suspects were commonly used tactics in the 
Magnum unit. Officers outlined that they were motivated to reduce crime statistics, therefore 
resulting in the fabrication of evidence to ensure convictions. Within the literature this type of 
behaviour and reasoning is called noble cause corruption, where officers engage in corrupt 
activities to ensure a conviction for the greater good (Punch, 2000). It supports previous 
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research in suggesting that noble cause corruption is a common type of corruption among 
corrupt police officers (Caldero & Crank, 2011; Cooper, 2011; Crank et al., 2007; Sen, 2007). 
For example, Kutnjak Ivkovic (2002) found a similar finding in her research into police 
corruption in the Knapp Commission. She states: “as police officers testified that the money 
stolen from drug dealers was considered to be ‘clean’ because the officers, ‘kind of felt he 
didn’t deserve no rights since he was selling narcotics,’ and ‘because no innocent person is 
directly injured by such a score” (Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2002, p. 24). Similar findings are supported 
by Merrington et al.’s (2015) study into noble cause corruption in the Wood Inquiry.  
In summary, an analysis of the transcripts revealed that the subculture in Manly, specifically 
the Brotherhood, impacted officers’ decisions to engage and continue to participate in corrupt 
practices. Senior and fellow officers played an active role in socialising new officers into the 
Manly culture and ultimately the corruption network. Although these findings are not entirely 
new, they do add further support to the assumptions in the literature. They also provide further 
empirical evidence to suggest that officers are motivated and impacted mostly by fellow 
officers. Opportunity also played a large role, where officers who had access and the means to 
engage in corrupt behaviour were more willing to do so; that is, their position and role in the 
police gave officers the opportunity to participate in corrupt practices.  
Personal Agency Factors 
In addition to the structural factors mentioned above, officers also mentioned that individual 
factors impacted their decision to take part in corrupt practices; however, these responses were 
few and far between. There were only a small number of officers who cited individual reasons 
for their behaviour. Three main reasons emerged from the transcripts, that they were: inherently 
corrupt, were not in the right state of mind (depressed) or could not explain why. Some officers 
outlined that they were inherently corrupt and would participate in corrupt behaviour regardless 
of their surroundings. Officers also indicated that they were not in the right state of mind (e.g. 
suffered from depression). One officer outlined that he engaged in deviant behaviour because 
he was depressed at the time and did not think of the consequences. Depression is a common 
diagnosis among officers due to the nature of their work (Darensburg, Andrew, Hartley, 
Burchfiel, Fekedulegn, & Violanti, 2006; Wang et al., 2010), so this explanation does make 
sense in helping to understand why they participated in corrupt behaviour. Other officers 
outlined that they were unable to explain why they engaged in corrupt behaviour. A possible 
analogy to help understand this phenomenon comes from Bourdieu’s game theory (Bourdieu, 
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1990). As Bourdieu (1990) explains, sports players move instinctively during a game based on 
a guided feeling they have acquired through training and experience. Players outlined to have 
little time to perform a rational calculation, but instead they do what needs to be done under 
the circumstances to achieve a certain result. This reasoning can help explain why some officers 
were unable to give a reason as to why they contributed to corrupt events. Under this reasoning, 
these officers might have used their knowledge and experience when confronted with a 
situation that involved their participation in unethical decisions.  
The lack of support for individual factors of influence corroborates the assumption that police 
corruption is impacted by both personal agency and structural factors. However, it does not 
support Punch’s (2003) notion that “police themselves often employ the 'rotten apple' 
metaphor—the deviant cop who slips into bad ways and contaminates the other essentially 
good officers – which is an individualistic, human failure model of deviance” (p. 172). A 
possible reason for the low response rate in relation to individual factors could be because it is 
easier to place the blame on external factors rather than admit personal downfalls. Another 
possible reason is that these officers wanted to protect other officers from prosecution in this 
inquiry.  
Taken together, the testimony collectively demonstrates that Manly officers were more willing 
or inclined to justify their actions by outlining institutional (structural) factors rather than 
individual (personal agency) factors. Although the findings suggest that institutional factors do 
outweigh individual factors, this does not necessarily mean that these factors were more 
influential than other factors. The findings merely suggest that Manly officers tended to utilise 
institutional excuses or justifications more than individual reasons. These officers may have 
been more inclined to point the blame towards institutional factors rather than implicating their 
own personal character. Officers under investigation are innocent until proven guilty, which 
may be why there are more officers who offset their individual factors with institutional factors.  
Additionally, since this study only focused on charged actors, no comparison was made with a 
control group (e.g. non-corrupt actors) suggesting that the factors identified cannot be causal. 
As a result, it remains unclear as to why some officers were corrupt and continued to engage 
in corrupt activities, while other officers working in Manly remained honourable officers. One 
suggestion could be that these officers were better at hiding their corrupt activities then other 
officers. Another suggestion is that these officers we above approach and were not influenced 
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by their peers. Unfortunately, without a control group it is impossible to outline the exact 
factors that influenced Manly officers into corruption.  
Concluding Comments 
This chapter has investigated the suite of influential factors identified by officers in their 
testimony used to explain why they engaged in corrupt practices. Specifically, this chapter 
addressed the first research question: What factors influence police officers to join corruption 
networks and continue to participate in serious corruption? The overall findings show that 
officers acknowledge that more structural factors rather than personal agency factors explain 
the reasons behind their behaviour and participation in the corruption network. These officers 
also admitted that opportunity played a role in their involvement in corrupt practices.  
This chapter has provided valuable insights into the range of factors influencing officers to 
engage in corrupt behaviours. Together, these findings provide a basis for understanding the 
results of the remaining three research questions. Although personal agency and other factors 
have been identified, structure still plays a role and therefore it will be instructive in 
understanding when and how, and under what conditions, corrupt practices develop and thrive. 
Therefore, the next chapter will provide further analysis and a discussion on the structural 
properties of these networks, followed by a chapter that analyses the operational components. 
The remaining research question is then discussed in Chapter Nine, focusing on the role of trust 
and trustworthiness in these corruption networks.  
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Chapter Seven 
How Are Police Corruption Networks 
Structured? 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter interrogated the transcripts, focusing on examining the key factors that 
influenced police officers to participate and continue to engage in corrupt activities. Extending 
the first set of findings on factors of influence, this chapter provides a critical and 
comprehensive investigation into the structural properties of police corruption networks. This 
chapter endeavours to illuminate these structural components by applying SNA. SNA is an 
empirical tool that can be used to identify, measure, analyse and visualise the ties between 
individuals (Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2013; Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell, 2011; Scott, 
1991). The ties or connections between individuals reveal relationships and roles that make up 
the wider network. Uncovering these connections and positions in a police corruption network 
will provide a deeper understanding of the structural components that allow the network to 
operate. 
Previous research has established that the structure of organised crime syndicates plays a role 
in criminal operations (Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011; Morselli, 2009a). These studies 
suggest that organised crime syndicates display network structures rather than the traditional 
hierarchical structures (Morselli, 2009a). In particular, studies have uncovered that some 
organised crime groups operate through different network structures (centralised versus 
decentralised, loose versus close connections, cliques or sub-groups) (Agreste et al., 2016; 
Bouchard, 2007; Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011; Malm & Bichler, 2011). Prior research 
has also found that some criminal networks are structured around roles and key players within 
the network (Bruinsma & Bernasco, 2004; Kleemans, 2008; Morselli, 2001). Studies into 
police corruption have also found that these officers operate in a network structure (Lauchs et 
al., 2012; Lauchs, Keast, & Le, 2011; Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011).  
However, despite these recent insights, there are very few studies that have investigated the 
structural elements within police corruption networks. One of the main reasons for this 
omission is the problem of gaining access to reliable data. This study adds to the existing 
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literature by providing more nuanced empirical evidence, derived from a unique data set.  The 
dataset is unique as it contains longitudinal data (e.g. covering three decades of corruption 
among police in the Manly region) that is used to not only expose the key structural properties, 
but allows for further investigation into the structural changes of these networks over time. 
Uncovering the corrupt exchanges and relationships between corrupt police will help police 
administrators better understand the nature, structure and operations of these networks. 
Revealing how police corruption networks are structured can assist law enforcement agencies 
to develop strategies to disrupt these dark networks and reinforce positive policing practices. 
Through this comprehensive analysis RQ2a and RQ2b are addressed: 
RQ 2a. How are police corruption networks structured? 
RQ 2b. Do police corruption networks change over time? 
 
This chapter begins by providing a summary of the key demographics of Operation Florida to 
provide a basis for the findings in this chapter. The next section provides exemplary examples 
derived from the transcripts used to highlight the key themes that emerged from the analyses. 
Examples derived from the transcripts are organised into the following sections. First, an 
overview of the 2-mode network is provided, followed by an overview of the 1-mode network. 
The chapter then investigates the network based on four time frames: 1987–1990, 1991–1994, 
1995–1998, 1999–2001. Next, a summary of the overall findings is presented and linked back 
to the literature to show how the findings inform the existing body of work. Linking the 
findings to the literature will help establish the main contributions of this thesis.  The chapter 
finishes with concluding observations about the overall findings of this research question.  
Overview of the Demographics of Operation Florida 
As previously highlighted in the background to Operation Florida in Chapter Four, over the 
course of 78 days, and generating over 6,000 pages of transcripts, 99 witnesses presented 
evidence in court. The evidence was heard in relation to seven separate segments of inquiry 
(Northern Beaches, Guns, Let’s Dance, Newport, Magnum, Kings, Letters of Assistance and 
O’Toole). Each of the segments investigated specific allegations and evidence revealed during 
the initial investigation. Within each of the segments a number of corruption events and officers 
associated with these events were identified. These events and officers are depicted in Figure 
7.1 to help contextualise the remaining sections of this chapter. The purpose of this map is to 
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first provide a visual representation of the magnitude of the trial and, second, to use this 
network map as a starting point and reference point to understand subsequent findings of this 
study.  
Figure 7.1: 2-Mode Network All Actors to All Events 
    
 
 
Actors involved in the trial (officers, civilians, drug dealers and other criminals) are highlighted 
in red. The corruption events uncovered during the trial are highlighted in blue. The numbers 
beside the events are the year the event took place. The map includes all actors involved in the 
trial (including both innocent and convicted actors) and emphasises the network’s betweenness 
measures to highlight some of the key actors that become the focus of this investigation. It 
demonstrates that there are connections between the individuals involved in the trial and that 
some individuals are more connected than others. It is these connections that provide the 
rationale for analysing the data further to explore the type of network structure that exists 
between corrupt officers charged in this inquiry. 
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2-Mode Network: Charged Actor-to-Corruption Event 
As discussed in the research approach chapter, network maps were coded using two modes (or 
two separate entities) of data: corrupt officers and corruption events. 2-mode data were used to 
determine the activity level of members in the network. In other words, this type of analysis 
was conducted to first reveal which members of the network were more active, which will be 
used to compare against the 1-mode data discussed later in this chapter.  
Figure 7.2 has been created using these two variables: officers and events. The resulting 
network map was derived from analysing these two variables for the purpose of identifying the 
main actors based on their activity level in the network. Corrupt officers are highlighted in red 
and the corruption events are highlighted in blue in the network map in Figure 7.2. The map 
also emphasises the officers involved in the most corruption events by the enlarged red circles. 
In particular, Patison, M5 and Jasper are emphasised in the network to show their high 
betweenness centrality. A high betweenness score refers to the sum of shares of shortest paths 
that pass through a given node (Borgatti et al., 2013). For example, of the 56 corruption events 
investigated Patison was involved in 30 (56%), M5 was involved in 27 (48%) and Jasper was 
involved in 19 (or 34%), thus demonstrating that these officers were more active than other 
members of the corruption network. It also shows that no single officer was involved in all 
corruption events. 
Figure 7.2: 2-Mode Network Charged Actor-to-Corruption Event 
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As Table 7.1 displays, the network is highly dense with a measure of 0.105. Density is a ratio 
of the number of actual ties out of the number of all possible ties with a node that meets all the 
ties having a rating of 1 (Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011, p. 105). In other words, density 
represents how closely connected and attached the network is and is also an indicator of the 
strength of the network.  
Table 7.1: 2-Mode Network Cohesion Measures 
Density Avg 
Dist 
Radius Diameter Fragment Transitiv Norm 
Dist 
# of 
Nodes 
# of 
Ties 
0.105 3.123 2 7 0.112 0.538 0.557 85 172 
Table 7.1 also shows that there are 172 ties across the entire network, indicating that there were 
numerous connections between the members. The large number of ties, coupled with a high-
density measure of 0.105, indicates that the network is highly connected in its structure and 
exhibits a high level of cohesion. This means that this network is large and highly connected 
involving individuals who were connected directly to a corruption event.  
Core and Periphery 
The core–periphery structure is a measure that divides both the rows and the columns into two 
classes, identifying which actors are in the core of the network and which actors are on the 
periphery.  The core consists of a partition of actors who are closely connected to each of the 
events in an event partition and, simultaneously, a partition of events that are closely connected 
to the actors in the core partition (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).  To put it another way, the core 
is a cluster of frequently co-occurring actors and events.  The periphery consists of a partition 
of actors who are not co-incident to the same events and a partition of events that are disjointed 
because they have no actors in common (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). Figure 7.3 gives a visual 
representation of the entire network by dividing the networks into a core and a periphery; that 
is, an inner core and outer layer. The top layer represents officers who are positioned as central 
(or at the core) in the network based on the number of corruption events they are involved in, 
while the remaining officers in the bottom layer represent officers on the periphery of the 
network because they are less active and have not participated in as many events as officers 
positioned at the core. It also demonstrates that officers at the core of the network were still 
involved in a number of events carried out by periphery members (represented in the top right 
corner of Figure 7.3.  
160 
 
Figure 7.3: 2-Mode Categorical Core/Periphery model 
 
Starting fitness = 0.376; Final fitness = 0.555 
Also, in accordance with Table 7.2, the partial density for corrupt officers among the corrupt 
events is 50.4%. When comparing this percentage with the overall density of the entire 
corruption network of 10.5% (Table 7.1), it demonstrates that corrupt officers within the core 
are able to operate intensively without the assistance of periphery members. Furthermore, the 
corrupt officers belonging to the periphery were found to be loosely connected to each other; 
the respective partial density in this segment is 3.5%, thus suggesting that the periphery 
members were only involved in the corruption event when they were needed. Finally, the 
partial densities of the intersections between the core and the periphery amount to 27% and 7% 
respectively, which suggests that the peripheral officers are indeed loosely connected to the 
core, further providing evidence that officers in the core of the network were able to operate 
separately from periphery members.  
This finding is consistent with the network map presented in Figure 7.2; it shows that Patison, 
King, M5 and Jasper are officers at the core of the network. It also reveals that the core officers 
were still involved in a number of peripheral events (see top right corner of Figure 7.3). This 
finding makes sense, because these officers were involved in more events than any other 
officer.  
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Table 7.2: Density Table for 2-mode categorical core/periphery model 
  Core Periphery 
Core 0.504 0.270 
Periphery 0.070 0.035 
The above analysis on the core and periphery of the network reveals that there are indeed 
corrupt officers who are more central than others, based on the frequency of corruption events 
these officers are involved in. It also demonstrates that the actors densely clustered in the core 
of the network could operate independently, despite some core actors being involved in events 
with periphery members. This finding further suggests that the network operated around a few 
main actors, whereby periphery actors only became involved when they brought valuable 
resources to the network. However, it is important to highlight that the final model fit of 
r=0.555 indicates that the ideal core/periphery structure is fairly approved but identifies that 
the network does not quite behave like a core-periphery (a fitness score of 0 means bad fit, 
while a score of 1 means an excellent fit). For this reason, it is acknowledged that the above 
analysis on the core-periphery of the network does not traditionally demonstrate a core-
periphery structure but these findings are useful in identifying the actors clustered in the core 
of the network4.  
To further examine this finding centrality measures were analysed using the 2-mode network 
data. Table 7.3 provides a summary of the top four actors in this network based on their 
centrality measures (refer to Appendix J for the full table). This table highlights the fact that 
Patison, M5, Jasper and King are the most central officers in the network and, therefore, were 
the most active in the network. This finding also suggests that these officers engaged in a 
number of corruption events together which is consistent with results presented above in 
relation to the core/periphery.  
Table 7.3: 2-Mode Network Centrality Measures 
  Degree 2-Local Eigenvect Closeness Betweenne 
Patison 0.536 0.287 0.558 0.626 0.321 
M5 0.482 0.232 0.580 0.671 0.345 
Jasper 0.339 0.115 0.395 0.521 0.122 
King 0.250 0.063 0.267 0.536 0.085 
                                                 
4 Although the network does not traditionally display a core-periphery structure, the expressions core and 
periphery will be used to describe the various layers of the network. 
162 
 
In summary, the analysis in this section utilised 2-mode data to provide an overview of the 
network’s structure. Although the findings revealed that the network does not represent a 
traditional core-periphery structure, the network still revealed that some officers were 
positioned in the core of the network, while others were loosely connected outside the core. 
Officers who were most active were positioned at the core of the network, while officers less 
active were positioned on the periphery of the network. The network measures presented 
further show that officers at the core of the network could operate without the involvement of 
periphery members. These measures also demonstrate that some core members were involved 
in corruption events with periphery members, demonstrating that these core officers were 
highly involved in the operations of the network. The next section continues this investigation 
into the structural properties of the network by interrogating the 1-mode data. 
1-Mode Network: Actor-to-Actor 
Looking at the connections in a 1-mode network provides a different perspective on the 
corruption network, as it shows the connection between officers rather than connections based 
on events. This deeper examination of the data will expose the key connections between 
officers and will help to understand how these connections build the overall network structure. 
Figure 7.4 provides an overview of the charged actors’ network developed from capturing all 
connections between actors outlined in the Operation Florida transcripts. Like the previous 
maps, the most central actors have been emphasised using larger red squares to demonstrate 
that there were actors in the network who were more connected than other actors. The network 
map shows that there was a total of 29 actors charged as a result of trial and two of these actors 
were drug dealers (highlighted in yellow). The network map also includes the year the officer 
joined the police force to show the years of experience of the officers involved in the corruption 
network. 
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Figure 7.4: All Charged Actors to Actors 
 
 
At first glance, the network map shows that most the actors are clustered together through 
shared connections and that some actors are isolated (showing they have no connections to the 
rest of the network). Specifically, the analyses revealed that, out of the 29 actors, 27 actors (two 
actors are drug dealers) were clustered together, while two actors were completely separate 
from the network. Since no direct connections were apparent between the two actors (Wilding 
and Kempnich), they were not included in the forthcoming network analyses.  
Size of Network 
Following the above, the network consists of 29 actors, two of whom are drug dealers and the 
remaining are corrupt NSW police officers. The size of the network is important to understand 
because it affects other network measures and influences the structure of relations (e.g. as 
actors only have certain capabilities and resources for creating and maintaining ties with other 
members of the network).  Since this network is relatively small, and all members are Manly 
detectives stationed in the Northern Beaches or Central Coast, it can be expected that many of 
the officers are aware of most the other officers in the network. It can be discerned from the 
network map in Figure 7.4 that the officers are well connected, with only two officers (Wilding 
and Kempnich) isolated from the main network. This makes sense, because Wilding and 
Kempnich were partners and worked in the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) which was a 
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separate unit to the other officers involved in the network. Additionally, these two officers were 
investigated during the trial under a separate segment (called the Letters segment), where they 
were the only two officers involved. The transcripts also revealed that Wilding and Kempnich 
had only worked together for a total of 12 months before the investigation, indicating that their 
corrupt collaboration was in its infancy. The allegations examined in this segment outlined that 
Wilding and Kempnich were paid by particular offenders to make sure the documentation was 
incorrect relating to informants P4 and P6. They are only connected to the other network 
through third parties. P4 and A1 operate in the same drug circle. A1 was arrested by Manly 
police, so there is only a connection between the drug dealers, rather than between the officers. 
As previously highlighted, since these two officers are completely separate from the main 
network and do not appear to have any connections to any of the other actors they were not 
included in the remaining network analyses.  
The remaining analyses based on the 27 actors examines the 1-mode data to reveal more of the 
structural properties of this network. The next section explores the diameter and path distance, 
followed by an investigation into the clustering and cliques within the network. The chapter 
then goes on to provide an overview of the centrality measures. Collectively, these analyses 
will help determine how the network was structured based on the key connections between 
actors in the network. The implications of these findings are discussed later in the chapter.  
Diameter and Distance 
Diameter and distance are also important measures to identify in this network as they can 
indicate how well resources can move from one part of the network to another (Carolan, 2014). 
Referring to Table 7.4, the diameter of the network is 2, indicating that the longest path between 
any two actors is two steps. The average distance in the network is 1.5, with a standard 
deviation of 0.5, indicating that, on average, officers in the network can reach each other in 1.5 
steps.  
Table 7.4: Whole Network Cohesion Measures 
Avg 
Degree 
Deg 
Central 
Density Closure Avg 
Distance 
Diameter Breadth Compact # of 
Nodes 
# of 
Ties 
11.93 0.59 0.46 0.67 1.54 2.00 0.27 0.73 29 319 
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Further investigation, using the geodesic distance measures in UCINET, shows that 45% of the 
actors have a score of 1 geodesic distance, while 54% of the actors have a score of 2 geodesic 
distance, which means that all actors in the network are separated by not more than 2 degrees 
of separation (refer to Table 7.5).  
Table 7.5: Geodesic Distance 
  Freq Prop 
1 317 0.452 
2 385 0.548 
*Average 1.5, SD 0.5 
 
These results are consistent with the figures presented in Table 7.4, as they indicate that there 
is high cohesion and clustering in the network, which provides further evidence that resources 
are easily moved from one side of the network to another. Furthermore, the small diameter and 
small path distance suggest that officers are highly reachable and that there is little need for a 
middleman or broker in this network.  
Clustering and Density 
Clustering is another network property that provides information regarding a network’s actors’ 
tendency to group together into pockets of dense connectivity (Valente, 2010). Overall, the 
graph clustering coefficient is 0.83, and the weighted overall graph clustering coefficient is 
0.66. The weighted version gives weight to the neighbourhood densities proportional to their 
size (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). The result presented suggests that, overall, the network 
resembles high clustering, where actors in the network are surrounded by local neighbourhoods 
that are relatively dense. In addition, the network also has a fairly high density score of 0.46. 
By comparing this density score to the overall clustering coefficient of the network, it can be 
seen that the density of the local neighbourhoods is much higher than the density of the whole 
network.  
By examining the densities of the neighbourhood of each actor, as shown in Table 7.6, it can 
be seen that the size of each actor’s neighbourhood is reflected by the number of pairs of actors 
in it. The table shows that Jasper has 325 possible ties, which at first glance may be interpreted 
as having many ties. However, when these ties are compared to Japer’s clustering coefficient 
measure of 0.41 it shows that only 41% of these ties are present, demonstrating that Jasper is 
166 
 
not highly clustered. On the other hand, looking at actors with fewer ties, such as McDougall, 
Moore and S8 (with only 15 possible ties), their clustering coefficient measures are 1.00, 
demonstrating that 100% of their ties are present, suggesting that these officers are embedded 
in highly-clustered neighbourhoods. This makes sense, because it is more likely that a few 
actors in a neighbourhood have ties with one another, than a neighbourhood with hundreds of 
ties.  
Table 7.6: Clustering Coefficient of Each Actor 
  
Clus 
Coef nPairs 
 
Jasper 0.41 325.00 
M5 0.45 253.00 
King 0.52 210.00 
Patison 0.55 91.00 
DavidsonS 0.62 78.00 
N1 0.64 153.00 
F7 0.65 136.00 
O'Toole 0.68 91.00 
Dowding 0.73 105.00 
Kendall 0.85 66.00 
Monk 0.87 45.00 
Irwin 0.89 55.00 
Blake 0.90 55.00 
DavidsonJ 0.91 55.00 
Smith 0.91 55.00 
Hill 0.93 28.00 
Messenger 0.93 28.00 
Peattie 0.93 28.00 
Benbow 0.95 28.00 
Ehsman 0.96 45.00 
Bernasconi 1.00 45.00 
Wrice 1.00 45.00 
Caccamo 1.00 21.00 
Hulmes 1.00 28.00 
McDougall 1.00 15.00 
Moore 1.00 15.00 
S8 1.00 15.00 
 
Cliques 
To build on this analysis, the data were analysed using the hierarchical clustering matrix in 
UCINET to determine if there were any cliques in the overall network. This analysis was 
167 
 
conducted to determine whether the network had a subset of actors who were more closely and 
intensely tied to one another than they are to other members of the network (Hanneman & 
iddle, 2005). From Table 7.7, it can be observed that the 27 actors make up 11 separate cliques 
within the larger corruption network. The largest clique comprises of 11 members, where the 
smaller clique is made up of four actors. Each of the smaller cliques shares some overlap with 
some part of the largest clique. Jasper has been emphasised and highlighted in Table 7.7 to 
show that he is the only actor who is part of all 11 cliques. This is consistent with the above 
findings regarding the clustering coefficient (see Table 7.6), where officers are seen to cluster 
around Jasper the most. This result shows that, alongside Jasper, King also has several 
memberships across the 11 cliques. Collectively, Jasper and King are the closest in the sense 
that they share membership in eight out of the 11 cliques, which is more than any other member 
of the network.  
Table 7.7: Cliques 
1 Bernasconi, Blake, DavidsonJ, Dowding, F7, 
Irwin, Jasper, King, M5, N1, Wrice 
 
2 Dowding, Ehsman, F7, Jasper, Kendall, 
King, M5, N1, O'Toole, Smith 
3 Dowding, Jasper, Kendall, King, M5, N1, 
Patison 
4 DavidsonJ, Dowding, Jasper, King, M5, N1, 
Patison 
5 Jasper, King, M5, McDougall, Moore, 
O'Toole, S8 
6 Hill, Jasper, M5, Messenger, Patison, Peattie 
7 Benbow, Caccamo, DavidsonS, Hill, Jasper, 
Messenger, Patison, Peattie 
8 DavidsonS, F7, Irwin, Jasper 
9 F7, Hulmes, Jasper, Kendall, King, Monk, 
N1, O'Toole, Smith 
10 Ehsman, F7, Jasper, Kendall, King, Monk, 
N1, O'Toole, Smith 
11 Jasper, Kendall, King, Monk, N1, Patison 
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Note: Jasper is emphasised to demonstrate his involvement in all 11 cliques. 
 
Core Vs Periphery 
As previously discussed in this chapter, distinguishing between the core and periphery actors 
is an important measure because it shows the topology of the network by identifying which 
actors are at the centre and which actors are on the edge of the network. These findings will 
help to understand how the structural roles of actor’s impact on their influence or control of the 
network’s operations. Like the previous analysis with 2-mode data, Figure 7.5 shows that the 
1 – mode network contains actors clustered around the core, while others remain loosely 
connected on the periphery. It also demonstrates that the final model fit of r=0.619 indicates 
that the ideal core/periphery structure is approved, as the fitness score is closer to 1 than 0 (a 
fitness score of 0 means a bad fit, while a score of 1 means an excellent fit), which is a similar 
finding to that of the 2-mode data. However, as previously acknowledged in the 2-mode 
network analysis, although the core of the network is adequate and the fitness enters the range 
of acceptability, the network fails to meet a key criterion, which is for the periphery of the 
network to be disconnected from the rest of the network. For this reason, the 1-mode network 
does not traditionally act as a core-periphery structure, however, for the purpose of this 
analysis, which is to unpack the layers of the network, the terms core and periphery will still 
be used to describe these features of the network. Furthermore, a further investigation into 
actors clustered in the core of the network will be explored later in this chapter (see Figure 7.6). 
Figure 7.5: Core and Periphery of the Network 
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Starting fitness = 0.619; Final fitness= 0.619 
 
In addition, in accordance with Table 7.8, the partial density for corrupt officers among the 
corrupt events is 89.1%. Compared with the overall density of the entire corruption network of 
46% (highlighted in Table 7.4 earlier in the chapter), the corrupt officers within the core can 
operate intensively. Furthermore, the corrupt officers belonging to the periphery are relatively 
connected to each other; the respective partial density in this segment is 22.9%. Finally, the 
partial densities of the intersections between the core and the periphery amount to 45.5% and 
47.7% respectively, which suggests that the peripheral officers are indeed highly connected to 
the core further demonstrating that the network does not traditionally display a core-periphery 
structure. This finding is consistent with the network map presented in Figure 7.4, as it shows 
that 11 out of the 27 (41%) officers are considered part of the core. It also reveals that the core 
officers were still highly connected to peripheral members (see top right corner of Figure 7.5).  
 
Table 7.8: 1-Mode Core/Periphery Matrix 
  Core Periphery 
Core 0.891 0.455 
Periphery 0.477 0.229 
Referring to the core-periphery network using the 2-mode data, these results also show that 
there are more officers at the core of the network (which can be observed in the first row) and 
that these officers have many connections with the network’s periphery actors (which can be 
seen in the top right corner). Unlike the findings of the 2-mode data, which showed that the 
core actors operated independently of the periphery actors, the findings of the 1-mode data 
suggest that the core was highly connected with the periphery. It also shows that the periphery 
actors were highly connected to other periphery actors, where this was not the case in the 2-
mode data. These findings make sense, because officers involved in the network (e.g. within 
specific cliques) had an understanding that if an officer was not physically present at the time 
the corruption act took place they would still receive their share, thus supporting the overall 
finding that the core and periphery actors were highly connected. 
Centrality Measures 
Centrality measures assess whether a network is structured around certain individuals. 
Centrality measures are important because they help to understand whether an individual’s 
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connections can put them in a central position of power in a network. This is important to 
understand in relation to corrupt police networks because it will help understand whether these 
networks are highly centralised and whether the removal of key officers can disrupt the 
network. Table 7.9 presents the overall centrality measure for the 1-mode network (officer-to-
officer connections). The centrality of the corruption network indicated 45.9% which is quite 
high, indicating that the network is controlled by key players. 
Table 7.9: 1-Mode Overall Network Centrality Measures 
Avg 
Degree 
Indeg H-
Index 
Density Closure Avg 
Distance 
SD 
Distance 
Diameter Breadth Compact 
11.926 11 0.459 0.673 1.541 0.498 2 0.271 0.729 
Taking a closer look at these key individuals, the centrality measures outlined in Table 7.10 
clearly identify those officers who held central positions in the network (for the full matrix 
please refer to Appendix K). In particular, Jasper, M5 and King have high between and degree 
measures, which place them as central actors. The finding of these officers having a high 
between and degree measure is consistent with the results regarding the core and peripheral 
positions in the network discussed earlier in this chapter. This finding also shows that these 
officers are highly connected to other officers in the network and that they hold important 
control positions in the network. This finding makes sense, because these officers acquired 
more connections than any other officer, making their positions in the network valuable 
because they were able to access other members of the network directly.  
Table 7.10: 1-Mode Centrality Measures 
  Degree Closenes Eigenvec Between 
Jasper 26.00 26.00 0.33 68.31 
M5 23.00 29.00 0.30 43.27 
King 21.00 31.00 0.30 23.00 
N1 18.00 34.00 0.28 9.50 
F7 17.00 35.00 0.26 8.15 
Dowding 15.00 37.00 0.24 4.47 
O'Toole 14.00 38.00 0.21 7.13 
Patison 14.00 38.00 0.19 11.99 
DavidsonS 13.00 39.00 0.18 8.71 
Kendall 12.00 40.00 0.20 1.37 
Blake 11.00 41.00 0.19 0.54 
DavidsonJ 11.00 41.00 0.19 0.73 
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Irwin 11.00 41.00 0.19 0.54 
Smith 11.00 41.00 0.19 0.63 
Bernasconi 10.00 42.00 0.18 0.00 
Ehsman 10.00 42.00 0.18 0.22 
Monk 10.00 42.00 0.16 0.87 
Wrice 10.00 42.00 0.18 0.00 
Benbow 8.00 44.00 0.10 0.14 
Hill 8.00 44.00 0.10 0.14 
Hulmes 8.00 44.00 0.14 0.00 
Messenger 8.00 44.00 0.10 0.14 
Peattie 8.00 44.00 0.10 0.14 
Caccamo 7.00 45.00 0.08 0.00 
McDougall 6.00 46.00 0.10 0.00 
Moore 6.00 46.00 0.10 0.00 
S8 6.00 46.00 0.10 0.00 
 
Referring to Table 7.10, Jasper, M5 and King are the most central actors in the network, while 
McDougall, S8 and Moore have the lowest centrality measures in the network. The centrality 
of these actors is also consistent with their relative positions in the core and periphery of the 
network. However, through a deeper interrogation of the results, the network can be further 
divided into three levels: the inner core, outer core and periphery. A visual representation is 
displayed in Figure 7.6. In addition to the inner core, which consists of Jasper, M5 and King, 
there also appears to be an outer core that consists of F7, Dowding, O’Toole and Patison. These 
actors in the outer core are also highly connected but fit somewhere in between the core and 
periphery. By further dividing the core into two layers it demonstrates that the removal of an 
actor in the inner core is unlikely to disrupt the operations of a corruption network. As the core 
and periphery are highly connected, it suggests that the network would be resilient to the 
removal of central actors. This finding will be important for practical implications, which are 
discussed in the conclusion chapter of this thesis (Chapter Ten).  
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Figure 7.6: Core, Inner Core, and Outer Core 
 
It should be noted that although Figure 7.6 and the corresponding centrality measures outlined 
in Table 7.10, provide insights into the centrality of actors in the network these measures only 
look at the network at a single point in time. As the investigation and trial heard evidence dating 
between 1980 and 2001, the next step in the interrogation is to analyse the network at different 
points in time to provide a deeper understanding regarding the network’s dynamics over two 
decades. These analyses aimed to address the RQ2b: Do police corruption networks change 
over time? The next section outlines the analyses undertaken in this thesis. 
RQ2b: Do Police Corruption Networks Change Over Time? 
Network Characteristics Over Time: Longitudinal Mapping  
A deeper interrogation of the network reveals that the network was indeed dynamic and that 
there were shifts in the structure and frequency of the corruption events. The 2-mode network 
presented earlier in the thesis was divided into four equal time segments to ascertain whether 
the network changed in size, density and centrality over time. As previously discussed in the 
thesis, the first recorded corruption event took place in 1987, with the last event concluding in 
2001, therefore the time segments are: 
 1987–1990 (T1) 
 1991–1994 (T2) 
Periphery
Kendall
Blake
DavidsonJ
Irwin
Smith
Bernasconi
Ehsman
Monk
Wrice
Benbow
Hill
Hulmes
Messenger
Peattie
Caccamo
McDougall
Moore
S8
Outer Core
N1
F7
Dodwing
O'Toole
Patison
DavidsonS
Inner Core
Jasper M5 King
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 1995–1998 (T3) 
 1999–2001 (T4) 
Each of the respective networks provided for each time segment was based on the connections 
and involvement officers had with corrupt activities during each of the time segments. 
Therefore, the network was created using 2-mode data (officers and corruption events). 
Officers needed to meet one of the following conditions to be classified as an active member 
of the network during this time: 1) an officer needed to be physically involved in a corruption 
event and receive his share, or 2) still received his share despite not being physically involved 
during the time the corruption took place. These ties between officers provide an overview of 
the structure and composition of the corrupt police network. This analysis will add a deeper 
understanding of the nature and fluidness of the network. This section starts by providing an 
overview of the demographics of each time frame, followed by an analysis of each period.  
Overall Demographics of Each Period 
Table 7.11 provides an overview of the demographics of the network at each point in time. At 
an initial glance, the network was at its largest during 1991–1994 (T1) and was at its smallest 
between 1995–1998 (T3). Officers appear to be most active during T4: 1999–2001 and least 
active between 1995–1998 (T3). The network has a fairly consist high density and compactness 
over the 14 years of operation. The network also has a small diameter, remaining constant at 
2, and a short path distance. The degree centrality fluctuates from between low and high 
throughout the years. Overall, the network measures presented in Table 7.11 demonstrate that 
the network resembles a medium-size network, with high density and cohesion, short path 
distances and low centrality. 
Table 7.11: Summary of Period Network Measures 
  Actors Events Density Path 
Distance 
Compact Diameter Average 
Degree 
Degree 
Centrality 
T1: 
1987–
1990 
9 9 0.75 1.25 0.88 2.00 6.00 0.16 
T1 Summary: Small network, high density, short path distance, low centrality 
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The following sections provide a more detailed discussion of each period. Overall network 
measures are presented, alongside a visual network map. Each section also provides an analysis 
of possible factors that influenced the change in network structure.  
1987–1990 
It is unclear when the police corruption commenced in Manly division in NSW. However, 
testimony from some of the officers suggests that corrupt activities date back to the 1970s. In 
one testimony, Peattie outlined that he was exposed to corruption earlier in his career during 
the late-1970s/early-1980s. Peattie’s testimony suggests that he was part of a separate 
corruption network before he entered the one investigated in this inquiry. Although there was 
an indication that there was a corruption network before the 1980s the focus of Operation 
Florida was only on corruption events from 1980s onwards. For this reason, the corruption 
events used in this thesis are only from 1980 to 2001. 
In addition, for the purpose of analysing the first period during which corruption occurred, 
1987 is used because it was the first corruption event disclosed during the trial by a member of 
the network under investigation. 1987 was also the year where Peattie was transferred to Manly 
and was partnered up with Patison, where they admitted to actively engaging in corrupt 
T2: 
1991–
1994 
22 16 0.49 1.50 0.75 2.00 10.27 0.51 
T2: Summary: Large network, medium density, short path distance, high centrality 
T3: 
1995–
1998 
5 6 0.70 1.30 0.85 2.00 2.80 0.50 
T3 Summary: Small network, high density, short path distance, high centrality 
T4: 
1999–
2001 
10 25 0.82 1.18 0.91 2.00 7.40 0.22 
T4 Summary: Medium network, high density, short path distance, low centrality 
Average 11.5 14 0.69 1.3 0.84 2.00 6.6 0.35 
Overall Summary: Medium network, high density, short path distance, low centrality 
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activities. During their time as partners, Peattie and Patison admitted to verballing and loading 
suspects. This appears to be the beginning of the creation of the corruption network that 
developed from 1987–2001. The next section discusses the network characteristics.   
Size, Distance, Diameter, Density 
On the surface, the network consists of nine actors (Dowding, Kendall, King, M5, Monk, N1, 
O’Toole Patison and Peattie) who engaged in corrupt acts from between 1987 and 1990 (refer 
to Table 7.13 for network map). All officers were Manly police and worked under the MCSN, 
either in the AHU or drug unit. The network has an overall density of 0.75, indicating it is 
highly dense and connected. As all officers worked under the same branch it makes sense that 
the density of the network would be high. In addition, the average distance in the network is 
1.3, with a standard deviation of 0.4, indicating that, on average, officers in the network can 
reach each other in 1.3 steps. The results show that 75% of the actors have a score of 1 geodesic 
distance, while 25% of the actors have a score of 2 geodesic distance, which means that all 
actors in the network are separated by not more than 2 degrees of separation (refer to Table 
7.12). These results indicate that there is high cohesion and high clustering in the network. By 
having high cohesion and clustering it suggests that resources are easily moved from one side 
of the network to another. Furthermore, due to the small diameter and small path distance it 
suggests that officers are highly reachable and that there is little need for a middleman or broker 
in this network. 
Table 7.12: Geodesic Distance 1987–1990 
  Freq Prop 
1 54 0.75 
2 18 0.25 
*Average 1.3, SD 0.4 
 
Centrality Measures 
The centrality measures outlined in Table 7.13 demonstrate that M5 and Patison are central 
players in the network. In particular, M5 has the highest betweenness score (3.40), indicating 
that he is most central and has the shortest paths from all vertices. This suggests that M5 has 
the most control over the network because of his level of connectivity in the network. The 
centrality measures also show that Patison is also a central player in the network, with a high 
betweenness score of 3.17, indicating he also reserved a central position in the network.   
176 
 
Table 7.13: 1987–1990 Network Map 
  Degree Closeness Eigenvec Between Network Map 
 
 
Density Avg 
Degree 
Deg 
Central 
Diameter Compactness Closure Avg 
Distance 
0.75 6 0.161 2 0.875 0.822 1.25 
Patison 7.00 9.00 0.35 3.40 
M5 7.00 9.00 0.36 3.17 
Kendall 7.00 9.00 0.38 0.57 
King 7.00 9.00 0.38 0.57 
N1 7.00 9.00 0.38 0.57 
O'Toole 6.00 10.00 0.33 0.40 
Dowding 6.00 10.00 0.34 0.17 
Monk 5.00 11.00 0.29 0.17 
Peattie 2.00 14.00 0.11 0.00 
     
Network Cohesion 
Measures 
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One would expect Peattie also to be in a central position since he was one of the original 
members of the network. A possible reason for this explanation is because Peattie was in a 
supervisory role at the time and therefore was not directly involved in the searches, which is 
why we see his low centrality measure. We can assume that he still received his share on all 
corruption events that took place but this was not always clear in the transcripts. 
Possible Reasons for Changes in Network 
As discussed above, the network was active but relatively small. Peattie and Patison’s 
partnership laid the foundation for the corruption network to grow and prosper. As this was the 
inception of the network it suggests that membership was extremely exclusive, where only 
trusted officers were allowed into the network.  This was demonstrated by the small size of the 
network, where officers in the network had a number of years’ experience working with one 
another. As all officers in the network worked in the Manly division they were exposed to the 
same types of opportunities to engage in corruption. For example, these officers were all 
involved in the search and arrest of suspects suspected of engaging in illegal activities. It was 
during these searches that officers were exposed to drugs, cash and other valuable goods found 
in a suspect’s residence. As previously outlined in Chapter Six, the subculture at the Manly 
division during the 1980s was a subculture that was accepting and tolerated corrupt officers. 
As highlighted in many of the officers’ testimony, these corrupt actions were supported and 
endorsed by senior officers which made it easier for officers to engage in these deviant 
behaviours. At the same time officers in Manly were engaged in corrupt practices the Fitzgerald 
Inquiry5 investigating police corruption was taking place in Qld. As a result of this inquiry 
huge organisational and structural changes were being made to the QPF. Yet, despite this 
inquiry taking place at the same time, there appears to be very little—if any—bearing on the 
activity or membership of the Manly division’s corruption network as they continued to operate 
and grow after the inquiry. This implies that because the investigation took place in a separate 
                                                 
5 In 1987, following a series of articles in the Courier-Mail about the police in Queensland, and then the national 
televising of Chris Masters’ program ‘The Moonlight State’ on the ABC’s Four Corners, Queensland’s Acting 
Premier Gunn announced an inquiry. The inquiry successfully unmasked widespread corruption in the Queensland 
police, particularly embracing gaming and vice. It was revealed that corruption extended to the very leaders of the 
police force and tainted some politicians. Criminal prosecutions were launched against some of those involved, 
and sweeping measures were recommended to minimise opportunities for future corruption. Former Police 
Commissioner, Sir Terence Lewis, was convicted of taking bribes and sentenced to 14 years in prison. The real 
value of this inquiry lay not so much in netting the corrupt, but in the improved structures and systems developed 
to overcome corruption, which led to a rebuilding of the police force (PIV, 2007, p.125) 
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state, the corruption network in NSW could continue, demonstrating that it was resilient to 
inquiries in separate states. 
1991–1994 
The inquiry evidence revealed that the network continued to operate between 1991 and 1994. 
The network measures will be discussed in more detail below to understand the changes from 
the previous years of operation.  
Size, Distance, Diameter, Density 
The network during this time of operation has grown to twenty-two actors (M5, King, N1, F7, 
Dowding, Irwin, O'Toole, Blake, DavidsonJ, Kendall, Patison, Wrice, Bernasconi, DavidsonS, 
Ehsman, Monk, Smith, Hulmes, McDougall, Messenger, Moore, Hill) who engaged in corrupt   
acts from between 1991 and 1994 (refer to Table 7.15 for network map). The network has an 
overall density of 0.49, indicating it is fairly dense and connected. A drop-in density makes 
sense because the network is significantly larger and officers involved were associated with a 
variety of units within the Police Service. In addition, the average distance in the network is 
1.5, with a standard deviation of 0.5, indicating that, on average, officers in the network can 
reach each other in 1.5 steps. The results shows that 46.8% of the actors have a score of 1 
geodesic distance, 52.4% of the actors have a score of 2 geodesic distance and 9% have a score 
of 3 geodesic distance, which means that all actors in the network are separated by not more 
than 3 degrees of separation (refer to Table 7.14). These results indicate that there is high 
cohesion and high clustering in the network. By having high cohesion and clustering suggests 
that resources are easily moved from one side of the network to another. Furthermore, due to 
the small diameter and small path distance, it suggests that officers are highly reachable and 
that there is little need for a middleman or broker in this network. 
Table 7.14: 1991–1994 Geodesic Measures 
  Freq Prop 
1 216 0.468 
2 242 0.524 
3 4 0.009 
*Average Distance 1.5, SD 0.5 
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Table 7.15: 1991–1994 Network Measures and Map 
  Degree Closenes Eigenvec Between Network Map 
 
Density Avg 
Degree 
Deg 
Central 
Diameter Compactness Closure Avg 
Distance 
0.49 10.27 0.51 2 0.75 0.67 1.5 
M5 20.0 22.0 0.3 41.8 
King 18.0 24.0 0.3 19.8 
N1 16.0 26.0 0.3 8.8 
F7 15.0 27.0 0.3 7.4 
Dowding 14.0 28.0 0.3 5.3 
Irwin 11.0 31.0 0.2 3.0 
O'Toole 11.0 31.0 0.2 4.9 
Blake 10.0 32.0 0.2 0.6 
DavidsonJ 10.0 32.0 0.2 0.9 
Kendall 10.0 32.0 0.2 0.9 
Patison 10.0 32.0 0.2 7.2 
Wrice 10.0 32.0 0.2 2.0 
Bernasconi 9.0 33.0 0.2 0.0 
DavidsonS 9.0 33.0 0.2 4.6 
Ehsman 9.0 33.0 0.2 0.2 
Monk 9.0 33.0 0.2 3.4 
Smith 9.0 33.0 0.2 0.2 
Hulmes 8.0 35.0 0.1 4.9 
McDougall 5.0 37.0 0.1 0.4 
Messenger 5.0 37.0 0.1 1.2 
Moore 5.0 37.0 0.1 0.4 
Hill 4.0 38.0 0.1 0.0 
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Centrality Measures 
The centrality measures outlined in Table 7.15 demonstrate that there are a number of central 
officers in the network. In particular, M5 has a betweenness measure of 41.8 and King has a 
betweenness measure of 19.8, indicating that these two officers are most central and have the 
shortest paths from all vertices. We can already see a shift in central players from the previous 
time frame between 1987–1990. While M5 maintains a central position in the network, Patison, 
who held the most central position in 1987 to1990, is now an officer who does not hold a central 
position in the network. A possible reason for this shift in centrality was due to Patison’s change 
in unit and location within NSW. Within the Regional Crime Squad North, Patison shifted from 
the sexual assault unit (1988–1990) to the AHU (1990–1993) to the drug unit (1993–1996). He 
also shifted from the Northern Beaches area to the Central Coast, where he would have minimal 
interaction with his original units.  
Possible Reasons for Changes in the Network 
As seen in Table 7.15, from 1991 to 1994 the network grew from nine officers to twenty-two 
officers. This is over a 140% increase from the previous period. There were a number of new 
actors who joined the corruption network: Wrice, Smith, Moore, F7, Ehsman, Hill, Kendall, 
DavidsonS, DavidsonJ, Hulmes, Bernasconi, Blake, Irwin, McDougall and Messenger. The 
growth in numbers in the network could be due to the large cross-over of jobs discussed during 
the trial. Specifically, officers outlined that they would often work with other officers from 
different units as a result of staff shortages. The officers involved in corruption during 1991 
and 1994 came from different units, such as the AHU or drug unit as well as being from two 
different areas: the Northern Beaches and the Central Coast. This finding confirms the 
statements made by officers during their testimony regarding the large cross-over of officers. 
This implies that the multiples cross-overs between units and officers allowed the corruption 
network to be exposed to new and valuable resources; new officers brought new connections 
and new resources that allowed the network to grow during this time. 
1995–1998  
Size, Distance, Diameter, Density 
Table 7.16 provides an overview of the officers involved, their centrality scores, the network 
cohesion measures and a network map to demonstrate visually how each actor is connected to 
specific events. Like the previous time frame, the network map was created using corruption  
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Table 7.16: 1995–1998 Centrality Measures and Network Map 
  Degree Closenes Eigenvec Between Network Map 
 
 
Density Avg 
Degree 
Deg 
Central 
Diameter Compactness Closure Avg 
Distance 
0.700 2.800 0.500 2.00 0.850 0.643 1.300 
M5 4.00 4.00 0.56 2.00 
King 3.00 5.00 0.47 0.50 
Patison 3.00 5.00 0.47 0.50 
Messenger 2.00 6.00 0.35 0.00 
O’Toole 2.00 6.00 0.35 0.00 
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events (e.g. an instance where an officer collaborated to engage in misconduct or corruption 
resulting in officers receiving a financial benefit). The links between officers provide an 
overview of the structure and composition of the corrupt police network in NSW during 1995–
1998.  
From 1995–1998 there was a large reduction in officers involved in the corruption network. 
During this time frame only five officers were active participants in the network.  This 
reduction is over a 70% decrease from the previous period. From the inception, there were 
particular officers who maintained a consistent involvement in the network: M5, King, 
O’Toole, Peattie and Messenger. During this period the Wood Royal Commission into the 
NSW Police Service occurred. This resulted in the introduction of PIC and the appointment of 
Peter Ryan from the United Kingdom as Commissioner of Police in 1996. The Royal 
Commission Reports were handed down in 1997                                                                                                            
(http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/about_us/history). 
In addition, in 1997 there was a major restructure of the NSW Police that resulted in 80 Local 
Area Commands as the focal point of policing within 11 geographic regions, with appropriate 
Specialist and Corporate Commands (http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/about_us/history). As a 
result of this restructure there were also officers transferred to different divisions and units (e.g. 
Patison was transferred to Manly Local Command from MCSN). The inquiry, restructure and 
transfers would have impacted the network’s operations. This is why there is a huge decrease 
in operations during this time.6 
The average distance in the network is 1.3, with a standard deviation of 0.5, indicating that, on 
average, officers in the network can reach each other in 1.3 steps. The results show that 70% 
of the actors have a score of 1 geodesic distance, while 30% of the actors have a score of 2 
geodesic distance, which means that all actors in the network are separated by not more than 2 
degrees of separation (refer to Table 7.17). These results indicate that there is high cohesion 
and high clustering in the network.  Having high cohesion and clustering suggests that 
resources are easily moved from one side of the network to another. Furthermore, the small 
                                                 
6 In 1998, following the recommendation of the Wood Royal Commission, police recruit training was completely 
revamped. The police organisation partnered up with Charles Stuart University and introduced the Diploma of 
Policing Practice, where recruits were treated as students, which changed the nature of police education. It was 
also a move towards the professionalisation of the occupation (Chan & Dixon, 2007, p.455). 
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diameter and small path distance suggest that officers are highly reachable and that there is 
little need for a middleman or broker in this network.  
Table 7.17 1995–1998 Geodesic Measures 
  Freq Prop 
1 14 0.700 
2 6 0.300 
*Average Distance 1.3, SD 0.5 
 
Centrality Measures 
Looking at the centrality measures outlined in Table 7.16, M5 clearly is the most central officer 
based on betweenness and degree measures. M5 has a betweenness measure of 2, a degree 
measure of 4 and closeness measure of 4. This is consistent with the previous findings in the 
1991–1994-time frame. It suggests that M5 was not only a central officer in the network but 
was also one of the most consistent in regards to involvement throughout the span of the 
network. This implies that M5 had access to several resources that positioned M5 in a central 
position. It also implies that M5 was a key actor in the network because he could reach and 
access resources by having a short path distance between him and the rest of the members. It 
should also be noted, however, that M5 was the one who exposed this network to police 
investigators and he was the one who recorded and documented corruption events which may 
have skewed the results by positioning him in a more central position than he really was.  
Possible Reasons for Changes in the Network 
Between 1995 to 1999 the network was small and not very active. A major external force that 
would have impacted the operations of the network would have been the Wood Inquiry7 
investigating police corruption in NSW. Like the Fitzgerald Inquiry discussed above, the Wood 
Inquiry also found that corruption was embedded in the police culture. Although the officers 
in the Manly division were not directly investigated, they would have minimised corrupt 
activities to reduce the likelihood of detection from integrity officers. Another possible reason 
                                                 
7 The Wood Royal Commission was established in 1994 to inquire into the workings of the NSW Police and the 
nature and extent of corruption in that Service. Its work retraced familiar ground. Significant systemic and 
entrenched corruption involving a wide range of criminal behaviours by police was revealed. This conduct was 
supported by a negative police culture described as the ‘enemy within’—it thrived on greed and valued allegiance 
to colleagues, even those who were corrupt, above loyalty to the Police Service. Dependent on group loyalty and 
a tradition of mateship and peer pressure, it gave its adherents little reason to fear exposure (PIV, 2007, p.127). 
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for the decrease in activity could also be due to the amount of opportunities presented to 
members of the network or that these opportunities were considered too risky because of the 
major inquiry taking place during this time. 
1999–2001 
Size, Distance, Diameter, Density 
Table 7.18 provides an overview of the officers involved, their centrality scores, the network 
cohesion measures and a network map to demonstrate visually how each actor is connected to 
specific events. Like the previous time frame, the network map was created using corruption 
events (e.g. an instance where an officer collaborated to engage in misconduct or corruption 
resulting in officers receiving a financial benefit). The links between officers provide an 
overview of the structure and composition of the corrupt police network in NSW during 1999–
2001. From 1999–2001 the network grew again from five officers to eight officers and two 
drug dealers. This is a 60% increase from the previous period.  
There were a number of new actors who joined the corruption network: Jasper, Benbow and 
Caccamo. The growth in numbers in the network could be due to the large role Jasper played 
in the network. Despite only becoming involved in the corruption network in 1999, he was an 
active and aggressive member of the network. 
The average distance in the network is 1.2, with a standard deviation of 0.4, indicating that, on 
average, officers in the network can reach each other in 1.2 steps. The results show that 80% 
of the actors have a score of 1 geodesic distance, while 20% of the actors have a score of 2 
geodesic distance, which means that all actors in the network are separated by not more than 2 
degrees of separation (refer to Table 7.19). 
These results indicate that there is high cohesion and high clustering in the network. This high 
cohesion and clustering suggests that resources are easily moved from one side of the network 
to another. Furthermore, the small diameter and small path distance suggest that officers are 
highly reachable and that there is little need for a middleman or broker in this network. 
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Table 7.18: 1999–2001 Centrality Measure and Network Map 
  Degree Closenes Eigenvec Between Network Map 
 
 
Density Avg 
Degree 
Deg 
Central 
Diameter Compactness Closure Avg 
Distance 
0.82 7.40 0.22 2.00 0.91 0.92 1.18 
Jasper 9.00 9.00 0.35 4.14 
Benbow 8.00 10.00 0.34 0.14 
DavidsonS 8.00 10.00 0.34 0.14 
Hill 8.00 10.00 0.34 0.14 
M5 8.00 10.00 0.31 3.00 
Messenger 8.00 10.00 0.34 0.14 
Patison 8.00 10.00 0.34 0.14 
Peattie 8.00 10.00 0.34 0.14 
Caccamo 7.00 11.00 0.30 0.00 
O’Toole 2.00 16.00 0.08 0.00 
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Table 7.19: 1999–2001 Geodesic Measures 
  Freq Prop 
1 72 0.800 
2 18 0.200 
*Average Distance 1.2, SD 0.4 
 
Centrality Measures 
The centrality measures outlined in Table 7.18, demonstrate that there are a number of central 
officers in the network. In particular, Jasper has a betweenness measure of 4.14 and M5 has a 
betweenness measure of 3.00, indicating that these two officers are the most central and have 
the shortest paths from all vertices. Again, there are shifts in the centrality of key players in the 
network. While M5 maintains a central position in the network Jasper is the most central player 
in this network. Although Jasper joined the police force in 1989 he did not become an active 
member of the network until 1999. As outlined in Jasper’s testimony presented in Chapter Six, 
a possible reason for his change in behaviour could have been the result of his transfer to Manly 
from the anti-theft squad and because of the change in supervision.  
It is interesting to note that Jasper and M5 did not engage in any corrupt activities together until 
2000. A search of a drug dealer’s residence resulted in cannabis and approximately $3,000 
being found. Jasper took the money and “gave M5 $1,500 of the $3,000. I kept $1,500. At a 
later stage I gave Detective Sergeant Peattie a certain amount of money, from my $1,500 - I 
can’t remember how much it was. He wasn’t on the search warrant, as you mentioned. It might 
have even been the next day. Davidson also received some money” (Jasper, p. 374). What is 
also interesting to note is that this is the first time that Jasper was involved in corrupt activities 
with M5, which suggests that M6 may have influenced Jasper to be involved in the corruption 
network. 
Possible Reasons for Changes in the Network 
Between 1999 and 2001, and after the Wood Inquiry, the network’s activity increased as well 
as officers’ involvement. As there is no direct evidence to explain the reasons behind the change 
in structure it can only be speculated that officers felt that there were strong enough protective 
barriers to remain hidden. This strength could be the result of not being discovered or revealed 
during the Wood Inquiry (1995) that investigated NSW officers. Remaining hidden and 
undetected may have boosted members’ confidence by reaffirming the codes and norms of the 
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corruption network (e.g. code of silence and strength of the Brotherhood). Unfortunately for 
the network one of their members turned on them—M5—who revealed the corrupt nature of 
these officers shortly after the Wood Inquiry (1995). If M5 had not become a whistleblower, 
one has to wonder if the network would have continued to prosper and grow. 
Discussion of Key Findings 
Interpreting the network measures and network created from the testimony presented during 
the trial, the principal finding of this study was that corrupt police officers who worked in the 
Manly division operated within and under a network structure. In other words, the evidence 
presented in the transcripts disclosed several ongoing patterns of connections/ties between 
corrupt officers. From the analyses the network was found to consist of 27 actors, two of whom 
were drug dealers and the remaining 25 were corrupt NSW police officers. Furthermore, the 
network was found to be highly dense and highly clustered. With a diameter of 2 and average 
path distance of 1.5 officers these measures indicate that resources moved well from one part 
of the network to another. With the small diameter, short path distance and clustering there was 
minimal use of a middleman or broker in this network. The findings also identified 11 cliques 
(which are small, exclusive group of individuals) within the wider corruption network. The 
largest clique composed of 11 of the 27 members, and all other smaller cliques shared some 
overlap with the largest clique. The network also contained officers in the core and in the 
periphery of the network, which demonstrates that some officers held different structural 
positions in the network.  
The centrality of the corruption network was 45.9%, indicating that the network is controlled 
by key players, which further highlights that some individuals held more power in the network 
based on their central positions in the network. This finding was revealed through a 
comprehensive analysis of interrogating 1-mode data (actor-to-actor) and 2-mode data (actor-
to-corruption event). As a result of these analyses, officers positioned in central positions were 
found to hold power not because of their hierarchical position in the wider police organisation 
but because they were the most connected compared to other actors in the network.  
A deeper interrogation of the network map and metrics revealed that the network was dynamic, 
in that there were shifts in both the structure and frequency of the corruption events. 
Structurally, the corruption network fluctuated between 5 and 22 members across the 14-year 
period. It also varied from five to 22 corruption events during this time of operation. The degree 
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centrality fluctuated from between low and high throughout the years. However, despite these 
changes, the network remained highly dense and compact over the 14 years of operation. On 
average, the network resembled a medium-size network with high density and cohesion, short 
path distances and low centrality, thus suggesting that the operational effectiveness of this 
network stemmed from the consistent participation of central officers in the network. 
Key Network Structural Properties 
 
Network Structure 
As outlined above, a crucial finding of the study is that corrupt police in the Manly division 
operated in a network structure. Unlike networks where individuals are loosely linked to each 
other, individuals in network structures actively work together to accomplish a mutual need or 
concern (Agranoff, 1998; Mandell, 1988, 1994). Corrupt police officers were found to 
collaborate to accomplish two common goals: (1) to achieve some financial gain, and (2) to 
minimise crime statistics. The findings point to the network growing from the development of 
informal ties to more formal connections over time. These ties developed through working and 
personal relationships among officers as they carried out both their work and other corrupt 
undertakings. As highlighted in the preceding chapter, these corrupt officers formed strong 
bonds with other officers as a result of the nature of the job and their socialisation into what 
they termed the Brotherhood. Over time officers were able to watch, monitor, learn and 
understand the patterns of behaviour of fellow officers to determine their trustworthiness. 
These bonds were so strong that officers would compromise their integrity to protect fellow 
officers from possible prosecution from police administrators and the broader society. The 
formation of these strong bonds provided a solid foundation for a corrupt network structure to 
develop between officers.  
These characteristics are consistent with the definition and requirements of a network structure; 
that is, a coherent, collaborative entity. As Keast et al. (2004) note, a network structure consists 
of two key components. First, when individuals form a network structure members 
acknowledge, albeit often silently and tactically, that their goals cannot be achieved 
independently and therefore need the help of others, resulting in mutually-interdependent 
actions. Second, individuals willing to participate in the network may already know each other, 
whereby they have already formed some level of trust prior to the formation of the network 
structure, allowing for actions to be turbocharged. As these characteristics were initially 
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applied to bright networks this demonstrates that there may some characteristics of bright 
networks that can be found in some dark networks, thus showing how close bright and dark 
networks are. It further suggests that it may be easy for bright networks to cross the thin blue 
line. 
Applying this network structure using Williams’ (2001b, 2010) topology of criminal networks, 
the components of this corruption network resemble a combination of transactional, directed 
and mesh network structures. As the network emerged spontaneously it can be classified as a 
transactional network, as the network was highly unstable and disconnected. The network also 
can be classified as directed because it had a core set of corrupt officers who were involved in 
a number of corruption events. These findings are similar to those in Lauchs et al.’s (2012) 
study into the police corruption group (aka The Joke). Lauchs et al. found that the network 
began as a transactional network as it emerged, but moved into a directed network by 
individuals at the core of the network. Although both studies found the networks to be 
transnational and directed, the current study has also found, through an analysis of the network 
over time, that the network also exhibited characteristics consistent with a flux network. The 
structure of the network derived from opportunities and specific corruption incidents. For 
example, connections were formed between officers during single corruption events to collude 
and cooperate to achieve a specific outcome, which generally resulted in the theft of money 
from searches. This finding provides support for Williams’ (2001c) topology, as well as 
provides a unique perspective into the dynamic nature of police corruption networks.   
Centrality and Power 
Another distinctive feature of network structures is the fact that no-one is in charge or has a 
more-superior rank or status than other members in the network. This finding demonstrates 
that, despite some officers being more central or part of the core of the network, they were not 
considered “the boss” or the man-in-charge. Instead, their central position in the network was 
a result of having more connections or being involved in more corruption events. These central 
positions, however, did provide these police officers with more power because they held the 
most connections over fellow officers in the network. What is interesting about this finding is 
the fact that these networks operated within the larger police organisation. As the police 
organisation is a traditional hierarchical structure based on typical networks formed of power 
and authority according to rank or position, it would be expected to see the same forms of 
power in the embedded police corruption network. However, the results reveal that power in 
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the network was not determined by rank or experience in the police agency, rather it stemmed 
from the interpersonal connections and access to the resource.  
Drawing from two officers in the network, Peattie and O’Toole were two of the highest ranked 
officers but, within the corruption network, they did not exhibit a strong, powerful position. 
Instead, power for these officers came in the form of networking or facilitating networking, 
where they played a key role in introducing new recruits into the network. Also, because they 
were highly connected in and outside the corruption network they could access resources and 
information more so than fellow officers. Being highly connected played a large role in the 
growth and development of the network. This finding further provides support that these 
corrupt officers operated in a network; power cannot be used unilaterally for it to be effective 
in the network (Keast et al., 2004). This finding supports the notion that informal power derived 
from connections and relationships can be more important than formal power.  
The findings of this study also reveal that the individuals were more likely to become involved 
because of their position and jurisdiction within the police agency. In particular, members who 
made up the corruption network came from specific units, such as the drug unit or AHU, and 
all resided in Manly. This finding confirms and is similar to Lauchs et al.’s (2011) research 
into the Fitzgerald Inquiry, where it was found that the protection supplied by police officers 
was determined by their power and jurisdiction within the agency. In their study they did not 
find officers from unrelated sections of the force, such as homicide detectives, within the 
corruption network, suggesting corrupt police officers in Qld became involved in corruption 
much like officers in NSW. 
Dynamic Nature of Network Structure  
A deeper interrogation of the network by analysing the data based on four time frames reveals 
that the network was dynamic and fluid, whereby the structural components of the network 
changed over time. Overall, the corruption network fluctuated between five and 22 members 
across the 14-year period. It also fluctuated on the number of corruption events that took place. 
From Table 7.20, it can be seen that between 1991 and 1994 the corrupt network was at its 
largest, containing 22 members. However, the network was most active during 1999–2001, 
being involved in 25 corruption events.  
Table 7.20: Summary of Structural Properties of Network between T1 and T4 
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The results suggest that these changes in structure and activity of members over the course of 
three decades was a result of the external influences on the corruption network. During 1987–
1990 (T1), overall, the network was small (n=9), achieved a high density of 0.75, had a short 
path distance of 1.25 and scored low on centrality at 0.16. These overall figures support the 
qualitative findings in this study.   
As previously outlined, the corruption network began with the partnership of Peattie and 
Patison. These two officers participated in their first corruption act together soon after they 
became partners. This partnership laid the foundation for the corruption network to grow and 
prosper. As this was the inception of the network it suggests that these officers needed to first 
provide a solid system where they could expand their operations by bringing in new recruits. 
As their testimony revealed, they did not actively recruit officers into their network, but instead 
involved officers when an opportunity was presented to them (e.g. money found during a 
search). The findings further suggest that these officers were not thinking about the long-term 
growth of the network, they were just interested in engaging in corrupt activities when there 
was an opportunity to do so. At the same time as the network's inception the Fitzgerald Inquiry 
investigating police corruption was taking place in Qld. As a result of this inquiry huge 
organisational and structural changes were made to the QPF. This is another possible reason to 
explain why the network was relatively small and inactive during this time.  
From 1991 to 1994 (T2) the network grew rapidly from nine officers to 21 officers, 
demonstrating a 50% increase from the previous time period. The development of this network 
also saw an increase in centrality, which is an interesting finding considering the largest inquiry 
into police corruption had just concluded in Qld. The driving force behind the growth in the 
  
Actors Events Density 
Average 
Path 
Distance Compact Diameter 
Average 
Degree 
Degree 
Centrality 
T1 9 9 0.75 1.25 0.88 2.00 6.00 0.16 
T2 22 16 0.49 1.50 0.75 2.00 10.27 0.51 
T3 5 6 0.70 1.30 0.85 2.00 2.80 0.50 
T4 10 25 0.82 1.18 0.91 2.00 7.40 0.22 
Average 11.5 14 0.69 1.30 0.84 2.00 6.6 0.35 
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network during this time was the result of staff shortages and therefore a large cross-over of 
jobs. These new officers brought resources and connections that proved to be valuable for the 
overall network. For example, testimony by officers noted that they would often work with 
other officers from a different unit, such as the AHU or drug unit, and these officers came from 
the Northern Beaches and the Central Coast. The cross-over of staff allowed officers to network 
and build a bond with other officers across units and jurisdictions. These connections allowed 
the corruption network at this time to expand its operations to include new members.  
From 1995 to 1999 (T3) the network reduced in size significantly (n= 5), had low activity (only 
six corruption events) but remained high in centrality (0.50). A possible reason for the 
reduction in corruption events and activity among members could be a result of the Wood 
Inquiry. Like the Fitzgerald Inquiry discussed above, the Wood Inquiry was also a major 
investigation into corruption, but its focus was now on NSW police officers. This reason is 
further backed up by the corruption events that took place during this time. Most of the events 
focused on removing exhibits from the Manly office that were stored there to be used when 
loading suspects. Testimony from officers outlined that these exhibits were thrown into one of 
the NSW rivers at the start of the Wood Inquiry. Officers involved in the removal and disposal 
of the exhibits outlined in their testimony that they were just following orders from senior 
officers. These senior officers were active participants in the corruption network, and therefore 
the discovery of these exhibits would not just jeopardise the unit but would put the whole 
corruption network at risk. For these reasons, the corruption network was small and relatively 
inactive during the investigation. 
In the final phase of the network development, the network was extremely active when 
compared to the previous period (involved in 25 corruption events), but the corruption events 
included only 10 active officers during this time. The centrality (0.22) was significantly lower 
than in the previous period. The changes in the structure during this time suggest that officers 
believed that there were strong enough protective barriers to keep their corrupt practices 
hidden. It also suggests that the network could have continued to operate were it not for one of 
its members (M5) exposing the whole operation.  
The finding that police corruption networks are dynamic in nature is a novel and unique finding. 
The analysis and mapping of the corruption network over time add and extend the knowledge 
regarding police corruption networks. As previously highlighted, prior studies have only 
analysed these networks as a whole and during one single period. The current findings offer 
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new insights into the changes in the structural properties of these networks, as well as possible 
reasons as to why they change over time.  
Connecting Research Question 1 and 2: Factors of Influence and Network Structure 
The findings from the first research question (RQ1), that found that the majority of officers 
referred to institutional factors to justify and explain their deviant actions, and the findings 
from RQ2a and RQ2b that officers operated within a network structure, provide further insights 
into the nature of police corruption networks. In particular, as many officers outlined, they 
became involved in corrupt activities because they were introduced to corruption by fellow 
corrupt officers and these activities continued because they had the support of senior officers. 
The finding suggests that these factors had an influence on shaping the overall structure of the 
corruption network. One impact observed was that the introduction of officers to the corruption 
network by officers positioned at the core or on the periphery of the network appears to have 
impacted the position these new recruits held in the network. For example, as the core members 
were the most connected, and the overall network was highly cohesive and clustered, these new 
members would generally establish fairly central positions as a result of the connections 
established with core members. This was made apparent through Jasper’s corrupt career, where 
he was introduced by a core member—Patison—in 1999. As Jasper and Patison became 
partners and worked on several jobs together, Jasper’s position in the network became very 
central only after a short period of time.  
A similar pattern was observed in relation to periphery members; when members positioned 
on the periphery of the network brought in new members those members tended to stay on the 
periphery of the network. The findings suggest that members introduced by individuals 
positioned at the core of the network played more active roles, while individuals introduced by 
members positioned on the periphery of the network were brought in because they had a 
specific resource considered valuable to the network. These individuals were therefore less 
active or were only active during a specific instance. Therefore, on the one hand, when more 
centrally-positioned officers introduced new individuals to the network, the denser and more 
cohesive the network became. On the other hand, when members on the periphery introduced 
new individuals to the network, the less dense or cohesive the network became. To summarise, 
the structure of the network was impacted by the social networks that developed outside the 
corruption network and it was these connections that impacted the overall structure of the 
network over time. 
194 
 
Concluding Comments 
This chapter investigated the structural properties of police corruption networks in the case of 
Operation Florida to address the second research question (RQ2a and RQ2b): How are police 
corruption networks structured? And Do Police Corruption Networks Change Over Time? The 
overall findings from this analysis demonstrate that this corruption network was relatively 
large, cohesive and highly clustered, where members were highly connected to one another, 
providing members with easy access to resources. The findings also demonstrate that the 
network was dynamic, with periods of high growth and activity as well as low grow and 
inactivity among members. The findings show that the network was more resilient to external 
investigations when they occurred outside the State of NSW. The next chapter adds depth to 
these findings by providing a detailed analysis and discussion regarding the specific operational 
components of these corruption networks. 
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Chapter Eight 
How Do Police Corruption Networks Operate? 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have examined the factors that influence officers to participate in 
corruption as well as the structure of the police corruption network through the use of SNA. 
This chapter looks at another aspect of police corruption networks, specifically exploring the 
operational components of these networks. The aim of this chapter is to illuminate the codes 
and mechanisms that govern the links between corrupt officers to gain a better understanding 
of the ways in which networks of corrupt exchanges develop. It further aims to uncover the 
internal governance that encourages officers to accept the risk, trust each other, and build and 
reinforce norms and reciprocity rules to govern the network’s operations. 
Previous research has explored the operations within a number of different criminal networks, 
for example drug trafficking networks (Morselli, 2001, 2003), terrorist networks (Krebs, 2001), 
transnational illegal networks (Bruinsma & Bernasco, 2004), Mafia networks (Agreste et al., 
2016; Cayli, 2010; Paoli, 2003), organised crime networks (Le & Lauchs, 2013; Levi, 2008) 
and police corruption networks (Lauchs et al., 2012; Lauchs, Keast, & Le, 2011; Lauchs, Keast, 
& Yousefpour, 2011). Research into these networks has found that each of these networks 
displays unique characteristics that enable them to operate covertly. For example, previous 
research on drug syndicates shows that individuals involved in the manufacture and distribution 
of drugs have specific roles, such as suppliers, cooks and dealers, and each serves a specific 
purpose in the network's operations (McKetin, McLaren, & Kelly, 2005; Schloengardt, 2007). 
Studies on terrorist networks have revealed that these networks function in a hybrid space, 
where activities in geographic and social spaces are necessary for operation and security 
(Medina & Hepner, 2011, p. 577). Additionally, research on Mafia-like organisations has 
shown that these networks have carried out countless kinds of criminal activities and are 
characterised by utilising a series of resources, such as violence, intimidation, reputation and 
acquaintance networks (Gambetta, 1993). Likewise, studies on police corruption networks also 
reveal that corrupt police engage in a number of different activities, such as green-lighting, 
extortion, verbals and theft, and can operate because of the exclusivity, culture and code of 
silence (Chan, 1999; Porter & Warrender, 2009; Punch, 2009).  
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Despite these findings, there have been few studies that have investigated the specific tactics 
and techniques used by corrupt police officers. Furthermore, there have been even fewer studies 
that have researched police corruption within an Australian context. Uncovering the unique 
components that allow these networks to operate is important to understand because it will 
assist integrity agencies to detect these networks early in development. This study therefore 
addresses the third research question: 
RQ 3.  How do police corruption networks operate? 
This chapter begins by providing exemplars from the transcripts to highlight the key themes 
that emerged. The source of each exemplar is provided at the end of the quote, citing the name 
of the witness testifying and the page number where the exact testimony can be found in the 
court transcript. First, it presents an investigation into the overall collective nature of the 
networks operations. It then goes onto explore the risk analysis officers conduct before 
engaging in any police misconduct or corruption. Then there is an examination around the use 
of police informants and the role they played in assisting corrupt police with fabricating 
evidence. Next, communication tools are explored, specifically analysing the type and timing 
of communication. The next section provides a detailed discussion of the main findings and 
links these results to the literature. The chapter finishes with concluding comments about the 
overall findings of this research question.  
Collective Corruption 
An overarching theme derived from the transcripts of Operation Florida was that officers 
collectively worked together to keep their corrupt practices hidden from individuals outside the 
corruption network. This finding is consistent with the network findings presented in Chapter 
Seven that demonstrated that officers worked closely with other corrupt officers which formed 
a highly dense network (see Figure 8.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
197 
 
Figure 8.1: All Charged Actors to Actors 
 
 
Officers outlined in their testimony that working as a team was a critical aspect of their 
operations because it provided officers with more opportunities and more freedom to engage 
in corrupt activities; if officers operated alone, more effort and time would be needed to hide 
and cover up the corruption, which may have been extremely hard as officers worked closely 
with other officers in their unit on a daily basis. As N1 outlined in his testimony: 
 
Q. It was each man’s own business?  
A. No - no, that’s not right.  
Q. Why wasn't it each man’s business? Why was that not right?  
A. Because it was done as a team.  
Q. With the knowledge and acquiescence of the members of the team?  
A. It was the only way it could be done.  
Q. And that’s what occurred?  
A. Yes.  
Q. And that referred to both teams - that is, your team and the other team?  
A. Well, it certainly referred to my team and there were times when members of the 
other team were, in fact, helping us, or vice versa.  
Q. And participating in the same sort of corrupt and criminal conduct?  
A. Yes. (N1, p. 3203) [emphasis added] 
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As N1 further outlined, this was the case when it came to loading suspects.  N1 outlined that it 
was not up to the individual officer to load or verbal, but instead it was done as a team: “it was 
an operation involving a lot of the squad - involving not just members of the armed hold-up 
unit but other members of the squad” (N1, p. 3185). N1’s testimony offers a glimpse into how 
officers worked together to achieve a particular outcome. This example suggests that officers 
used ‘collective corruption’ rather than worked individually. Police corruption, therefore, does 
not appear to be an isolated action by one individual, but rather a network of interactions and 
exchanges among corrupt individuals. It suggests that collective corruption was used to 
maximise members’ gains and to minimise the risk associated with corrupt activities.  
Corrupt Officers Received Their Share 
A common theme throughout the transcripts was the collective understanding and agreement 
that officers involved in the corruption network would be given their share of the proceeds. 
This agreement meant that officers did not need to be physically involved at the time the corrupt 
practices took place to receive their share. As Patison outlined in his testimony: “That was 
probably part of the culture. If you’re working with people and you’re involved in that kind of 
behaviour, you would normally include everyone in it. Just because you weren’t there doesn’t 
mean that you’re not involved (Patison, p. 1712).   
Similarly, Hill testified that everyone received some of the money because it was part of the 
culture. It was a common practice for officers to share proceeds on a regular basis: 
Q. May we take it from that that this situation - namely, sharing of the proceeds of 
thefts from offenders or suspects - was something which had happened in the past 
and for which there were certain rules which operated?  
A. Yes... 
Q. I just asked was it what is known as a giggle or a laugh where there was an 
arrangement that people shared on a regular basis the proceeds of any thefts?  
A. Yes, sir, that was what people used to call it in the old days.  
Q. Did you call it a giggle or a laugh - or both?  
A. I'd only heard the word “giggle”, I think, sir. (Hill, pp. 559–560) [emphasis 
added] 
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In another example, Jasper outlined that it was a common practice among corrupt officers to 
provide fellow officers with their share: 
Q. Who received the $1,000?  
A. There was $300 for myself, 300 for Patison, 300 for M5 and 100 for Peattie.  
Q. I don’t think Detective Patison was one of those you nominated as being at the 
search. Why was he given a share?  
A. I don’t really know why. I mean, it was just the done thing. He was part of it. 
Whether it was - whosever job it was didn’t really matter. Whoever was there got 
part of the proceeds. On most occasions - it didn’t happen all the time, but on this 
occasion I remember I gave him $300. (Jasper, p. 377–378) [emphasis added]  
 
The above testimony provides evidence demonstrating that officers involved in the corruption 
network understood the arrangement with fellow officers in the network. As both of these 
officers outlined, it was not only just an arrangement but a cultural expectation among officers 
in the Manly division. Their testimony is further collaborated with previous examples presented 
in Chapter Six, such as Patison’s testimony where he stated: “I don’t know who that money was 
paid to. I don’t know who did those negotiations. I didn’t. I didn’t ask. I took the money and I 
just didn’t ask any questions about it, sir” (Patison, p. 1716). As Patison outlined, he just 
accepted the money and did not ask questions, therefore demonstrating that corrupt officers 
would just accept money without asking any questions regarding the origin or circumstances. 
The possible reasons for this type of collective corruption are the following. First, by dividing 
the responsibilities among officers it also means dividing the risk. In other words, it would 
reduce the likelihood of being caught because all officers would be actively trying to keep the 
corruption hidden. Second, officers have different resources, and collection of experience and 
therefore can help reduce the risk. Put differently, some officers may hold different positions 
in the police organisation which may give them more access to future integrity testing that 
might take place. This information would be extremely valuable because corrupt officers could 
be alerted about these tests and therefore these officers may decide to stop any corrupt 
behaviour until these tests are conducted. Third, unlike officers who engage in corrupt practices 
alone, when officers collaborate with other officers it makes it harder to detect and identify all 
individuals involved. This is, of course, unless a member of the network comes forward and 
discloses all members of the corruption network. For these reasons, uncovering the hidden 
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connections between officers is a valuable practice for police investigators because it will help 
uncover whether corrupt practices are an individual practice or more collective, which may 
signal to the investigator that their investigation needs to look at the subculture of particular 
units. This information will allow investigators to see if the subculture is the reason why 
corruption in able to flourish in particular units within the police organisation.  
Risk Analysis 
A common theme that emerged from an analysis of the transcripts was the fact that officers 
conducted their own risk analysis before engaging in any corruption activity. Officers outlined 
that if the situation was deemed too risky then they would not consider engaging in any deviant 
behaviour as it may have given rise to suspicion and further internal investigations, thus 
exposing members of the corruption network to potential sanctions or prosecution. In 
particular, when conducting their risk analysis, officers outlined that they assessed two main 
areas. Officers assessed the risk of fellow officer’s present during the time the corruption act 
was to take place and the likelihood of the offender to complain. These two factors are 
discussed in the next section. 
Officers Present 
Any form of corruption was dependent on the officers who were present during the time the 
corrupt acts took place. This was especially the case when conducting searches at a suspect’s 
residence because there were a number of officers involved in each search. If all officers 
participating in the search were part of the corruption network, or were at least willing and 
trusted to turn a blind eye to the corruption, then engaging in corrupt behaviour could be 
classified as a low-risk situation. This risk was, however, heightened when officers were 
brought in from different units and divisions when there were staff shortages. As some officers 
outlined, a few of these officers had never worked together and, as a consequence, the 
willingness and acceptability of corrupt practices among these new officers was often 
unknown. 
Another element that added to the risk was the presence of an independent officer. An 
independent officer always needed to be present to ensure procedures were followed correctly. 
Consequently, taking money, drugs or items of value depended on which officers were 
involved in the search and their willingness to participate or turn a blind eye to the corrupt 
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activities.  In some cases, if it was too risky to take part in corrupt activities in front of other 
officers, officers would create new opportunities where they could engage in the corruption 
under different circumstances. In one incident Patison outlined in his testimony that when 
situations arose that were deemed too risky as a result of particular officers involved in the 
search he would create another opportunity to go back and steal money found at the time of the 
search: 
Q. Do you remember what it was about this situation which caused you not to take 
the money when you first found it?  
A. There was a substantial amount of money, sir. I could never have fitted that in 
my trousers. I didn’t have any other means to get the money out of there and I felt 
that if I left it there and just came up with an excuse to take him back later on, then, 
you know, there wouldn't be any other police around. (Patison, p. 1821) 
 
Patison’s testimony provides a good example to demonstrate the lengths officers would go to 
steal money from a suspect’s residence. As Patison outlined, he realised that it was physically 
impossible to take the money at the time of the search and therefore had to make up an excuse 
to come back and remove the money without any other officers around. This appeared to be a 
common scenario, whereby officers would go back to the suspect’s residence to steal money 
or valuable goods as this was also mentioned in a number of other testimonies. This therefore 
shows that officers were tactical when engaging in theft and only took the money when the 
element of risk was minimal. 
In addition, the independent officer also played a critical role during these searches. As many 
of the officers outlined, the majority of the independent officers had integrity that was 'above 
reproach' (Jasper, p. 44). For example, as Jasper outlined: “If we weren’t using the camera, 
they would make us turn the camera on. If we didn’t put something in the exhibit book, they 
would question it on a number of occasions” (Jasper, p. 44). Having an honest, above-reproach, 
independent officer present during the search made activities such as stealing or planting 
evidence harder to do (which is the sole purpose of having the independent officer there—to 
ensure the searches are run according to the rules). This suggests that the factors outlined in 
Chapter Six that influenced some officers to become corrupt did not affect all officers, thus 
showing that the factors that influenced certain officers in Manly are not universal in 
influencing all officers.  
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There were, however, some occasions where the independent officer was a member of the 
corruption network and, as a result of their presence during the time of the search, aided fellow 
officers to engage in corrupt activities.  For example, during one search of B6's property, 
Detective Sergeant Peattie was the independent officer on site. According to the complaint 
made by B6, Peattie: 
… did not supervise the search nor did he witness the locating or seizure of drugs. 
He was on the balcony talking to the brother of B6 during the search. Later Jasper 
and Patison spoke with B6 at another location and allegedly offered to reduce the 
relevant criminal charges, subject to B6 paying a sum of $20,000 cash. B6 said 
there was $20,000 cash hidden in a jacket at the premises and when he returned 
from the police station, having been charged and bailed, the money was missing. 
(Griffin, 2004, p. 21) 
The above quote is a good example demonstrating how easy it was to steal money during 
searches when everyone was on board, including the independent officer. As B6 outlined, 
Peattie did not supervise or witness the seizure of any of the items found during the search. 
Peattie’s role in the search was to keep the brother of B6 occupied while the other members 
took items of value. It suggests that when all members were active participants in the 
corruption network it minimised some of the risk factors associated with these activities. 
Hence, officers did not need to hide their operations from other officers because they were all 
on board. The only area of concern for these officers was whether the individual being 
investigated would report the misconduct.  
Minimising the Likelihood of Complaint: Extortion 
Another common theme throughout the transcripts was that officers were very strategic in 
regards to whom they stole money, drugs and other goods from. Testimony from officers and 
offenders disclosed that extortion or coercion was frequently used among officers within the 
corruption network. These tactics were used to minimise the risk and provided some insurance 
towards the officers’ actions. Throughout the transcripts there where two main scenarios were 
officers would use extortion as a tactic to ensure compliance: 1) when officers conducting a 
search found money or items they wanted to keep for themselves; and 2) when officers caught 
an offender in the act of a crime, whereby they found money or items they wanted to keep for 
themselves. Examples of each scenario are provided below. 
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Scenario 1: Finding Money or Valuable Goods during Search 
When officers found money or valuable goods at a search they outlined that they saw an 
opportunity and usually took it. Testimony from some of the alleged victims stated that officers 
were very direct in what they wanted. For example, according to one victim, L17: 
Q. Doing the best you can, can you tell us what it was that was said to you about 
the money and the ingot?  
A. I was told that they’d found the $10,000 in the house, and if I had a problem with 
it, I would have another charge. (L17, p. 4206) 
 
L17’s testimony is a good example showing the language that officers used to get a strong 
message across to the offender. As L17 outlined, officers found $10,000 cash on the premise 
that they were going to take for themselves, and if L17 had a problem with this then he would 
be facing more charges. This example suggests that officers used their power and authority to 
threaten individuals into believing that they would be worse off if they did not allow officers 
to take the money found in the search. One possible reason for this compliance is that these 
victims of extortion viewed the officer as a legitimate threat and believed that they could use 
their resources as an officer to follow through with the threat. Another possible reason is that 
if an extortion victim did make a formal complaint then it may have been difficult to prove 
because it would come down to the officer’s word against that of the alleged victim.  
P3 outlined a similar incident, where officers drew a gun on him and threatened that if he told 
anyone it would result in severe consequences: 
Q. How did you know that they weren’t joking?  
A. Because they looked seriously at me as though, “This is what we want, 
otherwise this is what’s going to happen”, you know.... 
Q. Which of the two fellows that you’ve been giving evidence about had the gun 
in his hand at that point?  
A. The Detective Sergeant Guy Wilding.  
Q. The person who had identified himself as that person to you?  
A. Yes.  
Q. What did they actually do with the gun at that point, about which you were 
giving evidence a moment ago? 
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A. He made the action of, "If you tell anybody" and he tried to scare me, scare 
tactics, with the gun. (P3, pp. 2429–2431) [emphasis added] 
 
P3’s testimony is a good example demonstrating the seriousness of the threats made to 
particular individuals. In addition to verbal commands, an element of enhanced fear is placed 
on the alleged victim.  As P3 outlined, officers drew a gun and pointed it at him to add another 
element of fear to pressure P3 to comply with their orders. This type of tactic suggests that 
when officers confronted P3 regarding the money that was to be taken they must have met 
resistance from P3, and therefore it implies that officers believed that an additional level of fear 
was needed to minimise the risk of a complaint. 
In another incident, a search of R1’s residence resulted in officers finding drugs and money, 
in R1’s testimony he stated that Jasper and Patison told him that it would be more beneficial 
to work with them than against them. R1 testified that Patison and Jasper told him “It's better 
to work with us than against us…We can help you out. We can be very helpful or we can’t…” 
R1 responded to this request by stating “I'll have to think about it and I'll get back to you”, 
and they said, “Don't take too long” (R1, p. 457). This particular instance is different to the 
above examples because the offender was a known drug dealer in the area. R1 had prior 
encounters with Jasper and Patison, which may have laid the foundation for officers to develop 
a working relationship. Instead of just stealing the money or goods within R1’s property, 
Jasper and Patison were able to convince R1 that it would be in his best interest to work 
together with Jasper and Patison. Jasper and Patison made a deal where they would receive 
money in exchange for ‘green-lighting’/turning a blind eye to R1’s drug operations. This 
arrangement would benefit both parties, where R1 could continue his drug operations without 
interference from the police, and Jasper and Patison would benefit financially by receiving a 
payment every month. This type of relationship relies on some element of trust, where both 
parties need to uphold their end of the deal to keep the operations running. 
The above findings suggest that the corruption network could operate without any formal 
complaints (unless they were kept in-house, but this is not disclosed in the transcripts). 
Extortion appears to be a common practice that many officers used to get potential offenders to 
comply with their demands. This compliance demonstrates that officers were able to keep their 
corrupt practices hidden by instilling enough fear that these offenders would not want to 
disclose to police administrators the events that took place. 
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Scenario 2: Catching the Offender in the Act 
In addition to the above scenario, officers outlined in their testimony that if they caught 
someone in the act, and an opportunity to steal money or valuable goods was apparent, that 
they would also use extortion to ensure the offender would comply with their demands. In one 
example, Patison found $40 000 cash in a laundry bag and four pounds of cannabis which he 
witnesses a drug dealer named Benbow throw into his neighbour's yard when police came to 
search his property. Since Patison caught Benbow in possession of drugs he had the upper hand 
in the situation and told Benbow that “We can either split the money four ways, you’ll get some 
back or we can go back and you can - we can go-you can go and get arrested for the marijuana 
that’s in your next door neighbour’s yard” (Benbow, p. 51), thus suggesting that Benbow 
would be better off if he complied with Patison’s suggestion to split the money four ways. This 
example adds another element to the extortion tactics used in earlier examples. In this example 
Patison offers to leave some of the cash behind, which not only reduces the charges but allows 
Patison to take a portion of the money in exchange for Benbow’s compliance and silence. This 
example suggests that offers of good faith were also used to convince offenders that it was the 
best scenario for all parties. Proposing to leave some of the money behind was another tactic 
that officers used to minimise the risk of an offender filing a complaint. 
A similar incident occurred in relation to a search of F2's car. The search revealed plastic bags 
and scales filled with cannabis. A recording of Patison and F2 was also presented during the 
trial. This recording disclosed a discussion whereby Patison told F2 that if he was charged with 
supplying cannabis from his vehicle then the vehicle would be subject to confiscation. Patison 
then went on to outline that, as an officer, he had the authority to do so.  Patison said that “it’s 
got to be worth a few bucks to you to fuckin’ keep the car mate” (PIC Exhibit 79B, p. 3). Later 
stating “...it’s got to be fucken’ ten I won’t do it for anything less than ten, alright” and later 
“...if you come up worth that, we leave the car alone, but either way you’ve got to get it tonight, 
mate. You have to have it tonight” (PIC Exhibit 85, p. 2). 
As the recording outlined, Patison arranged with F2 to provide him with $10 000 in exchange 
for reducing the charges and allowing F2 to keep his car. This arrangement suggests that 
offenders were more likely to cooperate with the officers because they would not leave empty 
handed. This arrangement signalled to the offender that it was a better deal than receiving the 
maximum charge for the offence.  
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Overall, extortion was commonly used when conducting searches or investigations of 
criminals. Extortion was used as a tactic to ensure individuals would comply with an officer’s 
order and were also used to minimise the risk of information being leaked to authorities. The 
above examples also demonstrate that these extortion tactics were successful because offenders 
did not come forward to make a formal complaint. In addition, the examples also show that 
officers were predatory in their corrupt practices; in other words, these officers initiated the 
corrupt arrangements to take place, rather than the offender trying to make a deal with the 
police.  This therefore suggests that these officers capitalised on any opportunities presented to 
them.  
Fabricating Evidence 
A common theme throughout the transcripts was the fabrication of entries into exhibit books. 
Testimony from officers disclosed that false exhibits and statements were recorded to cover up 
the tampering of exhibits. For example, officers would record a lesser amount of drugs and 
money found during a search to cover up the fact that officers took the money and shared it 
amongst members of the corruption network, rather than turning it in for evidence. In one 
instance, Patison outlined in his testimony that he only recorded the drugs and money that he 
wanted to be recorded.  
Q. Were the drugs recorded at the station in the regular way in an exhibit book?  
A. Only the drugs we wanted booked up, sir. 
Q. How were you able to conceal from the other police, whom you have described 
as honest, who were present, the existence of the remaining, let’s call it packaging?  
A. Probably on the way back, sir. You’d – I think I distinguished what we’d keep 
and what we’d book up and we got in - sir, I think it was just - I think - I don’t know 
- you - if you’ve got the records to show it, but I’m pretty sure Jasper wrote the 
exhibits up. (Patison, p. 1891) [emphasis added] 
 
Patison’s testimony provides a good example to demonstrate how easy it was for officers to 
record whatever they liked in their exhibit books. Officers outlined that duty book entries 
were rarely filled out at the time of the incident, but rather recorded at a later date. For 
example, as Patison described in his testimony, Jasper was able to write up the exhibits on the 
way to back to the station. Not documenting the exact amount at the time of the search and 
seizure allowed officers the freedom to record a lesser amount off-site. By doing so, these 
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officers could hide their activities from other officers who may have been at the search, 
unaware of their corruption ring, thus further providing evidence that officers were tactical in 
the way they operated.  
In addition to fabricating entries into their duty books, officers also fabricated suspects’ 
confessions and statements. Testimony from officers disclosed that verbals were frequently 
used to ensure a conviction, which is consistent with earlier findings outlined in Chapter Six 
that highlighted that the subculture at Manly accepted and encouraged these types of practices. 
For example, F7 outlined: “You see, that's something that you didn’t speak about like that. It 
was – that’s just something that was part and parcel of the job and you just did it without 
having to be told” (F7, p. 5241). As a result, officers were also aware of the techniques and 
procedures to hide verbals by observing other officers and previous experience.  In one 
testimony, N1 outlined the procedure for making false statements look genuine:  
Q. In relation to the record of interview itself, at one stage the document records 
that the interview was taken out of the typewriter and handed to C11 to read aloud?  
A. Yes.  
Q. For the purposes of authenticity, would you have actually taken the document 
out of the typewriter and then reinserted it so that you get a misalignment between 
questions and answers appearing above that step?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Is that right?  
A. Yes. (N1, p. 5297) [emphasis added]  
 
N1’s testimony provides a good example, demonstrating how officers would make verbals 
appear authentic. As N1 outlined, officers would make sure that the paper in the typewriter was 
reinserted before typing the false statement to make certain that the report appeared genuine. It 
seems that the main reason to go to these lengths was not to hide these actions from fellow 
officers within the unit, but was for any third parties that might view the documents (e.g. 
lawyers, judges, integrity officers). By following these procedures, it further minimised the risk 
of detection, especially if the statement was ever revisited. With the paperwork appearing 
authentic, and the acceptance and willingness of fellow officers in the Manly division, the 
actions of these corrupt officers were further supported and bolstered. 
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Fabricating Police Informants and Using Them as Alibis 
Testimony by officers disclosed that trusted informants were often used to help corrupt police 
cover up their corrupt actions. Police informants were also used to help officers’ requests for a 
search warrant to enter a suspect’s house as the information obtained from the informant would 
be viewed as credible and would often provide just enough evidence for a search warrant to be 
obtained.  However, some of the police informants were registered on behalf of corrupt police 
officers for the sole purpose of using them to assist in covering up and providing more 
opportunities to participate in corrupt behaviour.  Jasper outlined in his testimony some of the 
advantages of registering an informant: 
Q. Were you endeavouring to register R1 as an informant as a form of cover for 
your contact with him?  
A. Yes, that’s one reason, and the second reason being that it is a great deal easier 
to, one, obtain a financial reward for him if he was to come up with any information; 
two, if I put a letter up on information from him on the behalf of B7, if he is 
registered it just carries more weight. (Jasper, p. 431–432) 
Additionally, some of these police informants were also used as alibis to help protect members 
of the corruption network against prosecution. For example, one segment of the investigation 
investigated an alleged drunk driving offence by an officer named King. The evidence 
presented before the court exposed that M5 had conspired with other police, including King, 
to pervert the course of justice by enlisting a trusted police informant to lie and say that at the 
time of the alleged offence King met with a police informant. The plan involved fabricating a 
meeting at the Steyne Hotel with an informant to “… cover the fact that we had the [police] 
car at that time of the morning for work purposes …” (M5, p. 4632). A fabricated meeting with 
the informant was created which falsely recorded that O'Toole received information about a 
prison escapee, Ian Saxon. They called this file ‘Operation Deceivers’. M5, King and O'Toole 
discussed what needed to be in place “A. Well, it was from a discussion with O’Toole and King 
that this - like, when that scenario was put forward, it was discussed about what information 
would have to be there too” (M5, p. 4635). To provide further cover, M5 made a false entry 
into his duty book outlining that he went to the Steyne Hotel to meet the informant to receive 
information about Saxon. He also recorded that he went off duty at 3:10 am, which again 
provided an alibi (M5, pp. 4633–4636). 
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Additionally, they outlined that Orthoxicol-3 (found in cold and flu drugs) was in King’s 
system, which would help explain why he appeared to be intoxicated. M5 outlined: 
My recollection is that they had come up with a scenario which would involve 
getting an informant of O’Toole’s involved, who he could trust, and also 
introducing some medication some Orthoxicol-3 into that scenario, along with the 
alcohol, sort of that - my understanding was that the Orthoxicol-3, together with 
some beer, would - may cause the or give the appearance of drunkenness or 
intoxication. (M5, pp. 4632–4633) [emphasis added]  
The above instance is a good example demonstrating how officers collaborated with registered 
police informants to help cover up their activities. M5 and other officers were able to use an 
informant to make a false statement and assist in covering up King’s DUI incident. This 
example indicates that officers had past dealings with this informant and, as a consequence of 
these events, a trusted relationship was formed. The transcripts suggest that all three officers, 
M5, King and O’Toole had some previous dealings with the informant.  This example also 
reveals the possible issues that can arise when using police informants; there is an opportunity 
for corrupt police to take advantage of the registered informants. It shows how police 
informants add an element of risk, whereby the information provided can lead to false 
investigations and misrepresentation of resources. It also demonstrates that by having 
proximity to organised crime, police informants can significantly increase the officer’s chance 
of engaging in corrupt activities. 
For monetary purposes 
Testimony from corrupt officers also reveals that they benefited financially from the use of 
registered police informants. Collectively, these testimonies exposed that officers would 
register false informants for the sole purpose of receiving some of the reward money they 
would receive for providing valuable information regarding fellow criminals. In one example, 
M13 was registered as a paid informant and entered a corrupt arrangement with O’Toole to 
falsely claim reward money:  
Q. You were asked: So he gave you $200 for signing a form and you hadn’t provided 
any information?  
A. Nothing.  
Q. Is that correct?  
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A. That's right… 
Q. You were later asked: Would you accept that that’s a corrupt activity?  
A. Yes. (M13, p. 4775) 
 
To further elaborate, M5 testified that after O’Toole had met with M13, O’Toole returned to 
the office and communicated with M5 with hand signals how much money he received from 
the reward money: 
We were both working at the Sydney Police Centre on that task force and Dennis 
had – Dennis O’Toole had gone out to meet M13. Anyway, later on that day I saw 
him again, I walked into his office about something else and I just said, “Oh, how 
did you go?”, you know, “Everything all right?”, or something, and he just held up 
his hands two and a half to me; nothing was said, it was just an indication with his 
hands … to me it was if he’d got some of the reward money and it was either 2,500 
or 250. I didn’t know and didn’t want to know. (M5, pp. 4665–4666)  
M13’s and M5’s testimonies provide good examples demonstrating how corrupt police used 
informants for financial gain. As M5 outlined, O’Toole met with M13 and this meeting 
resulted in O’Toole receiving his share of the reward money. Furthermore, the other evidence 
presented at the trial disclosed that M13 and O’Toole first met back in 1976, when M13 was 
arrested for a break-and-enter and then became a registered informant a few years later. It also 
demonstrates that O’Toole and M13 had a long history of working together and that he was 
someone who could be trusted.  
Overall, this section has presented a number of reasons why a corrupt officer would use a 
police informant to help cover up their deviant practices. It shows that corrupt police officers 
were tactical in choosing the individuals from the criminal underworld to be their police alibi 
for the purpose of either covering up an officer’s corrupt behaviour or being a resource to 
obtain extra money. Furthermore, it demonstrates that trust played a role in the development 
of these corrupt relationships where corruption was able to flourish.  
Communication Tools 
Corruption is an active process which is generated and structured by the individuals involved.  
The individuals participating in the corruption network need to work together to keep the 
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activities hidden from authorities. As discussed above, the Manly division’s corruption 
network operated on a set of unwritten rules and norms which guided their decision-making. 
However, in addition to these unwritten rules and norms individual officers involved needed 
to have the necessary skills and insider knowledge to communicate effectively with one another 
to ensure that the operation of the corruption network ran smoothly and efficiently. 
Communicate is, therefore, an essential element to gain a better understanding of the mechanics 
and operation of the corruption network. The testimony of many officers sheds some light on 
how officers communicated with one another. There are a number of common themes that 
emerge from the transcripts: methods of communicating (e.g. code words, hand gestures); and 
timing of the communication (e.g. before, during and after a corrupt activity). This section 
explores each theme in more detail using exemplars from the transcripts. 
Type of Communication Used 
To keep their activities hidden from other officers and undercover integrity officers, code 
words and hand gestures were used to communicate items, such as how much money they 
could expect to receive from a search, who would be given a share and how the exchange of 
money would take place. The sections below explore exemplars from the transcripts. 
Officers would refer to specific fish to let other officers know how much share/money they 
could expect. For example, a reference to a small fish meant that the officer would receive a 
small amount. On the other hand, a reference to a large fish meant that the officer was going to 
get a significant share:  
Q. “Slimy mackerel” was one of the more memorable phrases which seemed to be 
used in the conversations between you and Detective Patison. First of all, did that 
mean something to you?  
A. As far as I’m aware it pertained to $500... 
Q. Why did you assume it was a reference to $500 and not $1,000?  
A. Oh, only because that's just a very small fish. That particular fish is only a small 
fish, and by that I would just assume that the amount of money that he received 
was only a small amount, being $500. (Jasper, p. 369) [emphasis added] 
 
Additionally, after a search, officers would signal to other officers who were not physically 
present at the time of the search but who would also receive their share. In the example below, 
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hand signals were used to let other officers know how much money they should expect. For 
example: 
Q. “The way Dennis was talking”, “No, mate”, says King. You say: He said two 
and a half, maybe it was just two hundred and fifty. What was that a reference to? 
A. That was - we were both working at the Sydney Police Centre on that task force 
and Dennis had - Dennis O’Toole had gone out to meet M13. Anyway, later on that 
day I saw him again. I walked into his office about something else and I just said, 
“Oh, how did you go?”, you know, “Everything all right?”, or something, and he 
just held up his hands two and a half to me; nothing was said, it was just an 
indication with his hands.” (M5, p. 4665) [emphasis added] 
 
Similarly, as N1 outlined in this testimony, officers would use cricket terms to communicate 
with other officers to deny the allegations regarding a particular incident. In his testimony he 
stated: 
Q. Well, as best as you can recall, what cricket terms did he use and what cricket 
terms did you use?  
A. Well, I said I’d be playing a straight bat.  
Q. Was that in response to some comment or question from Mr O'Toole?  
A. It could have been initiated by me.  
Q. Well, did he say anything at all to you in this conversation?  
A. That he would also be playing a straight bat.  
Q. And what did you understand him to be suggesting to you when he said that, or 
words to that effect?  
A. That we would be denying the allegations made to us. (N1, p. 2668) [emphasis 
added] 
 
These code words and hand gestures allowed these corrupt officers to communicate in a 
covert manner. Specifically, these officers were able to collaborate and discuss future 
plans and actions at a reduced risk. Although it was not specifically outlined in the 
transcripts, it implies that these officers were taught through experience and observation 
how to communicate with one another, thus implying that these officers used code words 
and hand gestures as a tactic to reduce the risk of fellow officers uncovering their 
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corruption. It further demonstrates that not all officers in the Manly division were part of 
the corruption network and that, although many officers outlined that it was an acceptable 
practice, these officers still took precautions to keep their corruption hidden. 
The Timing of Communication 
The timing of communication was an integral part of the operations of the corrupt network. 
The individuals in the network needed to communicate effectively with one another in a 
manner that was clear enough for other individuals to understand and effectively collaborate. 
Officers testified that communication occurred on an ongoing basis and that all actors in the 
network needed to work together in a manner that would keep their activities hidden. In many 
instances, when officers were involved in a search, they would have pre- and post-discussions 
to ensure consistency among all members of the corruption network. In the following sections, 
examples of pre-game discussions are presented first, followed by examples of post-game 
discussions. 
Pre-game Discussions 
Testimony from officers outlined that it was standard practice before any operational issues or 
specific details of a search to ensure officers were prepared with the right exhibits that may 
have been needed to load a suspect. For example, F7 outlines that O'Toole would discuss the 
plan of action with his team before the arrest to make sure that they were going to load up the 
criminals with the correct exhibits: 
A. He was the coordinator of the armed hold-up squad. For example, one matter, 
he said, “We are going to do this operation,” and told us who was in charge of 
what persons to - who were going to be arrested or - and then showed us - you 
know, told us to have a look at the victim statements and make sure we got the right 
exhibits.  
Q. And when you say “exhibits”, what sort of exhibits do you mean?  
A. Well, weapons. 
Q. I see. And that would be before the offenders or presumed offenders or suspects 
were approached by the unit?  
A. Yes.  
Q. And with a view to, what, taking similar –  
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A. Similar matching weapons, gloves, balaclavas, clothing if possible, taking that 
with us upon the arrests. (F7, p. 3217) 
 
F7’s testimony provides a good example of the pre-game discussions that took place before an 
arrest. In this instance, officers were briefed with a background of the suspect as well as an 
instruction to bring with them ‘special’ exhibits as a backup in case they needed to plant 
evidence on the suspect to ensure a conviction. These pre-game discussions were critical 
because they provided officers with essential information regarding the operation and gave 
them time to prepare and acquire exhibits that were used to load a suspect. Without this 
information officers would not have been prepared to collect the exhibits beforehand, leaving 
the corruption network vulnerable to detection.  
Additionally, as highlighted previously in Chapter Six, verballing was a common practice 
among police in the Manly division and these verbals did not need to be discussed between 
officers. It was instead an expectation among officers to be willing participants. Although 
verbals were not explicitly discussed between officers there is still evidence to suggest that 
officers still needed to discuss the tactics and operational roles that each officer needed to fulfil. 
In F7’s testimony he stated: 
Q. Were you specifically told by Wrice, Davidson or anyone on that day, 6 March 
1991, that you were to load and verbal Stuart?  
A. No. You see, that’s something that you didn’t speak about like that. It was – 
that’s just something that was part and parcel of the job and you just did it without 
having to be told, “Right, this is how it is going to go along.” It was more just 
saying, “Okay, you know, Wrice, [F7], you will be the interview teams for Stuart. 
So-and-so, so-and-so, you are the searchers.” You know, pointing out and then 
arranging what time we are going to meet in the morning, where we are going to 
meet - along those lines. (F7, p. 5241) [emphasis added] 
 
As this example demonstrates, discussions around whether a suspect was going to be verballed 
were not common. Instead, officers only needed to discuss the operational components that 
would allow for these corrupt practices to stay hidden from police investigators. In addition, 
since there were only a few officers who disclosed that these discussions took place, it further 
reinforced the cultural norms and unwritten rules among corrupt police in Manly, further 
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demonstrating that it was common practice where communication between officers regarding 
verbals was minimal. 
Post-game Discussions 
In addition to pre-game discussions, many corrupt officers outlined in their testimony that it 
was necessary to also have post-game discussions. These discussions occurred to ensure that 
records and stories would be consistent, as well as to communicate how money was to be 
distributed among the network’s members. In one example, a recording was presented during 
the trial that exposed a conversation between Fabris and other officers regarding how money 
was to be split that was stolen from a search: 
Q. And the reference to “him”, “between him and who was the boss down” there, 
is that a reference by you to Detective XXX and Detective Senior Sergeant XXX.  
 A. Yes. 
 Q. So you were suggesting in that conversation, were you, that there was some 
involvement by and in relation to the divvying up of the money that went back to 
Manly; is that what you were suggesting?  
A. Yes.  
Q. So in that conversation you were, in effect, saying things which implicated not 
only , but also II –  
A. That's correct.  
Q. -- in the split-up of the money; correct?  
A. Yes. (Fabris, p. 1068) 
 
In another instance, M5 outlined that there would often be discussions regarding past 
individual’s verbals over a beer: 
Q. At any time after the arrest and charging of Stuart did either Wrice or F7 confirm 
to you in any way that they had verballed Stuart?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Did either or both of them do it?  
A. More so F7.  
Q. Do you recall when it was that he –  
A. No.  
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Q. Just on one occasion, or several?  
A. Could have been more than one.  
Q. Over a beer?  
A. Could have been, yes. (M5, pp. 5359–5360) 
 
These examples demonstrate that officers would also discuss the details of the verbal or theft 
from a search after it took place. As M5 outlined, this was often in an informal setting outside 
of work. This statement was supported by Fabris, where he outlined that similar discussions 
took place in regards to the amount of money collected and how it was to be broken up between 
the officers involved. Overall, these two instances provide good examples of the discussions 
that took place before and after corruption incidents and provide evidence that it was a common 
and repeated occurrence.  
Discussion of Key Findings 
The findings from this study demonstrate that corrupt police collaborated with one another to 
keep their corrupt practices hidden within the wider police organisation. The collaboration 
between officers operated using unwritten rules and norms that guided their corrupt behaviour. 
The network’s overarching arrangement was that the officers who were aware of, and 
participated in, corrupt conduct received some of the proceeds. As a result of this arrangement 
officers did not have to be physically or directly present when the corruption occurred to 
receive their share. Other key findings of the study revealed that officers were very tactical in 
their operations and used a number of methods to minimise the risk of detection. The central 
themes that minimised the risk for the corruption network were: (1) conducting a risk analysis 
before engaging in corrupt activities, (2) consistent and clear communication between members 
of the network, (3) covering up corruption through the fabrication of evidence and the use of 
third parties. Each of these key themes is discussed in in relation to the literature in the 
following sections. 
Conducting a Risk Analysis 
A novel finding of this study is that officers would conduct a risk analysis before engaging in 
any misconduct or corrupt activities. Officers outlined that if the situation was assessed as too 
risky then they would not follow through with any deviant practices. As disclosed in the 
transcripts, officers constantly referred to two main considerations in determining their 
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participation in corruption. First, officers would perform a personal assessment of the officers 
present. This evaluation would analyse factors to determine a fellow officer’s willingness and 
trustworthiness to engage in corrupt activities. As previously outlined in Chapter Six, officers 
would learn the specific characteristics and traits of fellow officers by working alongside them. 
Through experience and observation, officers would grow to learn a fellow officer’s 
willingness to participate in and tolerance for corrupt practices. In addition, in their testimony 
officers continuously stated that they would only engage in corrupt activities if it were unlikely 
to result in a formal complaint by an alleged offender. This likelihood of a complaint was 
dependent on the nature of the search and whether officers had enough evidence to convince 
the offender to comply with their orders. For example, items found at the time of the search, 
such as money, drugs or stolen goods, were used as leverage against the offender. In other 
words, the more serious the offence, the most power the officers had in extorting the suspect 
to comply with their corrupt operations  
Reducing Risk Through Extortion Tactics 
Testimony from corrupt officers and the victims of extortion disclosed that extortion was 
frequently used to ensure compliance and to minimise the risk involved in the corrupt activity. 
Extortion tactics are not a new phenomenon, as a number of studies researching police 
corruption have found similar findings (Armstrong, 2012; Herbert & Gilling, 2004; Knapp, 
1972; Lauchs et al., 2012). What Gerber and Mendelson (2008) call predatory policing, 
whereby police officers are proactive in soliciting protection and initiating bribes, is another 
term used to describe extortion. As the transcripts disclosed, officers were very proactive and 
opportunistic in achieving particular outcomes. These similar findings suggest that corrupt 
police were extremely opportunistic and resourceful when it came down to engaging in these 
types of activities. Extortion was, therefore, common practice among police officers and was 
used against vulnerable individuals, such as drug dealers, because their illegal operations 
prevented them from receiving any public protection from corrupt police (Schelling, 1984). 
Furthermore, extortion tactics created a reputation based on fear and intimidation. Officers 
analysed the context of the situation and determined whether the offender was in a vulnerable 
state, whereby extortion would be a successful tactic. This finding shows that officers were 
very aware of their surroundings and that their actions were extremely deliberate. Similar 
findings have been cited in the police corruption literature. Mollen (1994) found that officers 
built their criminal careers based on violence and intimidation. Although the findings did not 
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explicitly outline that they used these methods to reduce the likelihood of being caught, it can 
be presumed that this was one of the underlying reasons. Similar findings have been found in 
other criminal operations, such as the Mafia. The Mafia’s operations depend on intimidating 
and extorting vulnerable individuals to effectively profit from risky businesses (Scandizzo & 
Ventura, 2015, p. 121). Again, there is no specific evidence to suggest that the Mafia conduct 
a risk analysis; however, they do use similar measures as corrupt police to minimise risk. 
Overall, this finding suggests that corrupt officers engaged in similar practices to reduce the 
likelihood of being caught. The main difference with officers in this case was that their actions 
were extremely deliberate, aimed at reducing risk. 
Consistent and Clear Communication 
Communication was another critical component that aided officers to operate effectively within 
the corruption network. Throughout the transcripts two main areas emerged: methods of 
communication and timing. To keep their activities hidden from other officers and undercover 
integrity officers code words and hand gestures were used to communicate. These gestures 
were used to cover topics such as how much money they could expect to receive from a search, 
who would be given a share and how the exchange of money would take place. This type of 
communication can also be found among other covert criminal operations. For example, prison 
gangs use code words and slang to communicate with other members to keep their 
communication hidden from other inmates and correctional officers (Cheloukhine & 
Haberfeld, 2010). 
The timing of communication was also an integral part of the corrupt network’s operations. 
The individuals in the network needed to communicate effectively with one another in a 
manner that was clear enough for other individuals to understand and effectively collaborate. 
In particular, pre- and post-activity discussions were common to ensure all officers were on the 
same page. This communication took place to ensure consistent stories and recorded documents 
among officers in the hope that it would minimise the risk of detection. This timing of 
communication also played a large part in the police corruption network for specific actors 
occupying particular roles in the network. This finding that there was a communication 
structure is consistent with Williams’ (2001c) typology of roles within criminal networks. 
Williams outlines that criminals can play the role of a communicator, whereby these 
individuals ensure that communication flows effectively across the network as a whole. 
Williams (2001c) further notes that some criminal networks will require more specific roles. 
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In the context of this study, each officer did not have a specific communication role; in other 
words, it was not their specific job to ensure that the whole network was informed with current 
activities. From the transcripts it appears that this communication role was dependent on the 
context and role they had at the time of the corruption incident. For example, if an officer was 
the one who removed money from a search they were more likely to be the ones to 
communicate this to fellow members. Della Porta and Vannucci (2011) confirm this 
observation by also noting that the existence of communication channels increases the 
probability of a successful collusion between corrupt individuals.   
Relying on Trusted Third Parties 
An additional theme that emerged from the transcripts was the reliance upon trusted third 
parties outside the corruption network. Testimony by officers outlined that they would 
frequently use police informants to gain financially and to further minimise the risk of 
detection.  In the first scenario, testimony by officers outlined that they registered individuals 
as police informants whom they trusted from the criminal underworld. The purpose of this 
registration was to officially register the third party so that any information the police received 
they would be financially rewarded. However, as the transcripts revealed, the relationship 
between the officers and the registered informant was established to mask the true nature of 
the relationship. These informants would agree to provide an officer with information (which 
was information already known to police or entirely false). The informant then passed on a 
share of the money they received to the officer with whom they had the agreement with. This 
arrangement benefited both parties because the officer would receive money for obtaining false 
information from their informant and the informant was given a share.  
In the second scenario police informants were used as alibis to cover up police misconduct. 
This use of informants was highlighted in King’s DUI incident, where a police informant—
M13—was used as an alibi to cover up the events that took place. As the evidence 
demonstrates, M13 provided a false statement outlining that he was providing King with 
valuable information at the time of this alleged DUI incident. This statement was then used as 
a cover-up for the fact that King was indeed driving drunk. In both of the scenarios the police 
informants were considered trustworthy enough to be brought into the corruption network. This 
example further demonstrates that these informants were not active members of the network 
but instead were only brought into the network to fulfil a purpose. This further supports the 
findings in Chapter Seven that show that some actors in the network were only connected to 
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the larger network through specific officers, thus showing that actors in the network had 
specific roles and that these roles were determined by the needs of the corruption network.  
The abuse of police informants is not a new finding. This abuse appears to be a continuous and 
constant theme among inquiries into police corruption. For example, the Kennedy Inquiry in 
WA noted that relationships “between police and informants have been poorly administered 
and are very much open to abuse” (Kennedy, 2004, pp. 554–558). Punch (2000) also 
acknowledges the significant relationship between officers and informants, stating that when 
the “relations are close and cosy, police officers can come to share the world-view of criminals. 
This can readily happen in informant-handler relationships and undercover work” (p. 315). The 
findings of this study provide further empirical evidence to support Punch’s claim. Although 
the transcripts did not disclose the full nature of the relationship with the chosen informant, it 
can be assumed that this relationship developed through repeated interactions. As these officers 
worked in the drug unit, they would have had constant contact with certain criminals, thus 
developing a trusted relationship. 
Connecting Research Questions 1, 2 and 3: Factors of Influence, Structure Components and 
Operation of Network  
As highlighted in Chapter Seven, collectively the corrupt officers formed a highly dense and 
cohesive network that operated between 1980 and 2001 (see Figure 8.1). The findings in 
Chapter Seven also revealed that although the network did not demonstrate a traditional core-
periphery structure, the network still contained a core (i.e., some members were more 
connected which resulted in a central position in the network) and a periphery (i.e., some 
members were less connected which resulted in a less central position in the network) layer 
and that these two layers were highly connected. These structural attributes had an impact on 
the day-to-day operations of the network. For example, since the network was highly dense 
and there was an overlap of members positioned at the core and on the periphery of the network, 
members could collectively engage in corrupt activities with minimal need to communicate to 
all members. In other words, cliques embedded within the network could operate without the 
involvement of all members. This allowed the network to be involved in a number of corruption 
events simultaneously.  
In addition, as outlined in Chapter Six, opportunity played a large role in aiding the network’s 
chances of being corrupt. From the analysis presented in Chapter Six, it is apparent that, 
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regardless of the other factors that may be of some influence such as individual or institutional 
factors, opportunity was a critical factor that impacted on the network’s operations. The type 
of opportunity also impacted the network’s operations. For example, if an opportunity 
presented itself and officers deemed the situation too risky they would not engage in the corrupt 
activities in order to minimise the risk of being detected. However, if a situation arose and it 
was considered to be low risk officers would still put the necessary precautions in place and/or 
cover up activities to minimise any possible exposure.  
Taken together, the network’s operations were impacted by the structural properties of the 
network as well as the opportunities presented. Each of these factors either constrained or 
enabled the network to effectively and successfully operate undetected for a number of years. 
Concluding Comments 
This chapter has looked at the key features that help corrupt police operate. In particular, it 
aimed to address the following research question: How do police corruption networks operate? 
The overall findings suggest that there were a number of key features that allowed these 
networks to operate successfully for some years. One of the major results of the study was that 
officers conducted their risk analysis before engaging in any misconduct of the large corruption 
ventures. Officers outlined that if it were too risky, meaning that there were too many unknown 
officers around or that the offender was unlikely to comply, then any form of abuse would not 
be considered. Additionally, the transcripts disclosed that officers needed to communicate with 
each other in an efficient and secretive manner. There was also a common use of code words 
and hand gestures used to communicate with other members. Pre-game and post-game 
discussions were required to keep members informed about particular searches and how they 
may verbal or load a suspect. It was critical that all members of the network worked together 
before, during and after any corruption act took place. Finally, the findings revealed that the 
corruption network utilised trusted third parties, in particular police informants, to help cover 
up the activities of the network. 
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Chapter Nine  
How do Members of Police Corruption 
Networks Determine a Person’s 
Trustworthiness? 
Introduction 
The preceding chapters examined the factors that influenced officers in the Manly division to 
engage in corrupt behaviour, as well as the key network structures and revealed the key 
operational components of the corruption network. This chapter examines and analyses another 
aspect of police corruption networks, in particular trust and trustworthiness. The intention of 
this chapter is to illuminate the role of trust and to expose the criteria and conditions corrupt 
police need to satisfy in order to demonstrate their trustworthiness in the network.  
Within the criminology literature, trust has been cited as a vital component in organised crime 
networks (Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011; Morselli, 2001). Previous research has 
suggested that trust is the 'glue' that holds organised criminal networks together (von Lamp, 
Gambetta 1993); this is particularly the case for drug trafficking operations and Mafia networks 
as individuals in these networks only deal with people they trust (Edwards & Levi, 2008; 
Morselli, 2001). Cohesive networks, such as networks that encompass family and close-friend 
relations are ideal for criminal operations, where a strong element of mutual trust is needed to 
carry out high-risk activities (Bruinsma & Bernasco, 2004, p. 90). Trust in these types of 
relationships can also develop over time, where members’ behaviour becomes more familiar 
and more predictable.  Similarly, police organisations can also be classified as trust 
organisations, where officers develop trust and mutual respect for one another over time. This 
trust is further re-enforced by an entrenched police culture of silence and exclusivity (Lauchs, 
Keast, & Le, 2011).  
Although trust is a large part of the wider police organisation, and is cited as a core element in 
organised crime networks, few studies have investigated trust in police corruption networks. 
Even more so, apart from Lauchs and Staines’ (2012) and Lauchs, Keast and Le’s (2011) 
research into the Fitzgerald Inquiry, there are no other studies that have empirically 
investigated trust in police corruption networks. In addition, although these studies found that 
trust is an important element among corrupt police, they did not investigate the specific 
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trustworthiness characteristics that enable these officers to be classified as trustworthy 
individuals. Additionally, this deficit in the knowledge of dark networks is also found in bright 
networks. Hardin (2002) confirms this insight by stating: “much of the literature on trust hardly 
mentions trustworthiness, even though implicitly much of it is primarily about trustworthiness, 
not about trust” (p. 29). Understanding the social mechanisms and processes that create 
interpersonal trust in networks is, therefore, important in order to understand how police 
corruption networks operate, as well as understand the individuals involved in these networks. 
The main focus of this chapter is the under-researched area of trustworthiness in police 
corruption networks. This study uses trustworthiness as a mediating lens, whereby the decision 
to trust has to pass through a ‘trustworthiness filter’ where one has to appear trustworthy in 
order to be considered a reliable individual (Caldwell & Clapham, 2003). This study therefore 
addresses the fourth research question: 
RQ 4. How do members of police corruption networks determine a person’s trustworthiness? 
This chapter begins by first providing exemplars from the transcripts to highlight the key 
themes that emerged. This section commences with a discussion on the different sources of 
accumulated knowledge that were used to develop a character assessment of officers in 
question. It then goes on to look at how this information was used to determine whether an 
officer was deemed trustworthy or not. There is then a discussion around whether tests played 
any role in understanding how members became part of the inner circle. Next, the chapter 
discusses the role of reputation and how it was used as a measure to confirm an individual’s 
trustworthiness. This is followed by a discussion of the key findings, linking them to the 
relevant theories, concepts and existing literature. The chapter finishes with concluding 
comments regarding the overall findings of this research question. 
Trustworthiness based on accumulated knowledge 
An individual’s trustworthiness did not instantly occur but, rather, trust resulted from repeated 
interactions over time. Drawing from the data set, determining an individual’s trustworthiness 
occurred by accumulating knowledge that came in a number of forms. The most frequently 
cited forms were personal experience, word-of-mouth or reputation, gossip and rumours, and 
through trusted third parties. Drawing on exemplars from the transcripts, each of these forms 
of accumulated knowledge is discussed below. 
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Personal Experience 
Testimony by corrupt officers revealed that they were able to develop character assessments of 
an officer’s willingness to engage in corrupt activities through repeated, personal interaction.  
In one example, Senior Detective Jasper stated that he picked up on clues and signals displayed 
through an individual's behaviour whether or not they would be willing participants to corrupt 
practices: 
Q. How did you know that he would receive a share of the stolen money and accept 
it?  
A. Again, I don’t know how to put it, but you - he seemed to be okay with it. There’s 
no real answer to - I know what you are trying to get at, but there is no real answer 
to it. I'm not sure. He just seemed to be okay, and I’d heard that he was right to give 
him money, from somewhere. I don’t remember what the conversation was or who 
told me. You work with people long enough and you get the general gist of if they 
are or are not inclined to take it.... 
Q. I take it from what you’ve just said that there were other officers who you would 
not have suggested receive money or offered money to?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Again, did that just result from an accumulated knowledge of whether a person 
would be inclined to participate in corrupt conduct or not?  
A. That’s right. (Jasper, p. 376) [emphasis added] 
 
Jasper’s testimony provides a good example of how accumulated knowledge through personal 
interaction was one of the factors that influenced their perceptions as to whether another officer 
was trustworthy or not. In this specific instance Jasper was able to do his own character 
assessment of Davidson based on repeated encounters with him. Jasper and Davidson joined 
the police force within 3 years of each other and worked on a number of jobs together over a 
20-year span. With a long history of interactions, Jasper could know confidently that Davidson 
was an individual who accepted and took part in corrupt activities during his time as an officer.  
Patison also supports the above statement from Jasper, as he noted in his testimony that the 
longer and more frequently you worked with other officers, the more you got to know them 
and could judge their character as someone who would be trusted or not. In his testimony 
Patison stated: 
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Q. How did that happen in terms of you trusting him or him trusting you to be 
involved in that sort of corrupt conduct?  
A. Oh, sir, I think that - Jasper often did a lot of talking with me about, you know, 
my time in the drug squad. He was genuinely interested in doing drug work. He 
didn’t - as I say, people probably don’t go in to be dishonest, sir, it just – it’s the 
way you fall, you know. You walk up the wrong path. He did - and I’m sure that 
over that period of time prior to that - because you don’t have sort of designated 
partners. You work with everyone because there’s no staff and everyone gets 10 
jobs to do, so I probably worked a bit with him and spoken a bit about our previous 
drug work and I might have mentioned to him that, you know, that I’d taken 
money and things. It’s not something that I – it’s not something that I’d go around 
and I’d tell anybody, sir. I didn’t - you know, there’d be gosh knows how many 
police out there who would be probably shocked to know what I’ve done because I 
didn’t publicly display it, sir. (Patison, p. 1746) [emphasis added] 
 
Patison’s testimony provides further evidence to suggest that trust was based on accumulated 
knowledge of another officer’s trustworthiness over time. This example demonstrates that 
Patison worked with Jasper enough to know that he could expose his previous experience with 
taking money and other items during his time in the drug unit. It also implies that Patison 
exposed this information because he wanted to see how Jasper would react to his previous 
corruption, whereby he would use this information to see if Jasper was someone who would 
keep these details to himself. Not reporting Patison’s corrupt actions would be viewed as a sign 
of loyalty and Jasper’s willingness to turn a blind eye to fellow officers’ corrupt behaviour. It 
also implies that this could be the first step into Jasper’s recruitment into the corruption 
network. 
Jasper’s testimony also provides further support for the notion that officers’ perceived 
trustworthiness developed over time. As he stated, he did not know whether Davidson was 
someone who could be trusted because he only worked with him a few times and was unable 
to determine his trustworthiness based on these few instances: “I wasn’t really in a position to 
say, because - that might have been the first or second job or search warrant that I’d ever been 
on where he [Davidson] had been involved and prior to that, when I was in uniform, I had 
nothing at all to do with him (Jasper, p. 394). Jasper’s testimony provides further evidence to 
suggest that perceived trustworthiness was based on repeated interactions with fellow officers. 
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At another search, Jasper and Messenger had only worked together on a few occasions and 
trust between these actors had not been established. This therefore suggests that trust was not 
an instant element, but one that developed over time. In other words, an officer's consistent 
trustworthy behaviour over time signalled to other officers that they could be trusted.  In 
another example, Ehsman outlines that there was no reason not to trust M5, as he had known 
him for a long time and there were no signs not to trust him: 
Q. How long had you known M5?  
A. Probably 10 or 12 years.  
Q. You worked with him?  
A. No, never.  
Q. Is he a person, a detective who you trusted or didn’t trust at that time?  
A. I never had a great deal to do with either of those persons, sir.  
Q. But you didn’t know of any reason not to trust them at that time?  
A. No. (Ehsman, p. 3898) 
 
Ehsman’s testimony further demonstrates that trust is built upon years of knowing each other. 
Since there was never any indication or incidents of untrustworthy behaviour by M5, Ehsman 
considered him trustworthy. This example suggests that M5’s past behaviour was consistent 
enough to develop a good reputation among the broader police community, while at the same 
time he was able to maintain his corrupt reputation from officers outside the network. It also 
implies that officers would be considered trustworthy as long as they maintained consistent 
behaviour in the future. 
Overall, the above examples show that trustworthiness was based on accumulated knowledge 
over time. In these instances, accumulated knowledge was acquired through personal 
interactions where officers were able to conduct character assessments based on their repeated 
exposure to particular officers. These examples provide evidence to show that information 
regarding an individual’s trustworthiness was developed through repeated interactions; 
however, what is unclear is the amount of time or number of interactions needed to determine 
whether someone is trustworthy or not. Since trust is subjective and often based on context this 
study cannot provide a magic number or exact figure. The data only suggest that trust or 
perceived trustworthiness developed through personal interactions with other officers. 
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Development of Strong Bonds 
Due to the nature of police work officers were able to develop strong bonds in and outside the 
police force. Many officers formed these bonds from a very early stage, and these bonds 
manifested as police recruits and rookies at the police academy. To demonstrate this point, Hill 
outlined that his relationship with Neild developed when they were junior detectives:  
Q. I will ask you again. Why was it that Mr Nield could have the confidence that 
you would accept the money from him without reporting him?  
A. You’d have to ask him that question, sir.  
Q. You know of no reason?  
A. We were very close friends. We worked together for years. I have known him 
since I was a very, very junior detective. (Hill, p. 4086) 
 
Similarly, Hill outlined that he knew M5 for a number of years and developed a close friendship 
with him. In his testimony he stated: 
Q. You’d played football with him; is that right?  
A. Yes.  
Q. You’d got on with him fairly well; is that right?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Indeed, you were friendly with him right up until 2000; is that right?  
A. Yes.  
Q. And you trusted him?  
A. Yes. 
Q. And he was someone that you spoke to freely, no matter what the subject matter 
of the conversation was; right?  
A. Probably. (Hill, p. 4314) [emphasis added] 
 
These examples demonstrate that friendships can develop among officers. This long history of 
friendship and a long history of a working relationship allowed Hill to feel confident in his 
character assessment of Neild and M5. This suggests that the more frequent the interactions, 
the more likely you are able to anticipate a specific behaviour from another party. Getting 
together outside of work and interacting with one another officer on a personal level appears 
to have helped officers build trust. This also suggests that trust was not only developed in their 
228 
 
working relationship but developed in their personal relationship with one another. Again, the 
more time officers spend with someone the more they got to know them, and the more they 
could feel confident in predicting their future behaviour.  
Overall, the above examples show that  “past cooperation is a basis for future cooperation such 
that trust is correlated with the strength of the relationship” (Burt, 2005, p. 101). It supports 
the notion that a history of repeated cooperation between individuals strengthens their 
relationship and, therefore, increased the likelihood of trusting one another. This tendency to 
generate trust over time may be a consequence of the type of trust between officers. For 
example, the transcripts also suggest that officers move from generalised trust (work 
colleagues) to particularised trust (friendship). This shift in trust suggests that officers first 
start off with a base level of trust (e.g. having each other’s back in dangerous situations) to one 
that grows to include individualised trust. From what the transcripts have exposed, it appears 
that individualised trust is needed among members to operate successfully. Without this type 
of trust, one can speculate that it would be difficult for members to cooperate and function 
smoothly. 
Word-of-Mouth and Reputation 
The transcripts expose that word-of-mouth and reputation are also vital forms of information 
to be able to accurately assess or determine an individual’s trustworthiness. In many cases, 
officers outlined that a person could be trusted based on their reputation within the police force 
and that this information regarding their reputation was obtained through word-of-mouth.  For 
example, M5 stated: 
Q. Right. The logical question which follows is: how does one, who does not 
necessarily have knowledge in advance, know that a given police officer is 
“amenable” to that kind of situation prior to putting the word on him or her?  
A. Yes, that's a good question. It’s probably word of mouth, I suppose.  
Q. In this particular situation - and you cannot speak for Mr Hill, I know - there 
was a certain element of risk attached to his making this proposition to you, was 
there not, without knowing where you stood on the issue of corrupt payments?  
A. That’s true. I don’t think he would have put that proposition to me unless he 
knew, if you know what I mean. (M5, 4188) [emphasis added] 
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M5’s testimony is a good example of how an officer would engage in a corrupt activity with 
another officer for the first time. M5 outlined that Hill approached him with a proposition to 
steal money from a search despite it being the first time they had worked together. What this 
suggests is that Hill could use information, such as M5’s reputation obtained through word-of-
mouth, to determine whether he would be keen to engage in that type of activity or not. 
Furthermore, it shows that, despite the personal interaction between Hill and M5 in the past, 
information through word-of-mouth was good enough for Hill to take the risk and involve M5 
in the corruption network. This point is highlighted in M5’s testimony, where M5 suggests that 
he had a reputation for engaging in corrupt dealings, that even when he switched units officers 
knew that he was involved in loading, verballing, accepting bribes and stealing from offenders: 
Q. When you came to North Sydney police station, you’d only been there three 
months; is that correct?  
A. Correct.  
Q. Today you mentioned that you’d received one prior payment; is that correct?  
A. That I recollect, yes.  
Q. You see, if that was the case, how would people know when someone’s only been 
there three months? Did you have the reputation for taking money under the 
counter?  
A. I believe I would have had a reputation that I would have been amenable to it, 
yes. (M5, p. 4173) [emphasis added] 
 
M5’s testimony is a good example of how his corrupt reputation can carry across police units 
and divisions. This transferability of a corrupt reputation thus implies that trust was also 
transferred. Although M5 acknowledges his corrupt reputation, it is unclear from this whether 
this information was available and known to all officers in the police organisation or whether 
it was restricted to officers within the corruption network. This example also implies that 
reputation was a valuable source of information to determine an officer’s trustworthiness and 
ultimately facilitated and authorised their entry into the corruption network. 
In addition to the reputation of specific officers, whole units also developed corrupt reputations 
in their specific jurisdictions. In the transcripts M5 outlined in his testimony that many officers 
in the NSDU had a reputation of being corrupt. He was aware of their reputation before he 
transferred to the unit: 
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Q. I’ve asked you about reputations of members of the North Sydney drug unit. 
Prior or at about the time that you commenced there, did you have any knowledge 
of the reputations of then current members of the Gosford drug unit?  
A. It was similar.  
Q. Does that include Eade?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Ison?  
A. Yes.  
Q. McClelland?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Kerr-Thomson?  
A. Yes. (M5, p. 4192) 
 
M5’s testimony provides a good example of how collectively or whole units, in this case the 
NSDU, can successfully build corrupt reputations. It also implies that reputation is based on 
association, where officers built and strengthen their reputation through the people they 
associate and frequently socialise with. This association, therefore, assists in the classification 
of officers who are trustworthy and officers who are not. Similarly, Irwin outlines that all 
members of the AHU could be trusted: “Q. Was Blake chosen because he was someone who 
could be trusted? A. Anybody in the armed hold-up squad could be trusted” (Irwin, p. 5449), 
further demonstrating that multiple units in Manly had successfully built and maintained 
corrupt reputations that were known among members of the corruption network. 
Overall, these examples show that officers not only identified corrupt individuals but they also 
identified whole groups of people as being corrupt (e.g. the drug squad). This demonstrates 
that trust was largely reliant on having a corrupt reputation that was shared among members of 
the corrupt network through word-of-mouth. An individual’s reputation was, therefore, an 
important element because it helped reduce uncertainty through an expectation that the 
individual would behave in a manner that was consistent with the expectations of the larger 
corruption network. It further implies that, since these individuals developed a corrupt 
reputation outside the network, they were likely to maintain their reputation by continuing to 
engage in corruption within the corruption network. Furthermore, an individual who had a 
corrupt reputation before they became a member of the corruption network would have also 
assisted in facilitating future collaborations between corrupt individuals, thus demonstrating 
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that reputation was a core element that not only allowed these networks to operate but also 
allowed members to assess an individual’s trustworthiness based on their previous actions. 
Gossip and Rumours 
Testimony from officers also showed that gossip and rumours were used as a source to evaluate 
and determine an individual’s trustworthiness and their eligibility into the corruption network. 
For example, Davidson outlined that he was aware of particular officers who engaged in corrupt 
activities as a result of rumours. In his testimony he stated: 
Q. Would you hand back the piece of paper upon which you wrote names pursuant 
to my request before lunch? Could you write on that same piece of paper the acts 
of corruption of those persons of which you are aware?  
A. Sir, I would - I can't write those because I don’t know of any personally; it is just 
by rumour.  
Q. These are names of people whose reputation you’ve heard involves corruption?  
A. Yes, sir.  
Q. You have no direct knowledge yourself of any corrupt acts by them?  
A. No, sir. (Davidson, p. 543) 
 
Davidson’s testimony provides a good example of how members, unknown to other associates 
in the network, obtained information regarding their corrupt activities. As Davidson outlined, 
he was only aware of the other members in the corruption network through rumours/gossip 
within the network. This finding demonstrates that not all members in the network were aware 
of other members or aware of their actions. 
To demonstrate this point further, Hill outlined in his testimony that Peattie had a corrupt 
reputation back in 1977 and that his reputation was known among officers in his unit: “Q. Did 
you know Ray Peattie to be corrupt before 1997? A. Before 1997? Q. Yes. A. Yes, sir, there 
were rumours about him when he was in charge of the drug squad” (Hill, p. 579). Similarly, 
Jasper outlined that he had heard of M5 before he worked with him; M5 had a reputation as 
being someone who was an active participant in corrupt activities:  
Q. Can you tell us what you had heard?  
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A. Well, Detective Sergeant M5 was a detective senior constable at that stage at the 
north region armed hold-up unit working with senior police, which was stationed 
at Chatswood. What I’ve heard and what’s actually true are two different things, 
but, you know, the fact of the matter was it used to be said if someone went in there 
and had committed two offences they might come out with about six or seven. It was 
commonly known that they’d be robbed or loaded up. (Jasper, pp. 501–502) 
 
Similarly, Minehan stated that he found out about the corruption through rumours or overheard 
officers discussing what they did over a few drinks. As Minehan noted, this information was 
usually revealed after they went to court: 
Q. Any other rumours that you are aware of as to load-ups at the unit?  
A. There probably were more. I remember more of conversations, like, over a beer 
and that, but more so to do with allegations from trials, more so than anyone saying, 
like - certainly I don't know - remember people specifically saying, “I did this or 
did that.” But I suppose there was [sic] rumours which used to float around but it 
more so came from allegations from court. (Minehan, p. 3265) 
 
The testimony from Jasper and Minehan provide good examples to further demonstrate how 
information obtained through rumours and gossip were used build character assessments and 
determine a person’s trustworthiness in the corruption network. By having this information 
officers could identify a person’s trustworthiness without conducting any tests or obtaining 
verification for other members. A corrupt reputation, especially one that was maintained over 
a few years, is a valuable asset for the whole corruption network. It shows that the more 
information they have regarding another officer’s past, the more time they can focus on 
operating the network and the less time needs to be spent on assessing an individual’s 
trustworthiness.  
Vouched Trustworthiness by Trusted Actor 
When an individual was unaware of another person’s character and was not able to predict their 
behaviour with a high level of success, these individuals relied on trusted sources to vouch for 
them. The transcripts outline that officers would frequently rely on obtaining information from 
a member of confidence within the corruption network. Jasper outlined that he trusted M5 
because he was vouched for by another trusted member within the network:  
233 
 
Q. How did you know during the search that he was someone who may be inclined 
to join in with the taking of the money?  
A. I was just told by Patison and Peattie that he was okay, and from that I presumed 
that he - he was - he should be included. (Jasper, p. 375) 
 
In one particular search, Blake was not assigned a specific role. N1 outlined in his testimony 
that he determined whether Blake could be trusted by asking a fellow officer, Irwin, if he was 
trustworthy or not. In other words, he was searching for information regarding whether Blake 
could be trusted not to reveal any illegal activities that might take place during the execution 
of the search warrant. N1 said that the plan to load and verbal C11 was, at that stage, ‘a 
contingency plan’ to be used only if C11 did not make any admissions (Griffin, 2004, p. 286): 
Q. Was any role assigned to Blake?  
A. I’d never - I don't know if Blake was even at the what do you call it –  
Q. The search?  
A. -- that day - at the briefing. But no real job was given to him, other than to assist 
us. He was Bobby’s workmate and I'd asked about him and was told that he could 
be trusted.  
Q. He could be trusted?  
A. Yes. (N1, p. 5292)      
 
The testimony of these officers provides good examples of where an officer was vouched for 
by trusted members in the corruption network. These testimonies show that trust in these 
situations was instant, whereby having a trusted member provide assurance and a guarantee 
that the individual in question could be trusted was a strong enough indication for members of 
the corruption network. It also implies that uncertainty and the element of risk was minimised 
because the information regarding an individual’s trustworthiness was transmitted through a 
trusted source in the network. The risk was also reduced because it was unlikely that an 
individual would put the rest of the corruption network at risk by referring an untrustworthy 
individual.                                          
Tests to Determine Trustworthiness 
Officers outlined that they did not rely on tests to determine whether someone could be trusted 
because these tests were considered too risky and would put the whole corruption network in 
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danger. In one example, Patison outlined that he did not even consider testing other officers 
because there was too much at risk if his corrupt behaviour was exposed. In his testimony he 
stated: 
A. Oh, no, sir, certainly not at all. I - and I've always had the belief that, you know, 
if you didn’t - if you didn’t know that that person was dishonest, then I would never 
ever implicate them. I wouldn’t even try and so-called test them to see if they were, 
sir, because I just didn't want to take any risk. I didn’t want people knowing that 
I was corrupt… 
Q. Was that because you had a genuine fear that they might actually report any 
knowledge they had of your corrupt behaviour?  
A. Oh, sir, it was a definite fifty-fifty feeling. There was 50 per cent of me that said, 
“Yes, don't, don't do it because they might report me” but there was definitely 50 
per cent feeling that I didn’t want them knowing that I was doing something wrong. 
I had a fairly good reputation in the police, and, you know, as I said, I put myself 
in the position of, you know, trying to -getting involved with training the younger 
detectives and that and I was trying to get them on the right path and doing the 
right things, and I’d learnt a lot in my time and I tried to pass that onto them. But 
there was no way in the world that I ever wanted anyone to believe that I was 
corrupt. (Patison, p. 1746) [emphasis added] 
 
Patison further noted: “If I can just add, if I didn’t know that somebody would take the money, 
would accept the money, then I wouldn’t try and test them either, sir” (Patison, 1712). This 
testimony is a good example demonstrating the strategic and tactical nature of each corrupt 
dealing. As Patison outlined, he would not risk involving someone who he was unsure about 
as this would severely jeopardise his reputation as a good and honest officer. His testimony 
shows that officers needed to have a level of certainty to be willing to take the risk of exposing 
the hidden dark nature of their activities. Consistent with previous sections, this certainty was 
obtained through information sources such as personal experience, word-of-mouth or 
assurance from trusted members of the network. 
In another example, Patison outlined that early in his career in the drug squad he was confronted 
with finding money under his dinner plate after he and the drug squad completed an undercover 
operation. Patison stated: 
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We went back to - after doing all the paperwork and all the tidying up, we went 
back to a restaurant in Lane Cove and we were having a meal there. I think there 
was probably the best part of a dozen of us there. I went to the toilet and then when 
I came back there was - I think there was about $500 or $600, sir, just under my 
plate. Now, I was - I think that was in the early stages of being in the drug squad 
and I think it might have been a case of - maybe not a testing, but I think the 
circumstances might have been that, you know, if the money is put there, then I 
don’t know where it’s come from and I don’t know who has given it to me, but I 
think later on if we had a few beers, I think we had a few beers just down the road 
at the hotel there, I think I later found out that this fellow had paid money to get 
bail. Now, I don’t know who that money was paid to. I don’t know who did those 
negotiations. I didn’t. I didn't ask. I took the money and I just didn’t ask any 
questions about it, sir. (Patison, p. 1716) [emphasis added] 
Patison’s testimony shows that he was considered as a trustworthy individual by members of 
the corruption network. The fact that money was left under a plate at dinner without any prior 
discussion with Patison demonstrates that information was available regarding Patison’s 
character and willingness to accept corrupt money. Understanding Patison’s acceptability and 
willingness to participate in these corrupt activities likely resulted from accumulated 
knowledge over time. Furthermore, as the example shows, there were at least a dozen officers 
out for dinner after the operation, which demonstrates that everyone there was either involved 
in the corruption network or were individuals who were considered trustworthy enough not to 
say anything (turning a blind eye). It suggests that there were three types of individuals: (1) 
individuals who were completely against any police corruption/misconduct, (2) individuals 
who tolerated police misconduct/corruption and turned a blind eye (e.g. not dobing you in), 
(3) individuals who actively engaged in corrupt activities. In other words, as long as the person 
was classified in categories two or three, they were considered trustworthy enough to involve 
in the corrupt dealings between corrupt officers. 
Embellishing Stories to Demonstrate Trustworthiness 
As previously mentioned, reputation played a huge part in determining an officer’s 
trustworthiness. Members of the network needed to have or needed to appear to have a corrupt 
reputation. Throughout the trial a number of covertly recorded conversations between officers 
revealed that officers would often discuss certain corruption events, which provides further 
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evidence that these officers did have post-game discussions as outlined in Chapter Eight. 
However, when questioned about these conversations and admissions of guilt, officers justified 
their behaviour by saying that they would often lie or embellish a story. For example, a 
discussion between M5 and Fabris provides a good example of an embellished story: 
Q. Well, why would you say to a serving police officer, “I had 15 grand in my pocket 
of the seized money”?  
A. As I said, we were just telling stories and embellishing.  
Q. Well, you go on to say, “Kingy’s got 12 in his”, meaning that King had $12,000; 
correct?  
A. As it comes out, yes… 
Q. So the only thing that you say is not true is the admission of criminal activity by 
you, the taking of $15,000 from this operation; correct?  
A. That’s right. It was just added to embellish the story. (Fabris, p. 1032) 
[emphasis added] 
 
Regardless of whether this is an embellished story or the truth, this testimony shows that Fabris 
trusted M5 enough to disclose that he had $15 000 in this pocket. It also demonstrates that 
Fabris trusted M5 enough to disclose King as another officer involved in his story. It could also 
suggest that it was a cultural tendency for officers to drink and show-off to other officers that 
they engaged in this type of activity on a regular basis, presenting themselves as an active 
member of the group who, as a result, could be classified as trustworthy. In another example, 
F7 outlines that he, as well as other officers, would regularly embellish stories while drinking: 
Q. So, again, your only explanation for suggesting in this conversation that and 
[sic] had been involved in a divvy up of the money is that it was a drunken 
embellishment?  
A. That's correct.  
Q. But you can’t give any explanation as to why you would, even when drunk, 
suggest that serving police officers had been involved in taking money; is that the 
position?  
A. That’s correct. It’s just, you know, we told stories all the time. We all knew them 
to be lies. M5 knew them to be lies. Nimmo knew them to be lies. It was just the way 
we spoke. (F7, pp. 1068–1069) 
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As F7 further mentioned, “looking back over many years, how the police was envisaged in the 
70s, and so forth, and it was just trying to make yourself a bigger man, or whatever, to be, you 
know, a better man” (F7, p. 1069). Similarly, Hill outlined that he would often embellish stories 
regarding things that he had done (e.g. assaulting criminals) to keep up the appearance that he 
was someone who could be trusted. For example, he stated in his testimony: 
Q. Well what was the reason, then?  
A. I don't know sir, I was just running off at the mouth again.  
Q. But that was the purpose, wasn't it, to show that you were still part of the club, 
part of the giggle, someone who could be trusted –  
A. Yes, sir. (Hill, p. 551). 
 
Testimony from F7 and Hill suggests that officers did, in fact, express to other officers their 
great accomplishments to demonstrate their trustworthiness to other actors in the network. 
Whether these achievements or stories are true or not is not particularly important, what is 
critical is that they started to demonstrate a particular image to other officers. As F7 outlined, 
the purpose of these embellished stories was to appear as the ‘bigger man’. To be a bigger man 
implies that these officers were not only bolstering their previous conquests to be accepted as 
a valuable and a trusted member of the network, but it also implies that these officers were in 
competition with one another to hold the reputation as being the most corrupt. 
Discussion of Key Findings 
The results of the study demonstrate that trust played a significant role regarding membership 
and the daily operations of the corruption network. Trust was critical in these networks because 
it acted as a lubricant for social relations by fostering and maintaining cooperation, while at the 
same time trust reduced risk by providing a sense of security. In other words, trust provided a 
foundation that allowed these officers to connect and collaborate with one another. Testimony 
from officers demonstrates that trust was based on the mutual understanding that all members 
involved would be cautious when engaging in any corrupt activities and that they would do 
whatever it took to keep the corrupt activities hidden. Officers established this mutual 
understanding by demonstrating that they could be trusted by developing and maintaining a 
reputation of someone who was trustworthy. This reputation was communicated to other 
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members through a number of forms, such as personal experience, word-of-mouth, gossip and 
vouched trustworthiness by a third party. Additionally, an individual officer's reputation was 
also communicated and strengthened by the officer embellishing stories of their previous 
conquests in a bid to bolster their reputation further in the network. These three types of 
information sources resulted in a ‘pipeline’ of trust where officers used trustworthiness 
attributes (such as consistent behaviour and reputation) and third-party information to 
determine whether a fellow officer was trustworthy enough to be a member of the corruption 
network. Figure 9.1 visually presents the overall findings that police corruption networks 
determined an individual’s trustworthiness through three main information sources that created 
a pipeline of trust. 
Figure 9.1: Pipeline of Trust 
 
The fact that the network relied on a member’s corrupt and trustworthy reputation also implies 
that interpersonal trust (e.g. trust between two officers) was not necessary for collaboration to 
exist; officers just needed to demonstrate that they were trustworthy enough to keep the 
corruption hidden and to demonstrate that they understood and operated under the unwritten 
rules and norms. Furthermore, by employing the norms of the network, fellow officers had the 
confidence and assurance that members had the ability to engage in corruption without the 
involvement of officers at the core of the network. As was previously demonstrated in Chapter 
Seven, some of the corruption events only involved members on the periphery. The lack of 
involvement and oversight from the core members shows that there was a base level of trust 
across the network that provided officers with the autonomy to participate in a corrupt manner.  
The remainder of the chapter expands on these overall findings by specifically discussing how 
officers developed familiarity and predictability through personal interactions, how officers 
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established and maintained their corrupt reputation and how testing was not a central part in 
determining an individual officer’s trustworthiness.  
Developing Familiarity and Predictability through Personal Interactions 
When determining a fellow officer’s trustworthiness, personal experience was referred to by 
officers in their testimony as a crucial source. Personal experience was the most common and 
most reliable source of information for assessing an individual’s trustworthiness. Officers 
outlined that the more time spent with fellow officers, the more they got to know them and 
could then confidently trust them with information, activities and tasks within the network. 
This finding is similar to the trust literature, as it suggests that prior interaction can create 
‘familiarity’ and, in turn, enables individuals to develop confidence in each other’s 
trustworthiness (Dore, 1983; Dyer & Chu, 2000; Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002).  This enhanced 
trustworthiness can manifest, for example, in an individual’s willingness to favour a particular 
individual over another by sticking to a pattern of repeated cooperative exchanges (Gulati & 
Sytch, 2008). Continuously collaborating in a consistent manner allowed officers to understand 
fellow officers’ behaviours and beliefs. This information could, therefore, be used to determine 
their willingness to participate in corruption. 
As a result of repeated interactions between officers, a fellow officer’s behaviour was familiar 
and became more predictable, leading to the formation of trust. Officers outlined that the more 
they worked with other officers the more they could assess their behaviour and ultimately be 
confident in predicting it. This ability to confidently predict another officer’s behaviour 
resulted in increased trust among members in the network. These results confirm Burt’s (2005, 
p. 99) suggestion that repetition of cooperative exchange promotes trust. Trust develops from 
initial interaction (low risk) to exchanges of familiarity and significance (higher risk) (Blau, 
1968; Cross & Parker, 2004). This finding also mirrors what Shapiro et al. (1992) label 
‘knowledge-based trust’, which is also referred to as cognitive-based trust by Lewis and 
Weigert (1985) and McAllister (1995).  Trust is grounded in the other person’s predictability 
and occurs when an individual acquires enough information about others to understand them 
and accurately predict their likely behaviour (Shapiro et al., 1992). Furthermore, Burt outlines 
that cumulative build is not only fuelled by people coming to know each other but is also 
powered by whether “a specific proposal is something the other person is especially likely to 
push to fruition” (Burt, 2005, p. 99). In this manner, individuals choose whom they will trust, 
in which respects and under what circumstances, and base their choice on ‘good reasons’, 
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constituting evidence of trustworthiness (Lewis & Weigert, 1985, p. 970). This type of trust 
develops through interactions over time, allowing individuals to develop an expectancy that 
the other party will behave in a manner because of consistent past encounters (Rotter, 1971).  
Additionally, as a consequence of these repeated exchanges strong ties and relationships were 
formed among some of the officers. These strong ties were demonstrated through friendships, 
where these officers spent time together outside of work hours. They would often engage in 
social activities together, such as playing sports, attending family functions and drinking. These 
results also resonate with the findings from Lauchs, Keast and Yousefpour’s (2011) study into 
the corruption network found in the Fitzgerald Inquiry. They found that officers tended to bond 
together outside of work, especially over a drink. They also found that the Qld Police mantra 
was ‘you never trust a man that doesn't drink' (Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011, p. 113). 
Despite there being decades between the Fitzgerald and Operation Florida Inquiries, it shows 
that there were similarities in the culture that guided their corrupt behaviour. In both scenarios 
there was a strong drinking culture, where officers would bond outside of work and would talk 
about their corrupt accomplishments. Officers were able to adjust their beliefs and attitudes 
towards another officer based on repeated exposure. For example, officers who frequently 
engaged in corrupt activities were, therefore, able to build strong reputations in the network 
and consequently increased their trustworthiness among members. Accordingly, this suggests 
that repeated interactions allowed officers to learn about characteristics of the trustee and could 
use this information to modify expectations regarding an individual’s behaviour (Buskens, 
1998, 2002). It also suggests that if expectations were met then the likelihood of trust would 
increase with each interaction (Coleman, 1990, p. 102–104; Granovetter, 1985, p. 40). 
Corrupt Reputation 
The findings of the current study show that an officer’s corrupt reputation played a large part 
in determining their trustworthiness. A member’s reputation provided other members in the 
network with a sense of security and minimised risk for these officers. Providing further 
empirical support, reputation in this study was a key component, just as it was in other police 
corruption and criminal networks. For instance, Lauchs and Staines (2012) found similar 
findings in the Fitzgerald Inquiry. Jack Herbert, also known as ‘the bagman’, was a Qld police 
officer who was able to build the network based on trusted connections and reputation among 
members within the network. Herbert overcame his initial lack of reputation and trust by 
extorting the Joke participants and, once in the group, he further built and reinforced his 
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reputation. Likewise, Morselli’s (2001) research into an international cannabis smuggler and 
members of the Cosa Nostra (Sicilian Mafia) found that these individuals’ entrepreneurial 
success was driven by reputation and trust.  
Furthermore, the findings reveal that information regarding an officer’s reputation derived 
from several different sources: word-of-mouth, rumours and gossip and verification from a 
trusted third party. Officers outlined in their testimony that they relied on information from 
trusted members of the network to gain a better understanding of unknown officers outside the 
network. This reliance on information from trusted members was especially the case when 
officers needed to assess the trustworthiness of another officer with whom they had not had 
any prior personal encounters. This finding is similar to research within the trust literature and 
suggests that trust is relational and depends on the relationship between individuals, either 
“directly through your own ongoing interaction or indirectly through intermediaries and 
reputational effects” (Hardin, 2002, p. 3). Similarly, Ferrin et al. (2006) state that information 
provided by gossip can be used to assess the trustworthiness of indirectly connected third 
parties. Ferrin et al. suggest that this type of information can lead to a ‘trust transfer’ in whole 
networks.  The new information about a third party can be used to update beliefs and attitudes 
of a trustee (Granovetter, 1985). This information can be especially powerful when it comes 
from a trusted source inside the network, as information from sources outside the network can 
be less accurate or weightless (Granovetter, 1985). In the current study the strength of the 
sources, for example information coming from core members of the network, appeared to be 
more reliable and valid than information from periphery members. In other words, information 
from core members regarding another officer’s trustworthiness was enough information for 
that officer to be considered a trusted member; corrupt officers did not need to seek out further 
information or confirm this information with other sources. The data suggest, however, that 
information from periphery members needed to be further verified and corroborated by other 
sources.  
Consequently, when a core member vouched for another officer’s trustworthiness this 
information was viewed as highly credible and trustworthy. In this sense, trust could be 
transferred to other members of the network through trusted third parties. This findings, 
complements Lauchs, Keast and Yousefpour’s (2011) research findings, where they also found 
that trust was obtained by having a reference to an existing Joke member. In this organised 
crime network members were not aware of all other members and therefore had to rely on 
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reputation and trust to function. This is consistent with the current research, as some of the 
periphery members were connected to the larger corruption networks only through third parties. 
It was, therefore, the connection between these two officers that allowed the network to 
continue to grow and operate on a strong foundation of trust between network members.  
Tests to Determine Trustworthiness 
All the findings in relation to this research question suggest that officers were very deliberate 
in their actions, especially regarding officers who were allowed into the corruption network. 
Previous studies on police corruption have reported that officers often test fellow officers to 
determine whether they could be trusted or not. For example, Lauchs and Staines (2012, p. 
117) reported that ‘integrity tests’ exposed officers to a “low-level opportunity to take a small 
payment” and found that individuals who accepted the money could be considered a trusted 
individual. Similarly, Caless (2008) outlined a case involving an officer and ex-officer who 
conspired to steal drugs and resell them. The findings show that officers would ‘test’ another 
officer’s corruptibility and indicated that when the officer succumbed to temptation then the 
officer was considered a member of the team (Caless, 2008, p. 9). Findings in this study, 
however, did not discover the testing of officers. A possible reason for this difference may be 
due to the increase in integrity testing after the Fitzgerald (1989) and Wood inquiries (1995). 
As previously outlined, officers in this study were very deliberate in their actions and 
demonstrated that they conducted risk analyses of situations. There is a possibility that these 
officers did not conduct these tests because they deemed them too risky due to the increase in 
integrity tests, which is why testing fellow officers may not be as common as previous studies 
suggest. Another possibility could also be the result of the difference in culture among corrupt 
police officers, where testing is common and embedded in the pro-corruption culture. 
Connecting Research Questions 1, 2a, 2b, 3 and 4: Factors of Influence, Structure 
Components, Operation of Network and Trustworthiness 
As outlined earlier in this chapter, corrupt officers operated in relationships based on 
demonstrations of trustworthiness. Trustworthiness in these relationships was exhibited by 
consistent and predictable behaviour resulting in trust being built over time. Although it was 
not clear whether individuals who demonstrated trustworthiness attributes, were trustworthy or 
had the appearance of being trustworthy played a large role in the corruption network. The 
findings of this study suggest that trust was crucial regarding membership, recruitment and the 
overall operations of the network. As previously outlined in Chapter Six, officers were 
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influenced and motivated to engage and continue to engage in corrupt activities because of 
fellow officers in their social networks. As many of the officers outlined in their testimony, 
strong personal relationships were formed outside of the police organisation. Although it was 
not explicitly stated, the findings suggest that these relationships would have been based on 
some element of trust which would have assisted in introducing new officers to corruption. 
Additionally, membership into the network was very deliberate, as recruits were not formally 
tested but were instead observed over time to determine their trustworthiness, willingness and 
ability to be valuable members of the network. This level of trust allowed the network to 
operate effectively and efficiently. 
Overall, trust and demonstrations of trustworthiness allowed the corruption network to expand 
over time, introducing new members when opportunities arose or when resources were needed. 
Trust reduced risk and allowed individuals to operate independently, which also allowed the 
network to operate effectively and efficiently. Without some level of trust, it is uncertain 
whether the network would have been able to form and continue to operate undetected. 
Concluding Comments 
This chapter has investigated the concept of trustworthiness within police corruption networks. 
Specifically, this chapter aimed to address the fourth research question (RQ4): How do 
members of police corruption networks determine a person's trustworthiness? The overall 
findings suggest that corrupt police in the Manly division operated in a trust network. Trust 
was critical because it acted as a lubricant for social relations, it fostered and maintained 
cooperation and reduced risk by providing a sense of security. Information regarding an 
officer’s trustworthiness was based on information obtained through personal experience, as 
well as through trusted sources and network members. Individual officers, as well as whole 
units, could develop strong reputations of being trustworthy members in the network. These 
reputations allowed members to collaborate without needing to test or confirm that fellow 
officers were trustworthy. Testing was also found to be too risky and therefore members relied 
on experience, reputation and third party affirmation, thus demonstrating that membership into 
the corruption network was very deliberate. 
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Chapter Ten 
General Discussion and Conclusion 
Introduction 
As noted in the introduction of this thesis, police corruption has serious consequences for the 
individual police officers involved, the police organisation and society as a whole. Cases of 
police corruption not only incur enormous financial costs each year but they also undermine 
the rule of law by eroding the police institution, which is essential for a fair and equitable 
society. Corrupt incidents engender a loss of public trust, which affects a police service’s ability 
to work together effectively with the community to combat crime and support social stability 
(Porter & Prenzler, 2012; Weitzer & Tuch, 2004). Previous research has demonstrated that 
police corruption does not only come down to a few ‘bad apples’ but, instead, police officers 
often collaborate and collude with other actors in order for them to continue to operate 
effectively and remain hidden within the broader police organisation (Fitzgerald, 1989; Lauchs 
et al., 2012; Lauchs, Keast, & Le, 2011; Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011; Wood, 1997). 
Additionally, more recent studies have demonstrated that corrupt officers operate within a 
network structure (i.e., an established pattern of relationships and exchanges) which allows 
them to gain access to new resources, capabilities, opportunities and connections not readily 
available if these officers engaged in corrupt behaviour in isolation (Lauchs et al., 2012; 
Lauchs, Keast, & Yousefpour, 2011; Lauchs & Staines, 2012). As a consequence of this, 
collaboration, secrecy, loyalty and reputation are significant elements that bond officers 
together, allowing them to operate covertly. Accordingly, this evidence provides a strong 
rationale for investigating why police officers engage in corruption, whether trust plays a role 
in facilitating and bonding officers together, and how police collaborate to engage in large-
scale or serious corruption.  
This thesis set out to explore the nature of police corruption networks, in particular the enabling 
factors that influence officers to engage in corrupt activities, the specific structure of these 
networks, and the critical operational mechanisms that allow these networks to function, as 
well as the role of trust in facilitating strong bonds of loyalty. In doing so, it drew on actual, 
official enquiries and resulting data on police corruption using Australian court transcripts.  
This study makes a substantial departure from existing research, which tends to rely on 
secondary sources or make sweeping statements without studying the detail of corrupt activity 
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within networks. In particular, the findings of this study contribute to the literature by providing 
key empirical insights concerning the structural, operational and relational elements of these 
police corruption networks.   
In a further departure from the existing studies investigating corrupt police, it drew on SNA, 
which is an analytical tool used to uncover, map and measure the connections between 
individuals, groups and organisations, in order to reveal the hidden relationships and 
characteristics of police corruption networks. Applying SNA has contributed to the literature 
by revealing the dynamic nature of these networks. It did this by analysing and mapping the 
structural changes of the Manly division’s corruption network over time. Illuminating these 
structural changes, combined with the qualitative findings, provides an in-depth contextual 
understanding of the evolution of the corruption networks identified in Operation Florida, 
presenting possible reasons regarding the changes in operation for the duration of the network’s 
activity.  
Additionally, as previously highlighted in Chapter Three, trust in criminal networks is 
acknowledged in the criminology literature as an important component in the functioning and 
operations of criminal networks. Despite the emphasis placed on trust within criminal 
networks, with the exception of Gambetta’s (1988) and von Lampe and Ole Johansen’s (2002) 
studies, there has been little attention directed at bridging this gap in the knowledge (Gambetta, 
1988; von Lampe & Ole Johansen, 2004). The current study has contributed to the knowledge 
deficit by providing a qualitative investigation into the role of trust in police corruption 
networks, which has distilled valuable and new insights as to how trustworthiness is 
demonstrated, used and leveraged by members of a corruption network.  
In the subsequent section a summary of the major results is presented in accordance with each 
research question. Following this, how the results of the study contribute theoretically and 
practically is explored. Next, limitations of the study are acknowledged and, finally, future 
research is identified, building upon the findings to help understand police corruption. 
Overview of the Findings for Individual Research Questions 
Overall, the findings of this thesis demonstrate that police officers are more influenced by 
structural factors—that is, the network connections and topology—that guide them to engage 
in corruption. As was identified, these officers operated in a highly cohesive and clustered 
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network. Furthermore, trust was found to play a central role in creating strong bonds, building 
a solid foundation for corruption to flourish. As there are limited studies that empirically 
investigate police corruption networks, apart from Lauchs et al.’s (2011, 2012) studies using 
the Fitzgerald Inquiry, this study builds on Lauchs et al.’ studies, providing new insights that 
significantly contribute to the knowledge on police corruption networks. A further breakdown 
of these significant findings is presented below according to the relevant research question. 
Research Question 1: What Factors Influence Police Offices to Join Corruption Networks 
and Continue to Participate in Serious Corruption? 
The findings outlined in Chapter Six revealed that most officers referred to 
structural/institutional factors (specific conditions that produce human actions or behaviour, 
such as the institutional culture) rather than personal agency factors (individual characteristics, 
such as age or education which influence human action) when justifying or explaining the 
factors that influenced them to participate in corruption. The most common structural factors 
identified by officers were: the subculture in the Manly division, the influence of senior and 
other officers, and that they were presented with an opportunity to be corrupt. Officers noted 
that it was only when they started working in Manly that they became entrenched in the culture 
which resulted in their participation in corruption. The culture at Manly was characterised by 
strong codes (e.g. code of silence), norms (e.g. verballing and loading were part of the daily 
functioning) and unwritten rules (e.g. officers caught drink driving would be escorted home) 
that allowed corrupt practices to grow and flourish without resistance from outside influences. 
Senior officers played a core role in influencing an individual officer’s decision to partake in, 
and continue to be an active member in, the corruption network. Many officers stated in their 
evidence that the main reason why they initially got involved was because they were introduced 
to corrupt behaviours by a fellow officer. Officers also outlined that they continued to 
participate because they had senior officers’ support. These influential officers (both senior and 
fellow officers) formed a larger, supportive network enabling the corruption network, whereby 
members would be positively rewarded for their corruption (e.g. receiving money or 
acceptance and belonging). This positive reinforcement by fellow officers acted as a continuous 
‘feedback loop’ that provided officers with a strong backing to continue to engage in corrupt 
activities. 
In addition to the strong pro-corruption and supportive culture in Manly, opportunity was 
another critical theme that emerged from the transcripts. Officers disclosed that they engaged 
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in these unethical acts because they were given the opportunity to do so without getting caught. 
This opportunity provided them with a platform and means to engage freely in corrupt 
behaviour with other officers. Overall, the findings of this research question show that police 
officers were influenced more by structural factors, rather than being influenced by their own 
personal agency factors. Therefore, the institutional factors of culture, leadership and influence 
of fellow officers, reinforced by the officer’s own willingness to cross the line, provided the 
main impetus for these officers to engage in corrupt practices.  
Research Question 2a: How Are Police Corruption Networks Structured? 
As noted in Chapter Seven, police officers collaborated and operated under a network structure. 
The network consisted of 27 actors, two of whom were drug dealers and the remaining 25 were 
corrupt NSW police officers. The network was highly clustered and cohesive, showing that 
resources and other officers were easily accessed. The cohesive nature of the network revealed 
that there were few structural holes, thus establishing that there was minimal use of a 
middleman or broker in this network. The findings also identified 11 cliques within the wider 
corruption network. The largest clique composed of 11 of the 27 members and all of the smaller 
cliques shared some overlap with members of the largest clique. Although the network does 
not traditionally act as a core-periphery structure, the findings revealed that the network was 
layered and could be broken down into multiple layers in the core and that there were actors 
loosely connected on the periphery of the network. 
Centrality measures also determined that the corruption network was centred around a set of 
integrating key police officers. This finding was highlighted in the investigation of 1-mode 
(actor-to-actor) and 2-mode data (actor-to-corruption event). The centrality of the corrupt 
officers was not reflective of their position in the police force, nor was it reflective of having a 
high authority/rank in the network. In other words, the most central officers did not hold senior 
positions in the police organisation or in the corruption network. Instead, it meant that these 
officers were more active and had more connections than other officers involved in the 
network. Interestingly, some actors in less central positions were found to hold more power 
because they had unique connections and access to critical resources. These connections not 
only assisted in the network’s operations (i.e., using false police informants to cover up 
activities of members in the network) but created new opportunities to participate in corrupt 
activities (i.e., using false police informants as a means to obtain reward money from false 
information provided to the police). 
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Additionally, the findings also imply that the structure of the corruption network was 
influenced by the officer’s geographic location within the police force. In other words, officers 
involved in the corruption network all worked in the Manly division. Additionally, the officers 
participating in the corruption network had experience working in specific units, such as the 
drug unit and AHU. Officers from other units and locations outside Manly, such as traffic 
detectives, were not members of the corruption network, suggesting that they did not have the 
proximity and therefore there was less of an opportunity to corrupt these officers. 
Research Question 2b: Do Police Corruption Networks Change Over Time? 
A deeper interrogation of the network’s structural properties revealed that the network was 
dynamic and that there were shifts in the structure and frequency of the corruption events. More 
specifically, it was found that, structurally, the corruption network fluctuated between five and 
22 members across the 14-year period. It also altered on the number of corruption events that 
took place. Despite the changes in size or centrality of key officers as a result of changes in the 
Manly division the density of the network remained high. This finding is particularly unique 
as it demonstrates that police corruption networks are adaptable and resilient to changes in the 
wider police organisation, which adds fundamental insights to the knowledge on the dynamic 
structural properties of these networks. 
Research Question 3: How Do Police Corruption Networks Operate? 
The findings outlined in Chapter Eight revealed that corrupt police collaborated under a set of 
unwritten rules, codes and norms that guided the corrupt operations of network members. 
Officers outlined in their testimony that they used a number of different tactics to hide their 
corrupt dealing from individuals outside the network. A central theme that emerged from the 
transcripts was that corrupt officers would not engage in any corrupt activities without first 
conducting a risk analysis of the situation. If the situation was deemed too risky or involved 
individuals who were classified as untrustworthy then officers would not consider participating 
in corrupt activities. Testimony from officers also revealed that extortion was a common tactic 
used by officers to ensure compliance and to minimise the risk of being caught as a corrupt 
officer.  
Communication was also found to be a critical component that aided officers to operate 
effectively within the corruption network. To keep their activities hidden from fellow officers 
and undercover integrity officers, code words and hand gestures were used to communicate. 
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These gestures and code words were used to cover topics such as how much money they could 
expect to receive from a search, who would be given a share and how the exchange of money 
would take place. The timing of communication was also an integral part of the corrupt 
network’s operation. Officers needed to communicate effectively with one another in a manner 
that was clear enough that corrupt fellow officers would understand and effectively collaborate. 
In particular, pre- and post-activity discussions were common to ensure all officers were on the 
same page. This communication took place to ensure consistent stories and recorded documents 
among officers in the hope that it would minimise the risk of detection. 
Additionally, testimony from corrupt officers revealed the arrangement was that the officers 
who were aware of, and participated in, corrupt conduct received their share of the proceeds. 
This arrangement meant that fellow officers in the network who were not directly involved in 
searches would still receive their share as a member of the network. As many officers outlined 
in their testimony, individual officers involved worked as a team to ensure that the corrupt 
activities would remain hidden. This further implies that officers relied on fellow officers to 
not only follow the rules and codes but to be discreet about the way they conducted their corrupt 
practices to keep these activities under the radar. 
Research Question 4: How do Members of Police Corruption Networks Determine a 
Person’s Trustworthiness? 
As noted in Chapter Nine, the testimony from officers revealed that police corruption networks 
operated on trust. Trust was developed in these networks through a number of information 
channels where officers determined a fellow officer’s trustworthiness. Drawing from the data, 
officers determined a fellow officer’s trustworthiness through three main information sources: 
(1) personal experience, (2) reputation, and (3) verification from a trusted third party. The most 
common and most reliable source of information for assessing an individual’s trustworthiness 
was obtained through personal experience. Officers outlined that the more time spent with 
fellow officers the more they got to know them, and could then confidently trust them with 
information, activities and tasks within the network. This confidence was based on the fact that 
a fellow officer’s behaviour became predictable, enabling officers to know confidently how 
they would behave in certain situations.  
An officer’s reputation as well as information obtained from a trusted third party were also 
common themes that emerged from the data. Individual officers, as well as whole units, had 
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successfully established corrupt reputations in the police force which allowed officers to 
collaborate without the need to conduct tests against fellow officers to determine their 
trustworthiness. When limited or no immediate information was available regarding an 
officer’s trustworthiness members of the network relied upon a trusted third party source. These 
individuals could be positioned at the core or the periphery of the network. The findings suggest 
that information from core officers contained more legitimacy and validity among members of 
the network because their opinions were highly respected. Information from periphery 
members was also valid but it was not as strong, as these members held positions on the fringes 
of the network. This was because these officers were usually only involved when there was an 
opportunity to do so (rather than being an active participant in the network). Overall, these 
three types of information sources resulted in a ‘pipeline’ of trust, where officers used 
trustworthiness attributes, personal experience or third party information to assess whether a 
fellow officer was trustworthy enough to be a member of the corruption network. This pipeline 
of trust was essential for the development and daily functioning of the network because it 
allowed members involved to operate with more confidence knowing that fellow members 
could be trusted to keep the corrupt activities hidden. 
Combined Findings of Research Questions 
Collectively, the findings from the above research questions suggest that corrupt officers 
operated on networks based on trust, and that these officers were influenced to engage and 
continue to engage in corrupt activities because of the institutional factors surrounding them. 
The influence of fellow officers, support of senior officers and the pro-corruption culture 
created by these factors played a significant role in motivating officers to become active 
participants in a corruption network. Individuals involved in the corruption network and their 
relative positions in the network also appear to play a role in influencing an officer to become 
involved in the corruption network. Officers positioned at the core and on the periphery of the 
network each provided the necessary resources and connections that allowed the network to 
grow and prosper. The connections that some of these officers had allowed new officers to 
enter and become active members in the network by providing reassurance and security. 
Members of the corruption network did this by only including individuals who demonstrated 
that they were trustworthy enough to become active members of the corruption network. 
Demonstrations of being trustworthy were exhibited through repeated interactions that led to 
predictability of behaviours, reputation and through a third-party validation. Being trustworthy 
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or demonstrating their trustworthiness allowed the network to operate without the involvement 
of all members. In other words, the members positioned at the core of the network did not need 
to monitor or include members positioned in the periphery of the network in all activities. 
Membership into the network was also very deliberate, as recruits were not formally tested but 
instead observed over time to determine their trustworthiness, willingness and ability to be 
valuable members of the network. This level of trust allowed the network to operate effectively 
and efficiently. Overall, it was the combination of the above factors that aided the corruption 
network to thrive over the years it was in operation. 
Implications for Theory 
This thesis aimed to make significant contributions to the understanding of police corruption, 
the networks these corrupt officers operate in and the role of trust in facilitating and maintaining 
corrupt exchanges. The significant contributions to the theory are outlined in the following 
sections.  
Contributions to Understanding the Factors that Influence an Officer to Engage in 
Corruption 
 
Rotten Apple, Rotten Barrel and Rotten Orchard Theories 
As noted in several places throughout this thesis, the findings provide support for several 
theoretical constructs. Specifically, the findings provide key insights into the application of the 
rotten apple and rotten barrel theories (Punch, 2003). The results of the study provide support 
to the idea that the bad apple theory alone cannot explain police corruption. As the findings 
highlight, structural/institutional properties, such as the influence of fellow officers and the 
subculture of the police organisation, appear to have more influence on an officer’s decision to 
first participate and then to continue to participate in corruption. These findings provide support 
for Punch’s (2003) notion that corrupt police operate as a rotten barrel, where corrupt officers 
collaborate with one another to achieve particular outcomes. More broadly, they provide 
support to the notion that corruption involves actions that are embedded in an ongoing network 
of interpersonal relations (Granovetter, 1985). Moreover, it is these interpersonal relations that 
influence officers to participate in corrupt actions.  
Although the findings of this thesis provide insight into the application of Punch’s (2003) rotten 
barrel theory they did not clearly provide support for the rotten orchard theory, which states 
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that corruption is systemic through the whole police organisation. One reason for this finding 
could be due to the restrictions and boundaries of the investigation into NSW detectives. As 
the inquiry focused only on specific detectives in Manly it is unclear whether the corruption 
was more widespread and embedded across the whole police organisation. For this reason, 
there was no evidence to suggest that corruption was systemic and across all police in NSW. 
However, the findings did reveal an embedded network within the wider police organisation, 
which implies that there could be more networks in other geographic jurisdictions that have 
similar networks embedded. On the whole, these findings add to the police corruption literature 
by providing support for the rotten barrel theory and for finding support that the rotten apple 
theory is no longer viable. They also provide insights into the application and practicality of 
some of these theories.  
Social Learning Theories and the Slippery Slope Theory 
In addition to Punch’s (2003) notions of rotten apples, barrels and orchards to explain police 
corruption, the findings also provide support for more general and underpinning theories, such 
as social learning theory, that can be used to explain how the ‘barrel’ is essentially groomed or 
nurtured. This gives a more nuanced understanding as it drills down to the next level to get at 
the actuality of what they do and how the network facilitates these corrupt behaviours. As 
previously outlined in the literature review, social learning theory (Akers, 1979; Bandura, 
1977) proposes that individuals are more likely to begin and continue to engage in deviant or 
criminal behaviour when they are influenced by observing this type of behaviour in others. As 
Chapter Six clearly demonstrated, one of the main reasons why officers participated in corrupt 
activities was because they were influenced by fellow officers. This finding provides additional 
support to the view that corruption is a learned process that officers encounter through the 
socialisation process into the corruption network. Furthermore, officers stated that they were 
able to learn from other corrupt officers regarding appropriate behaviour and group norms and 
learn techniques to cover up their corrupt activities. This pro-corruption learning provided 
officers with the necessary tools and supports to first engage and continue to take part in corrupt 
activities while remaining safe from detection. The results demonstrate that corruption was a 
process whereby officers developed understandings and skills that would allow corruption to 
flourish among network members. These findings therefore provide empirical support to the 
notion that social learning theories can be applied to an officer’s pathway to corruption.  
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In addition to finding that officers learn how to become corrupt through repeated exposure and 
interaction with other corrupt officers, the findings also demonstrate that a police officer’s path 
to corruption was incremental and occurred through a number of learning stages which 
ultimately resulted in corrupt behaviour. This finding suggests that officers were not 
immediately corrupt, but rather learnt how to be corrupt through learning, observing and being 
mentored by fellow corrupt officers. These gradual stages to corruption mirror the slippery 
slope theory, which suggests that corruption occurs on a continuum of graft stages, starting 
from the acceptance of gratuities, to the acceptance of bribes, to involvement in narcotics 
(Sherman, 1985). However, there was no direct evidence to suggest that officers who started 
their corruption careers through participation in small corruption (such as the acceptance of 
gratuities), led them down a slippery slope to participate in more-serious corruption (such as 
drug trafficking or protection or accepting bribes in exchange for protection).  
The findings also revealed that officers would engage and maintain consistent involvement in 
a particular type of corruption act, such as verballing or opportunistic theft. This suggests that 
officers would engage in these types of corrupt behaviours because they were given the 
opportunity to do so, rather than building on past corruption events to prepare them for more-
serious corruption. In other words, the nature or severity of the corruption did not increase as 
officers became more entrenched in the corruption network, thus demonstrating that officers 
did not go down a slippery slope to serious corruption. Opportunity, in this case, appears to be 
the most significant factor in determining whether an officer will act corruptly or not. It 
provides support to Burt’s (2005) notion that cumulative build is not only fuelled by people 
coming to know each other and but is also powered by whether “a specific proposal is 
something the other person is especially likely to push to fruition” (p.99). Overall, this adds to 
the literature by providing evidence that corrupt officers do not necessarily go down a slippery 
slope, but instead participate in corruption because they were given the opportunity to do so.  
Contributions to the Understanding of Trust and Trustworthiness in Police Corruption 
Networks 
 
An Officer’s Trustworthiness is Grounded in Predictability and Can Be Transferable 
Similar to the learning stages an officer experiences on their pathway to corruption, they also 
experience a similar pathway to assessing a fellow officer’s trustworthiness. The findings 
suggest that trust is a learning process that is built over time and is reinforced by positive 
outcomes. More specifically, the findings indicate that trust was grounded in the predictability 
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of another officer’s behaviour. As the findings in Chapter Nine outlined, officers determined a 
fellow officer’s trustworthiness through personal experience, reputation and trusted third party 
affirmation. As the results highlight, if no previous direct experience occurred between two 
officers there was a reliance on obtaining information from trusted third parties. In other words, 
corrupt officers would vouch for and assure fellow officers regarding the trustworthiness of the 
officer in question. Trust in this manner was transferred to members of the network through a 
third party. The transferability of trust allowed the corruption network to expand, allowing new 
officers to participate. As Erickson (1981) outlines, when secrecy is a necessary condition, 
whereby risk is a fundamental factor, social tie strength, trust and personal vouching all 
increase in importance. 
This finding also supports Shapiro et al.’s (1992) and McAllister’s (1995) concepts that trust 
is knowledge-based (cognitive-based). As highlighted in the literature review in Chapter Three, 
this type of trust develops through interactions over time that allow individuals to develop an 
expectancy that the other party will behave in a particular manner because of consistent past 
encounters (Rotter, 1971). This level of trust is grounded in the other person’s predictability 
and occurs when an individual acquires enough information about others to understand them 
and accurately predict their likely behaviour (Shapiro et al., 1992). By using empirical evidence 
from Operation Florida, this study revealed that police corruption networks operate in a 
network of trust. This finding provides crucial insights into the role of trust in these networks 
and adds to knowledge on trust in these networks. It also provides a base for comparison with 
future studies investigating the types of trust uncovered in police corruption networks. 
Contributions to Understanding the Structural and Operational Properties of Police 
Corruption Networks  
The dynamic nature of criminal networks in general have gained momentum in the literature 
over the past decade. However, few studies have empirically investigated criminal networks 
over time. Even more so, there are no studies to date that have investigated the dynamic nature 
of police corruption networks. Being the first study of its kind, this research provides critical 
insights into the structural changes of the Manly division network over the three decades during 
which it operated, as revealed by corrupt officers in their testimonies. 
As the thesis highlighted in Chapter Seven, the findings demonstrate that the structure of the 
network adjusted from 5 to 22 active members and from 6 to 25 corruption events, while 
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density ranged from 0.49 to 0.82 and degree centrality from 0.16 to 0.51. These structural 
changes show that the network was responsive to the activities of the corruption network’s 
members. The findings also demonstrate that the activity level of some members fluctuated 
depending on the number of opportunities presented to them. These opportunities therefore 
impacted on where officers were positioned in a network at a given time. As the findings 
revealed, there was movement regarding periphery officers, while the officers positioned at the 
core of the network appeared more constant. This further supports the idea that corrupt police 
operate in a network structure because it provides “networks with a host of advantages 
including adaptability, resilience, a capability for rapid innovation and learning, and wide-scale 
recruitment” (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones, 2008, p. 8). It also lends support to Williams’ 
(2001c) notion that membership among networks can be adaptable, whereby individuals join 
and leave based on particular needs or can arise from particular opportunities. In this sense, 
individuals can be recruited into corruption networks based on the resources of knowledge that 
they hold. Consequently, the network may modify their structure and membership to gain 
access to necessary resources, skills and knowledge so that the network’s operations remain 
hidden. Also, the findings reveal that some officers were more active than other network 
members. The level of a member’s activity impacted their position in the network, where more-
active members appeared to be positioned at or close to the core of the network, while less-
active members were positioned on the periphery of the network. This suggests that an officer’s 
position in the network was not static, but instead depended on their involvement based on the 
opportunities that were presented.   
These findings also lend support to previous research on other criminal networks, such Tenti 
and Morselli’s (2014) work on the ‘Ndrangheta group involved in illegal drug smuggling and 
Agreste et al.’s (2016) work on the Sicilian Mafia in Italy. Both of these studies found that the 
more-central positions in the network were not necessarily associated with high-status 
individuals. This is also supported by studies that have investigated the dynamic nature of 
criminal networks. For example, Bright and Delany’s (2013) study into methamphetamine drug 
networks found that individuals changed their roles based on the network’s needs. As Bright 
et al. (2014) also found, key players in a network were not restricted to their structural positions, 
but instead were key players because they had particular skills or attributes that were valuable 
to the network.  
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Also, as demonstrated through the analyses of the network over four time frames, the findings 
of the study reveal that shifts and changes in the network were impacted by the external context 
in which they were operating in. For example, the network was at its largest and most active 
between 1991 and 1994. During this time a number of officers outlined that there were many 
staff shortages which resulted in a large cross-over of jobs (e.g. traffic officers helping out the 
drug unit). This testimony suggests that the increase in new officers also brought an increase 
in new resources and opportunities to the network. This helps explain why the network grew 
and flourished during this time as a result of external conditions. These findings support similar 
results from Malm and Bichler’s (2011) study into the small arms trade. In their study, they 
also found that external forces, such as weapon availability and market infrastructure, were the 
driving force behind the changes in the network. Overall, the similarities between the current 
study and existing studies not only add to the knowledge and understanding of the structure of 
police corruption networks but also add to the knowledge of other criminal contexts. 
Collectively, these findings will help the development of new theoretical models that can be 
applied across multiple criminal contexts.  
Implications for Practice 
The overarching finding of this study demonstrates that corrupt police operate in a network 
structure and, thus, has important implications for practice. One implication is that if an 
individual police officer is identified as being corrupt the investigator also needs to consider 
the officer's social network to find out whether fellow officers are also participating in corrupt 
practices. As the findings and theory outline, more often than not, officers engage in corrupt 
activities with other officers, rather than it being an individual practice (Lauchs et al., 2012). 
In addition to identifying the social networks of these officers, the possible opportunities that 
can arise from the connections also need to be considered; it is through these connections that 
opportunities to participate in corrupt practices can emerge.  
The second implication for practice is that SNA is an effective analytical tool that can be used 
to identify the connections between corrupt officers, which can then be used to build the overall 
network. As the findings in Chapter Seven demonstrate, together these connections between 
officers form a broader picture of the overall structure of the network. From this information 
police administrators are able to identify officers at the core of the network as well as officers 
at the periphery of the network. As previous research (Burt, 2005; Morselli & Roy, 2008) has 
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highlighted, being located at the core of the network does not necessarily mean that these 
individuals occupy the most powerful positions. Research has found that individuals who 
occupy broker positions (e.g. connecting two individuals or groups together who would 
otherwise be disconnected) can be just as powerful, if not more powerful than, individuals 
positioned at the centre of the network. Although the findings of the current study did not reveal 
that the network utilised brokers they did establish that the network could be broken down into 
three layers: 1) officers positioned at the core of the network (e.g. at the centre of the network), 
2) officers positioned in an “outer core” (meaning these officers still held central positions but 
were not included in the “inner core”), and 3) officers positioned on the periphery of the 
network. Identifying these network layers can provide crucial insights for police administrators 
when developing disruptive and anti-corruption strategies. For example, the network may be 
resilient if members of the inner core are removed from the network because the officers 
positioned at the outer core may still be able to function.  
The third implication for practice reflects the findings concerning the structural (institutional) 
factors influencing officers to engage in and continue to participate in corrupt practices. As the 
findings in Chapter Six highlight, the most common reason officers outlined for taking part in 
corruption was because fellow officers influenced them. These officers’ behaviour was 
particularly shaped by senior officers who were active members of the network or supported 
and turned a blind eye to the corruption. This created a pro-corruption subculture that was 
dominated by strong codes, norms and unwritten rules that allowed corrupt practices to grow 
and flourish without the resistance of outside influences. As similar findings have been found 
in previous inquiries (see Fitzgerald, 1987; Wood, 1995; Kennedy, 2004), this demonstrates 
that there is a distinctive pattern occurring among corrupt police officers in Australia. This 
pattern suggests that intervention and prevention strategies currently in place are essentially 
ineffective, as new cases of police corruption continue to appear. Police administrators will 
need to revisit these strategies as a consequence of the findings of this study, and similar 
findings across previous inquiries in Australia. These strategies will also need to be constantly 
revisited and updated based on more current inquiries.  
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Directions for Future Research 
Repeating the Methodology in Other Jurisdictions in Australia 
As a first step, the methodology use in this study can be repeated using other data on police 
corruption in Australia, namely the Fitzgerald (1987), Wood (1995) and Kennedy (2002) 
inquiries, and other smaller available investigations into police corruption. Once the data have 
been analysed using SNA, the key network measures and network maps could be used to map 
out a longitudinal study of police corruption across states within Australia. Findings from a 
longitudinal study incorporating multiple sources of information would make a significant 
contribution to understanding the similarities and differences of police corruption networks 
across states. It would also make significant contributions to understanding the dynamic nature 
of these networks and how they change over time. To further enhance these longitudinal studies 
a comprehensive investigation into key environmental influences (such as changes in policy, 
Royal Commissions or restructuring in the police organisation) in which these corruption 
networks operate in can provide a further level of analysis to uncover why these networks 
change over time. Insights into the parallels between structure, operations, culture and 
individuals within these organisations will help to understand how corruption can flourish 
within a bright network. It will also provide law enforcement agencies with crucial information 
that can be used to detect the development and growth of these networks, as well as identifying 
disruptive strategies to stop them from thriving and succeeding. 
Replicating the network methodology and extending the findings on trust in these networks 
would also add to the literature by enhancing the understanding of how trust is used in these 
networks to facilitate the collaboration between corrupt police officers. Further empirical 
evidence is needed to see whether the findings in this study are similar or different to other 
cases of police corruption.  
Applying the Methodology to a Broader Context 
As a second step, the methodology used in this study can be replicated using data outside of 
Australia. As there appears to be more available data in the US, researchers could utilise other 
sources of data (such as the Knapp and Mollen Commissions) to uncover patterns of similarity 
or patterns of difference between studies that use Australian data. Additionally, the 
methodology utilised in this research can be replicated to broader corruption cases. In 
particular, this research approach can be applied to investigate other public officers who have 
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autonomy and significant decision-making powers. These careers could include politicians, 
government officers in the licensing or housing departments or any other department that can 
affect the livelihood or basic standards of members of society. Replicating the methodology 
used in this study in other contexts will further expand the knowledge regarding corruption 
networks and can be used to see if there are any variations or likenesses between police 
corruption networks and other corruption networks that involve public officials in significant 
government positions.  
Studying Violent Cultures in Addition to Corrupt Cultures 
Consistent with previous studies on police corruption (see Kappeler et al., 1998; Lauchs et al., 
2011; Punch, 2000, 2009), the current study found that corrupt police officers operated within 
a culture supported by unwritten rules and norms that guided their behaviour. For example, one 
unwritten rule and norm was to follow the code of silence that prohibited disclosing deviant 
behaviour by fellow officers. This rule was reinforced by the Brotherhood, which was the 
collective formation of the corrupt officers and was used as a protective measure to safeguard 
their fellow corrupt officers from any external threats of prosecution. Although these cultural 
attributes are cited in the police corruption literature and have been found in the current study, 
it is unclear whether these cultural norms are consistent and reflective of other types of police 
culture. In particular, as the current study focused on specific types of corruption within certain 
units (such as the drug unit and AHU), there still remains a gap in understanding as to whether 
these specific cultural attributes are also found in other police cultures. To extend the findings 
even further, a future study could investigate violent police culture, such as units of officers 
that use excessive use of force, to see whether these groups of officers exhibit and follow the 
same cultural norms. This information would not only extend the current knowledge on the 
culture in which corrupt police operate in, but it would also help with extending existing 
theoretical frameworks which could then be used as an effective basis for creating strategies to 
minimise or disrupt cultural norms that allow corrupt officers to operate undetected.   
Comparison of Bright and Dark Network Characteristics 
As evident in the literature review and findings of this current study, there are several 
characteristics of dark networks (e.g. police corruption networks) that allow these networks to 
operate, such as the overall network structure, size, path distance and centrality of key players. 
Within the broader network literature, bright networks (e.g. police organisations) also have 
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similar characteristics that aid in the network’s operation and efficiency. An avenue for future 
research is the investigation of both the network characteristics that allow these police 
corruption networks to operate, as well as the network characteristics of the wider police 
organisation. This would provide valuable insights into the transferability of these 
characteristics from dark to bright networks. In particular, it would be valuable to uncover the 
key characteristics that make dark networks resilient and explore whether these attributes can 
be transferred to bright networks, allowing these networks to be more resilient and robust. The 
cross-comparison will not only extend the existing knowledge on the resilience of dark 
networks but it will also help bridge the gap between the dark and bright network literature. 
Overall Concluding Remarks 
This thesis sought to build upon recent theoretical and empirical work to uncover the key 
characteristics and dynamic nature of police corruption networks. Specifically, as highlighted 
in the introduction to this thesis, the aim was to investigate the structure and operational 
features of these networks, the role trust played in facilitating collaboration between officers 
and the factors that influenced officers’ engagement in corruption. In line with previous studies, 
evidence emerged that individual characteristics were less important, in part because 
corruption, when uncovered, was widespread across various departments and included a 
number of individuals in the police organisation (Lauchs et al., 2012; Lauchs, Keast, & 
Yousefpour, 2011; Perry, 2001; Porter & Warrender, 2009; Punch, 2003; Tiffen, 2004). This 
further supports Punch’s (2003) rotten barrel theory and Granovetter’s (1985) notion that 
corruption involves actions that are embedded in an ongoing network of personal relations.  
Further evidence presented demonstrated that officers learnt how to become corrupt through 
repeated exposure and interaction with other corrupt officers. An officer's path to corruption 
was incremental and occurred through a number of learning stages, which provides support to 
the slippery slope theory and, more broadly, to social learning theories. Similar to the learning 
stages an officer experienced on their way to corruption, they also experienced a similar 
pathway to assessing a fellow officer’s trustworthiness. As highlighted in Chapter Nine, 
officers determined a fellow officer’s trustworthiness through personal experience, reputation 
or a trusted third party. Only officers who were trustworthy or appeared to be trustworthy were 
members of the corruption network, thus suggesting that trust played a large role in the 
membership and functioning of the network. The application of SNA also proved to be a 
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valuable analytical tool to undercover the structure of the police corruption network. Using the 
network measures and network maps, this thesis was able to uncover a network that was dense 
and cohesive, and which operated around specific officers. It also found that the network was 
dynamic and shifted in structure as a result of the external conditions in which it operated,  
providing critical insights that will help shape the knowledge and existing literature on police 
corruption networks. 
Overall, the analyses presented in this thesis have implications for the development of 
theoretical models of how officers engage in corruption and the factors that aid in their 
operations. Additionally, the research herein represents the first empirical investigation of the 
relationships between corrupt police, network structures, operations, trustworthiness and 
factors of influence. With preliminary results now recorded, researchers should build on these 
promising findings to investigate whether these results generalise to other police corruption 
networks across Australia and internationally. Ultimately, the results of this thesis suggest that 
the structural properties of police corruption networks and nature of trust in these networks are 
critical to understanding the nature of how these networks operate and should be incorporated 
into future studies examining corruption in network settings.  
 
 
262 
 
Appendix 
263 
 
Appendix A: Northern Beaches Segment Summary of Affected Actors 
Table A1: Northern Beaches Segment 
Actors 
Involved 
Position 
& Year  
Summary of Allegations/Criminal Prosecution Outcome of Trial 
Benbow, 
Luke 
Michael 
(Drug 
Dealer) 
N/A  Benbow is an affected person because he is the subject of the 
substantial allegation that he supplied prohibited drugs 
(Griffin, 2004, p.75) 
 Following the Commission’s hearing Benbow 
pleaded guilty to two counts of supplying cannabis 
pursuant to subsection 25(1) of the Drug Misuse 
and Trafficking Act 1985. A further charge of 
supply cannabis pursuant to subsection 25(1) of the 
Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 and two 
counts of goods in custody were taken into account 
on sentencing. He was sentenced on 21 March 2002 
and received a two year suspended sentence. The 
Commission is of the opinion that consideration 
should not be given to the prosecution of Benbow 
for any further criminal offences arising from 
Operation Florida (Griffin, 2004, p.75). 
Caccamo, 
Vincent 
(Drug 
Dealer) 
N/A  Caccamo is an affected person because he was the subject of 
the substantial allegation that he supplied prohibited drugs 
(Griffin, 2004, p.75) 
 Following the Commission’s hearing Caccamo 
was charged with a number of drug related 
offences and eventually pleaded guilty to two 
counts of supplying heroin pursuant to 
subsection 25(2) of the Drug Misuse and 
Trafficking Act 1985 and one charge of 
supplying cannabis pursuant to subsection 
25(1) of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 
1985. Three further charges were taken into 
account on sentencing: two charges of supplying 
heroin pursuant to subsection 25(1) of the Drug 
Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 and a charge 
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of receiving stolen property pursuant to section 
188 of the Crimes Act 1900. He was sentenced 
on 30 May 2002 to eight year’s imprisonment 
with a non-parole period of five years. Caccamo 
received a significant discount on his sentence for 
the assistance he provided. The Judge indicated 
that but for his assistance he would have received 
15 years’ imprisonment. The Commission is of 
the opinion that consideration should not be 
given to the prosecution of Caccamo for any 
further criminal offences arising from 
Operation Florida (Griffin, 2004, p.V) 
Davidson, 
Shaun 
Andrew 
Detective 
Senior 
Constable 
*1991 
The subject of a number of substantial allegations, namely that he: 
 received bribes; 
 was an accessory after the fact knowing Patison had 
committed the serious indictable offence of stealing cash; 
 received stolen property i.e. cash; and 
 committed certain actions and omissions with the intention of 
perverting the course of justice (Griffin, 2004). 
 
The Commission considers that Davidson engaged 
in police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the 
Act. Charged with four counts of accepting bribes 
pursuant to section 200(1) of the Police Act 1990 
(Griffin, 2004, p.76).  
 Davidson pleaded guilty on all counts and was 
sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment concurrent 
on each, with a non-parole period of 12 months. 
He appealed to the District Court, which 
confirmed the sentence on 3 October 2002, but 
reduced the non-parole period to nine months. On 
27 May 2002 the Supreme Court ordered that 
Davidson pay the Treasurer the sum of $1,100. 
The money was paid on 30 May 2002. He 
resigned on 14 January 2002 (Griffin, 2004, p. iii). 
Hill, David 
Marshall 
Sergeant 
*1977 
The subject of a number of substantial allegations, namely that he: 
 received a bribe; 
The Commission considers that Hill engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act. 
Charged with receiving a corrupt reward pursuant 
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 was an accessory after the fact knowing that Patison had 
committed the serious indictable offence of stealing $6,000 
cash; and received stolen property, i.e. cash (Griffin, 2004). 
 
to section 249B of the Crimes Act 1900 (Griffin, 
2004, p.78). 
 Hill pleaded not guilty but was convicted and on 3 
April 2003 was sentenced to eight months’ 
imprisonment with a non-parole period of six 
months. Hill was suspended with pay from NSW 
Police on 8 October 2001 and without pay on 20 
December 2001. He resigned on 25 March 
2002(Griffin, 2004, p. iii) 
Jasper, 
Matthew 
John 
Detective 
Senior 
Constable 
*1989 
The subject of a number of substantial allegations, namely that he: 
 received stolen property, both cash and goods; 
 was an accessory before and after the fact knowing that 
serious indictable offences had been committed; 
 committed certain actions and omissions with the intention to 
pervert 
 the course of justice; 
 solicited and received bribes;  
 with Patison conspired to supply prohibited drugs; 
 neglected his duty as a police officer; 
 corruptly solicited and received cash; 
 stole cash and property including during the execution of 
search warrants; 
 hindered the investigation of and discovery of evidence 
concerning the serious indictable offences of supply prohibited 
drugs and break enter and steal; 
 concealed the commission of the serious indictable offences of 
supply prohibited drugs and break enter and steal; 
 solicited / accepted a benefit for himself and others so as to 
conceal the commission of the serious indictable offences of 
supply prohibited drug and break enter and steal; 
 concealed evidence with intent to mislead a judicial tribunal; 
 made a false official instrument (the search warrants 
containing false information); 
The Commission considers that Jasper engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act 
(p. 79). Charged and pleaded guilty to the 
following on indictment: 
• five counts of perverting the course of justice 
pursuant to section 319 of the Crimes Act 
1900; 
• four counts of receiving / giving corrupt 
rewards pursuant to section 249B of the 
Crimes Act 1900; 
• three counts of receiving a bribe pursuant to 
section 200(1) of the Police Act 1990; and 
• one count of being an accessory before the 
fact to a break, enter and steal (Griffin, 2004, 
p. iii). 
 Jasper received a sentence of seven years’ 
imprisonment with a non-parole period of five 
years. Jasper was tried separately in relation to 
one charge of permitting the supply of a 
prohibited drug (heroin) pursuant to subsection 
25(1) of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 
1985. He pleaded guilty and on 11 March 2004 
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 made a false instrument, i.e. police property receipt; and  
 conspired with R1 to commit the serious indictable offence of 
break enter and steal (Griffin, 2004). 
 
was sentenced in the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales to five years’ imprisonment with a 
non-parole period of three years. The sentence 
will be served concurrently with his earlier 
sentence so will not increase Jasper’s overall time 
in gaol. Jasper was suspended from NSW Police 
on 8 October 2001 and resigned on 23 October 
2001. In October 2001 the Commission 
commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of 
New South Wales under the Criminal Assets 
Recovery Act 1990 against Jasper. On 15 April 
2002 the Supreme Court ordered that Jasper pay 
the Treasurer the sum of $39,517. The money was 
paid on 10 August 2002 (Griffin, 2004, p. iv). 
Messenger, 
Mark 
William 
Detective 
Sergeant 
*1976 
The subject of a number of substantial allegations, namely that he: 
 corruptly received cash; 
 received stolen property; 
 was an accessory after the fact knowing that M5 had 
committed serious indictable offences; 
 solicited and received bribes; 
 neglected his duty as a police officer; 
 tampered with evidence with the intention to mislead a judicial 
tribunal 
 made a false official instrument; 
 committed certain actions with the intention of perverting the 
course of justice;  
 obtained unauthorised access to data held in a computer; and 
 stole cash (Griffin, 2004). 
 
The Commission considers that Messenger 
engaged in police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) 
of the Act. Charged on 22 February 2002 with four 
counts of receiving corrupt rewards pursuant to 
section 249B of the Crimes Act 1900, and one 
count of giving false or misleading evidence 
pursuant to section 107 of the Police Integrity 
Commission Act 1996 (the Act) (Griffin, 2004, 
p.80-81) 
• He pleaded guilty and was sentenced on 25 
October 2002 to a total of five years and two 
months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 
three years and two months. Messenger was 
suspended with pay from NSW Police on 8 
October 2001, suspended without pay on 20 
December 2001 and resigned on 18 September 
2002. In August 2002 the Commission 
commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of 
267 
 
New South Wales under the Criminal Assets 
Recovery Act 1990 against Messenger. On 19 
August 2002 the Supreme Court ordered that 
Messenger pay the Treasurer the sum of $1,500. 
The money was paid on 20 August 2002 (Griffin, 
2004, p. iv) 
Patison, 
David 
Phillip 
Detective 
Senior 
Constable  
*1979 
The subject of a number of substantial allegations, namely that he: 
 stole cash during the execution of search warrants; 
 corruptly received / solicited cash from suspected drug dealers 
and others; 
 hindered the investigation, and the discovery, of evidence 
concerning the commission of the serious indictable offences 
of supply prohibited drug and break enter and steal; 
 solicited / accepted a benefit for himself and others so as to 
conceal the commission of the serious indictable offence of 
supply prohibited drug; 
 concealed evidence with intent to mislead a judicial tribunal; 
 was an accessory before and after the fact knowing that the 
serious indictable offences of supply prohibited drug, break 
enter and steal and steal cash had been committed; 
 committed certain actions and omissions with the intention to 
pervert 
 the course of justice; 
 solicited, received and offered bribes; 
 conspired to pervert the course of justice to obtain a refund of 
cash seized by police; 
 with Jasper, conspired to supply a prohibited drug; 
 demanded cash with menaces and intent to steal; 
 received stolen property and cash; 
 made a false official instrument (the search warrants 
containing false information); and 
 conspired to commit the serious indictable offence of break 
enter and steal (Griffin, 2004). 
The Commission considers that Messenger 
engaged in police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) 
of the Act. Charged and pleaded guilty to ten 
offences on indictment (Griffin, 2004, p.80-81). 
• three counts of perverting the course of justice 
pursuant to section 319 of the Crimes Act 1900; 
• two counts of receiving corrupt rewards pursuant 
to section 249B of the Crimes Act 1900; 
• one count of permitting the supply of a prohibited 
drug (heroin) pursuant to section 25(1) of the 
Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985; 
• three counts of receiving a bribe pursuant to 
section 200(1) of the Police Act 1990; and 
• one count of knowingly take part in the supply of 
a prohibited drug (cannabis) pursuant to section 
25(1) of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 
1985 (Griffin, 2004, p. iv) 
• Patison was sentenced in the Supreme Court of 
New South Wales on 2 December 2002 to seven 
year’s imprisonment with a non-parole period of 
five years. Patison was suspended from NSW 
Police on 8 October 2001 and resigned on 8 
February 2002. In October 2001 the Commission 
commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of 
New South Wales under the Criminal Assets 
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 Recovery Act 1990 against Patison. On 6 May 
2002 the Supreme Court ordered that Patison pay 
the Treasurer the sum of $58,675. The money was 
paid on 1 August 2002 (Griffin, 2004, p. v). 
Peattie, 
Raymond 
John 
Detective 
Sergeant 
*1976 
The subject of a number of substantial allegations, namely that he: 
 received stolen property; 
 committed certain actions and or omissions with the intention 
to pervert the course of justice; 
 solicited and received bribes; 
 stole cash; 
 corruptly solicited and received cash; 
 hindered the investigation and discovery of evidence 
concerning the serious indictable offence of supply prohibited 
drug; 
 concealed the commission of the serious indictable offence of 
supply prohibited drug; 
 solicited / accepted a benefit for himself and others so as to 
conceal the commission of the serious indictable offence of 
supply prohibited drug;  
 concealed evidence with intent to mislead a judicial tribunal 
(Griffin, 2004). 
 
The Commission considers that Peattie engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act 
(p. 83). Charged with four counts of accepting 
bribes pursuant to subsection 200(1) of the Police 
Act 1990. 
• He pleaded guilty and on 3 May 2002 was 
sentenced to three years and two months’ 
imprisonment with a non-parole period of one 
year. Significant issues of assistance and 
contrition were taken into account on sentence. 
Peattie was suspended from NSW Police on 8 
October 2001 and resigned on 31 October 2001. 
In May 2002 the Commission commenced 
proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales under the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 
1990 against Peattie. On 27 May 2002 the 
Supreme Court ordered that Peattie pay the 
Treasurer the sum of $2,500. The money was paid 
on 8 April 2003(Griffin, 2004, p. v). 
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Appendix B: Guns Segment Summary of Affected Actors 
Table B1: Guns Segment 
Police 
Involved 
Position 
& Year 
Summary of Allegations/Criminal Prosecution Outcome of Trial 
Dowding, 
Kim 
Sergeant 
*1978 
The subject of the substantial allegations that: 
 he was aware of and / or participated in the collection and 
retention of a stash of weapons at the offices of MCSN at 
Chatswood (“the stash”); 
 he participated in the use of weapons and other items to load 
and / or verbal alleged offenders, (“the loads”); and 
  he, together with M5 dumped of a stash of weapons into the 
Hawkesbury River, (“the dump”). 
 
Evidence supports consideration being given to prosecute on the 
following offences: 
 Conspiracy to commit an act intending to pervert the course of 
justice (sections 319 and 342, Crimes Act 1900) 
 Commit certain actions and / or omissions with the intention 
to pervert the course of justice (section 319, Crimes Act 1900) 
 Fabricate / knowingly make use of false evidence (section 
317, Crimes Act 1900) 
 Perjury with intent to procure conviction (section 328, Crimes 
Act 1900) 
 Make false instrument (subsection 300(1), Crimes Act 1900) 
 Use false instrument (subsection 300(2), Crimes Act 1900) 
 Hawkesbury River Escapee – Arrest and Charging of A2 
 Conspiracy to commit an act intending to pervert the course of 
justice (sections 319 and 342, Crimes Act 1900) 
 Commit certain actions and / or omissions with the intention 
to pervert the course of justice (section 319, Crimes Act 1900) 
The Commission considers that Dowding engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act. 
• Dowding was a serving officer at the time he gave 
evidence. Following the public hearings in this 
segment and prior to the completion of this Report, 
NSW Police investigated this matter. A 
recommendation was made that consideration be 
given to taking action against Dowding pursuant 
to section 181D of the Police Act 1990. However, 
prior to this process commencing Dowding was 
granted medical discharge. He left NSW Police in 
July 2003. Accordingly, the question of taking 
action pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of 
the Act does not arise (Griffin, 2004, p. 135). 
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 Fabricate / knowingly make use of false evidence (section 
317, Crimes Act 1900) 
 Perjury with intent to procure conviction (section 328, Crimes 
Act 1900) 
 Make false instrument (subsection 300(1), Crimes Act 1900) 
 Use false instrument (subsection 300(2), Crimes Act 1900) 
(p.135) 
Ehsman, 
Peter 
Detective 
Senior 
Constable 
*1973 
The subject of the substantial allegation that he participated in the 
load and related verbal of an offender, A2. 
 
Evidence supports consideration being given to prosecute on the 
following offences: 
 Conspiracy to commit an act intending to pervert the course of 
justice (sections 319 and 342, Crimes Act 1900) 
 Commit certain actions and / or omissions with the intention 
to pervert the course of justice (section 319, Crimes Act 1900) 
 Fabricate / knowingly make use of false evidence (section 
317, Crimes Act 1900) 
 Perjury with intent to procure conviction (section 328, Crimes 
Act 1900) 
 Make false instrument (subsection 300(1), Crimes Act 1900) 
 Use false instrument (subsection 300(2), Crimes Act 1900) 
(Griffin, 2004, p. 136) 
• The Commission considers that Ehsman engaged 
in police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the 
Act. 
• Following the public hearings in this segment, NSW 
Police gave consideration to the preparation of a 
brief of evidence against Ehsman in relation to the 
Hawkesbury River Escapee incident. A decision 
was made to take no further action. The reasons for 
this decision included the age of the matter, the lack 
of corroborating evidence, the facts that the victim 
is deceased and Ehsman is no longer a serving 
officer, and the discrepancies in the versions of the 
incident given by the participants. In the 
circumstances the Commission is of the opinion that 
further consideration should not be given to the 
prosecution of Ehsman for any criminal offences. 
Ehsman is no longer a serving police officer. 
Accordingly, the question of taking action pursuant 
to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act does not 
arise (Griffin, 2004, p. 136) 
F7 Detective 
Senior 
Constable 
The subject of the substantial allegations that: 
 he participated in the collection and retention of a stash of 
weapons at the offices of MCSN at Chatswood, (“the stash”); 
 he participated in the use of weapons and other items to load 
and / or verbal alleged offenders, (“the loads”); and 
The Commission considers that F7 engaged in police 
misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act. 
• Following the public hearings in this segment, NSW 
Police gave consideration to the preparation of a 
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*1980  he was aware of the dumping of a stash of weapons into the 
Hawkesbury River by former and current officers of NSW 
Police, (“the dump”) (Griffin, 2004). 
 
Evidence supports consideration being given to prosecute on the 
following offences: 
 Conspiracy to commit an act intending to pervert the course of 
justice (sections 319 and 342, Crimes Act 1900) 
 Commit certain actions and / or omissions with the intention 
to pervert the course of justice (section 319, Crimes Act 1900) 
 Fabricate / knowingly make use of false evidence (section 
317, Crimes Act 1900)  
 Perjury with intent to procure conviction (section 328, Crimes 
Act 1900)  
 Make false instrument (subsection 300(1), Crimes Act 1900) 
 Use false instrument (subsection 300(2), Crimes Act 1900) 
(Griffin, 20004, p. 137) 
brief of evidence against F7 in relation to the 
Hawkesbury River Escapee incident. A decision 
was made to take no further action. The reasons for 
this decision included the age of the matter, the lack 
of corroborating evidence, the facts that the victim 
is deceased and F7 is no longer a serving officer, 
and the discrepancies in the versions of the incident 
given by the participants. In the circumstances the 
Commission is of the opinion that further 
consideration should not be given to the 
prosecution of F7 for any criminal offences. F7 is 
no longer a serving police officer. Accordingly, the 
question of taking action pursuant to subsections 
97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act does not arise (Griffin, 
2004, p. 138). 
Kendall, 
Glenn 
Wayne 
Senior 
Sergeant 
*1974 
The subject of the substantial allegation that: 
 he participated in the loading and verballing of P2 following 
his arrest in August 1990. 
 
Evidence supports consideration being given to the prosecution of 
Kendall for the following offences: 
 Conspiracy to commit an act intending to pervert the course of 
justice (sections 319 and 342, Crimes Act 1900) 
 Commit certain actions and / or omissions with the intention 
to pervert the course of justice (section 319, Crimes Act 1900) 
 Fabricate / knowingly make use of false evidence (section 
317, Crimes Act 1900) 
 Perjury with intent to procure conviction (section 328, Crimes 
Act 1900) 
 Make false instrument (subsection 300(1), Crimes Act 1900) 
 Use false instrument (subsection 300(2), Crimes Act 1900) 
(Griffin, 2004, p. 138-139). 
The Commission considers that Kendall engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act. 
• Following completion of the Commission’s 
hearings in this segment, P2 passed away (in 
September 2003). P2 was not examined on 
Kendall’s behalf at the time he (P2) gave evidence 
at the Commission. There is now no opportunity for 
Kendall to cross-examine P2. NSW Police has given 
consideration to the question of criminal 
prosecution against Kendall and formed the view 
that there is insufficient evidence for a prosecution 
to succeed. In the circumstances the Commission is 
of the opinion that further consideration should 
not be given to the prosecution of Kendall for any 
criminal offences. At the time he gave evidence 
Kendall was a serving officer however he was 
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medically discharged from NSW Police on 7 May 
2004. Accordingly, the question of taking action 
pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act 
does not arise (Griffin, 2004, p. 139). 
King, 
James 
Justin 
Detective 
Sergeant 
*1978 
The subject of the substantial allegations that: 
 he participated in the collection and retention of a stash of 
weapons at the offices of MCSN at Chatswood, (“the stash”); 
 he participated in the use of weapons and other items to load 
and / or verbal alleged offenders, (“the loads”); and 
 he was aware of the dumping of a stash of weapons into the 
Hawkesbury River by former and current officers of NSW 
Police, (“the dump”) (Griffin, 2004, p.139). 
 
The Commission considers that King engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act (p. 
139) 
• The Commission is of the opinion, however, that 
despite considerable 
• suspicion attaching to King’s degree of knowledge 
and participation in the use, and retention, of the 
stash there is insufficient admissible evidence for 
consideration to be given to the prosecution of King 
for any related criminal offence. There is also 
insufficient evidence to substantiate King 
participating in or having specific knowledge of 
loads or verbals. On the admissible evidence, 
therefore, the Commission is of the opinion that 
consideration should not be given for the 
prosecution of King for any criminal offence. 
King is no longer a serving police officer. 
Accordingly, the question of taking 
• action pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of 
the Act does not arise (Griffin, 2004, p. 140). 
M5 Detective 
Senior 
Constable 
*1980 
The subject of the substantial allegations that: 
 he participated in the collection and retention of a stash of 
weapons at the offices of MCSN at Chatswood, (“the stash”); 
 he participated in the use of weapons and other items to load 
and / or verbal alleged offenders, (“the loads”); and 
 together with Dowding dumped of a stash of weapons into the 
Hawkesbury River, (“the dump”) (Griffin, 2004). 
The Commission considers that M5 engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act. 
• The Attorney General has granted M5 has an 
indemnity from prosecution in relation to all 
matters in respect of which he has admitted criminal 
conduct. Therefore, the Commission has not 
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Evidence supports consideration being given to the 
 prosecution of M5 for the following offences: 
 Conspiracy to commit an act intending to pervert the course of 
justice (sections 319 and 342, Crimes Act 1900) 
 Commit certain actions and / or omissions with the intention 
to pervert the course of justice (section 319, Crimes Act 1900) 
 Fabricate / knowingly make use of false evidence (section 
317, Crimes Act 1900) 
 Perjury with intent to procure conviction (section 328, Crimes 
Act 1900) 
 Make false instrument (subsection 300(1), Crimes Act 1900) 
 Use false instrument (subsection 300(2), Crimes Act 1900) 
 Conspiracy to commit an act intending to pervert the course of 
justice (sections 319 and 342, Crimes Act 1900) Commit 
certain actions and / or omissions with the intention to pervert 
the course of justice (section 319, Crimes Act 1900) 
 Fabricate / knowingly make use of false evidence (section 
317, Crimes Act 1900) 
 Perjury with intent to procure conviction (section 328, Crimes 
Act 1900) Make false instrument (subsection 300(1), Crimes 
Act 1900) 
 Use false instrument (subsection 300(2), Crimes Act 1900) 
(Griffin, 2004, p. 140-141). 
expressed an opinion about whether consideration 
should be given to the prosecution of M5 for any of 
the above criminal offences. M5 is no longer a 
serving police officer. Accordingly, the question of 
taking 
• action pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of 
the Act does not arise (Griffin, 2004, p.141) 
N1 Detective 
Senior 
Constable 
*1969 
The subject of the substantial allegations that: 
 he participated in the collection and retention of a stash of 
weapons at the offices of MCSN at Chatswood, (“the stash”); 
 he participated in the use of weapons and other items to load 
and / or verbal alleged offenders, (“the loads”); and 
 he was aware of the dumping of a stash of weapons into the 
Hawkesbury River by former and current officers of NSW 
Police, (“the dump”) (Griffin, 2004, p.141). 
 
The Commission considers that N1 engaged in police 
misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act. (Griffin, 
2004, p. 141). 
• Following the public hearings in this segment, NSW 
Police investigated N1’s involvement in this matter. 
A decision was made to take no further action 
because none of the victims was prepared to provide 
a statement or give evidence in court. Without this 
evidence a prosecution would not succeed. In the 
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Evidence supports consideration being given to the prosecution of 
N1 for the following criminal offences: 
 Conceal serious indictable offence (section 316, Crimes Act 
1900) 
 Pervert the course of justice (section 319, Crimes Act 1900) 
(Griffin, 2004, p. 142). 
circumstances the Commission is of the opinion that 
further consideration should not be given to the 
prosecution of N1 for any criminal offences. N1 
is no longer a serving police officer. Accordingly, 
the question of taking action pursuant to subsections 
97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act does not arise (Griffin, 
2004, p. 142). 
O’Toole, 
Dennis 
Peter 
Inspector 
*1967 
The subject of substantial allegations that: 
 he was aware of and / or participated in the collection and 
retention of a stash of weapons at the offices of MCSN at 
Chatswood, (“the stash”); 
 he participated in the use of weapons and other items to load 
and / or verbal alleged offenders, (“the loads”); and 
 he was aware of the dumping of a stash of weapons into the 
Hawkesbury River by former and current officers of NSW 
Police, (“the dump”) (Griffin, 2004, p.142) 
 
Evidence supports consideration being given to the prosecution of 
O’Toole for the following criminal offences: 
 Conspiracy to commit an act intending to pervert the course of 
justice (section 319 and section 342, Crimes Act 1900) 
 Commit certain actions and / or omissions with the intention 
to pervert the course of justice (section 319, Crimes Act 1900) 
 Fabricate / knowingly make use of false evidence (section 
317, Crimes Act 1900) 
 Conspiracy to commit an act intending to pervert the course of 
justice (section 319 and section 342, Crimes Act 1900) 
 Commit certain actions and / or omissions with the intention 
to pervert the course of justice (section 319, Crimes Act 1900) 
(Griffin, 2004, p. 144). 
The Commission considers that O’Toole engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act. 
(Griffin, 2004, p. 142) 
• Following the public hearings in this segment, NSW 
Police investigated O’Toole’s involvement in this 
matter. A decision was made to take no further 
action because none of the victims was prepared to 
provide a statement or give evidence in court. 
Without this evidence a prosecution would not 
succeed. In the circumstances the Commission is of 
the opinion that further consideration should not 
be given to the prosecution of O’Toole for any 
criminal offences. O’Toole is no longer a serving 
police officer. Accordingly, the question of taking 
action pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of 
the Act does not arise (Griffin, 2004, p. 144). 
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Smith, 
Ronald 
Bruce 
Inspector 
*1967 
Smith is an affected person because he is the subject of the 
substantial allegations that: 
 he was aware of and / or participated in the collection and 
retention of a stash of weapons at the offices of MCSN at 
Chatswood, (“the stash”); 
 he participated in the use of weapons and other items to load 
and / or verbal alleged offenders, (“the loads”); and 
 he was aware of the dumping of a stash of weapons into the 
Hawkesbury River by former and current officers of NSW 
Police, (“the dump”) (Griffin, 2004, p.144-145). 
 
The Commission considers that Smith engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act 
(Griffin, 2004, p. 144-145). 
• The Commission is of the opinion that despite 
considerable suspicion attaching to Smith’s degree 
of knowledge and participation in the dump and 
retention of the stash, there is insufficient 
admissible evidence for consideration to be given to 
the prosecution of Smith for any criminal offence. 
There is also insufficient evidence to substantiate 
Smith participating in or having specific knowledge 
of any loads or verbals. This is despite the evidence 
reflecting a number of clear examples of corrupt and 
criminal conduct by several officers of the AHU and 
despite Smith being unable to offer any explanation 
as to how these practices could have occurred at 
MCSN without this knowledge. The Commission is 
of the opinion therefore that consideration should 
not be given to the prosecution of Smith for any 
criminal offences. Smith was a serving officer 
when he gave evidence. He was suspended from 
duty on 13 August 2002. Following the public 
hearings in this segment, NSW Police 
recommended that consideration be given to taking 
action against Smith pursuant to section 181D of the 
Police Act 1990. However, prior to this process 
commencing Smith was medically discharged. He 
was not reinstated to duty prior to his medical 
discharge. His last day of service was 5 September 
2003. Accordingly, the question of taking action 
pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act 
does not arise (Griffin, 2004, p. 145). 
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Appendix C: Let’s Dance Segment Summary of Affected Actors 
Table C1: Let's Dance Segment 
Police 
Involved 
Position 
& Year 
Summary of Allegations/Criminal Prosecution Outcome of Trial 
F7 Detective 
Senior 
Constabl
e 
*1980 
The subject of the substantial allegations that all police officers 
from both Manly Detectives and MCSN who were involved in the 
arrest of A1 and P1 
 entered into an agreement to share money corruptly taken 
during Operation Let’s Dance,  
 that payments were also made to other nominated officers who 
were not involved in the Operation, and  
 that false documentation was deliberately prepared for use in 
the prosecution of A1 and P1. 
 
The Commission is of the opinion that the evidence supports 
consideration being given to the prosecution of F7 for the following 
criminal offences: 
 Steal Money from the Person of K2 under section 94 of the 
Crimes Act 1900 on the basis that F7 was party to a joint 
criminal enterprise which had as its objective the stealing of 
money from K2; 
 Larceny under section 117 of the Crimes Act 1900 of the 
money from  
 K2 on the same basis; and 
 Conspiracy to Do an Act Intending to Pervert the Course of 
Justice in breach of sections 319 and 342 of the Crimes Act 
1900. The conspiracy had as its object the preparation of 
documentation for use in the prosecution of A1 and P1 that 
The Commission considers that F7 engaged in police 
misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act. 
• Following the public hearings in this segment and 
prior to the completion of this Report, NSW Police 
forwarded a submission to the ODPP seeking advice 
as to the sufficiency of evidence to commence 
criminal proceedings against 
• F7. The ODPP recommended that no criminal 
proceedings be commenced. In the circumstances 
the Commission is of the opinion that further 
consideration should not be given to the 
prosecution of F7 for any criminal 
• offences. F7 is no longer a serving police officer. 
Accordingly, the question of taking action pursuant 
to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act does not 
arise. (Griffin, 2004, p. 191) 
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deliberately understated the amount of money that was seized 
during the course of their respective arrests (p.191). 
 
Hulme, 
Paul 
Inspector 
of Police 
*1968 
Hulme is an affected person because he is the subject of the 
substantial allegations that: 
 all police officers from both Manly Detectives and MCSN who 
were involved in the arrest of A1 and P1 entered into an 
agreement to share money corruptly taken during Operation 
Let’s Dance, and 
 that false documentation was deliberately prepared for use in 
the prosecution of A1 and P1 (Griffin, 2004, p.194). 
 
The Commission considers that Hulme engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act 
(Griffin, 2004, p.194) 
• While the evidence raises a strong suspicion that 
Hulme was involved in the corrupt conduct that took 
place during this Operation, if not one of the 
instigators of it, the admissible evidence is such that 
the Commission is of the opinion that 
consideration should not be given to the 
prosecution of Hulme any criminal offence in 
relation to this matter. At the time he gave 
evidence Hulme was a serving officer however he 
was medically discharged from NSW Police on 2 
January 2004. Accordingly, the question of taking 
action pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of 
the Act does not arise (Griffin, 2004, p. 194). 
Kendall, 
Glenn 
Wayne 
Detective 
Inspector 
*1974 
Kendall is an affected person because he is the subject of the 
substantial allegation that: 
 all police officers from both Manly Detectives and MCSN who 
were involved in the arrest of A1 and P1 entered into an 
agreement to share money corruptly taken during Operation 
Let’s Dance (Griffin, 2004, p.195). 
 
The Commission considers that Kendall engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act 
(Griffin, 2004, p. 195). 
• Kendall did not deny that the entry in his duty book 
for 5 February 1992 was correct or that he took part 
in the search of A1’s premises. However, he had 
little independent memory of the events and could 
not recall being involved in or seeing the count of 
money at Manly Police Station. N1’s evidence 
confirmed the entry in Kendall’s duty book that he 
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was present at the police station when the money 
was counted however neither N1’s evidence nor the 
• duty book entry implicates Kendall in any illegal 
conduct. The Commission is therefore of the 
opinion that the available evidence is such that 
consideration should not be given to the 
prosecution of Kendall for any criminal offence 
arising out of this matter. At the time he gave 
evidence Kendall was a serving officer however he 
was medically discharged from NSW Police on 7 
May 2004. Accordingly, the question of taking 
action pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of 
the Act does not arise (Griffin, 2004, p. 195). 
King, 
James 
Justin 
Detective 
Senior 
Constabl
e 
*1978 
King is an affected person because he is the subject of the 
substantial allegations that:  
 all police officers from both Manly Detectives and MCSN who 
were involved in the arrest of A1 and P1 entered into an 
agreement to share money corruptly taken during Operation 
Let’s Dance, and that false documentation was deliberately 
prepared for use in the prosecution of A1 and P1.  
 
The Commission is of the opinion that the evidence supports 
consideration being given to the prosecution of King for the 
following criminal offences: 
 Steal Money from the Person of K2 under section 94 of the 
Crimes Act 1900 on the basis that King was party to a joint 
criminal enterprise which had as its objective the stealing of 
money from K2; 
  Larceny under section 117 of the Crimes Act 1900 of the 
money from K2 on the same basis; and 
 Conspiracy to Do an Act Intending to Pervert the Course of 
Justice in breach of sections 319 and 342 of the Crimes Act 
The Commission considers that King engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act. 
• Following the public hearings in this segment, NSW 
Police gave consideration to the preparation of a 
brief of evidence against King. However, after N1 
and F7 indicated that they were not prepared give 
evidence in criminal proceedings against King it 
was determined that there was insufficient evidence 
to prepare a brief against him. In the circumstances 
the commission is of the opinion that further 
consideration should not be given to the 
prosecution of King for any criminal offences. 
King is no longer a serving police officer. 
Accordingly, the question of taking action pursuant 
to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act does not 
arise (Griffin, 2004, p. 195-196). 
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1900. The conspiracy had as its object the preparation of 
documentation for use in the prosecution of A1 and P1 that 
deliberately understated the amount of money that was seized 
during the course of their respective arrests. In King’s case, he 
prepared such documentation. The available evidence from F7 
and N1 clearly supports the allegation he did so with 
knowledge that it was false (Griffin, 2004, p. 195). 
 
Monk, 
Robert 
John 
Assistant 
Commiss
ioner 
*1980 
Monk is an affected person because he is the subject of the 
substantial allegations that: 
 all police officers from both Manly Detectives and MCSN who 
were involved in the arrest of A1 and P1 entered into an 
agreement to share money corruptly taken during Operation 
Let’s Dance, and that false documentation was deliberately 
prepared for use in the prosecution of A1 and P1 (Griffin, 2004, 
p.197). 
 
The Commission considers that Monk engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act 
(Griffin, 2004, p. 197). 
• While the evidence available to the Commission 
raises a strong suspicion that Monk was involved in 
the corrupt conduct that occurred, in particular in 
relation to the events of 4 February 1992, and that 
he received part of the 
• money corruptly taken, the admissible evidence in 
respect of Monk is such that the Commission is of 
the opinion that consideration should not be given 
to the prosecution of Monk for any criminal 
offence (Griffin, 2004, p. 198). 
N1 Detective 
Senior 
Constabl
e 
*1969 
N1 is an affected person because he is the subject of the substantial 
allegations that: 
 all police officers from both Manly Detectives and MCSN who 
were involved in the arrest of A1 and P1 entered into an 
agreement to share money corruptly taken during Operation 
Let’s Dance and that false documentation was deliberately 
prepared for use in the prosecution of A1 and P1. The admissible 
evidence against N1 consists of the evidence of A1, P1, K2 and 
C2 which suggests that there was more money seized from A1’s 
premises than revealed by the police, the duty book entries of 
N1 and his involvement in the Operation on 5 February 1992 
The Commission considers that N1 engaged in police 
misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act (Griffin, 
2004, p. 198-199). 
• Following the public hearings in this segment, NSW 
Police forwarded a submission to the ODPP seeking 
advice as to the sufficiency of evidence to 
commence criminal proceedings against N1. The 
ODPP recommended that no criminal proceedings 
be commenced. In the circumstances the 
Commission is of the opinion that further 
consideration should not be given to the 
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and the admissions made by him in the recorded conversations 
contained on the listening device material. The admissions he 
made in evidence at the Commission are not admissible against 
him.  
 
The Commission is of the opinion that the evidence supports 
consideration being given to the prosecution of N1 for the following 
criminal offences: 
 Steal Money from the Person of K2 under section 94 of the 
Crimes Act 1900 on the basis that N1 was party to a joint 
criminal enterprise which had as its objective the stealing of 
money from K2; 
 Larceny under section 117 of the Crimes Act 1900 of the 
money from K2 on the same basis; and 
 Conspiracy to Do an Act Intending to Pervert the Course of 
Justice in breach of sections 319 and 342 of the Crimes Act 
1900. The conspiracy had as its object the preparation of 
documentation for use in the prosecution of A1 and P1 that 
deliberately understated the amount of money that was seized 
during the course of their respective arrests (Griffin, 2004, p. 
198-199) 
prosecution of N1 for any criminal offences. N1 
is no longer a serving police officer. Accordingly, 
the question of taking action pursuant to subsections 
97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act does not arise. 
O’Toole, 
Dennis 
Peter 
Inspector 
*1967 
The subject of the substantial allegations that: 
 all police officers from both Manly Detectives and MCSN who 
were involved in the arrest of A1 and P1 entered into an 
agreement to share money corruptly taken during Operation 
Let’s Dance, and that false documentation was deliberately 
prepared for use in the prosecution of A1 and P1.  
 
The Commission is of the opinion that the evidence supports 
consideration being given to the prosecution of O’Toole for the 
offences of: 
The Commission considers that O’Toole engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act. 
• Following the public hearings in this segment and 
prior to the completion of this Report, NSW Police 
gave consideration to the preparation of a brief of 
evidence against O’Toole. It was determined 
however that there was insufficient evidence to 
prepare a brief against him. In the circumstances the 
Commission is of the opinion that further 
consideration should not be given to the 
prosecution of O’Toole for any criminal offences. 
O’Toole is no longer a serving police officer. 
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 Steal Money from the Person of K2 pursuant to section 94 of 
the Crimes Act 1900 on the basis that O’Toole was an 
accessory before the fact; 
 Larceny under section 117 of the Crimes Act 1900 on the same 
basis; and 
 Conspiracy to Do an Act Intending to Pervert the Course of 
Justice under sections 319 and 342 of the Crimes Act 1900, the 
act being the deliberate preparation of false documentation to 
be used in the prosecution of A1 and P1. Although there is no 
evidence O’Toole prepared any such document, there is 
sufficient evidence concerning his role in the Operation to 
support a conclusion that he was a party to that conspiracy 
(Griffin, 2004, p. 200-201). 
Accordingly, the question of taking action pursuant 
to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act does not 
arise (Griffin, 2004, p. 201). 
Smith, 
Ronald 
Bruce 
Inspector 
*1973 
Smith is an affected person because he is the subject of the 
substantial allegation that: 
 all police officers from both Manly Detectives and MCSN who 
were involved in the arrest of A1 and P1 entered into an 
agreement to share money corruptly taken during Operation 
Let’s Dance (Griffin, 2004, p.202). 
 
The Commission considers that Smith engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act 
(Griffin, 2004, p.202) 
• Following the public hearings in this segment, NSW 
Police gave consideration to the reparation of a brief 
of evidence against Smith. It was decided that there 
was insufficient evidence to prepare a brief against 
Smith for any criminal offences. In the 
circumstances the Commission is of the opinion that 
further consideration should not be given to the 
prosecution of Smith of any criminal offences. 
Smith was a serving officer when he gave evidence. 
He was suspended with pay on 13 August 2002. 
Following the public hearings in this segment and 
prior to the completion of this Report, NSW Police 
assessed the matter and decided to take no further 
action in relation to Smith. Smith was subsequently 
granted medical discharge from NSW Police from 5 
September 2003. He was not reinstated to duty prior 
to his medical discharge. His last day of service was 
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5 September 2003.  Accordingly, the question of 
taking action pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) and 
(d) of the Act is no longer applicable to him (Griffin, 
2004, p. 203). 
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Appendix D: Newport Segment Summary of Affected Actors 
Table D1: Newport Segment 
Police 
Involved 
Position 
& Year 
Summary of Allegations/Criminal Prosecutions Outcome of Trial 
Hill, 
David 
Marshall 
Sergeant 
*1977 
The subject of the substantial allegations that police from both the 
NSDU and GDU of Major Crime Squad North: 
• entered into a corrupt agreement to share money, being 
$10,000, stolen from L17 during the execution of a search 
warrant on 21 February 1992, at premises occupied by L17; 
• entered into a corrupt agreement to share $50,000, paid by 
L17 to police, for assistance provided to her in respect of the 
matters with which she was charged; 
• stole a gold ingot from L17; and 
• corruptly assisted L17 in relation to the charges brought 
against her and thereby perverted the course of justice 
(Griffin, 2004, p.261) 
The Commission considers that Hill engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act 
(Griffin, 2004, p.261). 
• In the circumstances the Commission is of the 
opinion that further consideration should not be 
given to the prosecution of Hill for any criminal 
offences. Hill is no longer a serving police officer. 
Accordingly, the question of taking action pursuant 
to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act does not 
arise. 
M5 Detective 
Senior 
Constable 
*1980 
The subject of the substantial allegations that police from both the 
NSDU and GDU of Major Crime Squad North: 
• entered into a corrupt agreement to share money, being 
$10,000, stolen from L17 during the execution of a search 
warrant on 21 February 1992, at premises occupied by L17; 
• entered into a corrupt agreement to share $50,000, paid by 
L17 to police, for assistance provided to her in respect of the 
matters with which she was charged; 
• stole a gold ingot from L17; and 
• corruptly assisted L17 in relation to the charges brought 
against her and thereby perverted the course of justice 
(Griffin, 2004, p.266) 
The Commission considers that M5 engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act. 
• The Attorney General has granted M5 has an 
indemnity from prosecution in relation to all 
matters in respect of which he has admitted 
criminal conduct. Therefore, the Commission has 
not expressed an opinion about whether 
consideration should be given to the prosecution of 
M5 for any criminal offences. M5 is no longer a 
serving police officer. Accordingly, the question of 
taking action pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) and 
(d) of the Act does not arise (Griffin, 2004, p.267). 
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L17 Unknown • L17 is an affected person because it is alleged that she gave 
false evidence in a material particular to the Commission. 
These matters suggest that L17 gave false or misleading 
evidence, in a material particular, to the Commission. 
Specifically, L17 gave evidence of that character in 
relation to: (1) her knowledge of S7; and (2) the 
association that she had with S7. The Commission is of 
the opinion that consideration should be given to the 
prosecution of L17 for giving false or misleading 
evidence to the Commission pursuant to section 107 
of the Act. 
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Appendix E: Magnum Segment Summary of Affected Actors 
Table E1: Magnum Segment 
Police 
Involved 
Position & 
Year 
Summary of Charges Outcome of Trial 
Bernasconi, 
Philip 
Sydney 
Detective 
Sergeant 
*1967 
Bernasconi is an affected person because he is the subject of the 
substantial allegations that: 
• he fabricated the adoption of the record of interview alleged 
to have taken place between Wrice and Stuart; and 
• he made a false statement in relation to the adoption of 
Stuart’s alleged record of interview and perjured himself 
when he gave evidence in accordance with that statement. 
 
The Commission is of the opinion that the evidence supports the 
consideration being given to the prosecution of Bernasconi for 
perverting the course of justice pursuant to section 319 of the 
Crimes Act 1900 (Griffin, 2004, p. 312). 
The Commission considers that Bernasconi 
engaged in police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) 
of the Act. 
• Following the public hearings in this segment, 
NSW Police sent a brief of evidence to the ODPP 
in relation to Bernasconi for consideration of 
possible criminal charges. The ODPP 
recommended that no charges be laid. In the 
circumstances the Commission is of the opinion 
that further consideration should not be given to 
the prosecution of Bernasconi for any criminal 
offences. Bernasconi is no longer a serving police 
officer. Accordingly, the question of taking action 
pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act 
does not arise (Griffin, 2004, p.312). 
Blake, Ian 
Grant 
Junior 
Detective 
Constable 
*1982 
Blake is an affected person because he is the subject of the 
substantial allegations that: 
• he made a false statement in relation to the arrest, interview 
and admissions of C11 and perjured himself when he gave 
evidence in accordance with that statement; and 
• he perjured himself when he gave evidence at his trial in 
March 2000. 
 
The Commission is of the opinion that the evidence supports 
consideration being given to the prosecution of Blake for perjury 
The Commission considers that Blake engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act 
(Griffin, 2004, p.313) 
• In any event following the public hearings in this 
segment, NSW Police sent a brief of evidence in 
relation to Blake to the ODPP for consideration of 
possible criminal charges. The ODPP 
recommended that the charge of perjury was not 
available and there was insufficient evidence to 
support any other charges. In the circumstances 
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pursuant to section 327 of the Crimes Act 1900. However, the 
decision of the High Court of Australia in The Queen v 
Carroll,1215 delivered after the Commission’s hearing, suggests 
that such a prosecution would not be available (Griffin, 2004, 
p.313). 
the Commission is of the opinion that further 
consideration should not be given to the 
prosecution of Blake for any criminal offences. 
Blake is no longer a serving police officer. 
Accordingly, the question of taking action 
pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act 
does not arise (Griffin, 2004, p. 314) 
Davidson, 
John Stuart 
Commander 
*1971 
Davidson is an affected person because he is the subject of the 
substantial allegations that: 
• he, together with N1 and Irwin, fabricated the adoption of 
the record of interview alleged to have been held between 
N1 and C11; 
• he made a false statement in relation to the arrest and 
interview of C11 and perjured himself when he gave 
evidence in accordance with that statement; 
• he perjured himself when he gave evidence at his trial in 
March 2000; and 
• members of Task Force Magnum, including Davidson were 
prepared to do anything necessary to obtain convictions, 
including "loading" and "verballing" or both (Griffin, 2004, 
p.315). 
 
The Commission is of the opinion that the evidence supports 
consideration being given to the prosecution of Davidson for 
perjury pursuant to section 327 of the Crimes Act 1900. 
However, the decision of the High Court of Australia in The 
Queen v Carroll,1227 delivered after the Commission hearing, 
suggests that such a prosecution would not be available (Griffin, 
2004, p. 316). 
The Commission considers that Davidson engaged 
in police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act 
(Griffin, 2004, p.315). 
• Following the public hearings in this segment and 
prior to the 
• completion of this Report, NSW Police sent a brief 
of evidence to the ODPP in relation to Davidson 
for consideration of possible criminal charges. The 
ODPP recommended that the charge of perjury 
was not available and there was insufficient 
evidence to support any other charges. In the 
circumstances the Commission is of the opinion 
that further consideration should not be given to 
the prosecution of Davidson for any criminal 
offences. Davidson is no longer a serving police 
officer. Accordingly, the question of taking action 
pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act 
does not arise. 
Dowding, 
Kim 
Senior 
Detective 
Dowding is an affected person because he is the subject of the 
substantial allegations that: 
The Commission considers that Dowding engaged 
in police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act 
(Griffin, 2004, p.317). 
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Constable 
*1978 
• he, together with Wrice, F7, M5 and King agreed to pervert 
the course of justice and did so by fabricating evidence, 
specifically the false police identification, against Stuart; 
• he made a false statement in relation to the arrest and 
interview of Stuart and perjured himself when he gave 
evidence in accordance with that statement; and  
• members of Task Force Magnum, including Dowding were 
prepared to do anything necessary to obtain convictions, 
including "loading", "verballing" or both (Griffin, 2004, 
p.317). 
 
The Commission is of the opinion that the evidence supports 
consideration being given to the prosecution of Dowding for 
perverting the course of justice pursuant to section 319 of the 
Crimes Act 1900 (Griffin, 2004, p. 318) 
• Following the public hearings in this segment, 
NSW Police sent a brief of evidence to the ODPP 
in relation to Dowding for consideration of 
possible criminal charges. The ODPP 
recommended that no charges be laid.  In the 
circumstances the Commission is of the opinion 
that further consideration should not be given to 
the prosecution of Dowding for any criminal 
offences. Dowding is no longer a serving police 
officer. Accordingly, the question of taking action 
pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act 
does not arise (Griffin, 2004, p.318). 
F7 Detective 
Senior 
Constable 
*1980 
F7 is an affected person because he is the subject of the 
substantial allegations that: 
• he, together with Wrice, M5, King and Dowding agreed to 
pervert the course of justice and did so by fabricating 
evidence, specifically the false police identification, against 
Stuart; 
• with Wrice he fabricated an interview allegedly held 
between Wrice and Stuart; 
• he, together with Bernasconi, Wrice, and M5 fabricated the 
adoption of 
• the interview alleged to have taken place between Wrice and 
Stuart; 
• he made a false statement in relation to the arrest and 
interview of Stuart and perjured himself when he gave 
evidence in accordance with that statement; and 
• members of Task Force Magnum, including F7 were 
prepared to do anything necessary to obtain convictions, 
The Commission considers that F7 engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act 
(Griffin, 2004, p.318). 
• Following the public hearings in this segment, 
NSW Police considered the admissible evidence 
against F7 with a view to preparing a brief of 
evidence against him. It was decided that there was 
insufficient admissible evidence to prepare a brief 
against F7. In the circumstances the Commission 
is of the opinion that further consideration should 
not be given to the prosecution of F7 for any 
criminal offences. F7 is no longer a serving police 
officer. Accordingly, the question of taking action 
pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act 
does not arise (Griffin, 2004, p. 319). 
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including "loading" and "verballing" or both (Griffin, 2004, 
p.318). 
 
The Commission is of the opinion that the evidence supports 
consideration being given to the prosecution of prosecution of F7 
for perverting the course of justice pursuant to section 319 of the 
Crimes Act 1900 (Griffin, 2004, p.319). 
Irwin, 
Robert 
James 
Detective 
Senior 
Constable 
*1972 
Irwin is an affected person because he is the subject of the 
substantial allegations that: 
• he, together with N1, agreed to pervert the course of justice 
and did so by fabricating evidence, specifically the loading 
of the blank Occupier’s Notices, against C11; 
• he fabricated admissions alleged to have been made by C11; 
• he, together with N1 fabricated a record of interview 
allegedly held between C11 and N1; 
• he, together with Davidson and N1 fabricated the adoption 
of the record 
• of interview alleged to have been held between N1 and C11; 
• he made a false statement in relation to the arrest and 
interview of C11 and perjured himself when he gave 
evidence in accordance with that statement; and he perjured 
himself when he gave evidence at his trial in March 2000 
(Griffin, 2004, p. 319) 
 
The Commission is of the opinion that the evidence supports 
consideration being given to the prosecution of Irwin for perjury 
pursuant to section 327 of 
• the Crimes Act 1900. However, the decision the High Court 
of Australia in The Queen v Carroll,1241 delivered after the 
Commission’s hearing, suggests that such a prosecution 
would not be available (Griffin, 2004, p. 320) 
The Commission considers that Irwin engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act 
(Griffin, 2004, p.320) 
• Following the public hearings in this segment and 
prior to the completion of this Report, NSW Police 
sent a brief of evidence to the ODPP in relation to 
Irwin for consideration of possible criminal 
charges. The ODPP recommended that the charge 
of perjury was not available and there was 
insufficient evidence to support any other charges. 
In the circumstances the Commission is of the 
opinion that further consideration should not be 
given to the prosecution of Irwin for any 
criminal offences. Irwin is no longer a serving 
police officer. Accordingly, the question of taking 
action pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of 
the Act does not arise (Griffin, 2004, p. 321). 
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King, 
James 
Justin 
Detective 
Senior 
Constable 
*1978 
King is an affected person because he is the subject of the 
substantial allegations that: 
• he, together with Wrice, F7, M5, and Dowding agreed to 
pervert the course of justice and did so by fabricating 
evidence, specifically the false police identification, against 
Stuart; 
• he made a false statement in relation to the arrest and 
interview of Stuart and perjured himself when he gave 
evidence in accordance with that statement; and 
• members of Task Force Magnum, including King, were 
prepared to do anything necessary to obtain convictions, 
including "loading" and "verballing" or both (Griffin, 2004, 
p.321). 
 
The Commission is of the opinion that the evidence supports 
consideration being given to the prosecution of King for 
perverting the course of justice pursuant to section 319 of the 
Crimes Act 1900 (Griffin, 2004, p.322). 
The Commission considers that King engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act 
(Griffin, 2004, p.321). 
• Following the public hearings in this segment, 
NSW Police sent a brief of evidence to the ODPP 
in relation to King for consideration of possible 
criminal charges. The ODPP recommended that no 
charges be laid. In the circumstances the 
Commission is of the opinion that further 
consideration should not be given to the 
prosecution of King for any criminal offences. 
King is no longer a serving police officer. 
Accordingly, the question of taking action 
pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act 
does not arise (Griffin, 2004, p.322). 
M5 Detective 
Senior 
Constable 
*1980 
M5 is an affected person because he is the subject of the 
substantial allegations that: 
• he, together with Wrice, F7, King and Dowding agreed to 
pervert the course of justice and did so by fabricating 
evidence, specifically the false police identification, against 
Stuart; 
• he, together with Bernasconi, Wrice, and F7 fabricated the 
adoption of 
• the interview alleged to have taken place between Wrice and 
Stuart; 
• he made a false statement in relation to the arrest and 
interview of Stuart and perjured himself when he gave 
evidence in accordance with that statement; and 
• members of Task Force Magnum, including M5 were 
prepared to do anything necessary to obtain convictions, 
The Commission considers that M5 engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection16(1)(a) of the Act 
(Griffin, 2004, p.322). 
• The Attorney General has granted M5 has an 
indemnity from prosecution in relation to all 
matters in respect of which he has admitted 
criminal conduct. Therefore, the Commission has 
not expressed an opinion about whether 
consideration should be given to the prosecution 
of M5 for any criminal offences. M5 is no longer 
a serving police officer. Accordingly, the question 
of taking action pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) 
and (d) of the Act does not arise. 
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including "loading" and "verballing" or both (Griffin, 2004, 
p.322). 
 
N1 Detective 
Senior 
Constable 
*1969 
N1 is an affected person because he is the subject of the 
substantial allegations that: 
• he agreed, with Irwin, to pervert the course of justice and 
did so by fabricating evidence, specifically the loading of 
the blank Occupier’s Notices, against C11; 
• he fabricated admissions alleged to have been made by C11; 
• he, with Irwin, fabricated a record of interview allegedly 
held between C11 and N1; 
• he, with Davidson and Irwin, fabricated the adoption of the 
record of interview alleged to have been held between N1 
and C11; 
• he made a false statement in relation to the arrest and 
interview of C11; 
• he perjured himself when he gave evidence at his trial in 
March 2000; and 
• members of Task Force Magnum, including N1, were 
prepared to do anything necessary to obtain convictions, 
including "loading" and "verballing" or both (Griffin, 2004, 
p. 323-324). 
 
The Commission is of the opinion that the evidence supports 
consideration being given to the prosecution of N1 for perjury 
pursuant to section 327 of the Crimes Act 1900. However, the 
decision of the High Court of Australia in The Queen v 
Carroll,1256 delivered after the Commission hearing, suggests 
that such a prosecution would not be available (Griffin, 2004, 
p.325). 
The Commission considers that N1 engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act. 
• In any event following the public hearings in this 
segment, NSW Police considered the admissible 
evidence against N1 with a view to preparing a 
brief of evidence against N1. It was decided that 
there was insufficient admissible evidence to 
prepare a brief against N1. In the circumstances 
the Commission is of the opinion that further 
consideration should not be given to the 
prosecution of N1 for any criminal offences. N1 
is no longer a serving police officer. Accordingly, 
the question of taking action pursuant to 
subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act does not 
arise. 
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Wrice, 
Philip 
George 
Detective 
Senior 
Constable 
*1975 
Wrice is an affected person because he is the subject of the 
substantial allegations that: 
• he, together with, F7, M5, King and Dowding agreed to 
pervert the course of justice and did so by fabricating 
evidence, specifically the false police identification, against 
Stuart; 
• he, with F7, fabricated a record of interview allegedly held 
between Stuart and himself; 
• he together with Bernasconi, F7, and M5 fabricated the 
adoption of the record of interview alleged to have taken 
place between Stuart and him; 
• he made a false statement in relation to the arrest and 
interview of Stuart and perjured himself when he gave 
evidence in accordance with that statement; and 
• members of Task Force Magnum, including, King, were 
prepared to do anything necessary to obtain convictions, 
including "loading" and "verballing" or both (Griffin, 2004, 
p.325). 
 
The Commission is of the opinion that the evidence supports 
consideration being given to the prosecution of Wrice for 
perverting the course of justice pursuant to section 319 of the 
Crimes Act 1900 (Griffin, 2004, p. 326). 
The Commission considers that Wrice engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act 
(Griffin, 2004, p.325). 
• Following the public hearings in this segment, 
NSW Police sent a brief of evidence against Wrice 
to the ODPP for consideration of possible criminal 
charges. The ODPP recommended that no charges 
be laid. In the circumstances the Commission is of 
the opinion that further consideration should not 
be given to the prosecution of Wrice for any 
criminal offences. 
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Appendix F: King Segment Summary of Affected Actors 
Table F1: King Segment 
Police 
Involved 
Position Summary of Charges Outcome of Trial 
King, James 
Justin 
Sergeant 
*1978 
King is an affected person because he is the subject of the 
following substantial allegations: 
• that a number of police officers, including King, and a 
civilian conspired to pervert the course of justice by 
giving false evidence in proceedings, in the Local 
Court of New South Wales, arising out of King’s arrest 
for DUI on 25 September 1993; 
• that he gave false evidence in proceedings in Manly 
Local Court on 12 February 2001 and attempted to 
pervert the course of justice in proceedings arising out 
of his arrest for PCA on 13 April 2000; 
• that O’Toole, aided and abetted by King, obtained a 
financial benefit by deception when he obtained an 
informant reward payment in late 1997 or early 1998 
based on a false application for a reward payment made 
by King and approved by O’Toole in October 1997; 
and 
• that he engaged in money laundering in 1999 (Griffin, 
2004, p.370). 
 
The Commission considers that King engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act 
(Griffin, 2004, p.370). 
• Following the public hearings in this segment, 
NSW Police gave consideration to the preparation 
of a brief of evidence against King in relation to 
the three following matters: 
• 1993 DUI – a brief of evidence was sent to the 
ODPP however the ODPP recommended that no 
criminal charges be laid against any of the 
participants. 
• Payment of registered informants - NSW Police 
investigated this matter and found there is 
insufficient evidence to consider criminal charges 
against King, or any other person. 
• Money laundering – NSW Police sent a detailed 
report to the ODPP requesting a review of the 
evidence to ascertain if there was sufficient 
evidence to prosecute King. The ODPP 
recommended that no charges be laid against 
King. 
 
In the circumstances the Commission is of the opinion 
that further consideration should not be given to the 
prosecution of King for any criminal offences in 
relation to the above three matters. The 
293 
 
Commission will seek the advice of the ODPP in 
relation to the 2000 
• PCA. As King is no longer a serving police officer 
the question of taking action pursuant to 
subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act does not 
arise (Griffin, 2004, p.372). 
M5 Senior 
Constable 
*1980 
M5 is an affected person because he the subject of the 
following substantial allegation: 
• that a number of police officers, including M5, and a 
civilian, conspired to pervert the course of justice by 
giving false evidence in proceedings, in the Local 
Court of New South Wales, arising out of King’s arrest 
for DUI on 25 September 1993 (Griffin, 2004, p.372). 
 
The Commission considers that M5 engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act 
(Griffin, 2004, p.372). 
• The Attorney General has granted M5 has an 
indemnity from prosecution in relation to all 
matters in respect of which he has admitted 
criminal conduct. Therefore, the Commission has 
not expressed an opinion about whether 
consideration should be given to the 
prosecution of M5 for any criminal offences.  
M5 is no longer a serving police officer. 
Accordingly, the question of taking action 
pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act 
does not arise. 
McDougall, 
Roslyn 
Senior 
Constable 
*1992 
McDougall is an affected person because she is the subject 
of the substantial allegation: 
• that a number of police officers, and a civilian, 
conspired to pervert the course of justice by giving 
false evidence in proceedings in the Local Court of 
New South Wales arising out of King’s arrest for DUI 
on 25 September 1993. McDougall was one of those 
officers (Griffin, 2004, p.374). 
 
The Commission considers that McDougall 
engaged in police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) 
of the Act (Griffin, 2004, p.374). 
• Following the public hearings in this segment, 
NSW Police sent a brief of evidence against 
McDougall to the ODPP. The ODPP 
recommended that no charges be laid against 
McDougall. In the circumstances the Commission 
is of the opinion that further consideration should 
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not be given to the prosecution of Dougall for 
any criminal offences. 
Moore (Butt), 
Clare Margaret 
Senior 
Constable 
*1984 
Moore is an affected person because she is the subject of the 
substantial allegation: 
• that a number of police officers, and a civilian, 
conspired to pervert the course of justice by giving 
false evidence in proceedings in the Local Court of 
New South Wales arising out of King’s arrest for DUI 
on 25 September 1993. McDougall was one of those 
officers (Griffin, 2004, p.375). 
The Commission considers that McDougall 
engaged in police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) 
of the Act (Griffin, 2004, p.375). 
• Following the public hearings in this segment, 
NSW Police sent a brief of evidence against 
Moore to the ODPP. The ODPP recommended 
that no charges be laid against Moore. In the 
circumstances the Commission is of the opinion 
that further consideration should not be given to 
the prosecution of Moore for any criminal 
offences. As Moore is no longer a serving police 
officer the question of taking action pursuant to 
subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act does not 
arise. 
O’Toole, 
Dennis Peter 
Senior 
Sergeant 
*1967 
O’Toole is an affected person because he is the subject of 
the substantial allegations: 
• that a number of police officers, and a civilian, 
conspired to pervert the course of justice by giving 
false evidence in proceedings, in the Local Court of 
New South Wales, arising out of King’s arrest for DUI 
on 25 September 1993; and 
• that O’Toole, aided and abetted by King, obtained a 
financial benefit by deception when he obtained an 
informant reward payment in late 1997 or early 1998 
based on a false application for a reward payment for 
an informant made by King and approved by O’Toole 
in October 1997 (Griffin, 2004, p.375-376). 
 
The Commission considers that O’Toole engaged 
in police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the 
Act. 8.204 (Griffin, 2004, p.376). 
• Following the public hearings in this segment, 
NSW Police gave consideration to the preparation 
of a brief of evidence against O’Toole in relation 
to the following matters: 
• 1993 DUI – a brief of evidence was sent to the 
ODPP however the ODPP recommended that no 
criminal charges be laid against any of the 
participants. 
• Payment of registered informants - NSW Police 
investigated this matter and found there is 
insufficient evidence to consider criminal charges 
against O’Toole, or any other person. 
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In the circumstances the Commission is of the opinion 
that further consideration should not be given to the 
prosecution of O’Toole for any criminal offences. 
As O’Toole is no longer a serving police officer the 
question of taking action pursuant to subsections 
97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act does not arise (Griffin, 
2004, p.376-377). 
S8 Sergeant 
*1965 
S8 is an affected person because he is the subject of the 
substantial allegation: 
• that a number of police officers, and a civilian, 
conspired to pervert the course of justice by giving 
false evidence in proceedings in the Local Court of 
New South Wales arising out of King’s arrest for DUI 
on 25 September 1993. S8 was one of those officers 
(Griffin, 2004, p.377). 
 
The Commission considers that S8 engaged in 
police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act 
(Griffin, 2004, p.377). 
• The only evidence about S8’s involvement in a 
conspiracy to pervert the course of justice arising 
out of the 1993 DUI incident came from S8 
himself. That evidence cannot be used against him. 
In relation to subsection 97(2)(a) of the Act, there 
is therefore no admissible evidence against S8 
implicating him in any criminal activity in relation 
to the 1993 DUI incident. The Commission is of 
the opinion therefore that consideration should 
not be given to the prosecution of S8 for any 
criminal offence. As S8 is no longer a serving 
police officer the question of taking action 
pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act 
does not arise. 
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Appendix G: Letters of Assistance Segment Summary of Affected Actors 
Table G1: Letters of Assistance Segment 
Police 
Involved 
Position 
& Year 
Summary of Allegations/Criminal Prosecution Outcome of Trial 
Kempnich, 
Michael 
Scott 
Detective 
Senior 
Constable 
*1979 
The subject of the following substantial allegations, namely that: 
• in relation to the preparation of assistance documentation 
concerning P4, he did an act intending to pervert the course of 
justice; 
• in relation to the preparation of assistance documentation 
concerning P6, he conspired to do an act intending to pervert 
the course of justice; and 
• he stole money from P4’s premises during a search on 28 June 
1992. 
 
The Commission is of the opinion that the evidence supports 
consideration being given to the prosecution of Kempnich for the 
offences of: 
• doing an act intending to pervert the course of justice; section 
319, Crimes Act 1900; 
• conspiring to do an act intending to pervert the course of 
justice at Common Law (Victoria); and 
• larceny at Common Law (Griffin, 2004, p. 231). 
The Commission considers that Kempnich 
engaged in police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) 
of the Act. 
• NSW Police sought advice, from the ODPP 
regarding possible criminal proceedings against 
Kempnich. The ODPP advised that no 
proceedings should be commenced. In the 
circumstances the Commission is of the opinion 
that further consideration should not be given to 
the prosecution of Kempnich for any criminal 
offences. Due to the satisfactory nature of the 
evidence concerning the allegation made by P4 
concerning Wilding and Kempnich and the 
alleged dealing with F3, the Commission is of the 
opinion that consideration should not be given 
to the prosecution of Kempnich for any 
criminal offence relating to this matter. 
Kempnich is no longer a serving police officer. 
Accordingly, the question of taking action 
pursuant to subsections 97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act 
does not arise (Griffin, 2004, p. 232). 
Wilding, 
Guy John 
Detective 
Sergeant 
The subject of the following substantial allegations, namely that: 
• in relation to the preparation of assistance documentation 
concerning P4, he did an act intending to pervert the course of 
justice; 
The Commission considers that Wilding engaged 
in police misconduct: subsection 16(1)(a) of the Act 
(Griffin, p. 232-233). 
297 
 
*1977 • in relation to the preparation of assistance documentation 
concerning P6, he did an act intending to pervert the course of 
justice; and 
• he stole money from P4’s premises during a search on 28 June 
1992. 
 
The Commission is of the opinion that the evidence supports 
consideration 
• being given to the prosecution of Wilding, in relation to both 
the P4 and P6 letters of assistance, for the offences of: 
• doing an act intending to pervert the course of justice; section 
319, Crimes Act 1900; 
• doing an act intending to pervert the course of justice at 
Common Law (Victoria); and 
• larceny at Common Law (Griffin, 2004, p.232-233). 
• In the circumstances the Commission is of the 
opinion that further consideration should not be 
given to the prosecution of Wilding for any 
criminal offences. Due to the unsatisfactory nature 
of the evidence concerning the allegation made by 
P4 concerning Wilding and Kempnich and the 
alleged dealing with F3, the Commission is of the 
opinion that consideration should not be given 
to the prosecution of Wilding for any criminal 
offence relating to this matter. Wilding is no 
longer a serving police officer. Accordingly, the 
question of taking action pursuant to Subsections 
97(2)(c) and (d) of the Act does not arise. 
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Appendix H: Trial Segment Demographics 
Table H1: Trial Segment Demographics 
  NBeaches Guns LetsDance Newport Magnum King Letters O'Toole 
A5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Asser 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Benbow 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
B6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
C3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Caccamo 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Clarke 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D6 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DavidsonS 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Etheridge 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
G2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
G3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
G4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
G5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
George 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Green 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
H1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Heath 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hill 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Jasper 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
K4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kehoe 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kendall 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
King 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
L4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
M8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Markarian 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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McDougallG 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
McKillop 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Messenger 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Morgan 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nixon 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Patison 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Peattie 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Puffett 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Raymond 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Taylor 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
V1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
V2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
V3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
A2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
A4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Adams 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Allot 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Anderson 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
B8 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
B11 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Bernasconi 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
Blake 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 
Breedon 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Brett 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Bridges 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Brown 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Butt 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
C6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
C7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
C8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
C11 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
C12 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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C14 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Café 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Carson 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Crawford 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
DavidsonJ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dowding 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ducker 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
E2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Eade 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Ehsman 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
F3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
F4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
F5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
F6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
F7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fabris 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Farmer 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
G6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Gilligan 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Goldberg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Gumley 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
H5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Hagan 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Halliday 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Harbone 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Henry 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Hollis 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hulme 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Irwin 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Ison 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Jamieson 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
K2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
K6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Kempnich 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Kendall 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Kennedy 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Kerr-
Thomson 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
L17 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
L18 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
L19 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Lotz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Lysaught 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
M7 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
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M11 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M13 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M14 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Madden 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
May 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Mayger 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
McClelland 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
McDonaldC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
McDonaldS 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
McDonaldM 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
McDougallR 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
McKay 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
McManus 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Minehan 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Monk 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Moore 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
N1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Newman 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Nicholson 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Neild 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Nimmo 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Noonan 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
O'Brien 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
O'Connor 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
O'Toole 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Owen 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
P1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
P2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
P4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
P6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Perl 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Pickering 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
R3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Ramaccia 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Rudolph 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
S7 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
S8 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
S9 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Saxon 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
ShepherdA 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
ShepherdD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Smith 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Spence 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
StJohn 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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Starmer 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Stuart 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Symonds 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
V4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
VanDerVlag 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Vicary 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
W8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Walsh 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Wilding 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Williams 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wrice 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Yabsley 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Total 62 20 29 17 24 29 32 7 
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Appendix 1: Coding Protocol 
Table 11: Coding Protocol Forms of Corruptions 
Qualitative Data Description Examples from Transcripts/Literature 
 
Forms of Corruption 
Assault Physical assault by police officers on potential 
perpetrators. 
“He was pushed, slapped, I think he was pushed off the chair and - to 
try to get him to confess to that matter” (p. 1684). 
Opportunistic 
Theft: from 
Arrestees, Victims, 
Property 
Officers investigating crimes “may merchandise, drugs or 
money left behind by the original thief. Officers may keep 
a portion of the confiscated evidence they discover during 
vice raids” (Roebuck & Baker, 1974, p. 430). 
"I think there was about 3 grams of heroin in that drawer where the 
money - where I took the money from, and I think it was on the 
proviso that I didn't charge him with that heroin that we take that 
money” (p.1713). 
Protection of 
Illegal Activities/ 
Green-lighting 
Corruptors are “actively engaged in illegal conduct and 
seek operation without police harassment. Legitimate 
businesses operating illegally also pay for protection” 
(Roebuck & Baker, 1974, p. 431). 
“Q. Did you know what greenlighting meant? A. Yes, I did. Q Go on. 
What did you say? A. He continued on talking, saying I would have 
the green light; he would tell me where special operations groups, 
anti-theft were working in certain areas. Also if I needed a hand with 
anything that they would look after me and that was pretty much it” 
(p. 459). 
Loading Planting of weapons, drugs, money on offenders to ensure 
a conviction by officers. 
“A. I had obtained a small amount of heroin from M10 and I think it 
was the next day I went and found [[K4]] and charged him with the 
possession of that, sir. Q. By what is known as loading him with the 
heroin provided to you by M10? A. Yes, sir” (p.1725). 
Verballing Falsifying interviews/confessions/testimonies by officers. “Q. Do you say that that interview never took place? A. Never. Q. 
And you were not spoken to by John Davidson in relation to it; is that 
right? A. At no time” (p.5181). 
Providing 
Information to 
Criminals 
Police officers provide sensitive information to criminals 
(e.g. regarding upcoming searches/arrests – a warning 
signal). 
“Q. Was there an occasion when on the telephone you sought 
information from Detective Jasper about yourself? A. Yes, I did. Q. 
What did you ask about? A. I asked him if I was red hot, which means 
I asked him if I was being tailed by other police officers.... I got a 
phone call saying, “It's red hot. I'll give you a call when I can” (p.474-
475). 
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Internal 
Payoffs/Bribes 
Internal payoffs “regulate a market where police officers' 
prerogatives may be bought, bartered, or sold. Actors are 
exclusively police officers. Prerogatives negotiated 
encompass work assignments, off-days, holidays, vacation 
periods, control of evidence, and promotions” (Roebuck 
& Baker, 1974, p. 434). 
“Officers who administer the distribution of assignments and 
personnel may collect fees for assigning officers to certain divisions, 
precincts, units, details, shifts, and beats; for insuring that selected 
personnel are retained in, transferred from, or excluded from certain 
work assignments.8 In departments taking protection money from vice 
operations, officers may con- tact command personnel and bid for 
“good” (lucrative) assignments” (Roebuck & Baker, 1974, p. 434). 
Extortion Demanding payment, under threat of action, from those in 
conflict with the law. 
“Q. Doing the best you can, can you tell us what it was that was said 
to you about the money and the ingot? A. I was told that they'd found 
the $10,000 in the house and if I had a problem with it, I would have 
another charge” (p. 4206). 
Money Laundering The process of making illegally-gained proceeds (i.e. 
“dirty money”) appears legal (i.e. "clean"). Officers would 
exchange dirty bills for clean bills. 
“Q. Did you tell him that the split for that service that you would 
provide him would be a 60:40 split, that is, M5 would keep 60 per 
cent of the money and 40 per cent would be kept by yourself or your 
mate? A. Oh, I could have done so. I don't - as I said, I remember 
vaguely taking the money from him. Q. In fact, is that what you did - 
you took some money from M5 in 1999 and laundered it on his 
behalf? A. Yes” (p. 5061). 
Fabricating 
Evidence 
Fabrication of evidence (omission or creation of 
testimony, physical evidence…etc.) 
“A. It reads: ... in the space of 45 minutes, four persons entered the 
premises and left a short time after (within 5 minutes) none of these 
persons were known to investigators. However, they did appear to be 
drug addicts. That's not correct. That did not happen. Q. You just 
invented that to make the application look better? A. Yes, sir, I did” 
(p.406). 
Perjury The intentional act of swearing a false oath or of 
falsifying an affirmation to tell the truth, whether spoken 
or in writing, concerning matters material to an official 
proceeding. 
“Q. Thank you, December '98, I take it you had been involved in a 
number of criminal activities as a police officer? A. In the past, yes. Q. 
Committing perjury? A. Yes. Q. On many occasions? A. Yes” (p. 
6018). 
 
Covering Up Activities  
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Paper trail A consistent paper trail was left to cover false 
searches/interviews…etc.:                                                     
1. Missing Document -Police documents were used to 
cover up activities, for example using a statutory 
declaration to cover up missing occupiers notice/search 
warrant.                                                                              
2. False Documents - To cover up the false statement 
they would reinsert the document into the typewriter to 
make it look real                                                                                                          
3. Duty Book Entries - To cover up their activities they 
ensured that their duty books where exactly the same. 
Therefore, false entries were made to cover up corrupt 
activities (e.g. recording a lesser amount of drugs/money 
then was actually seized and taking the rest). 
 Missing Document- “Q. In relation to it, you record in paragraph 
20 of your statement that Stuart said this about the statutory 
declaration: After the job we put our heads together and we 
remembered we left the occupier's notice behind but, we fucked up 
so I made the stat Dec to cover me arse” (p.5234).  
 False Document – “Q. In relation to the record of interview itself, 
at one stage the document records that the interview was taken out 
of the typewriter and handed to C11 to read aloud? A. Yes. Q. For 
the purposes of authenticity, would you have actually taken the 
document out of the typewriter and then reinserted it so that you 
get a misalignment between questions and answers appearing 
above that step? A. Yes. Q. Is that right? A. Yes” (p.5297).                                                                                                                                                   
 Duty Book Entries – “Q. All I'm asking you is, surely, besides 
worrying about the money, if you had really decided, as you have 
said you did, to lie about it and make up that conspiracy to start 
framing or putting a defence into a hole that can't be moved, at that 
point one of the first things you would have done is ensure the 
other six filled in their duty books accordingly, otherwise you may 
be caught out; wouldn't that be right? A. Yes…The thing is, yes, 
what you're saying is right, as far as the duty books, but that's if 
you fill your duty book in on time. It's common practice, in my 
experience, to make sure that everybody - everybody's duty books 
essentially end up the same” (p.4176) 
Hidden 
Money/Stolen 
Goods 
1. Money Buried - Officers outline that they hid their 
money under their homes for safe keeping rather than 
depositing into a bank.                                                        
2. Money Laundered - In order to cover up the money 
that was stolen or given to officers as part of a plea deal 
was laundered into new note 
 Money Buried – “Q. What did you do with the $5,000 that you 
say you got? A. I buried it under the house. Buried it? A. Yeah. Q. 
What, you had other money buried there too, did you? A. Yes” (p. 
4180).                                                                                                                                  
 Money Laundered – “Q. Can you tell the Commission briefly 
what that incident involved? A. The retrieval of that jar containing 
money was in relation to Jim King, or the start of a process where 
the money - that money, which was old and in a deteriorating 
condition, was to be laundered; that is, exchanged for newer 
currency” (p.5989). 
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Consistent 
Testimony 
Officers involved in corruption activities made sure that 
they maintained the same stories throughout. 
“Q. Was an agreement reached between the four of you to maintain 
the line that you had maintained in your statements and evidence to 
other courts? A. Yes. Q. Can you tell us the effect of the conversations 
in that regard? A. Well, the effect was just to stick to the story” 
(p.5326). 
False/Creation of 
Evidence 
To cover up arrests, verbals, evidence found at search 
warrants, officers would find items that matched their 
reports in order to convict offenders. 
“Q. Did you have any part to play in the creation of the false 
identification? A. I know that when we… I'm not sure where the 
wallet came from. It would have been, I don't know, a spare one of 
someone's. My recollection is that it wasn't the actual - an actual 
badge that a police officer uses, it was actually of a hat badge that 
turned up. My recollection is that Dowding supplied that. And whilst 
we were in the meal room there, it was noticed that there was a blue 
tea towel which was similar in colour to the backing of a constable's 
badge, and part of that cloth was cut out and put behind the badge in 
that wallet” (p.5352-5353). 
Disposal of 
Exhibits 
During the time of the Royal Commission officers were 
instructed to dispose of any exhibits/weapons that were 
not legitimate. Exhibits such as knifes were broken and 
thrown in the trash and weapons were thrown in the river. 
“A. There was a couple of old knives which were broken up and the 
blades broken. There was a set of old-style handcuffs - not police issue 
handcuffs, but older style set of handcuffs. They were broken up with 
a sledgehammer and then placed in the bin…There is a dumpster bin 
at the back of Chatswood police station. Once they have been broken 
up and made un-useable they are put into the dumpster bin” (p. 3068-
3069). 
Police Informants Police informants were involved in covering up activities. 
For example, informants making false statements. 
“Q. He offered you $500? A. Yes. Q. Did he say what that was for? A. 
Yeah, he said it was for a - he had caught some woman with some 
drugs. Q. Did he say that that $500 was for you for the -- A. Yes. Q. 
Had you provided any information with -- A. No” (p.5842). 
Maintain Lifestyle Officers maintained a low-key lifestyle. Consistent 
spending throughout their corrupt career. 
“But I didn't - I didn't go to any particular place and openly gamble 
large amounts of money because I didn't want to - I didn't want 
anyone to attract any attention to the fact that, you know, here's the 
local constable walking around here and he's betting 500 bucks, you 
know, and where's he getting the money from?” (p.1856). 
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Not in front of 
Camera 
Officers ensured that if they were to conduct any false 
interviews or assaults that they were not to be done in 
front of any cameras. 
“We just don't do it in front of the videos”; do you remember that? A. 
Yes, that's what it says.... Q. Was that a reference to a practice taking 
place at Manly where people were being assaulted but care was taken 
to ensure that it didn't happen in front of the video cameras in the 
station? A. No, sir, not that I know of. Q. That's what you were 
referring to, wasn't it? A. Yes, sir” (p.546-547). 
Keeping in House To protect their own, any misconduct and corruption was 
kept in house. 
“A. My attitude was that at that particular time, after being told of the 
circumstances of why King had been stopped, I realised that there 
were no other witnesses other than police, that King had not been 
involved in a motor vehicle accident, there were no other property 
damage, there were no other witnesses, from what I can establish, at 
that particular time of the morning, and I felt as though if he was to be 
charged by means of being breathalysed, and coming under the notice 
of Internal Affairs, that his career would be in jeopardy. Accordingly, 
I took the option of making a decision of informing his superior 
officer and keeping it in-house” (p. 1329). 
Trusted Actors Only officers who knew they could be trusted (e.g. 
through reputation of being another corrupt cop or an 
officer who has witnessed incidences of corruption and 
has kept their mouth shut). Also, family members were 
also kept in the dark if they could not be trusted. 
“Q. And did you come to trust him from time to time in relation to 
your work? A. Yes. Q. And did you from time to time confide things 
in him in relation to your work? A. Yes. Q. Was he someone to whom 
you might say something in confidence, hoping that he would not 
repeat it to others? A. Yes” (p.1163). 
Deals Made with 
Offenders 
Officers made sure that they spoke to the suspect before 
engaging in corruption (e.g. stealing money from them). 
Officers would cut a deal with offenders (e.g. charging 
offender with lesser degree or leaving some money/drugs 
behind). 
“Q. But this was experience in corruption, was it not? A. Not my 
experience in corruption, no. Q. Well, why did you say it? A. Because 
it's - I mean - I'd been in the field, I knew what was - what had to be 
done, because that's what happened. Q. What, money was stolen from 
suspects and they complained if they weren't asked first? A. Well they 
could complain, yeah, that's what - what criminals would tell you” 
(p.563). 
Use of Technology Officers would record suspects outlining that they would 
not sign anything. This was used to justify why a 
statement was not signed (which the police prepared - 
false statement). 
“I suppose part and parcel with that, it was also a practice to record an 
early refusal by an offender to sign anything so as to indicate a reason 
why the false confession was not signed by the offender? A. Yes” 
(p.3331). 
308 
 
 
Culture 
    
Cliques/In-Group Only officers part of the in-group (that could be trusted) 
where included in discussions/meetings. Others were 
excluded from the operations. It was also a male 
dominated culture – females were not in the in-group. 
“Q. Did you try to ingratiate yourself with them, try to break into the 
clique? A. Yeah, I did. Q. Was that unsuccessful? A. Well, you know, 
I got on well with them, but things would come up and there was 
always people whispering and talking and I always found that I was 
excluded from that sort of stuff. When I say whispering and talking, 
they were talking about jobs. I would not be involved” (p.2355). 
Divisional Cultures The culture/atmosphere between units/divisions were 
different (e.g. some divisions accepted the 
corruption/misconduct while others did not). 
“Q. In what way was the supervision different in the anti-theft squad 
compared with the way things happened at Manly? A. Well, as I just 
mentioned, basically the commander of the section would be with you 
while you were working the operation there. That is, effecting arrests, 
executing search warrants, conducting surveillance, the charging 
processes and the like. He'd be there 90 per cent of the time” (p. 347). 
Drinking Culture There was an open drinking culture among officers. Some 
even had their own personal beer fridge in their office. 
Many officers admit to drinking on the job and have also 
been pulled over for drunk driving. Common for officers 
to go out and have a social drink during and after work 
“Q. Would it be correct to say that you generally drank on duty with 
police – other police? A. Yes” (p. 1012). “Q. Do you ever recall in 
your career any officer being so drunk that he had to be taken out of 
the station? A. Oh, a number of times” (p.1530). 
Hogwash Officers commonly embellished/told lies to fit in or to 
impress other officers (e.g. some officers would lie about 
stealing from offenders when in actual fact they did not). 
“Q. You were in the practice of telling lies to each other, were you? A. 
Yes. Q. What was the purpose of that? A. I don't know. It was just - 
that's what we did. Q. Did you ever tell lies to each other about being 
involved in corrupt activities? A. I'm not sure, but - as I indicated, we 
used to tell each other basically hogwash all the time” (p.5930). 
Unwritten 
Rules/Norms 
There are a number of unwritten rules that officers needed 
to follow in order to fit in. It was common practice to: 
 Load and verbal criminals 
 Give false statements/testimony in court 
 Conspire to protect other officers (aka the Brotherhood 
and code of silence). 
“Q. And they were not formal rules; they were informal rules imposed 
by senior officers who had been in the Service for a long time? A. 
Yes. Q. And part of the rules where that if you didn't play the game in 
which they were engaged of acting improperly and corruptly, then you 
weren't part of the club that was going to get on in the Service? A. 
That's right” (p. 538). 
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Treatment of 
Whistle-blowers 
Officers who spoke up against misconduct or corruption 
would become a target for harassment and ostracised (e.g. 
threats were made against their families if they made 
formal complaints/reports). 
“Q. You didn't report any part of this conversation to anybody? A. No, 
sir, because it would have implicated me. Q. And you knew of your 
obligations to report misconduct? A. Sir, I do and I have already 
reported misconduct on one occasion and I was victimised for it” 
(p.572-573). 
 
Institutional Failures  
Creation of Special 
Units/Allocation of 
Officers 
Special units were created to combat crime. For example, 
Magnum was created to reduce the number of armed 
robberies and this was done to any cost. 
“Q. You say it wasn't necessary to have a discussion about that or get 
a direction or talk about it at any length; the group that were brought 
together, as far as you knew, were all prepared to do whatever had to 
be done -- A. Exactly. Q. -- to get a conviction? A. That's correct. Q. 
Do you say now that is why former Inspector Davidson was put in 
charge of the team? A. I believe so, yes” (p.5245). 
Insufficient Staff Officers outlined that there were not enough staff and 
therefore had to bring in staff from other units/ 
department. Collaborations between officers resulted in 
new officers being corrupt. 
A. Some days you wouldn't have any detectives in the office 
physically - they would be at court; they would be at various other 
secondments - so if a crime happened you could then extend the - I 
guess the gauntlet out to other commands. So we're unlike sort of the 
fire brigade or ambulance service where they sit in the station and wait 
to react. We're busy all the time. So they would be rostered on, but at 
various locations and operations. As I say, if the crime got serious we 
would up the ante of bringing in other places (p.2016). 
Following Orders 
from Senior Staff 
Some senior officers would encourage misconduct or turn 
a blind eye to officer’s activities, especially when it 
resulted in arrests. 
We were given a direction to do something and we did it. It wasn't a 
matter of, “Yes, we'll go along with you, yes, we'll do this.” That 
didn't happen at all. We followed a direction and - or I followed a 
direction and that's what we did” (p. 4964). 
Expectations of 
Senior Officers 
Senior officers were under a lot of pressure to reduce the 
number of armed robberies. Senior officers were viewed 
that they had an expectation that all means would be 
carried out to achieve results. 
“Q. And it was accepted within the Service - or no questions, to your 
knowledge, were asked about this methodology being adopted? A. 
None whatsoever. I believe it was expected of us from higher ranking 
officers. Q. Was that said to you? A. No, it was just -- Q. It was a 
belief you formed? A. From – yeah” (p. 5247). 
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Lack of Oversight Senior officers outlined that they lacked oversight because 
they trusted their officers to do a good job. 
“Q. How was it that you hadn't detected that that procedure was not 
being followed? A. Well, I had five inspectors - well, six, including 
the crime manager, plus another 12-odd team leaders and sergeants 
under that and then senior constables. I'd assign to them portfolios and 
teams. The teams had responsibility for the systems and so there were 
a number of gateways to go through first and I trusted they were doing 
it and I would only have a look in the dip sampling about once a year” 
(p. 2010). 
No Sanction for 
Past Behaviour 
Officers were not sanctioned for previous discretions (e.g. 
Patison having previous dealing with drug dealers with no 
penalty). 
“Q. He had been the person who had been the subject of a 181D 
dismissal review, had he not? A. Yes, he has. Q. And almost 
immediately before you assumed your command, he had been the 
subject of a significant internal investigation in relation to allegations 
of improper dealings with drug dealers, had he not? A. Yes…A. 
Because there was no sanctions as a result of those investigations I 
made a presumption that there was no - either no substance in those 
complaints or, if there was, then he'd either stopped that behaviour or 
didn't behave in that way in the beginning” (p.2005-2006). 
Lack of Training Officers outlined that they were not fully trained and 
therefore observe or realise that procedures were not 
followed through correctly by fellow officers. 
“Q. Did you think that was a breach of correct procedure as well? A. I 
wouldn't have known. I don't know what the procedure is in relation to 
the charging of police officers, I don't know” (p. 4954-4955). 
Location of 
Detectives Office 
Manly detectives were separate from the other units which 
could have led to the operation of their corrupt activities. 
“Q. One of the matters which was identified by the audits as being 
unsatisfactory was the geographical situation which existed at the 
Manly local area command with the office of the commander being 
separate from the workplace of the detectives in particular. Was that a 
situation which was specifically brought to your attention? A. Oh, I 
was aware of it. I was certainly aware of the construct of the police 
command. I wasn't aware that the separation presented a problem, as 
such” (p. 2053). 
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Reporting 
Misconduct/Corru
ption of Senior 
Officers 
Officers failed to report misconduct/corrupt because of 
the fears of consequences to themselves and to other 
officers. Other officers did not report because they did not 
believe the embellished stories of corruption from other 
officers or didn’t see it as their role to do so (e.g. junior 
officers). 
“Q. Is there any reason why you didn't raise it with Senior Sergeant 
Smith? A. As I said, I was a relatively junior officer in the crime 
squad for a period of time. It was obvious to me that N1 was under the 
influence on occasions. I didn't see it as my role to act upon it when I 
believe that other people could see the same things that I was seeing” 
(p. 2866). 
 
Factors of Influence 
Influence of 
Officers 
Officers engaged in misconduct/corrupt activities because 
of the influence of officers. There were 3 sub-categories 
of influence: 
 Expectations of Senior Officers: “Q. Because of the problem that 
existed at the time? A. At the time there was a very large problem 
with armoured robberies - Armguard robberies - armoured van 
robberies. Q. And it was accepted within the Service - or no 
questions, to your knowledge, were asked about this methodology 
being adopted? A. None whatsoever. I believe it was expected of 
us from higher ranking officers. Q. Was that said to you? A. No, it 
was just -- Q. It was a belief you formed? A. From – yeah” 
(p.5247). 
1.       Influence of Senior Officers -                           
A)     Expectations - Senior officers endorsed the use of 
unethical means to get a conviction.                                                        
B)      Following Orders – officers followed ordered from 
senior officers 
 Following Orders from Senior Officer “A. From what I can 
recall, of shock, that I had directed such a thing. But, I guess being 
police officers obeying a superior officer, they obeyed that 
particular direction. But initially it was shock. Q. That direction 
was given to them not as a suggestion, but as an order, as far as 
you were concerned? A. As a direction, yes, not an order but a 
direction. Q. As far as you are aware, they felt the need to follow 
that because it was a direction? A. Yes” (p.4682) 
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2.       Influence of Officers in unit                                       
A)     Expectations – if you didn’t engage in corrupt 
activities you weren’t part of the unit                                                                                
B)   Following Directions – officers followed the 
directions from other officers in their unit 
 Expectations of Officer: “Q. What was said, to the best of your 
recollection? A. Basically, it was just "It's got to be done. If you 
don't do it, I'll do it." Q. Who said that? A. John. Q. And when he 
said, "It's got to be done," what was he referring to? A. Well, if 
C11 had to be verballed and loaded, someone had to do it and I 
suppose he pressed a few buttons on my ego and I then agreed to 
do it. Q. Which buttons were those? A. The ones that say "You're 
a weak bastard if you don't” (p. 5290). 
   Following Order from other officers: “We were given a 
direction to do something and we did it. It wasn't a matter of, 
"Yes, we'll go along with you, yes, we'll do this." That didn't 
happen at all. We followed a direction and - or I followed a 
direction and that's what we did” (p.4964). 
Increase Statistics Motivated to reduce crime rates “But I got money from them, I never said no. I'm not making excuses 
for it, but, still, my prime aim was to get statistics up for the - or 
impact on drug crime for the command. It wasn't to get my dollars in 
and that” (p. 267). 
Lack of Empathy Officers engaged in misconduct/corruption because they 
lacked empathy for the offenders they loaded or 
verbalised 
“A. Well, there is - there is something that I can say in relation to that. 
I mean, the way that's worded gives a very cold and hard flavour to it, 
which it is, I suppose, but in saying that, in my experience of the 
things that I have been involved in and witnessed over the years - and 
I bring the M11 matter to mind - is that on most of these occasions, 
this load-up and verbal, as you call it, yes, was done, but I think the 
mind set in relation - as far as we were concerned was that it is not as 
if - it is not as if they hadn't committed the offence” (p. 3388). 
No sanction for 
past behaviour 
Some officers had previous sanctions for misconduct. For 
example, Patison was known as a 'risk' in the force 
because of his past behaviour with drug dealers. Many red 
flags but no sanctions for his behaviour could have led to 
his downfall. 
“Q. In Detective Patison’s case, which happens to be a good example, 
he had been the subject of suggestions in the past, had he not, of 
improper relationship with drug dealers? A. Yes, he did. Q. He had 
been the person who had been the subject of a 181D dismissal review, 
had he not? A. Yes, he has... Because there was no sanctions as a 
result of those investigations I made a presumption that there was no - 
either no substance in those complaints or, if there was, then he'd 
either stopped that behaviour or didn't behave in that way in the 
beginning” (p.1542). 
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Not going to get 
caught 
Officers outlined that they engaged in corrupt activities 
because they didn’t think they would get caught. Even if 
there was some suspicion, it would be very hard to prove 
“I'm sure it's a massive part of it, sir, that you just - you just don't care 
what you're doing because you just don't think - even if you do get 
caught you don't think it's going to lead to a successful conviction 
because if you tell a few lies you might throw some doubt into a jury's 
mind and you'll get it away with it” (p.369). 
Opportunity Officers outlined they engaged in corrupt activities 
because there was an opportunity to do so (drug unit). 
“Q. Did that seem to open up more opportunities, from what you 
could observe, for corruption than had been the case in relation to the 
anti-theft investigations? A. Yes, I could - suppose you could say that. 
I mean, where there is drugs there seems to be vast amounts of 
money” (p.348). 
Protecting Family Officers would lie or provide false evidence to protect 
their family or other officers. 
“Q. What was your reason for giving the false or misleading 
evidence? A. I have two children. They're now 20 and 17. Their 
mother passed away in 1993 of breast cancer. My attitude was if I 
went to gaol, who was going to look after my kids and, yes, I was 
concerned about it. And that's why I gave - I wanted to be there for my 
children because no-one else was going to be there for them and that's 
the reason I gave the false and misleading information” (p.5542). 
Not in the right 
state of mind 
Officers outlined they engaged in corruption (e.g. 
accepted money) because they were depressed at the time 
and not in the right state of mind. 
“Q. In relation to receiving money which you believed to be stolen in 
relation to the execution of the search warrants, you knew that that 
was wrong, did you? A. Yes, I did, sir. Q. Why did you do that? A. I 
was depressed. Q. Depressed? A. (Witness nods). Q. And why did 
your depression cause you to take money? A. For some reason it made 
me feel a bit better. I don't know. It's something now I just can't 
understand why I did it” (p.2076). 
The Devil Inside In the officer’s personal characteristics and nature to 
engage in corruption/misconduct despite senior officer’s 
present. 
“A. Oh, I don't believe so, sir. Because I - I was probably in that frame 
of mind that I would have done it even - as I say, like, there was good, 
honest supervisors there during the search warrants and I still took 
money and did the wrong thing, sir. Their presence there - it didn't sort 
of - it didn't influence me, sir, put it that way, and my supervision at 
work - if I'm going to do the wrong thing, you just lie to someone 
about it and you say, “I'm going out to meet so and so. He wants to 
talk to me about some information,” and off you go” (p.1830-1831). 
314 
 
Traditional 
Methods 
Unsuccessful 
Officers outlined that if they did not load and verbalise 
criminals that it would be hard to get a conviction and 
therefore resorted to unethical methods to ensure the bad 
guys are put away. 
“Q. Would it be true to say that in the short period of time that 
Magnum was set up, if you just used traditional methods without 
loading and verballing, it would be difficult to get too many of them to 
court? A. It probably would have been, yes. I mean, some of the 
matters - I mean, you know, we caught people in the act, you know. 
Obviously those, but a lot of others would have been quite hard, yes” 
(p.5244). 
 
Operation 
    
Communication Communication between actors can in a number of forms:                                                                                     
1. Code words/gestures - Officers would use code words 
to in person and over the phone to discuss corrupt 
activities, such as exchange of stolen money.                                                                                      
2. Pre-Game/Post Game Discussions - Officers outlined 
that there would be pre-discussion regarding searches or 
post discussion regarding how money was to be split. For 
example, officers met up under the bridge and had a 
discussion regarding how the money was going to be split. 
Roseville Bridge was an area that the officers had social 
engagements - e.g. bbqs.                                                      
3. Negotiations with Offenders - Officers regularly had 
discussions with offenders to cut a deal with them (e.g. 
give money to lessen the charge/green-light 
activities…etc.). 
 Code words: Q. "Slimy mackerel" was one of the more 
memorable phrases… “Q. Why did you assume it was a 
reference to $500 and not $1,000? A. Oh, only because that's 
just a very small fish. That particular fish is only a small fish, 
and by that I would just assume that the amount of money that 
he received was only a small amount, being $500” (p.369).                                                                    
 Pre-Game/Post Game Discussion – “Q. When did you first 
appreciate that there was money in the van, are you able to say, 
or had there been some discussion between you and N1 that 
that's what you were going to do or what? A. I think - well, 
there had been some…discussions, yeah. Ni had said, "Come 
on, we'll - pretty much - I can't recall the exact words or the 
conversation I had with N1, but, you know, he told me he had 
the money and we were going down to split it up under the 
bridge” (p. 2895-2896).                                                                            
 Negotiations with Offenders – “We want 10 grand or 10 big 
ones”, or what? A. It was “Have you got any of this on the 
premises?” ra, ra, ra. They went and checked rooms for cash 
and then they came back and they said, “Can you get us” and I 
said, “How much?”, and they went like that. Q. So one of them 
did, in fact, put their 10 fingers in the air; is that so? A. Yes. 
And they weren't joking. They meant it” p.2429-2430). 
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Collaboration 
between actors 
Officers worked as a team and collaborated when 
engaging and covering up misconduct/corruption. For 
example, making sure everyone wrote the same thing in 
their duty books. 
“Q. It was each man's own business? A. No - no, that's not right. Why 
wasn't it each man's business? Why was that not right? A. Because it 
was done as a team.  Q. With the knowledge and acquiescence of the 
members of the team?  A. It was the only way it could be done” 
(p.3203). 
Loading, 
Verballing and 
Opportunistic 
Theft 
Officers outlined that they created new or modified 
existing evidence in order to get a conviction. 
Specifically: 
 Loading: “I'm not sure where the wallet came from. It would have 
been, I don't know, a spare one of someone's. My recollection is 
that it wasn't the actual - an actual badge that a police officer uses, 
it was actually of a hat badge that turned up. My recollection is 
that Dowding supplied that. And whilst we were in the meal room 
there, it was noticed that there was a blue tea towel which was 
similar in colour to the backing of a constable's badge, and part of 
that cloth was cut out and put behind the badge in that wallet. Q. 
Do you know who cut it out? A. It could have been me. I'm not 
sure, but I think it could have been me” (p. 5352-5353).                            
 Verbals – “Q. Can I just ask you, did your legal representative 
question Dowding about the assault in the interview room? A. To 
the best of my memory, I think he did; I think he did. Q. Well, did 
Dowding tell the truth about that? Was there an admission? A. No, 
he didn't admit that we were assaulted, no” (p.3636)                                                                                                                                        
 Opportunistic theft – “I think there was about 3 grams of heroin 
in that drawer where the money - where I took the money from, 
and I think it was on the proviso that I didn't charge him with that 
heroin that we take that money. And I eventually took that heroin 
and sold it back to M10, sir” (p.1713).  
1.       Loading – created evidence to plant on offenders 
(e.g. using old exhibits) 
2.       Verbals – False statements created 
3.    Opportunistic Theft -stole only from offenders that 
Money Exchange Consistent themes across money exchange: “Q. I will go back to the details in a moment, but how is it that you 
relate that $5,000 to the investigation and arrest of L17? A. Well, as I 
said, there was discussions between Hill and myself and during the 
course of those I became aware that through B11, and organised by 
McClelland, there was going to be $50,000 paid in relation to the 
[L17] matter. As I said earlier, when we met in that Gosford area, that 
matter was mentioned whilst we had downtime there, and at 
  
 money was corruptly taken by the police involved 
in the Operation; 
 an arrangement was arrived at between N1 and 
Hulme as to how the money was to be shared 
between Manly Detectives and MCSN; 
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 there was considerable drinking at the end of the 
Operation; 
Chatswood the money was there which was, in effect, one tenth of the 
amount” (p. 4148). 
 F7 and King were involved in an unusual journey 
at the conclusion of the Operation; 
 a count of the money took place under the 
Roseville Bridge; and 
 the money corruptly taken was later distributed 
amongst police at MCSN (p. 181) 
Equal Share All officers who were part of the corruption received their 
equal share even if they were not physically present 
during search. Some of the officers were even on vacation 
and came back to the office to find money in their duty 
books. 
“Q. Why did he receive a share of the money if he hadn't been a party 
to the activity which took place on the day of the searches? A. That 
was probably part of the culture. If you're working with people and 
you're involved in that kind of behaviour, you would normally include 
everyone in it. Just because you weren't there doesn't mean that you're 
not involved” (p.1712). 
Rick Analysis If it was too risky to take money (e.g. other officers 
around), then they would wait or create another 
opportunity to go back and take the money 
“Q. Do you remember what it was about this situation which caused 
you not to take the money when you first found it? A. There was a 
substantial amount of money, sir. I could never have fitted that in my 
trousers. I didn't have any other means to get the money out of there 
and I felt that if I left it there and just came up with an excuse to take 
him back later on, then, you know, there wouldn't be any other police 
around” (p. 1821). 
 
Roles 
    
Broker Information between two clusters that otherwise would 
not have been in contact. 
“Approximately 475 grams of cannabis and $31 000 cash was found 
in Benbows car. M5 approached Benbow and suggested that he make 
a payment/tax to be permitted to continue his drug supplying 
activities. Patison also met with Benbow and made this suggestion - a 
lump sum of $15 000 to enable him to continue to supply drugs. 
Patison also introduced Benbow to Caccamo and Markarian (drug 
dealers) to bridge a connection between them” (p. 16-17). 
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Influencer There were certain officers who influenced other officers 
to engage in misconduct/corruption. 
“Q. But you went down that path without any real persuasion from 
anyone? A. No, I made that decision - well, not entirely without 
persuasion. M5 played a large role in persuading me to go down that 
particular path, but I did go down that path” (p. 3126). 
Knowledge Source Certain actors in the network had particular resources, 
skills or knowledge that was useful in the operation of 
corrupt activities. 
“Later on you say: ... and all that. I, oh it's a distance away. There's no 
problem. M5 says: Yeah. You say: He deals in cash all the time. What 
you were telling M5 here, weren't you, was that you were going to 
give this money to an acquaintance of yours who would put it through 
his cash business” (p.5091). 
 
Trust and Trustworthiness  
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Types of Trust There are a number of forms of trust identified:                 
1. Occupational Trust - trust in others in the police force 
(e.g. the thin blue line).                                                                                         
2. Friendship/Family trust - Some officers had personal 
relationships outside of work (e.g. played football 
together or went to family bbqs). These relationships 
demonstrated an element of personal trust.                                                                       
3. Third Party Trust - Officers involved their parties into 
their network (e.g. Lawyers, informants) to assist in some 
of the corrupt dealings 
 Occupational Trust: “Q. He was someone you trusted back in 
the early '90s? A. Yes. Q. You were very pleased to have him 
on your armed hold-up squad team? A. He was quite a smart 
person, yes. Q. So much so that he was in charge of the SWOS 
firearms for a time? A. Well, that was sort of with the position 
of what he was doing, yes, but certainly that, yes. Q. Isn't that 
indicative of someone who has the experience and the integrity 
such that you could trust him? A. Well, it certainly - it goes 
with the job of being the weapons instructor that it would most 
probably follow he would have carriage of the SWOS cabinet. 
Q. So he was a trusted member of your team? A. Yes” (p. 
3746-3747)                                                                                                                                                                                         
 Friendship/family Trust: “Would you describe your 
friendship with M5 as at February 1992 as a close friendship? 
A. Yes. Q. And was M5 someone with whom you from time to 
time worked on investigations with when you were with the 
Police Service? A. Yes. Q. During that time did you come to 
trust M5? A. Yes…Q. So he remained someone whom you 
would trust; is that right? A. Yes. Q. And he remained 
someone in whom you would confide things; is that correct? 
A. Yes” (p. 1164).                                                                      
 Third Party Trust – “A. My recollection is that they had 
come up with a scenario which would involve getting an 
informant of O'Toole's involved, who he could trust” (p. 4632-
4633). 
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Trustworthiness  Trustworthiness was based off of:                                     
1. Trustworthiness based on character - Officers 
outlined that he knew certain individuals could trusted 
with information because of their reputation/character 
(e.g. the type of person that would not dob you in).                                                        
2. Trustworthiness based on past behaviour - Officers 
outlined that trust was based off of a person’s reputation 
(examples of corruption in the past).                                                                                          
3. Trustworthiness based on association - Only in-group 
officers were trusted. Officers outlined that certain 
groups/units could be trusted with information/money 
from corrupt dealings.                                                                                        
4. Vouched Trustworthiness - Actors in the network 
who were vouched for by trusted officers could be trusted.                                                                      
5. Word-of-Mouth - individual actors are found out 
through word-of-mouth. Word-of-mouth appears to be the 
most used method to find out if an officer is keen to take 
money.                                                                               
6. Embellishing Stories to demonstrate 
trustworthiness: Officers outlined that they would often 
lie/ramble on about things that he had done (e.g. 
assaulting criminals) to keep up the appearance that he 
was someone who could be trusted. 
 Trustworthiness based on character: “Q. How did you know 
that you could rely on O'Toole not to do anything about your own 
misconduct? A. For two reasons: that I had known O'Toole; 
secondly, that I believed that he believed, like me, in the thin blue 
line - to look after your own - and that he would take the necessary 
action in-house. Q. How did you know that he believed in the thin 
blue line? A. Oh, I guess because of his service, like mine - it was 
a culture. I'm presuming. I'm presuming that” (p. 4744).                                                                                                                                  
 Trustworthiness based on past behaviour: “You see, if that was 
the case, how would people know when someone's only been there 
three months? Did you have the reputation for taking money under 
the counter? A. I believe I would have had a reputation that I 
would have been amenable to it, yes” (p. 4173).                                                                  
 Trustworthiness based on Association – “Q. Was Blake chosen 
because he was someone who could be trusted? A. Anybody in the 
armed hold-up squad could be trusted” (p. 5499).                                                                                               
 Vouched Trustworthiness: “Q. How did you know during the 
search that he was someone who may be inclined to join in with 
the taking of the money? A. I was just told by Patison and Peattie 
that he was okay, and from that I presumed that he - he was - he 
should be included” (p. 375).                                                                                                           
 Word-of-Mouth – “Q. Right. The logical question which follows 
is: how does one, who does not necessarily have knowledge in 
advance, know that a given police officer is "amenable" to that 
kind of situation prior to putting the word on him or her? A. Yes, 
that's a good question. It's probably word of mouth, I suppose” (p. 
4188).  
 Embellishing storied to demonstrate trustworthiness “Q. Well 
what was the reason, then? A. I don't know sir, I was just running 
off at the mouth again. Q. But that was the purpose, wasn't it, to 
show that you were still part of the club, part of the giggle, 
someone who could be trusted -- A. Yes, sir” (p. 551). 
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Test to Determine 
Trustworthiness of 
Actors 
There were a number of techniques used by actors in the 
network to determine whether someone could be trusted 
or not:                                                
1.  Jokes/Hints – jokes about corrupt behaviour to see 
how others would react.                                             
2. Tests - testing individuals to determine their 
trustworthiness. 
 Jokes: “When you say "hints", there may have been a few little 
jokes here and there that you pick up on, you just listen to, and 
when you're working with older fellows you just pretty much see 
how they do things” (p. 348).               
 Tests: “I think there was about $500 or $600, sir, just under my 
plate. Now, I was - I think that was in the early stages of being in 
the drug squad and I think it might have been a case of - maybe 
not a testing, but I think the circumstances might have been that, 
you know, if the money is put there, then I don't know where it's 
come from and I don't know who has given it to me, but I think 
later on if we had a few beers, I think we had a few beers just 
down the road at the hotel there, I think I later found out that this 
fellow had paid money to get bail. Now, I don't know who that 
money was paid to. I don't know who did those negotiations. I 
didn't. I didn't ask. I took the money and I just didn't ask any 
questions about it, sir” (p.1716). 
Breaches of Trust Instances where trust has been breached/broken between 
actors involved in the corruption. 
“Q. That's because, is it, your corrupt attitude of the past had not 
changed? A. I wouldn't say it hadn't changed, but when it came to 
loyalty for Patison, then it had changed - it hadn't changed. Q. You 
know from what you've seen on the video that it was Detective Patison 
who in fact took the money? A. Yes, sir. Q. And, indeed, that was part 
of the conversation with M5, was it not, that Patison had taken six but 
had only revealed four - thousand dollars, that is? A. Well, I didn't 
know if it was four or six hundred or four or six thousand” (p.561-
562). 
Building Trust 
with Third Parties 
Offer of Good Faith: Officer outlined that they only took 
some of the money and left some drugs behind (there they 
were both present) to establish good faith between them 
and the offender. 
I spoke to him about the money and I said that "I've taken about three-
quarters of the money that was in the boot. We've left some cannabis 
there in the esky for you," and that was - that was just like an offer of 
good faith, that he - that he wouldn't - that he wouldn't report us to the 
authorities for taking the money, sir. Q. Did he appear to accept that 
situation? A. Yes, sir (p. 1795-1796) 
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Appendix J: 2-Mode Centrality Measures 
Table J1: 2-Mode Centrality Measures Full 
  Degree 2-Local Eigenvect Closeness Betweenne 
Patison 0.536 0.287 0.558 0.626 0.321 
M5 0.482 0.232 0.58 0.671 0.345 
Jasper 0.339 0.115 0.395 0.521 0.122 
King 0.25 0.063 0.267 0.536 0.085 
DavidsonS 0.143 0.02 0.14 0.507 0.078 
Peattie 0.143 0.02 0.186 0.457 0.011 
N1 0.125 0.016 0.104 0.489 0.052 
Dowding 0.107 0.011 0.134 0.469 0.008 
Hill 0.107 0.011 0.076 0.453 0.03 
O'Toole 0.107 0.011 0.09 0.407 0.029 
Messenger 0.089 0.008 0.092 0.45 0.006 
F7 0.071 0.005 0.08 0.41 0.004 
Kendall 0.071 0.005 0.044 0.446 0.025 
Monk 0.071 0.005 0.06 0.453 0.005 
Ehsman 0.054 0.003 0.061 0.393 0.001 
Kempnich 0.054 0.003 0 22.4 0 
Wilding 0.054 0.003 0 22.4 0 
Benbow 0.036 0.001 0.05 0.436 0 
Hulmes 0.036 0.001 0.025 0.413 0.001 
Bernasconi 0.018 0 0.019 0.382 0 
Blake 0.018 0 0.004 0.327 0 
Caccamo 0.018 0 0.007 0.304 0 
DavidsonJ 0.018 0 0.004 0.327 0 
Irwin 0.018 0 0.004 0.327 0 
McDougall 0.018 0 0.017 0.367 0 
Moore 0.018 0 0.017 0.367 0 
S8 0.018 0 0.017 0.367 0 
Smith 0.018 0 0.021 0.37 0 
Wrice 0.018 0 0.019 0.382 0 
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Appendix K: 1-Mode Centrality Measures 
Table K1: 1-Mode Centrality Measures Full 
  Degree 2local BonPwr ARD Closenes Eigenvec Between 
Jasper 26.00 296.00 4385.44 26.00 26.00 0.33 68.31 
M5 23.00 274.00 4038.31 24.50 29.00 0.30 43.27 
King 21.00 262.00 3947.63 23.50 31.00 0.30 23.00 
N1 18.00 247.00 3686.54 22.00 34.00 0.28 9.50 
F7 17.00 234.00 3512.28 21.50 35.00 0.26 8.15 
Dowding 15.00 219.00 3247.56 20.50 37.00 0.24 4.47 
O'Toole 14.00 189.00 2772.62 20.00 38.00 0.21 7.13 
Patison 14.00 188.00 2579.61 20.00 38.00 0.19 11.99 
DavidsonS 13.00 180.00 2438.49 19.50 39.00 0.18 8.71 
Kendall 12.00 187.00 2685.78 19.00 40.00 0.20 1.37 
Blake 11.00 175.00 2538.55 18.50 41.00 0.19 0.54 
DavidsonJ 11.00 176.00 2548.04 18.50 41.00 0.19 0.73 
Irwin 11.00 175.00 2538.55 18.50 41.00 0.19 0.54 
Smith 11.00 174.00 2511.52 18.50 41.00 0.19 0.63 
Bernasconi 10.00 163.00 2373.78 18.00 42.00 0.18 0.00 
Ehsman 10.00 167.00 2385.69 18.00 42.00 0.18 0.22 
Monk 10.00 151.00 2194.37 18.00 42.00 0.16 0.87 
Wrice 10.00 163.00 2373.78 18.00 42.00 0.18 0.00 
Benbow 8.00 107.00 1343.77 17.00 44.00 0.10 0.14 
Hill 8.00 107.00 1343.77 17.00 44.00 0.10 0.14 
Hulmes 8.00 129.00 1858.89 17.00 44.00 0.14 0.00 
Messenger 8.00 107.00 1343.77 17.00 44.00 0.10 0.14 
Peattie 8.00 107.00 1343.77 17.00 44.00 0.10 0.14 
Caccamo 7.00 85.00 1071.50 16.50 45.00 0.08 0.00 
McDougall 6.00 96.00 1281.42 16.00 46.00 0.10 0.00 
Moore 6.00 96.00 1281.42 16.00 46.00 0.10 0.00 
S8 6.00 96.00 1281.42 16.00 46.00 0.10 0.00 
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Appendix L: Network 1987-1990 2 Mode Centrality Measures 
Table L1: 87-90 Actor-to-Event 2 Mode Centrality Measures 
 Degree Eigenvect Closeness Betweenne Network Map 
 
 
 
Density 
Avg 
Dist Radius Diameter Fragment Transitiv 
Norm 
Dist 
0.389 2.691 3 6 0 0.759 0.546 
 
King 0.625 0.533 0.75 0.189 
M5 0.625 0.533 0.75 0.189 
Patison 0.625 0.299 0.667 0.445 
Dowding 0.500 0.445 0.667 0.098 
N1 0.375 0.331 0.632 0.057 
Peattie 0.375 0.065 0.400 0.013 
Kendall 0.125 0.116 0.444 0 
Monk 0.125 0.095 0.429 0 
O’Toole 0.125 0.088 0.429 0 
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Table L2: 87-90 Actor-to-Actor Centrality Measures 
  Degree 2local BonPwr 2Step ARD Closenes Eigenvec Between 2StepBet 
Patison 7 41 1298.815 8 7.5 9 0.349 3.4 3.4 
M5 7 42 1322.386 8 7.5 9 0.356 3.167 3.167 
Kendall 7 45 1409.832 8 7.5 9 0.379 0.567 0.567 
King 7 45 1409.832 8 7.5 9 0.379 0.567 0.567 
N1 7 45 1409.832 8 7.5 9 0.379 0.567 0.567 
O'Toole 6 39 1233.818 8 7 10 0.332 0.4 0.4 
Dowding 6 41 1266.154 8 7 10 0.341 0.167 0.167 
Monk 5 34 1059.03 8 6.5 11 0.285 0.167 0.167 
Peattie 2 14 410.573 8 5 14 0.11 0 0 
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Appendix M: Network 1991-1994 2 Mode Centrality Measures 
Table M1: 91-94 Actor-to-Event 2 Mode Centrality Measures and Network Map 
  Degree Eigenvect Closeness Betweenne Network Diagram: Actor-to-Event 
 
 
 
Density 
Avg 
Dist Radius Diameter Fragment Transitiv 
Norm 
Dist 
0.173 3.368 4 8 0.054 0.614 0.472 
King 0.533 0.563 0.731 0.321 
M5 0.467 0.492 0.679 0.215 
Patison 0.333 0.116 0.518 0.205 
F7 0.267 0.354 0.538 0.026 
Ehsman 0.200 0.282 0.500 0.007 
Hill 0.200 0.037 0.445 0.025 
Kendall 0.200 0.098 0.509 0.064 
Monk 0.200 0.176 0.548 0.021 
N1 0.200 0.162 0.559 0.150 
O'Toole 0.200 0.264 0.509 0.016 
DavidsonS 0.133 0.084 0.500 0.062 
Dowding 0.133 0.201 0.483 0.002 
Hulmes 0.133 0.094 0.500 0.008 
Bernasconi 0.067 0.072 0.460 0.000 
Blake 0.067 0.012 0.365 0.000 
DavidsonJ 0.067 0.012 0.365 0.000 
Irwin 0.067 0.012 0.365 0.000 
McDougall 0.067 0.063 0.425 0.000 
Messenger 0.067 0.005 0.324 0.000 
Moore 0.067 0.063 0.425 0.000 
Smith 0.067 0.099 0.438 0.000 
Wrice 0.067 0.072 0.460 0.000 
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*Kempnich and Wilding were omitted from the analysis as they are completely separate from the main network. They are visually represented in 
the network map only. 
Table M2: 91-94 Actor-to-Actor Centrality Measures 
  Degree 2local BonPwr 2Step ARD Closenes Eigenvec Between 2StepBet 
M5 20 198 3395.519 21 20.5 22 0.328 41.811 41.811 
King 18 192 3333.733 21 19.5 24 0.322 19.797 19.797 
N1 16 184 3187.459 21 18.5 26 0.308 8.797 8.797 
F7 15 175 3040.463 21 18 27 0.294 7.438 7.438 
Dowding 14 168 2910.551 21 17.5 28 0.282 5.325 5.325 
Irwin 11 139 2332.597 21 16 31 0.226 2.952 2.952 
O'Toole 11 130 2179.915 21 16 31 0.211 4.903 4.903 
Blake 10 132 2243.06 21 15.5 32 0.217 0.619 0.619 
DavidsonJ 10 133 2252.217 21 15.5 32 0.218 0.858 0.858 
Kendall 10 131 2180.636 21 15.5 32 0.211 0.861 0.861 
Patison 10 115 1880.538 21 15.5 32 0.182 7.222 7.222 
Wrice 10 131 2194.759 21 15.5 32 0.212 2 2 
Bernasconi 9 124 2105.221 21 15 33 0.204 0 0 
DavidsonS 9 109 1762.652 21 15 33 0.17 4.625 4.625 
Ehsman 9 122 2033.641 21 15 33 0.197 0.236 0.236 
Monk 9 106 1778.496 21 15 33 0.172 3.375 3.375 
Smith 9 122 2033.641 21 15 33 0.197 0.236 0.236 
Hulmes 8 73 1140.82 21 14 35 0.11 4.944 4.944 
McDougall 5 62 929.689 21 13 37 0.09 0.417 0.417 
Messenger 5 51 749.441 21 13 37 0.072 1.167 1.167 
Moore 5 62 929.689 21 13 37 0.09 0.417 0.417 
Hill 4 44 659.904 21 12.5 38 0.064 0 0 
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Appendix N: Network 1995-1998 2-Mode Centrality Measures 
Table N1: 95-98 Actor-to-Event 2 Mode Centrality Measures 
  Degree Closenes Eigenvec Between Network Map 
 
 
Density 
Avg 
Dist Radius Diameter Fragment Transitiv 
Norm 
Dist 
0.300 1.920 2.00 4.00 0.545 0.853 1.667 
Patison 0.67 0.44 0.96 2.33 
M5 0.33 0.11 0.00 2.33 
King 0.17 0.03 0.00 1.40 
Messenger 0.17 0.03 0.29 1.17 
O'Toole 0.17 0.03 0.00 1.40 
     
 
 
 
 
 
Network Cohesion 
Measures 
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Table N2: 95-98 Actor-to-Actor Centrality Measures 
  Degree BonPowr 2Step ARD Closenes Eigenvec Between 2StepBet 
M5 4.00 722.31 4.00 4.00 4.00 0.56 2.00 2.00 
King 3.00 606.99 4.00 3.50 5.00 0.47 0.50 0.50 
Patison 3.00 606.99 4.00 3.50 5.00 0.47 0.50 0.50 
Messenger 2.00 452.58 4.00 3.00 6.00 0.35 0.00 0.00 
O'Toole 2.00 452.58 4.00 3.00 6.00 0.35 0.00 0.00 
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Appendix O: Network 1999-2001 2-Mode Centrality Measures 
Table O1: 99-01 2 Mode Centrality Measures 
  Degree Eigenvec Closenes Betweenn Network Map 
 
 
 
 
Density 
Avg 
Dist Radius Diameter Fragment Transitiv 
Norm 
Dist 
0.313 2.302 1.00 6.00 0.125 0.693 0.781 
Jasper 0.82 0.63 0.93 0.39 
Patison 0.64 0.52 0.72 0.18 
M5 0.55 0.46 0.72 0.15 
Peattie 0.27 0.27 0.54 0.02 
DavidsonS 0.23 0.19 0.57 0.03 
Benbow 0.09 0.08 0.48 0.00 
Hill 0.09 0.03 0.46 0.06 
Messenger 0.09 0.08 0.47 0.00 
O'Toole 0.05 0.00 38.00 0.00 
 
Network Cohesion 
Measures 
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Table O2: 99-01 Actor-to-Actor Centrality Measures 
  Degree 2local BonPwr 2Step ARD Closenes Eigenvec Between 2StepBet 
Jasper 9.00 65.00 1673.57 9.00 9.00 9.00 0.35 4.14 4.14 
Benbow 8.00 64.00 1627.09 9.00 8.50 10.00 0.34 0.14 0.14 
DavidsonS 8.00 64.00 1627.09 9.00 8.50 10.00 0.34 0.14 0.14 
Hill 8.00 64.00 1627.09 9.00 8.50 10.00 0.34 0.14 0.14 
M5 8.00 59.00 1508.85 9.00 8.50 10.00 0.31 3.00 3.00 
Messenger 8.00 64.00 1627.09 9.00 8.50 10.00 0.34 0.14 0.14 
Patison 8.00 64.00 1627.09 9.00 8.50 10.00 0.34 0.14 0.14 
Peattie 8.00 64.00 1627.09 9.00 8.50 10.00 0.34 0.14 0.14 
Caccamo 7.00 57.00 1456.47 9.00 8.00 11.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 
O'Toole 2.00 17.00 405.36 9.00 5.50 16.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 
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